COPT HO. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.ONE
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET BLOC FORCES TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO
6 Published1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET BLOC FORCES TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO
Uh Li !ilu Ji-tiL B
.'cGlligence igsss;/.
SE-16
Published1
This estimate was prepared for the guidance of the United States Deputy Representative to thc Standing Group,Committee, North Atlantic Council.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffin thc preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimatectober.
top aeetcBi
THE STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET BLOC FORCES TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the strength and capabilities of Soviet Bloc forces to conduct military operations against NATO during the, including the capacity of the Soviet Bloc to maintain and Increase these forces after the outbreak of war.
ANALYSIS
See thc Enclosure.
CONCLUSIONS
USSR has at present and will probably have throughmilitary strength of such magnitude as to pose aserious threat lo the security of the NATO powers,in view of the aggressive nature of Soviet objectives and
economically, and militarily the Soviet Blocofajor war. Its over-all strengthpotential should increase considerably by
a. Despite continued political tensions within the Soviet Bloc, both the Soviet population and the European Satellites are under firm Kremlin control. In the event of war various Internal tensions will tend to become more acute, but they probably will not become serious enough toajor obstacle to Soviet ability toajor war effort until
the latent disruptive elements within the Soviet Bloceasonable expectation and hope of the ultimate victory of the anti-Soviet forces. The potential of such disruptive elements will probably increase substantially and at an accelerated pace if and as the Soviet Bloc suffers damaging internal reverses.
Soviet economy is alreadyigh state ofand its productive capacity is such as toUSSR toajor war effort. In the eventthe Soviet economy, unless crippledtrategiccouldubstantial Increase in war
over-all conventional military strength in beingSoviet orbit is the greatest in the world today. Whilestrength of the Soviet Bloc forces shouldmoderately throughhe completion ofshould materially improve their mobilizationand combat effectiveness. Soviet atomic capabilities,substantial, should also materially increase.
n view of the high state of war-readiness of the Sovietand armed forces, the USSR is at present capable ofhostilities against the NATO powers with little or no warning. It now has the capability of simultaneouslyeries of land campaigns against Western Europe and the Middle East, as well as air and submarine attacks against the UK, the US and Canada, and NATO sea communications. Byrowing Soviet military and economic strength, particularly in atomic weapons, should materially enhance Soviet ability to conduct these operations.
I'CO CCCIUIT
ENC LOSURE
L SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES
The ultimate Soviet objective is toommunist world order dominated by the USSR. Soviet leaders have clearly shown that they consider themselves engaged in an unceasing andstruggle wiih the non-Communist countries and that they regard this struggle astate of war in which any tactic or weapon that promises to weaken and destroy the enemy ts admissible.
The principal immediate aim of Soviel policy In Europe is to obstruct thc further growth of Western strength and unity. The Soviet Union ts seeking specifically to divide the Western Powers, to frustrate their rearmament plans, toest German military contribution to Western defense.
In pursuit of these objectives it appears likely that the USSR will continue Its present aggressive policy of political andwarfare. In fact, the USSR has already intensified Its pressures In Europe, particularly In seeking to forestall West German rearmament and to undermine popular support of NATO defense programs. The continued growth of NATO strength,might lead the USSR toew approach:
a. On the one hand, the USSR might seek to promote arelaxation of international tensions. This approach would simplyactical shiftifferent method of political and psychological warfare, designed to lull the Westalse sense of security and undermine growing NATO strength.
iT.CitliT
b. On thc other hand, there will continue toeriousthat the USSR in pursuit of Us objectives mightgeneral war. In view of thc aggressive nature of Soviet policy, the high state of Soviet war-preparedness, and the present Soviet superiority In conventional military strength, the danger of Soviet military aggression will remainacute until the NATO powers achieve an adequateof strength.
II. POLITICAL FACTORS
In contrast to the NATO coalition, the USSR occupies aadvantageous position for conducting Us foreign policy. Theperates on the premiseermanent conflict with thc non-Sovietan act "correctly- on the governmental level while its world Communist network undertakes aggressivean act quickly, secretly, and arbitrarily withoutto the opinions of legislatures, special interest groups, domestic public opinion, or Usan use Communist ideology as an ostensibly moral cover for Us own aggressive actions andagnet for attracting local and foreignan conduct Us propagandaingle voice;an largely frustrate by Us own security measures any counter-moves directed at the Soviet people.
Despite the tensions peculiar to the USSR, as well as those inherent in any totalitarian state, the internal position of thc Soviet Government Is probably more secure at present than al any time There are no indications of any actual or potential dissension within leading Soviet circles sufficient to weaken the Party's position, nor are there signs of either theor capability of the Soviet armed forces to challenge the Party's supremacy. Although living standards and police-slate controls continue to produce dissatisfaction and lassitude on the part of large segments of the population, there is no evidence of
TOP OL'CUUT
any organized opposition groups capable of threatening thecontrol. While Stalin's death might present seriousthe present situation in tho Politburo appearsajor split than at the time of the death of Lenin.
Despite continuing tensions within the Soviet bloc, Communist control seems assured in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and Communist China. The only appreciable likelihood of serious internal strains would be in Communist China, If itembroiled in hostilities in thc Far East. While chronic difficulties will persist in the Sovielization of the Europeanthey will probably be still held under firm Soviet control. Domestic dissatisfaction with the deprivations created by the forced pace of Industrialization, agrarian collectivization, and rearmament will continue in the Soviet orbit, but will nota serious threat to Soviet control.
esult of Its world network of Communist Parties and front organizations the USSR has the advantage of an organized center of opposition in most foreign countries. These groupslocal machinery for attracting non-Communist support, shaping public opinion, bringing pressure on local governments, and, by infiltration of strategic trade unions, disrupting the local economy. At present these groups are concentrating, together with the USSR,oncerted drive to destroy the local will to fight by seeking to convince Weslern public opinion that support
of Western defense plans will lead to severe economic hardships and eventually to war.
the event of war various internal tensions will tend tomore acute, but they probably will not becometoajor obstacle to Soviet ability to sustainwar effort untU the latent disruptive elements withinBloceasonable expectation and hope of thevictory of the anti-Soviel forces. The potential ofelements will probably increase substantially andaccelerated pace if and as thc Soviet Bloc suffersreverses.
III. ECONOMIC FACTORS
trategic Significance of the Soviet Bloc Economy-Summary
Soviet economy is alreadyigh state ofand it is estimated that its productiveevel and ofharacter as to enableajor warontinued large-scaleand stockpiling during the next two yearsincrease Soviet economic war-readiness. Therethat during recent years high priority hasto the development and production of new andmilitary items. Moreover there has beenthroughout the entire economy oncapabilities through technological advances andquality. Increased industrialization in theand thetr further integration into the Sovietwill also contribute to Soviet war potential.
certain sectors of the Soviet economyvulnerable to air attack and willespite Soviet efforts to improvedefenses, to continue dispersion of facilities and toa more complete system of reserve stocks.
economic deficiencies will still persist withinBloc, particularly in such itemstypes of aviation fuels, some chemical items,merchant shipping, some types of machineryand precision instruments, certain nonferrous metals
This statement does not consider the effects of air attack. The vulnerability of the economy to such attack isin paragraphelow.
and ferro-alloys, natural rubber, transportationide variety of replacement parts and equipment components.eneral war of long duration these deficiencies wouldIncreasingly important, although they would probably not deter the Soviets from becoming involvedeneral war.
trategic Industrialost of the heavyof the USSR are fair.ly well developed and are fully cabable of supplying the requirements of the Soviet military machine. Estimated production of four basic industries2 is shown below.
USSR Satellites!/
Steel (thousands of metric
Coal (thousands of metric
Crude Oil (thousands of metric
Electric Powers (millions of
Industrial production is generally sufficient toajor war effort, although in certain areas stringencies woulddevelop. Of these, the two most important woulde petroleum and electronics.
* The discussion in paragraphshroughoes not consider the effects of air attack unless It is specifically referred to.
astern European Satellites, including the SovZone of Germany.
n hard coal equivalents.
3/The maximum probably figure.
Petroleum. Petroleum production and stocks are generally adequateeasonable rate of peacetime development and for at least the initial Soviet military campaigns. There may be some question with respect to the adequacy of some types of high octane aviation gasolineowever,3roduction facilities and the increased use of jet aircraft would probably eliminate any such deficiency.
Electronics. It is estimated that the Soviet Bloc is capable of producing conventional electronics items, Includingand radar, in sufficient quantity to meet essential Soviet military needs. However, the capacity of this industry isnot adequate to supply expendable military electronics itemscale which would permit widespread utilization in large quantities.
Other Industries. The Soviet Bloc has shown additional weaknesses in the production of certain special quality metal products, certain chemicals, special types of machinery and equipment, precision instrumentside variety ofparts and equipment components. Of considerable importance is the Soviet Bloc's very limited merchantcapacity.
Production of Selected Military Items. The munitions industry, although concentrated in Western USSR and the Urals, consistsarge number of plants scattered throughout these regions.
a. Aircraftroduction of aircraft by the Soviet Union0 is estimated at more, of whichtwo-thirds were combat aircraft. Currentare1 production will be considerably higher0 with increased concentration on combat types. Soviet production facilities have the capability of increasing
this figure inasmuch as adequate supplies of materials,aluminum, are available. The potential total capability to produce is estimated0 all types, which could be reached at the endwenty-four month period with existing plant facilities producing present models.
VehiclesIt is estimatedere trucks) were produced by2 production will be atre expected to produce more0
Combat VehiclesThe estimated rate0anks and self-propelled gunsdesired, be increased within one year to rate The peak Soviet production rate ofvehicles during World War II0 perthe Satellites, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Eastat present the capacity to produce componentsquantities of armored fighting vehicles.
The Soviet Union is not buildingof ocean-going merchant ships ofRTis estimated that its annual output of such vessels0 GRT. The combined output of theestimated00 GRT per year.
Except in the Far East, construction of naval vessels was held up by the war, and it was not until9 or0 that shipyard damage had been fully repaired and capacity production resumed. Yards are now becoming available for the construction of postwar ships. Capacity for building submarines has increased since the war and willto increase during the. .
Materials. On the whole, the Soviet Blocsupplies of nearly all the natural resources requiredan advanced industrial economy. Dependence onin relation to total consumption of most commoditiessmall in peacetime. Deficiencies in some items such
1 as copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, nickel, antimony, tin, cobalt, industrial diamonds, sulphur, pyrites, and natural rubber wouldareful allocation of these resources by the Soviets in wartime.ong war of attrition and destruction thesemight have an important effect on some lines ofThe position of the Soviet Bloc in raw materials is expected to improve, however, with the increased exploitation of raw material sources, such as tin, tungsten, and antimony in China, with continued imports and stock building of natural rubber, industrial diamonds, and other Items which are obtained from Western sources.
and Labor. The labor supply for theof the Soviet Bloc will be Increased by transferspreponderantly agricultural labor forces and byof women. Trained personnel,"although growingwill continue to be short relative to industrialThis will have its effects on the economy, but thewill give emphasis in placement and training to theand critical areas. Government control over thewill be greater. Efficiency of labor andls expected to increaseesulttraining at various levels and experience acquiredentrants into the labor force. On the whole, themanagement and labor tooviet Bloc militarytheill be greater than It was in this area
-
TOP UECnHT
Production. Although some difficulties appear
to have developed in Soviet agricultureesult of the program for the merger of collectives, these seem to have been overcome by the government's easing up in the prosecution of the program. The agricultural situation in the USSR is therefore expected to remain stable with production generally adequate to meeteither in war or peace, and with some improvement in the livestock and industrial crop situation. In the Satellites, recent tensions in the agricultural sphere wilt probably continue, but unless exacerbatedapid increase in the rate ofthey should not present an insuperable problem to the regime. For thc Soviet Blochole, if harvests are normal production should be sufficient to meet present rates of rationed consumption, including continued stockpiling.
The communications network ofBloc is capable of meeting at least the basicrequirements. Land line sysiems serving most ofEuropean USSR and the European Satellites areby radio services of reasonable efficiency. Theof the Urals are generally dependent on radiomilitary requirements of modern war would probably demand
a more extensive utilization of radio communication throughout the whole country. The strain which might be imposed on Soviet radio transmission under such conditions might well be great; however, the system is probably designed, at least in large part, to meet such an emergency and cannot be expected to break down.
Although inferior by US standards, thctransportation system, in which railways occupy by farimportant position, probably has the capacity, afternon-essential traffic, to meet military and civiliana major war. The greatest transport potential lies in thecapacity of the East-West lines in Europe. One of thepoints in the Soviet economic and logistical positionthe dependence on the Trans-Siberian railroad for support ofEastern provinces; however, this weakness has beenby stockpiling.
-
The difference In gauge between the Soviet and Satellite rail systems necessitates the transloading of all freight to standard gauge at or near the borders of the Soviet Union.oints, several of which are extensive in nature, retard through freight movements, but their capacity is adequate to handle Soviet logistic requirements. Despite the foregoing limitations, the Soviet rail system Is probably better equipped toajor war effort than it was
Ability to Increase Production in the Event of War. If war were to break out in thehe economy, in the absence of destruction from military action, could support an Increase in military production. Reserve capacity in theindustry could be utilized and plants such as those*currently producing tractors could be converted to military production. Materials, transportation, and labor would be carefully allocated to the highest priority producer and in the early phases of the war would not create critical deficiencies.ar lasting more than two years certain items in tight supply would probably begin to weaken or limit certain phases of the military effort.
Vulnerability to Air Attack. The close balance betweenand requirements in many items of importance to the Soviet Bloc economy, together with the vulnerability of many segments of the economy to air attack, would represent the principal weakness in any effort to strengthen the economy of the Soviet Bloc under wartime conditions. The concentrations of plants in areasto Allied bombers and the extreme difficulty of replacing or reconstructing such plants makes certain industries highlyto air attacks. Such attacks coulderiousin the supply of vital services and commodities; however, substantial stocks of these commodities and of military end items, which are widely dispersed, might prevent the full effects of such losses from being felt at the front during the early phases of the conflict.*
Thc question of the ability of the Soviet Bloc to benefit from the economies of any areas it might overrun is not considered in this paper.
-
ulnerability of the Economy to Economic Warfare. Under wartime conditions the Western program of economic warfare would be much more effective than it is now. Not only would thereuch tighter and more complete system of export control but additional measures would be employed including: preclusive buying, black listing, foreign funds control, denial of shipping facilities and sabotage. The Soviet Bloc would attempt to reduce the effects ofrogram by adjustments within thc economy but there wouldefinite limit on their ability to reduce these effects; andong war, with the inevitableand destruction, some lines of military production would be seriously affected.
-
IV. PRESENT AND PROJECTED MILITARY STRENGTH
It is estimated that the present Soviet Bloc (less North Korea) armed forcesotal strength of. Assuming that no war occurs,4 total strength of the armed forces of the Soviet Bloc is estimated at about seven and one-half million.
For some time the USSR has been systematically strengthening its own and Satellite forces in Eastern Europe to maintain its relative advantage over growing Western strength. The highly mechanized Soviet group of armies in Eastern Germany is being maintained in an advanced state of combat-readiness and is being supplied with the most modern equipment. Soviet and some Satellite air units are being rapidly re-equipped with jet aircraft and an airfield expansion program is well under way.
Ground Forces. The present ground forces of the Soviet Bloc (less North Korea) have an estimated total personnel strength, organized tooviet,uropean Satellite,hinese Communist line divisions. Assuming that no war occurs, it is estimated that the strength and number of Soviet divisions will remain at approximately the present levelut that the armament, mobility, and capability of these forces for sustained combat will haveignificant increase in capabilities of the European Satellite forces has occurred0 and4 the presentivisions will have increased. In addition to this numerical growth, it
is estimated that the capabilities of the European Satellites will have increasedoint where they would possess significant offensive capabilities, without support of Soviet tactical forces, although sustained combat would require major Soviet logistical support.
Forces. The Soviel Navyeagoing combatant surface units
-
top nncnuT
submarines. It is estimated that4 the Soviet Navy will have increased toeagoing combatant surface units andperational submarines. The Naval forces of the Soviet European Satellites have not been considered in this report since they are small and made up of minor combatant types and miscellaneous lesser craft, suitable for local defensive operations only. No significant change is expected in this regard
Air Forces. The Soviet Air Forces, including Naval Air, comprise antrength0 aircraft. Together with European Satellite Air Forces, estimatedssigned and potentially operational aircraft, and the Chinese Communist Air Force, estimatedircraft, the Soviet Air Blocombined estimated strength0 aircraft. It is estimated that4 the personnel strength of the Soviet Air Forces will have been increased. While the number of aircraft In units is not expected to be increased, It is expected that virtually all thc fighter strengthonsiderable proportion of the light and medium bombers will be jet-engined types and that combat efficiency will be significantly increased. Increases in the effectiveness of the Satellite Air Forces is expected with the introduction of jet-powered aircraft.
Status of Supply. It is estimated that the Soviet Army at present has sufficient stockpiled weapons, ammunitions, supplies and equipmentorceivisions in combat in Europe and Asia for one year, independently of current production. There are adequate supplies of oil, food,o service the Soviet Baltic, Northern and Black Sea fleets. The aircraft industry and associated industries are providing the Soviet Air Forcesteady supply of new and modern aircraft and equipment. This supply will probably be large enough to allow the maintenancearge war reserve.4 the over-all status of supply of the Soviet armed forces will have improved.
-
TOP MXUDT
top.
V. MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL
armed forces of thc Soviet Unionotalmendditional trained reserves.an0 reserves who have receivedtraining. The major problem of mobilization willallocation of technicians and individuals withamong the three military services and the wararmed forces of the European Satellitesotal
ofen withdditional reserves of varying degrees of training.
Forces. It is estimated that the Soviet Armyof expandingersonnel strengthine divisions0 days orWhile the European Satellites could mobilize
a substantial portion ofan reserve, their ability to equip ground force units will be the limiting factor. The availability of equipment from either Soviet or indigenous sources cannot be estimated at this time.
Naval Forces. Assuming that the personnel strength of the Soviet Navy at thc beginning of mobilization remainsthe same as at the present, lt is estimated that the Soviet Navy can mobilize0 daystrengthen. Since the Soviet Navy does notajor reserve fleet, but maintains ils fleets in operational readiness, the mobilization of the Navy would notajor problem.
Air Forces. It is estimated that the personnel strength of Soviet Air Forces,, wiil have increased toyt is believed that the Soviets couldotal strengthn all components of military aviation, including naval, shortlyay. It is estimated that0 men are assigned
-
to the European Satellite Air Forces. Their mobilization potential depends in considerable measure on the degree of dependability of the reserve personnel, and it is not possible to determine what number might be considered reliable by the Soviets.
-
TOP SECRET
VI. MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE EVENT OF WAR
lie Soviet Bloc forces, possessing the advantageoncentration of force on Interior lines and potentially exercising the initiative, are so disposed, organized, and equipped that they possess the capability of initiating hostilities with little or no prior warning. It is estimated that thc Soviet Union has sufficient armed forces to undertake ail of the operations listed below and still retain an adequate reserve.
a. Simultaneously:
A campaign against Western Europe including Italy,ine divisions and upactical aircraft.
An aerial bombardment against the British Isles, with initially upediumight bombersighters.
Campaign in the Balkans to include European Turkey,ine divisions and upactical aircraft.
Campaigns against the Near and Middle East with aboutine divisionsactical aircraft.
Campaigns in the Far East, employing up toine divisionsactical aircraft against Japan and Korea.
Attacks against Canada and the United States, including Alaska and the Aleutians. Attacks could include mining, amphibious and airborne operations within range limitations, and aerial attack (conventional and atomic) against Canada and most of the United States.
-TOP KliURIiT-
TOP CECli.LT
A sea and air offensive against Allied seaemploying submarine and mining attack.
Subversive activities and sabotage againstnterest in all parts of thc world.
Defense of the Soviet Union against hostile attack.
successful in the occupation of the Channel Portfull-scale sea and air offensive against the Britishan attempted invasion.
successful in overruning the intermediate areas,launch campaigns against Scandinavia and theas well as air attacks against other areasWestern defense as necessary.
-
TOP L'BCnET
VII. ATOMIC WEAPONS
lthough the Soviet atomic stockpile will continue to increasehe disparity in numbers between current US and Soviet atomic bomb stocks will not be reduced.
he Soviet Union has and will have sufficient aircraft, trained crews, and bases of operation to warrant an attempt to deliver in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the full stockpile of atomic bombs that are now and will become available. The Soviet Union has Uie capability for clandestine atomic explosions in ports and in selected inland areas, and may be able to launch guided missiles with atomic warheads from submarines within the period under consideration.
-
VIII. SUMMARY OF FIGHTING EFFECTIVENESS
he Soviel Army is the most powerful and effective ground combat force in being in the world today, and the Europeanforces patterned on the Soviets are being build up rapidly and will be fully combat ready by the endhc Soviet Air Forces in being are the world's largest and are making rapid progress in re-equipment with modern aircraft and the buildingtrategic air arm. Their training is far advanced and their tactical and fighter defense units are currently disposed for the effective carrying out of their assigned missions. The capabilities of tlic Satellite Air Forces have been increased through Soviet-sponsored re-equipment and training programs, apparently with the ultimate goal of becoming effective as independent combat forces. The principal strength of the Soviet Navy liesarge and powerful submarine force coupledonsiderable number of ships of all types up to and including cruisers. The present Naval constructionwillrogressive increase in the strength and capabilities of the Soviet Navy.
-
4frSrffiS-9ftf-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: