DISSEMINATION NOTICE
copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of theon the front cover and of individuals under the Jurisdiction of thewho requite the Information lor the performance of their official duties.elsewhere in the department to other offices which require thefor the pcrtorrriance of official duties may be authorised by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for theof State
ssistant Chief of, for the Department of the Army
of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the AirDirector of Intelligence. AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for anyor Agency
copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency bywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA
DISTRIBUTION (NIKffice of the PresidentBecuiitr Council National Security Resources Boardtate Omce of Secretary of Defease DtparuitM of tie Ann* Department of the Hit; Department of the Atr Pore* Atuule EarrgT Cemmluuon joint Chiefs of BUS Federal Bureau of Investigation Research and Devrtopmrnt Board MunlUons Board
8 EC B.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE BRITISH POSITION IN EGYPT
The Intelligence orgenlrattons of thef State, the Army, the Nary, the Atr Force, and the Joint SUA participated tn the preparation of tht* estimate. Allof the Intelligence Advisory Cornmillee concurred in this estimate onctober.
T
THE BRITISH POSITION IN EGYPT
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strategic significance of possible changes In the British position In Egypt and the Sudan.
CONCIUSIONS
present British base in Egypt Is extremelv inipo.Uiil to Western defense of the Middle East and of the Suez Canal, and the West could not adequatelyfor its loss by the development of other bases in the area
Continued Western control of this base is jeopardized by mounting Egyptian
S
rcssure for the withdrawal of British Drees and for Egyptian control of the Sudan. This pressure has now resulted in Egyptian steps to denounce theAgreements9 and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
nless the Egyptians can be induced to negotiate further, it is probable that Egypt will initiate political action to secure the removal of British troops and adopt administrative and economicdesigned to make the position of the British forces untenable.
4itter struggle might develop in which the British would face an eventual choice betweenhe base and (b) openly defying Egyptian efforts to expel them In the latter case serious civil disorders might break out. the consequences of whichnow be foreseen. In eitherrotracted dispute between the British and Egyptians would probably resulteterioration of Western relations with the Arab world.
5 It is possibleettlement of the base problem might be achieved by meansultilateral arrangementwhich the base would be turned overiddle East defense organization of which Egyptull member.
However, in view of the tact that evenultilateral defenseBritish troops would probably have toignificant part of theforce in Egypt, there is grave doubtatisfactory compromise of the base issue can be reached unless, at the least, substantial concessions are made to the Egyptians on the Sudan Issue. The Egyptians will make every effort to link the two issues because they realize that their bargaining position on the Sudan is weak.
Failing agreement, the British have the capability of maintaining theirposition In the Suez base. The UK could be expected to refrain from major military action except in case of extreme provocation in either the base area proper or the Canal area in general.
DISCUSSION
Significance of British Basel In Egypt
8 The present crisis inis of particular lrnporta nee to the US and the West because it involves the keystone of Western defense capabilities In thethe maintenancease In the Sue/ Carta? area for theand support of defending forces for the Middle Eastern area. Moreover, legardlcss of therotracted Anglo-Egyptianwill probably affect adversely theof the Werernto otherEastern countries
existing base Is of unique value forreasons It is sufficientlythe 8ovlct orbit to be reasonablySoviet surprise attack. It Is sothat it could be readily reinforced toan overland campaign. At the samecan support Ung-range bombers capablekey areas In the USSR It is soas to provide protection for thecommunication* centering on theIt is supportedartiallyarea with adequate internal(Including ports and airfields),large, if not highly-skilled, laborits facilities and stores arcand are even now capablemilitary operations. Theseand stores arc easily expandable
the Egyptians gained control ofit would almost certainlyEven 'n the unlikelythatadequately maintained. Westernnot be able to establishwithout considerable loss of time.
It No other bases In the Middle East-Eastern Mediterranean area, either Individually orcould compensate for the loss by the West of control of this base, even if such other bases were further developed. Furthermore, It is questionable whether the UK would be prepared or able to assume the expense and face the political difficulties Involved. Abase area could be established in Israel by developing the port of Haifa and utilizing Israel's pool of labor, but would be moreto attack than Egypt and could not be usedajor stagingase in Libya, while less vulnerable than an Egyptian base, would be too far west to supportthe defense of the Middle East.the use ofase would be limited by inadequate port facilities, poorcommunications, lack of labor supply, and the generally undeveloped nature of the country. Bases In Iraq and Jordan would not only sufler from the same disadvantages but would also be much more vulnerable toattack. Aden and Cyprus are suitable only as specialtied bases.
Tho Present Siluotion
The British defense position in the Suez Canal area and the British authority in the Sudan, which are presently governed by the Condominium Agreements9 and the Anglc-Kgyplian Treatyave been under steadily increasing pressure from Egypt since the end of World War II. Negotiations for revision of the Treaty, under way for the past five years, have resulted in deadlock. The Egyptian Cabinet has now submitted forapproval four decrees providing for denunciation of these agreements. Such denunciation will greatly reducenegotiated settlement between Egypt and the UK and might eventuallythe UK to choose between withdrawal of Its troops and open defiance ol Egyptianto expel them.
The Treaty6 undertook toermanent alliance between Egypt and the UK and authorized the UK to maintain in the vicinity of the0 land forcesilots, together with necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties. The Egyptian Government haswillingness to permit British troops to use Egyptase In time of war, butto their presence in Egypt in time of peace. It Is expected that Egypt will demand that the British withdraw their forces
diately on Egyptian denunciation ol the Treaty.
he British Oovernment considers that its forces and inslallations in Egypt arenot only on behalf of the Britishbut also In the general interest of the West and of the Middle Eastern countries. The British bold that Egypt is the key to the Middle East, that it is certain to be anfor any aggressiongainst that area, and that It is Irreplaceablease They have maintained that to be effective in time of war these defense arrangements require the peacetime presence of British forces to insure the readiness of bases and equipment. While the UK has ofTeitd lo withdraw all its land forces from Egyptt has Insisted in return that British civilians be permitted to maintain the base Installations on the Canal and that BAP units be permitted to remain permanently as partoint Anglo-Egyptian air defense organization.
ith regard to the Sudan, the Treaty of
19S5 reaiT-rms the provisions of theAgreementshe latterel that the Ooiemor-Oeneral (who isby the King of Egypt on theof the British (KuTit) should continue to exercise his powers on behalf of both Egypt and the UK. In fact, the UKeffective control of the SudanEgypt deeply resents the continuing control by the British of territory once held by Egypt. Furthermore, It fears that any foreign control of the Sudanese portion of the Nile might subject It to diversion of Egypt's
vital water supply. The Egyptiandemands the end of the present British
position In the Sudan and the union of the Sudan with Egypt Uivler the Egyptian crown.
1C. The British, on the other hand, refuse to permit what they regard as one of their most successful colonial enterprises to be ruined by anticipated Egyptian Incompetence. They reject Egypt'i claim and maintain that the Sudanese, who are making progressself-government, have no desire to come under Egyptian control and shouldajor voice In any decision concerning their future status.
The UK has tried on several occasions to separate the Sudan issue from the baselargely on the theory that while it was prepared to make concessions on the base problem for the sake of an agreed settlement, it was not prepared to make substantialon the Sudan issue Egypt on the other hand, has consistently Joined the issue of British evacuation from Egypt with the Sudan question, because It realties that its bargaining position on the Sudan issue alone is weak and because It regards the basicof freeing Egypt from British influence to be involved in both questions.
Anglo Egyptian relations are furtherat the present time by conflictfrom Egyptian restriction* on thethrough the Canal of strategic materials, primarily oil, destined for Israel and bydesire lo haw the issue brought before the UN Security Council. Although thishas no dltect bearing on Ihe Treaty Issue, the friction It engenders reduces still further the possibility of compromise by either side on Ihe defense Issue or the Sudan question
dors Affecting. Egypt's Attitude
nationalism, whichall theonsciousthe population,ynamic factoragainst compromise In negotiationsBritish Public opinion in general hasgreatly inrlamrdesults expressed through theParliament, In public demonstrations,statements by Egyptian leaders,makes It almost impossible forto surrender, at least openly,with respect to the questions atwith the British Political leaders areto the danger of mssaxsmation byif they attempt to act counter todemands It Is highlyany Egyptian governmenttoolicy less nationalisticof the present government.
M. Sentiment throughout the Arab world has the erlecl Of reinforcing the EgyptianThe Arab countries arcregarding foreign political or economic
s
S li"
e press and the governments of these countries lend to side with Egyp1 1X1 lts conflict with the UK The binding factor In ail Middle East nationalist movements, whether economic or political, li common opposition to the same ImpcrlilHence the prevalence of the slogan, "get the British out"
SI. In Egypt, as in the rest of the Middle East, fear of World War III and doubt whether the West would In fact defend the area against Soviet attack has led to the growthossible avenue of escape from Involvement in the East-West conflict.feeling thus reinforces the demands for British evacuation from Egypt
he extent to which the Egyptianmight reduce its demands would deperd at least in part on Its estimate of Brit'sh wiL and power to defend the present position by force and on Its estimate of the probableof the US. The Egyptians undoubtedly interpret the complete British withdrawal from the Iranian oil industry as an indicationeurmined Egyptian stand will be wore fruitful than appeals on legal oe moral grounds and as an indication that the US is unwilling to support the UK In the use of force. Egypt may hope that the US willits national aspirations and probablythat the US will use Its influence tothe Bnusn from uting force.
Major Factors Affecting the British Attitude
M The British refusal to turn over the Sudan and the Sues bav to Egypt is rasedom-btnatton of strategic and domestic
onvinced of the strategic importance of the Canal area to Middle East defense and Cocnroonwealth communications, the British hold that capitulation to Egyptian demands would gravely weaken Western defense While willing to share with Egypt and other powers in organizing Egyptian defenses, the British have no confidence in Egypt's capacity to defend Itself
oncern for prestige has hardened the British position. The British tear thatto nationalist pressure In Egypt willtheir difficulties elsewhere, not only in the Middle East but also in other areas where they are confronted with nationalist feeling
he UK's attitude on the Sudan issue is determined by moral as well as strategic eon-sWerattoos. On the moral side, the British believe that they have an obligation to the Sudanese and emphasise the economic and political progress which has taken place under British administration This attitude has been reinforced by the conviction that the sSgyptians would exploit the Sudanese and that the Sudan would surfer economically and politically Strategically, control of the Sudan bolsters the British defensive position In the Middle East and Africa. The Sudan Is valuable to the UKommur.Icatlons link, especially by air. andeneral war could provide depth to the defense of the Suet Canal and East Africa areas
The UK's sensitivity about Its prestige and strategic position In the Middle East has been heightened by the political situation In Britain itself. Conscious of its politicalthe Labor Oovemment Is anxious,on the eve of national 'lections, to avoid further criticism ol its couducl ofaffairs. The British public, which is making sacrifices In order lo preserve as much as possible of Britain's world position, would resent policies which Involved furtherof positions or abandonment offor subject peoples like theUborltes, particularly the extreme left, are somewhat more sympathetic than the Conservatives towards nationalistn the ease of Egypt the view that right and season are on the British side is common to the major parties. Furthermore, the British refuse to admit that the Middle Eastern countries should be permittedto default on their treaty obligations.
Many British leaders, Conservative and Labor alike, tend to discount Egyptianon the theory Uiat Egyptianagitation Is largely an artificial creation of ambitious politiciansenal press, and is designed primarily Vo divert public attention from growing domestic grievances. Furthermore, the view is prevalent In Britain
BT
Egyptian politicians will, as In the past, respond lo firmness.how ol force. In this counectkm, the Britishthat maintenance of the Westen.position In the Middle East requires complete US support of the British policy in Egypt. The British believe, moreover, that the Egyptian Government's action in seeking abrogation at this time stemsesire to obtain domestic political benefit*iddle East Command offer.
Probable Future DevelopmentsIn submitting legislation forof the Treaty6 and theAgreementshe Egyptianhas undertaaCu thepolicy designed to sxure theBritish troops from Egypt and to endcontrol of the Sudan. It will befor any Egyptian government tofrom the policy to which theCabinet has committed Itselfenjoys strong popular support,other leadershipizeableKing cannolorecabinet without appearing to use histo contravene nationalEgypt's leaders, and particularlyprobably have qualms abouta course of action which might leadbetween Egyptian andor lo demonstrations andmight be turned against theirand persons, there Is noin which they can reverse the present
trend of events.
gyptian denunciation of the Treatyf Itself have little immediate effect on the British military esUblishment In the Canal aiea It will, however, provide the Egyptiansretext for declaring the presence of British forces to be Illegal and for enacting military and administrativeagainst them Denunciation ol the Treaty8 will also enable Egypt to deny any further obligation to grant assistance and iinrountly lo the British forces, to provide facilities andnd to construct and maintain roads and railway lines for them.
fter denouncing the Treaty, the Egyptian Government will probably not take immediate action to expel the British forces but Instead will await British reactions or possibly appeal to the UN. If It gains nothing by waiting, it will probably Initiate political action to secure the removal of British troops anderies of administrative measures to Isolate and Inconvenience them Suchmight include:
Egyptian nationals tothe Britisheasuregyptian laborersat present;
with Britishthe Canal;
port facilities to shipsto the British forces;
the exclusion of BritishEgyptian controlled ports.Said and Suez.
the use of EgyptianBritish military expenditures;
orbidding traders and contractors lo deal with the British lorces;
p. Forbidding or delaying the movement of British military personnel within Egypt;
h. Encouraging non-cooperation ofwith the British forces by Intimidation and pressure; and,
i Instigating local sabotage.
n reprisal, the UK could Impose punitive sanctions against Egypt. It could reduce white oil (gasoline and kerosene) supplies to Egypt and impose financial restrictions on Egyptian trade. Such restrictions, while they would damage the important BritishIndustry, would alsoerious effect on the Egyptian economy. Othermeasures which the British mightagainst Egypt include tbe withdrawal of such British nationals as are at uj serving in varloui technical posts in the Egyptianand industry, and the severance of trade between Egypt and the Sudan Such measures would probably damage theeconomy and aggravate the economic stringency which already exists Although the Egyptian Government, arinlng Itself with emergency powers, could probably maintain
-OgOP.ET-
control of the situation. It is possible thai social unrest and economic misery might lead to violent attacks against the regime, theof which cannot now be foreseen
t is unlikely that non-military pressure by the British would Induce the Egyptian Government to yield. The application of punitive measures by the British wouldarouse resentment in all the Arab countries and might make the Egyptianeven more uncompromUlng.
The UK. through its control of thein the Sudan, could seriously Interfere with the normal flow of Nile water and thusevere blow to the Egyptian food supply. It is unlikely, however, that the British would employeasure In view of the fact that It would do Irreparable damage to Anglo-Egyptian relations, would provokeindignation throughout the world, and would tend to vindicate Egypt In its demands for control of the Sudan
The Egyptians would almost certainly take no mayor military action agalntt the British positions in the Canal area, although Egyptian troops might well be used to man checkpoints and might even seise certainInstallations. The Egyptianchief concern would probably be with internal security; consequently, the Egyptian forces would probably be kept in reserve to support the police in case of demonstrations and disorders.
he UK else could be expected to refrain from major military action except underprovocation in either the base area proper or the Canal area in general. The British would probab'y feel Justified inmajor military action in the event that the Egyptians interfered seriously withshipping through the Sues Canal or in the unlikely event that Egypt attempted to expel the British garrison by force. Under such circumstances, the British could and would turn back any Egyptian attack and might also selie control of the entire CanalAlthough the British could swiftly seise control ofnilateral British resort to force would accentuate hostility toward the British throughout the Arab world, might severely strain British relations with Pakistan and India, and might well lead to censure by the UN. In the absence of an Imminent threat of general war. the UK is unlikely to risk such consequences.
t Is unlikely that the UN could resolve the conflict between the UK and Egypt. The Security Council was unable to agree on any resolution when Egypt submitted the Issue to Itnd the elements have not changed substantially since then. The British have been consistently averse to bringing the UN into the picture. Vhuc Egypt might tryapnea: to the Security Council, it would do so not to much in the hopeavorable decision as with the expectation of gaining propaganda advantage in preparation for subsequent unilateral action against the British-SB. The recent decision to Include Oreece and Turkey in NATO and the prospective estab-hshrnentiddle East Command provide an opportunityresh approach to the problem. Under this approach. Egypt will be asked to grant base rights not to the UK butiddle East defense grouping (including the OK) of which Egypt itself wouldember.
t Is doubtfulesult satisfactory to both Egypt and the UK could be achievedultilateral approach. Before agreeing to the establishmentegional defense system, the Egyptians would require assurances that6 Treaty would be abrogated andettlement of the Sudan satisfactory to Egypt would be reached In the actual negotiationsegional defense force, they would almost certainly demand thai Egyptian fotcea be extensively equipped by the West so that Egypt could fill Its new role; that the new defense forces be truly International in character; and that the base area be under Egyptian command. The UK would probably agree to abandon6 Treaty and to make limited concessions on the administration of the Sudan. The UK would be also willing to charefor the maintenance of the base area with other powers and to giveominal share In the command, but it would certainly reject full Egyptian control oier the Sudan
evenultilateral defensewould insist on the leading part In control of the Suezn rtew of the likelihood that, evenultilateral defense arrangement, British troops would be expected to comprise apart of the garrison, there is grave doubtatisfactory compromise of the base issue can be reached unless, at the least,concessions are made to thewith respect to the Sudan
British Military Forces in Egypt
of troops
81
13
40
14
An0 British troops arein Cyprus, Ubya, Zoidtn, the Sudtn, Ertues, and Aden.
Military Forces
umber of troops
a. Army (1 Div.; 9 Brigs.; 4
Frontier Corps
Bodyguard
guard
.
ircraft
fighters
fighters
e. light bombers
6 Transports
e Communication, and liaison
S. Naval vessels
craft
combat vessels .
8S
170
46
no
1
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: