ASSISTANT DIRECTORE
.ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIESILITARY ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES BEFORE2
4 Published1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIESILITARY ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES BEFORE2
ublished1
this doccseat has
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The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated In the preparation of this estimate. Allof the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred ln this estimate onctober.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES-'FOR^MILITARY-ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES BEFORE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of the USSR toilitary attack on the United States1 before
ASSUMPTIONS
For the purpose ol this estimate it is assumed that:
oviet attack on the US would be designed to cause the maximum possible reduction In the capability of the US to wage offensive war.
D. The USSR would not avoid employing any weapon and tactic because of US capabilities for retaliation in kind.
ESTIMATE
Military Attack AJR ATTACK
Atomic bombardment with long-rangels the most threatening of the various types of potential military operations against the US within Soviet capabilities during thc period considered in this estimate.
Tlie Soviet Air Force is capable ofa strategic air offensive against the United States while simultaneously providingtactical support for all campaigns which Uie USSR might launch against continental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India and Pakistan).
During the period of this estimate other types of airith the possible excep-
'The effects of OS counUrrneasures upon Soviet capabilities have not been considered ln this
1 Including Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone.
'Such as conventional bombing with highguided missiles launched fromterritory and the employment of free
tion of conventional bombing with highagainst Alaska, will noterious threat Although chemical andweapons might be delivered by long-range aircraft, these weapons arc better suited to clandestine or sabotage attack. It lsunlikely that the USSR willydrogen bomb during the period of this
Soviet Atomic Weapons
he limiting factor In the scale of atomic attack would be the stockpile of bombsto the USSR for use against the US. The USSR possesses sufficient aircraft, trained crews, and base facilities to enable It todellvory against the US of the fullof atomic bombs that will be available in the period covered by this estimate.
he Soviet atomic stockpile12 has been estimated as follows:
The following factors must be considered in connection with this estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities:
The number and/or size of thefacilities postulatedasis for this estimate may be incorrect The minimum program, which is not Inconsistent with the information available, would provide aof about one-half the number of weapons indicated. On the other hand, from theavailable at the present time, the possibility that additional or expandedfacilities will be constructed during the period under consideration cannot be
Thc type of weapon postulated for calculating the stockpile figures may beIt is possible by changing the weapon design to substantially increase orthe number of weapons in the stockpUe,ertain quantity of fissionableSuch changes, however, alter the kilo-tonnage of the individual weapons
eapons could range upNT equivalent.ay runilolons.analysis of the recent Soviet atomicdoes not as yet warrantthis estimate.
Soviet Long Range Aviation
attack is thc principalby which the Soviet Unionmaximum results ln the reductionUS war effort Therefore, thedecideumber of atomicbe utilized best in surprise attacks atof hostilities. In that case. It isthat the major portion of thestockpile would be employedUS It is considered that theexpend aircraft and crews, asorder to deliver atomic bombs ontargets.
study of pnssiblc target sysiemsled to an appreciation of thelocalmg and destroying eachystem. This would beif night or bad weather operations Accordingly thc Soviets might
not select industrial targets as such. They might instead elect to attack large centers of population, counting upon destroying aportion of their industrial capacity. The Soviets might also consider that attacks on population centers would have adverseon political and military control. The extent of air attack on US retaliatory capacity would depend on Soviet assessment of lheprobability of successfully blunting the US atomic counterattack by this or other means, such as sabotage.
ery little information Is available on the tactical doctrine of Soviet Long RangeIt is considered that the SovieU would attempt to deliver the maximum possible weight of attack within the shortest possible period of time, although they would betoortion of the Soviet atomic stockpile for re-attack of the United States.t is believed that the Sovietsairly comprehensive knowledge of the Western Powers' air defense systems. The Soviets would avoid passing over the effectiveareas of radar nets, If at all feasible, in order to achieve surprise. Against targets where range Isritical factor It isthat deviations ln route and altitude to avoid detection would probably be
uring World Wnr II, the Soviet Union had no strategic air arm as the term IsIn the United States. Soviet Long Range Aviation operated primarily against targets which directly supported German Armies in the field The course of eventsthe war undoubtedly influenced thcand immediately after the war theytotrategic air arm with the mission of long range strategic bombing,and participation in airborne operations Thc Soviets have spent theperiod in developing and training this strategic air aimriority basis.
owever, the development of this force has been handicapped by the Soviet's lack of staff personnel experienced in long rangeand it is probable that the over-allof thc force is well below the standards
established for the OS Strategic AirUie level ol proficiency Istoerious threat to the, --
Soviet Long Range Aviation is estimated to consisttrength ofircraft divided among the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Long Range Air Armies. Of these aircraft,Soviet version of the Uniteds thc only known bomber lnuse capable of reaching thc United States with an atomic bomb from presentbases. Considering present estimates of production and presenttrength ofype aircraft. It Is estimated thatU-4's will be in units trylthough the Soviets haveew heavy bomber, little is known about this aircraft, and it is unlikely that it will appear In operaUonal numbers during Uie period covered by this estimate,
Thepound bomb load, is estimated toombat radiusautical milesombat rangeauUcal miles.
No information is available regardingdevelopment of aerial refuelingbut it Is considered within Sovietto develop Uie equipment andfor operational use of In-flightIt is believed that the Importance of US targets to Soviet war plans, plus present range limitations of Soviet long range bombers,the assignmentigh priority to Uie development of operational aerial refueling techniques and equipment
Maximum ranges of refueled TU-4might theoretically be as follows:
ne-way mission, with the tanker and receiver taking off together, Uie tanker could refuel Uie bomberautical miles from thepoint thus giving theotal range from point of take-off ofautical miles.
wo-way mission, In order toaximum radius of action for tho bomber, the outbound refueling could take place
autical miles from the point of take-off and the return refueling could take place atiles Irom the point of take-off.il execution of both outbound andrefueling could extend lhe bomber's combat radius to moreautical miles.
Air Base Areas
he three base areas considered mostIn assessing Soviet air eapabililies against the US are:
(a) Soviet-controlled territory along thc BalUc
<b) thc Kola Peninsula area in northwest Russia
(c) Uie Chukotski Peninsula area In northeast Siberia.
It must be noted that the following discussion of these three areas is based on Information which Is far from adequate.
The Baltic Area. Favorably situated with respect to transportation andweather, and distance to the United States, the area along the Baltic fromto the British Occupation Zone tncontains at leastir bases which might be employed byombers against the United states. It is estimated mat each of these bases could handle at least oneofU-4's. with some of them capable ofonsiderably larger number. The total capacity, for operationsmall number of landings and take-offs by each aircraft involved, is estimated atircraft Weather conditions would be generally those of Uie NorthZone and It ls unlikely that weather considcraUons would impose any unusualTransportation andfacilities are adequate In the area and supply would present only the normalproblems. However, due to the proximity of Norway and Sweden Uie risk of detection of Soviet nights from bases In this area is greater than of flights egresslng over Soviet-controlled territory.
Kola Peninsula Area. For purposes of this discussion, the Kola Peninsula area lsto include that portion of the USSR sit-
orth of Lake Ladoga and west of the White Sea. Weather conditions in this area, such as extremely low temperatures, would Impose operational difficulties which could be overcome at the expense of some loss ofional efficiency and/or an increase InThe area Is favorably situated withto distance from the United States and offers the additional advantage of permitting routes wlfich avoid overflight of countries friendly to the United States. Relatively old information indicates that, ofodd air facuities which were known to exist in the regionwo airfields.'E) andppear suitable forircraft. Ineight airfields had5 runways or take-offeet or longer in length. They arc as follows:
Very little information is available on the present status of these airfields. Some may have been improved to accommodate medium bombers. Scattered and unconfirmed reports of base Improvements have been received and there have been many Indications that the area is closely guarded.
The area is served by the Kirev Railroad, which connects Murmansk with Leningrad and with the Finnish and Soviet rati system. Electrification of the entire line ls scheduled, although completion date is not known. While some stockpiling in advance might be necessary to avoid overburdening facilities, there is no doubt that the present railfacilities are adequate toarge-scale air attack from this area.
Chukotski Peninsula Area. ThePeninsula area is, from thc purelystandpoint, favorably situated for aerial attack on the United States. From this area, two-way missions against the Seattle-Hanf ord area and one-way missions against all
major targets in the United States could be launched. However, intelligence on the alr facuities which might be available forn most cases, either entirely lacking or dates backit is at present Impossible to identify positively any specific air installationaunching site or staging base for_ Soviet atomic attacks against the US, there arebases which could be considered by thc Soviets as the most likely sites to develop forperations.
fK,which was buflt6 is the only airfield In thePeninsula area known to have beensince the end of World War n, but the extent of this development Is unknown. At, WISTS) several largeare known to have been erected but there ls no evidence of runway extension orThere are unconfirmed reports that the airfield atas Improvedut whether it has been Improved sufficiently to support even limitedperations Is not known. Whilestockpiling, sufficient to support minimum medium bomber operations at Velkal or Markovo, could be accomplished. It must be borne in mind that the severe weatherin this area at certain times of the year would seriously hamper this accomplishment. Airfields at Magadanand atE) offer the best potential sites for development asbomber bases. Due to rangeairfields at these locations could be used for attacks on the US only by utilizingmissions. Finally, the Soviets have placed considerable emphasis upon the use Of frozen surfaces in the Arctic, which makesotentially large number of airfields which could be placed in operation during tho whiterinimum of preparatory efiort. For example, virtually unlimited extension of the take-off run at Velkal is possible by this method.
Operations against the US from thePeninsula area, in which there are no known roads or railroads, wouldbe more difficult to supply thanfrom other potential base areas of the
TOP t BT
Union. It Is estimated that for each medium bomber staged through theaximum ofhort tons of supplies would be adequate to provide thc required logistical support plus storage loss. This would5 short tons of aviation fuel inhort tons of bomb loadhort tons of other supplies. However, bomber aircraft staged through these fields would probably havequantities of unbumed fuel in their tanks upon landing, thus requiringless fuel to be presLocked thantrike mountedmighthort tons of supplies, ofhort tons would be bomb load, probably flown ln by the staging aircraft Thc remaining deficiency would have to be brought In by ship, barge,train, or transport aircraft. Bargewhich would presumably be used to supply both Markovo and Tanyurer during the ice-free months. Is capable of moving largeprovided sufficient equipment lsBarge and caterpillar train traffic would move inland from the port of Anadyr, which is open to shipping during the period May-November, up the Anadyr and Tanyurer rivers. Anadyr could be supplied withease, although aerial photographsthat lighters are used atart of the time In unloading. This may represent direct unloading Into river barges destined for up-river points. Air bases up the Anadyr and Tanyurer rivers, and on the coastal regions, can be stockpiled with the equipment which Is known to be avalloblc or which maybe considered to be available to lheAdditional equipment aa required could be transported by airlift and caterpillar overland trains during periods of Iced
Attacks Against the US
U-4's operating at maximum range (without refueling) on one-way missions could reach all important US targets from bases in the Chukotski Peninsula area; allwithin an arc from Portland, Oregon, to Charlotte, North Carolinarom bases in thc Kola Peninsula area; and all targets within an arc from Charleston, South
Carolina,sm ark, North Dakotafrom bases Ln -Soviet-controlledalong tho Baltic Bases further in the
.tillxedfcr.
_ interior xf_lhe
art* located at less than maximum range from the three base areas mentioned above. Forthc Seattle-Hanford area is within one-way range of the excellent field at Kuiby-shevka. Just north of Manchuria. Theof the range of they aerialwould permit alrcralt to operate from as far away as the Moscow area in the west and thc Yakutsk area ln the east against targets in almost any part of the US. Under sucharge number of basecould be selected which would permit compromise between such factors as maximum range, ease of logistic support and surprise.
Attacks Against Alaska
proximity of Alaska to Soviet airnortheast Siberia, both actual andwould permit the USSR to utilize aof aircraft ln attacks againstlight bombers such as therbe used from Siberian bases againsttn the FBirbaruCs-Anchorage-KodiakIs estimated that the Sovietsirrom these bases. In addition,range aircraft could utilize interiorattacking Alaska.
Attacks Against the Panama Canal Zone
Is remotely possible that theZoneautical miles)attacked by TU-4's after one aerialHowever, thc extreme range andof early warning due to over-flightcountries, might cause theconsider the Panama Canal antarget for air attack.
Mechanical Condition of Aircraft
Is no Intelligence availablethe actual serviceability rate or thecondition of theircraft inunits. However, at the end of theSoviets retained In service the bestpersonnel and have since conducted
SECrtEgi
an intensive training program aimed atmaintenance throughout their air forces. The high priority given theof Long Range Aviation, tne presence ofircraft in operaUonal units for more than three years, and the combination ofskilled maintenance personnel and an intensive training program should, by this date, have enabled the Soviets toatisfactory serviceability rale. It is believed that this rate is and will continue to be below that of US units operating under similarbecause of Uie greater length of time Uie United States has had to trainpersonnel on large bombardmentthe more highly developed US supply system, and Uie development in the United States of maintenance staff personnel through extensive war-time experience with large bombardment aircraft. However, Sovietto conduct air operations against the United Stales does not require that USbe met. and lt can be expected that for an initialperaUon of high priority practically allircraft in operating units could be made serviceable.
Stale of Crew Training
It is probably Uie obJecUve of the Soviet High Command, that Long Range Aviation shall eventually be capable of undertaking strategic bombing missions by day or night in any weather. The deficiencies of Soviet pilots ln night and Instrument flying have beenby tactical and training commanders, and this fact Is reflected In Uie comprehensive training directive given by Uie Soviet Ministry of War. There Is no doubt that greatIs being placed on the development of proficiency ln these fields through antraining program and development of new equipment. There arc Indications, however, that Uie standards of training are not equal to those of the United States In theof all-weather and mass formationradar navlgaUon. and high altitude bombing.
The average Soviet medium bomber crew is still considered to be less skilled than the average US four-engine bomber crew of World War II. Nevertheless. II must be emphasized
that on atomic attack on the United States would involve only the best of Soviet crews. It is considered that the limiting factor In the ^peraUonal capabiliticsof Soviet Long Range ^Aviation will lie in-theof aircraft component equipment rather than in any shortcomings in training and techniques.
Navigational Ability and Available Aids
Lack of World War II experience inand bombing techniques required for modern high altitude operations, together with corollary deficiencies in equipment and systems, are handicaps which the Soviets are attempting to overcome. Although polar navigaUon poses problems more difficult than temperate zone navigation, the USSR was the first naUon to give ocUve support to polarand Uie first comprehensive andtreatment of polar navigation was published In Moscown addition, the Soviets have engaged in extensive Arctic flights in connecHon with both surface craft navigation of the Northern Sea Route and civil air operations in that area.
Photographs ofircraft confirm the presencelister Identical ln size andto Uie radomc ofois available concerning Uie actual radar equipment, if any. Installed In this radome. The USSRacquired several sets ofadar under Lend-Lease during World War IE, and in addition obtained at least two British and three German search and bombing radars. It is also possible that Uie Soviets acquiredater navigaUonal andradar, from damaged US aircraft during World War II. The Soviets have had access to many captured German documents, and haveumber of German scientists working In the USSR since World War II. It istherefore, that Uie Soviets may havenavigation and blind bombing radar comparable In performance to the AN/
On Uie basis of available evidence It is esU-mated that Soviet bombers could fly Arctic routes and stay on course with the equipment now available.
charts and radio facility information sary to navigation in the United States and Canada are for sale to the public by thegovernments. Aerial photographs of large cities and industrial installations are likewise sold publicly. II is thereforethat public sources provide all thenecessary for the Soviets to identify assigned targets correctly under visualThe nature of most US targets Is such that little difficulty would be experienced In identifying them with ther an equivalent radar. The possibility also exists that Communist agents might set up covert facilities (radar reflectors, radio homers, and beacons) as an aid to identification ot targets. Most of the attacking Soviet aircraft should, therefore, be capable of locating andselected targets,
The Soviets are known to possess optical bomb sights with performance characteristics at least equal to those of the Morden and Sperry sights used by US forces during World War n. While there is no factual evidence concerning the accuracy of Soviet bombing, it is likely that they could attain an accuracy under visual conditions comparable to that of US crews during World War n.
Kadar bombing equipment Is known to be in service but the degree of bombing accuracy which may be obtained by thc Soviets with this equipment is not known. Although theof Soviet blind bombing attacks could be Increased by the use of radar responder beacons clandestinely placed on or near the target, accuracy of radar bombing wouldbe generally lower than that of visual bombing. It ls believed that Uie SovieU would not hesitate to bomb at lower altitudes, If necessary, to Insure accurate bombregardless of the safety of the crews.
Electronic Countermeasures
thc basis of available intelligenceSoviet training and concepts, it ls
-ouii ruieasurcs iccnniquesis. based on Information of the countermeasures employed by Uie Germans during World War II. in ad-dlUoo. both US and British war surplusfor use in electronic reconnaissancehave been purchased by Uie Soviet Union. The Lend-Lease program supplied thc Soviets wiUi samples of US "window" andfor its use. Technical Information on theamming transmitter and the RDO wideband search receiver was made available to Uie Soviets. The Soviets have knowledge of US and Allied World War II radar searchAmerican airborne ECM equipment interned by the Soviets during World War Tl includedN/APRFerretN/APA II0 Mcs Jammer).
Actual evidence of Soviet postwar progress ln countermeasures has been detected. The Soviets haveigh level ofin Jamming communicationof the Voice of America. The Soviets are capable of Jamming operaUons at frequencies up toegacycles. Airborne Jammers may be available, utilizlnE thc same spectrum scale as airborne passive ECM. Since specimens of German World War II VIIF Jammers areavailable to Uie Soviets, this capability may well extend as high In frequencies as the VHF band. DirecUonal equipment utilizing Uieands, and possibly someay be available but large gaps In thc spectrum will not be covered.
Other measures of passive defense maydirectional radio equipment capable of Intercepting any type signal ln the frequency spectrum from very low tocs. VHF. Simple Soviet airborne intercept receivers may be anUclpated at frequencies on which the US has acUve radars. Sovietircraft may use false radio indentlflcatlon as well as USAF markings in an effort to evade detection as
It Is the view of the Director of Navaland the Assistant Chief of, that lamming atand ls unlikely.
enemy. Soviet infrared camouflage paint for use on aircraft, similar to British paintoptical wave-lengthshas been found. No anti-Jammingare known lo be on Soviet equipment; however, the USSR can be expected lo possess some knowledge of German anti-jamming techniques. Although there is no evidence of large-scale production of radar magnetrons it ls believed that the Soviets arc capable of equipping some Soviet Long Range aircraft to conduct countermeasures operations.
AIRBORNE ATTACK
he Soviet Union was the first majorto display an interest in airborne forces and, although it conducted no airborneIn World War II on the scale of those accomplished by the Germans and thoAllies, its interest since World War II has been demonstrated by the training of large numbers of airborne troops. However, the Soviet air forces arc not known to possess any operaUonal transport aircraft with rangewhich would permit two-wayoperations against the United States. Theransport with rangesimilar to those of Uieomber,several years ago in the Moscow Air Show. Although it is not knownour-engine type transport aircraft has been placed in series producUon, the possibility cannoi be discounted. ould be modi-fled to carry approximatelyaratroopsto the limitation imposed by temperature and altitude. The range and radius of action would be similar to that for theomb load. Although lt is highlythat TU-4's would be employed onoperations, such operations, employing specially trained assault and sabotage teams, mighl conceivably be directed against suchand difficult bombing targets as atomic bomb storage sites.
n view of Uie logistic difficulties involved inarge combat force inSiberia, plus prevailing adverse weather conditions, it Is considered that any Soviet campaign against Alaska during the period of this estimate would be of limited scope. Soviet operations could include an air-
borne assault against the Fairbanks-Anchor-age-Kodiak area, initially employing aofroops withurprise assault or following aattack. Such an attack wouldircraft of uieype. Range limitations would prevent airborne operations with full loads on targets as distant as Fairbanks and Anchorage, Western Canada, and Western United States; but such targets could be attacked If one-way missions were Sown with four-engine aircraft. Seizure of such facilities as Point Spencer, Marks. Galena or Walseth Air Force Base might provide Uie Soviets with intermediate airfields forreturning from operations againstor Anchorage. If Uie attack succeeded ln capturing US stores of food and/or POL,airborne troops could be brought in as reinforcements.
facilities in the Chukotskiunless considerably expandedknown status, would restrict theof transport aircraft foragainst targets in Alaska, sincebombers and fighters would requireuse of all these facilities.airborne operations would beby adverse weather conditionsIn thisubstantial portion ofGliders might be used in periodsis not hazardous. Supportwould be limited to theperiod from June to October.
objectives of Soviet operationswould be neutralization of basewhich the USSR could be attacked,of Allied military resources to thedisruption of Allied seaSoviets might also hope to seize andleast temporarily, bases from whichair attacks against thc United States.
NAVAL ATTACK
operating forces of the Sovietdivided into four major fleets andmaintainedair In good staleThe Soviet Navy's greatestare in submanne operations, mineand in Arctic cruising. It is handi-
capped by wide geographical separation of Its maritime frontiers, limited operationaland lack of shipborne aircraft
Surface
the period undercapability of the Soviet surface fleetmarine for participating In anon the continental United States isto be negligible. Soviet surfacenoterious threat orWestern naval power or to the securitycontinental US.
Amphibious Forces
Soviet force of minor combatantIncluding amphibious types,ransoceanic attack. Anyfor amphibious lift would requireupon the Soviet Merchant Marine.Merchant Marine Is aof vessels, many obsolescent, andlacking in tankers for overseasThis largely precludes theits employment ln any large-scaleattack on Canada, the Panamathe continental United States. It Isthat Uie Soviets could launchAlaskaroopsamphibious assault coupled with anattack of. Suchprobably be directed at: (a) the(b) the Anchorage-FairbanksUie Aleutian Chain; or (d) Kodiak Island.
Submarines
major naval threat to Uie USperiod Is that of the SovietThe USSR will have during thctotalubmarines, ofcapable ofirect attackUnited States. Assuming thatremain unchanged,patrol submarines will be availableSoviet Pacific fleet for attacks alongcoast of the United States, and fourspeed andcean patrolwill be available from the Baltic,and Black Sea fleets for attacks alongcoast The Soviets should at allable to employ more submarines inmining and in torpedo attacks than the
Germans and Japanese did during WorldThe probable uses of Soviet
n merchant shipping and
mlnolaying alongln Uie approaches to principal harbors.
of saboteurs-and agents.
reconnaissancepicket duty.
long-range bombers.
aunching of guided missiles and rockets with conventional or atomic warheads, against coastal targets.
