-SECRET
SPECIAL ESTIMATE THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN
SE-17
Published1
The Intelligence organizations ol the Departments of State, tho Army, toe Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffin the preparation of this estimate. AH members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this estimate onctober.
aeerTET -
THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN
The Assassination of Ltaqu.it AH Khan
nctober Prime Minister Liaquat AH Khinan now officially described as an Afghanhe Premiership has been assumed by the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin.
Thftre Is unlikely to be any immediate threat to the stability of the regime. The popular reaction to the murder has been one of shock and revulsion and the assassination cannot be taken as an Indication of widespread opposition to the government. The group of Moslem League leaders which Liaquat headedominant position in Pakistani politics, hastrong grip on the armed forces and on the press and radio, and appears to be dealing efficiently with the situation. Although there Is some danger of disorders In the traditionally turbulent tribal areas In the North West Frontier Province from which the assassin came, the government will probably be able to contain them. Opposition groups are weak. The armyof last spring appears to have been effectively crushed.
Nevertheless, the government is unlikely lo provide as firm leadership as under Liaquat. Nazimuddinapable butcolorless East Pakistan politician, who appears to have
The'Director of Intelligence, USAF, would note that the motives and affiliations of the assassin are not yet sufficientlytoull assessment of Ihe implications of this assassination.
Effect on the Stability of the Regime
been chosenymbol of national unity andeutral chairman; neither he nor any of his colleagues appears to possess LUquat's high degree of personal vigor and politicalhe absence of an established line of succession may encourage rivalry within the ruling group.
Effect on the Kashmir Dispute1
SKCRRT
herelight chance that extremist elements In Azad (pro-Pakistan) Kashmir may attempt In the near future to take advantage ol the slluallon and, by attacking Indian troops, to briii^eneral resumption ol hostilities In Kashmir. There t*light chance that some hot-headed Pakistani army officers might attempt similar action.
Effect on Relations with Afghanistan
he official description of the assassin as an Afghan national may create some popular pressure for action against Afghanistan. If It Is verified that the Afghan Government was in some wayPakistan may demand that Afghanistan make atonement for the assassination and renounce further agitation in regard to Pushtoonlstan. If Afghanistan proves unresponsive, the Pakistan Government might countenance border raids by tribesmen, but It In unlikely tiiat it would resort to war ag*lnst Afghanistan.
Effect on Relations with the West
he new Prime Minister, Ihe Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammed Zafrullaii Khan, and the new Governor-General, Shulam Mohammed, have all shared Liaquat'stern leanings. But thestate of the Kashmir dispute, plus increasing antl-Westernism In the Moslem world, particularlyesult of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis, will make It more difficult for Liaquat All's successors toro-Western orientation.
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Original document.
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