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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE PROBABILITY OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF BW AND CW IN THE EVENT OF ATTACKS UPON THE US
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
ubti*cd1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DISTRIBUTION (NIEffice ol the President National Securily Council NaUonal Security Resources Board Depariment of State Office of Secretary of Defenie Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of Uie Air Force Atomic Energy Cotnrnuulon Joint Chiefs of SUB Federal Bureau of In*esUgaUon Research and Development Board Munition! Board
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE PROBABILITY OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF BW AND CW IN THE EVENT OF ATTACKS UPON THE US
NIE-18
KproveCrclc-s3 through tho"iL RoVXCi- FROGRaH of
BE fi-3 S
This estimate has been prepared at the request of NSRB for guidance In civil defense planning and Is based onavailable on IShe intelligenceof the Departments oi Stale, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur In it.
! I
THE PROBABILITY OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF BW AND CW IN THE EVENT OF ATTACKS UPON THE US
HE PROBLEM
t thc request of NSRB, to estimate for the:
The capability of the USSR for biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) attacks upon the US, and
The probability that the USSR will employ BW or CW in the event of an attack upon the US.
APABILITIES FOR BW ATTACK ON THE US
BW Agents Available to USSR fob Attack OK THE US.
It is highly probable that the Soviets arc carrying on an extensive program to develop BW agents and equipment, and they appear to have given some attention to the possible use of BW agents for sabotage activities.
On thc basis of available information on Soviet interest and activities in BW, Soviet scientific and technical potential, and US experience inof BW. it is estimated that:
At present, the Soviets areofariety of agents in sufficient quantities for sabotage or small-scale
2 at the latest, theprobably will be capable of mass production of BW agents for large-scale
The Soviets would most likely develop and produce loragainst the United States one or more of the BW agents listed In App. A. Data
on the characteristics of the agents and possible targets are also included in App.abotage Attack.
W is well suited for sabotageagainst personnel,and crops,
Sabotage does not necessarily require the techniques and equipment prerequisite to large-scale military
Some biological agents canthemselves. Thc equipment necessary formany bacteria is usually available in any smallor can be improvisedln the average kitchen. Therefore, certain biological agents need not be Introduced Into the United StatesDetection of the minute initial quantity required Is
A trained bacteriologist could procure and culture effective BW agents locally. Hence, it would not be necessary to in-
DPOrtET
TOP ODORDT
biological materials Into the Unitedabotage employment ofweapons during periods of nominal peace Is facilitated by the resemblance of theof such sabotage2 The USSR Is considered to beof sabotage employment ofweapons against personnel, plants, and animals. Thc technical qualifications requiredaboteur arc not great, and it must be assumed that the Soviets have personnel who are technically qualified for BW
ossible methods of Introducing and disseminating biological weapons are almost limitless. The following are examples:
BW agents that withstandcould be smeared on cloth, leather,r perhaps under the postage stampetter. Agents which cannot persist In this form could be preserved in tubes small enough to beIn clothing, letters,igarette.
The Initial material need not be in the formulture.animals, birds, ormight be released to spread thc disease.
BW agents may be disguised as cosmetics In personal baggage.
Contain Inn ted letters may be sent directly lo the intended victims, without risk of
APABILITIES FOR CW
W Agents Available to USSR fob CW Attack on the US.
he lerm CW agents as used herein refers to those toxic chemical agents suitable for employment in mass quantities for conventional chemical warfare. These agents are to he con-
he contentsuartbottle introduced Into the air-conditioning systemarge office building couldinfection in the majority of the personnel,ours toays, depending on the agent.
ilitary Attack.
Two of thc principal aspects which govern the capability of the Soviet Union for military attack with BW agents are delivery to the target and dissemination on thc target.
During the, theUnion will be capable ofBW agents to the United States by long range aircraft or submarines. (The detailed discussion of theof delivery lnnwith CW is generally applicable also toowever, it isthat the quantities of BW agents required to support military attackarge scale will not be available to the Soviets2 (seebove).
There are Indications that thc Soviets are experimenting with variousfor disseminating BW agents. Although it is difficult to devisethat produce optimumevice that effectively spreads atmall portion of the BW filler can prove adequate. Therefore, it Is estimated that the SovieU can have adequate weapons forthe BW agents available lo them. These can include cluster bombs, aerosol devices, and
ATTACK ON THE US
trasted with the almost countless number of poisonous chemicalwhich are readily available from commercial sources in the United States for employment byagents for contaminating food and water supplies and forkey individuals.
It Is known that thc Soviet* have large stockpiles ol standard CW agents as well as the necessaryfacilities- However, It isimprobable that these agents would be employed In an attack on the US If the SovieU employ CW against the US, it Is believed that nerve gases will be used. Thc nerve gases are considerably more toxic than standard CW agents and the quantity required for comparableIs many times less.
At the close of the war. the Sovietsuantity of German GA nerve gas. In addition, the Soviets obtained the only German full-scale plant for thc production of OA. This plantated capacity0 tons per month. They also obtained the German pilot plant for theof GB nerve gasull-scale plant. The latter was partially completed and was toated capacityons per month. These production facilitiesumber of the German specialized personnel were removed to the Soviet Union. The available intelligence suggests that the Soviets have been producing at least one of the nerve gasesence. It Isthat:
At present, the Soviets probably have available sufficient nerve gasass lethal attackumber ol US cities.
hc Soviets will have available sufficient nerve gas for sustained extensive
Data on the characteristics of GA and OB nerve gases and possible targets are indicated in App. B.
There Is Insufficient informationSoviet CW research andtoefiniteof additional agents which may become availableowever, thc available intelligence pertaining to scientific competence and lo the
potential of the chemical Industry ln the Soviet Union necessitates thethat the Soviets havetechnical skill and capacity for developing and producing CW agents. Therefore,4 the Soviets may have available new agents inquantity for limited mass lethal attack on selected-military ortargets in the US. These agents could be several times more toxic than the present nerve gases andless quantity would befor comparable effectiveness.
aws-tack Attack.
n view of the small quantitiesG-series nerve gases are well suited for sabotage attack against personnel in key installations where immediate incapacitationigh percentage of the personnel IsHowever, the characteristic physiological effects of the nerve gases make their detection andas enemy action relatively easy. Therefore, the nerve gases are not suited for sabotage attack prioray.
he Soviet Union Is capable ofto smuggle nerve gas into the United States in the relatively small quantities required forattack.
Since the agents are odorless, colorless liquids, they can be transported In glass or suitably lined containers. Hence, thc agent could be shipped ln any desired quantity disguised as innocuous liquids, such as champagne or perfume.
As indicated in App B, nerve gas becomes an effectiveweapon when dispersedog or an Invisible vapor. For sabotage attack, this Is best accomplished by an aerosol bomb, such as those used for insecticides. Therefore, as an alternative to shipment of agents disguised as harmless
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the Soviets might choose to ship completedbombs. This could be done under the cover of diplomatic immunity or as aerosol bombs labeled as insecticides.
ittack.
uring the. theUnion will be capable of deliver-
ing CW agents to the United Slates by long range aircraft or submarines. This capability is discussed in detail in App. C.
t is considered that the Soviet Union has reasonably efficient means forthe dissemination of available CW agents.
ROBABILITY THAT THE USSR-WILL USE BW AND CW AGENTS IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES
thc event the Soviets attack thc Uniied States, they may well strike withsurprise and effectiveness in order to cripple our retaliatory forces, ourmobilization and communications centers, and specific critical Industries. To this end, they will undoubtedlyemployment of all the atomic,and chemical weapons available to them.*
Both sabotage and surprise military attack with atomic, biological andigh potential of effectiveness, particularly when employed concurrently with or Just prior to the initiationull-scale war. Many methods of delivery could be used prioray. However, detection and Identification as enemyofy delivery would cost the Soviets complete loss of slrategicOn the other hand, detection ofintroduction of atomic weapons Into key harbors is extremely difficult, as is the Identification of certain types of biological warfare. Nevertheless. It can be assumed that any attack with weapons of mass destruction upon the US would
* The USSR hu Die basic facilities available lor the producUonradiological warfare (RW)Large scale production of these materials will seriously compete with production of fissionable material for atomic bombs. It Is most Improbable that the Soviet effort will be diverted fromof atomic bombs. By comparison MUi BW and CWhe employment of RW agents foeattack is very disadvantageous, and their use In thisherefore Improbable.
be synchronized with Soviet over-all war plans and, with the possible exception of sabotage attack wllh BW agents, would be undertaken only after the Solvets had decided they were prepared to becomein full-scale war against the United States.
In an altack on the US. it is likely that the Soviets will employ their atomic bomb stockpile lo the fullest extent consistent with the over-all strategic situation. Based on present estimates of BW and CW potential, the problems of eftectlveand the fact that BW and the nerve gases are untried weapons, it isthat the Soviets would probablyarge scale military attack with BW or CW onlyupplement to their atomic capabilities. However, scientific and technological developments during the next few years may further Increase the decisive potential of these weapons.
The Soviet decision to employ UW or CW against the United States may beto some extent by their fear ofretaliation in kind by the United States and by their appraisal of ourcapabilities against both sabotage and military attack. Without attempting to evaluate the operational significance of our retaliatory and defensive capabilities, and In the absence of definite Indications of Soviet intentions to employ BW or CW, it Is estimated that:
abotage attacks with BW agents may be employed by the Soviets at
oiaonri'T
any time, even well in advance otday, aa part of on over-all plan to deter the military effectiveness of the US. This includes attacks against crops and livestockelatively long period of lime with theof producing significant economic losses.
Subsequentay, widespread sabotage attacks with BW agents may well be employed againstcrops, and livestock.
It Is unlikely that the Soviets willsabotage employment of CW agents prioray due to the ease of identification of such employment and the consequent loss of strategic surprise.
Coincident with overt militaryas well as subsequently,employment of CW agents may
possibly be employed against person-nel in key5 As BW agents become available to the Soviets in sufficient quantities,attack with BW may be cm-ployed to supplement AW and CWagainst population centers. Military attack against crops and livestock ls likely to' be limited to small-scale, isolated attacks with self-propagating agents which may have widespread0 Military attack with CW agents may be employed by the Soviets totheir atomic7 Unless there is significant increase in the decisiveness of BW and CW military employment of theseis more likely during that period when the Soviet atomic bombis relatively limited.
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W AGENTS
Characteristics.
t is estimated that the Soviets would most likely develop and produce loragainst the US one or more of the BW agents listed inhese agents have been selected on the basis of the following considerations:
The known characteristics ofmicro-organisms and their toxic products In the light of probable military
US experience in selection and development of BW agents.
Ease of production, stockpiling,and dissemination.
1usceptibility of US personnel, crops, and livestock and resulting probability of effectiveness.
I.IS Evidence of Soviet knowledge and Interest.
Among the micro-organisms and toxins that meet the broad requirementsW agent, effects vary widely. Some act rapidly, while othersong Incubation period. The results include temporary incapacitation, prolonged disabilityigh percentage ofIf the BW agent and method of dissemination are carefully chosen, naturally occurring disease may be simulated so closely that deliberateof BW cannot be proved.
If sabotage attack Is employed prior to the outbreak of open hostilities, thewould most likely use BW agents that produce diseases normallyto occur in the US. ForUS livestock is notoriouslyto foot and mouth disease and rinderpest. However, after openthe Soviets mighl use agents that would produce new or unusual Detection and identification
might be difficult and time-consuming and the problem of defense may not be solved with the identification of the agent
W Targets .
ersonnel Targets.
BW attacks upon populationwould probably be undertaken by large-scale contamination of the air or by contamination of the water supply. In addition tothe objective would be the psychological eflect and theresulting from overtaxing the medical facilities.
BW is well suited for sabotageagainst key personnel. The Pentagon has been provedto such attack In tests with simulated agents. Other critical installations, such as Strategic Air Command bases, are alsoto BW agents Introduced into air, water, or food supplies.employing chieflylabor would be less suitable targets than industriesonger period of training tospecial skills. Attacks upon key communications andfacilities would beinjurious.
Animal Targets. BW attack onwould be directed primarily at the food supply. Cattle could be attacked In shipping centers, stockyards, and other concentration areas. Hogs also are an important target; sheep and poultry would be somewhat less
Plant Targets. Food crops wouldrimary target, but attack might also be directed against crops that are thc source of important industrial oils or
textile fibres. Chemical growthbeing persistent for several months could be used to render the soil unsuitable for certain types of crops. If cereal rusts arc employed, local winds would be utilized to spread the
eferences. Additional data of possible value for civil defense planning isIn theiological Warfare. Presentation to the Secretary of Defense's Ad Hocittee on CEBAR by Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps,
Report of the Secretary of Defense's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare,
Reports on thc vulnerability of the Pentagon to attack by BW agents,by the Biological Department, Chemical Corps, Camp Detrick,Maryland:
Special Report
Special Report
Special Report,
Table I
BW AGENTS LIKELY TO BE USEDNST THE UNITED STATES BY THE USSH' A. ANT/-PERSONNEL AGENTS
AGENT
PRODUCED
Of
acre iu
anlhr ocit
day*
days in fatal
infeclivily; per-
not transin*-
man to man
tin of Cloth idium
under
days in fatal
typos toxic to
hours.
not transmissi-
His non-fa-
most powerful
known
species
days
onths
persistent;
transmissible man
man
imilit
mycosis
daya
weeks in acute
high!* per-
longer in
case*
loiio
poisoning
boure
over 24
not destroyed by
sabotage use
mallti
landers
day*
days In falsi
persistent
- monthi or
In chronic
VirUS
fever
weeks
Several weeks
contagious
pull*
days
days in fatal
persistent;
type high-
contagious
bwnttii
fever
more
days
ays
tulartntit
days
weeks
for several
not tranamlui-
ble to man
No priority is indicated by order of mention. Other disease* whose agents ar* less likely lo be used are: dysentery (baclltary and amebic) and Other enteric diseases, including cholera, typhoid, and paratyphoid; influenia; virusides; typhus.
ll dala refer to natural cases of theee diseases; presumably ihe characteristic of diseases induced by BW would bo much the same.
TOP ODOflDT
fl ANTI-ANIMAL AGENTS'
rthretii
A virus
Airus
Ait
rnoovceo
Anthra-
Foot end mouth
Fowl pi sgue Rinderpest
Cattle, eheep (almost alt mammala
Clo ten-hoofed[cattle, hogs. aeMgfl
Chickens, turkeys and other birds
Cattle, sheep; and goats HMi often
rmuoo
aysI daya
aya
iht rsrsb-itt, arc.
suallyt daya
2-JO; recovered animali ihow toaa of weight and
; usuallyays
Applied -et, in foodried spore dual; exlronw-ly persistent
Highly roaMUnt virus, per-Msj at rera] daya,disease highly
logical type. Fairly resistant
ease highly contagiouslagious;
ataya
Other diseases, .h* agents arc leas likely to be uxod, are: hog coolers; Newcastle disease, dlaeaaa produced by tho ioi.fi of StatbvbotrviVenezuelan equine cnrcphslomyclllii
C. ANT/CROP AGFXTS'
AC EMT
imcn
pronmi'iand olher species causing eal ruiU
Chemicalgrowth
disease attacking all small grains (wheat, rye, barley,evcre epiphytollri may reduce both winter and spring wheat crops by at
Complete or partial destruction ofcrop depending on quantity of agent used aad degree of coverage. Flaot reaction towdaya or weeks for total
spore dust, resistant to environmental conditions. Effective dissemination requires0 gram per acre
Synthetic organic compounds of considerableia relation to aOaeti on crops. One group of cocapouads (phonosy) primarily etToc-tira on broad leaf plssiUt: beats, cotton,nother group tcarbaraate)effective oo email grain cereals (wheat, rye, barley,road leaf plants can bo destroyed0 Ih of agent per acre, while cereal destruction wouldbs. per
tr,.
Otheragents are less likely to be used, are: late bl.glil of potatoes, golden nematode infestation of
TOP ODOIIDT
APPENDIX A AND GB NERVE GASES
GA and GB are colorless,low viscosity liquids, somewhatthan kerosene. They become ef-
* fective anti-personnel agentsapor or invisible fog. GB is approximately 2'A times more toxic than GA.
Required fob Effective
ilitary Attack.
ons of GB used in present munitions would betooncentrationethality, in an open area of one square mile, under favorable weather conditions as described in4 below.some 2Vi tunes more GA would be required for comparable effectiveness. However,of OA by munitions lo date does not approach this Ideal andoimes more GA than GB may be neededethality.
The quantities of GA and GBon the targetilitary attack may well be sub-lethal. However, even with as little0 of the lethal quantity,incapacitation andcan be obtained.
Inasmuch as the nerve gases are anti-personnel weapons they would be employed against population centers and military andinstallations where theis primarily Incapacitation of personnel as contrasted with physical destruction. However, CW may also be employed toAW and high explosives.
Effective dissemination of GA and GB against the foregoing targets requires the following conditions.
Low or medium wind
Shallow layer of cool aira warm layer.
Openings in the buildings through which outside air can penetrate, such asor air conditioningducts (openings can be obtained by employing high explosive munitionswith CW agents).
he atmospheric conditionspresent on many cloudy days and at times when inversion is present arc suitableasNight conditions in times of fair weather arc generally more favorableW attack than day conditions. Sunny, hot days In summer time with little or no wind are unsuitable and the use of toxic agent clouds at these times would be inefficient.
abotage Attack.
hen effectively disseminatedonfined apaceubic feet, about one ounce of OA or about one-half ounce of GB are sufficient to incapacitate or kill substantially all of the people in the area. The mostmethod of dissemination would be by means of an aerosol bomb type container similar to those used for Insecticides. These bombs operate with an auxiliary volatile liquid, which together with the weight of the container would make the weight of the dispenser about five times the weight of the agent; that is,ubic feet the dispenser would weigh about V* pound.
top
top ononnT
In Uie case ol thc Pentagon, which0 cubic feet ofspace,bs of OA orbs of QB would have to be dispersed throughout the building to cause the above results, assuming no significant extraction by the air conditioning system. This wouldound bombs ofallon capacity for GA. Fewer bombs or smaller ones in the rationiould be needed for GB.
ffects Produced and Protective
GA and GB produce characteristic physiological effects, such as,of the pupil of the eye, twitching eyelids, tightness of the chest, difficulty in breathing, blurring of vision,of muscles, headache, nausea,salivation and diarrhea. In the caseethal dose, the victim loses muscular power and coordination. In addition to Intensification of theeffects, convulsions occur and there ts involuntary defecation and urination; distressed breathing;unconsciousness; heart slowing, dilating and eventually stopping due to heart muscle failure and asphyxia. In general, death occurs within an hour after exposure to thc lethal
The physiological effects are greatest when absorbed through the respiratory system following inhalation of theHowever, the same effects can be produced by larger doses through mucous membranes, open wounds, and evenmall drop of the liquidthe skin. The liquid will penetrate ordinary clothing.
Theoretically, complete protection against the nerve gases requires not
ell fitted gas mask but also special impermeable clothing.except in the Immediate vicinity of bursts, the concentrations which probably will be encountered will be such that gas masks will provideprotection for allew of the personnel in the target area. On the olher hand, at present there is no quick method of detection of GA and GB for warning and identification.
GA and GB are easily decomposed by any acid and they hydrolyzc veryin alkaline solutions. Effectivecan be carried out with alcohol solutions of sodium andhydroxide, and solutions or pastes of washing soda, lime bleach, andsoda. Even scrubbing with soap and water Is effectiveegree.
Immediate injection of atropine iseffective in counteracting the physiological effects of these gases.
eferences,
Additional information which may be of assistance to civil defense planning will be found in the following:
Presentation to the Secretary ofAd Hoc Committee on CEBARubmitted by Office of Chief, Chemical Corps.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on BW, CW, and RW (Stephensonto the Secretary of Defense,
Summary Technical Report of NDRC DivisionolumeI andolume I, Part II.
Chemical and Toxicologic Data on CW Agents by E. L. Wardell and C. A. Rou-iller, Information Branch, Technical Service Division, Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps,
l;'fj i'i^f
APPENDIX C
CAPABILITY OF THE USSR TO DELIVER CW AGENTSILITARY ATTACK AGAINST THE US
The Soviet Union has theof attempting the delivery of CW agents to the United States by long range air attack or from submarines ln coastal waters opposite key US ports.
Long Ranck Aircraft. The Soviet Union has and will have sufficient long rangetrained crews, and bases of operation to enable it to attempt to deliver sizeable CW attacks against targets In the US.
It is estimated that the Soviet Union will not be able to employ heavyon conventional two-way missions against the entire United Stateshen available, these aircraft could deliver approximately four to six tons of CW agents, depending upon the length of the intercontinental mission assigned.
Priorhe USSR can useircraft to attack the northwest US (Stale of Washington) on two-wayHowever, with refuelingand/or one-way missions,can be attempted against all vital targets In thc US. While there is no evidence that the Soviet Union hasa refueling technique, USindicates there are nodifficulties involved. Employment of single point refueling would increase the combat radius of theauticaler centheour-cnglncd, medium bomber comparable to thehis aircraft wouldayload of approximately five ib) tons in bombs with an estimated three tons of nerve gas filler.
t is estimated that Soviet Long Range Air Force hasircraft. This number of TU-4's will increase to any mid-
yhe Soviet Union can employ orumber of TU-4's to attempt CW attacks against the US without reducing Its capability to deliver its available stockpile of atomicorld War II operations of the Soviet bomber units were handicapped by poor navigation and by lack of skill inand high altitude flying. It is known that units of the Long Range Air Force are undergoing concentrated and progressive training to overcome these World War II weaknesses and to increase their capabilities for long range attack. The average Sovietbomber crew is still considered to be less skilled than the average US four-engined bomber crew. However, because of the large amount of target, weather, and US defenseavailable to the Soviet Union,interception, attacking Sovietshould be capable of locating and accurately identifying selected targets. Should local conditions require the dropping of bombs by other than visual means, efficiency of bomb placement may be adversely affected.
uided Missilrs.
It is estimated the Soviet Union will not be capable of delivery of CW agents against targets In the US using long range, intercontinental,guided missiles
The useype missiles in air-to-surface missions tn conjunction with medium and heavy bombers Isfeasible, but would probably produce less accurate attack, lessdissemination,ecrease In the quantity of agent delivered by each aircraft.
ype missUes with CW warheads could be employed against coastal cities by limited numbers of submarines (or disguised surfacemmediately following.)
ttackr faced Submarines. The Soviet Union Ls capable of employing long and medium range submarines to deliver CW agents against key cities on the East and West coast of the Uniled States.the attacks would be of comparatively small scale and harassing in nature.
he Soviet Union will have anong range submarines andedium range submarines from which to draw for such attack.his fleet will increase toong range submarines andedium range submarines. The medium range submarines wouldmid-ocean refueling, but thisno Insurmountable limitation.
Ali cf these submarines, except approxi-mately twenty of tlie latest high speed, long range type, could launch briefusing the medium caliber, deck gun to fire shells with CW agent filler. They could surface and hastily fire, for example,pound projectiles"achabout six pounds of agent, from probable rangesards.
However, it Is considered likely that lnmall scale attack, conventional high explosive ammunition wouldas much. If not more, panic and damage.
Similarly, these submarines can be modified easily to surface and deliver within fifteen to thirty minutes, from rangesards, up toounds of agent using two or four deck-mounted heavy0m) or multiple, rail type, barrage rocket launchers andrm rockets. It ls considered such an attack would be effective only If confinedarget arem of less than one-quarterquare mUe.
A portion of these submarines could be equipped toype,missiles from probable ranges ofiles. With deckubmarine could carry two toype missiles, or with extensive design changes, eight to twelve missiles could be carried. At comparatively short ranges each missile could deliver approximately one ton of nerve gas and produce lethal resultsarget area of one-quarter to one-halfquare mile. Itubmarine would have to be surfaced fororaunched.
Original document.
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