Clandestine Attack With Weapons Of Mass Destruction1
attack1 with atomic,and chemicalighof effectivenessimitedof targets, particularly whenwith, or Just prior to, theof full-scale hostilities.
CLANDESTINE ATOMIC ATTACK
USSR Is capable of clandestineof atomic weapons by disguisedships, smuggling, and guided
Disguised Aircraft
of Its resemblance to thethe Sovietould be disguisedmarkings and employedmall number ofby taking advantage of the gapsradar screen, might escapewould greaUy increase the probabilitysuccessful attack on high priorityas the Washington area, for the purpose
'This sectionummary of hie si. which may be consultedore detailed discussion of this subject
the purpose of this estimate, the termattack" does not Include the employment of conventional sabotage.
'Only atomic, biological and chemical weapons have been discussed, since tbe state of development of other conceivable weapons of moss destruction Is such ih in their employment during the period of this estimate ls considered most unlikely.
of paralyzing the top military and civila few hours prior to the initiation of hostilities elsewhere. Soviet capabilities for clandestine air attack correspond to those for overt air attack discussed in2 above.
USSR also could undertakeattack with civilian aircraftypeUS or foreign transoceanic airlines.wouldreater chance ofdetection and identificationcivilian aircraft are not equipped withemployment of civilian aircraftprobable than the use of militaryat present, neither the USSR northe Satellites are known to possessand acquisition fromSconcern would increase the riskthe operation.
Merchant Ships
An atomic weapon could be detonated in the holdhip or laid as an underwater mine. Detonation of an atomic weapon in the holdhip would not Involve any special engineering problems, nor need the crew be aware of thc presence of the weapon. Laying an atomic weaponine wouldencasing the weaponatertight container and might also require specialequipment. The USSR is capable ofthese requirements as well as providing an accurate time-delay mechanism to permit laying the weapon several days, weeks, or months in advanceay.
During the first quarterhe Soviet orbit (including China, but excludinghad under charter moren addition, the chartering ol Western ships by non-Soviet countries alien leads to Iheir sale to the USSR or theSoviet possessionumber otfishing trawlers similar in lype to US vessels and capable of transporting atomic weaponsarticular threat.
Examinationhip's iwpers is not a reliable method of determining
* These figures do not Include thcngaged in trade wiih the Soviet orbit but not under direct charter to the Soviet orbit
hip is actually undor Soviet
The Soviets enforce secrecy for their ship chartering by maintaining their own charter and insurance agencies which enable them to by-pass the usual commercial
In many instances. Intelligenceindicating Soviet charter orhas not been received until more than sixty days after the transaction occurred. Therefore, lt is within Soviet capabilities to obtain andoreign ship fordelivery before the US could leam that the ship was under Soviet control.
of the above factors, thebe considered capable of utilizing aship for delivering an atomica key US harborelativelyof escaping detection.
Smuggling
An atomic bomb, including the fissionable material, could be broken down into relatively small components" which could be smuggled separately into the US. Unusual handling precautions would not be required anddetection would be most improbable. Assembly of the bomb would present certain difficulties but none of an insuperable
Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, components for an atomic bomb or, lesseven an assembled bomb could beto Soviet diplomatic representatives in the US as household effects or suppliesfear of official inspection by USln addition, no government agency ls specifically charged with thc responsibility for observing the offloading, processing, andof such shipments. This method would require the closely coordinated effort of several individuals ln the US to acquire the weapon and deliver it to the target area.
bl ll is feasible to smuggle an atomic bomb thiougli Customsommercial shipment.
' Although It would be theoretically possible toi lac lure clandestinely within the US all the ration eats of an a'ornlc weapon with the exceu-t'.on of the fissionable material, it would be difficult to nrocirc and process lhe neeessaiy material.
and many types ol imports from tho Soviet Satellites could be usedcover" for such an act. J'urthermore. the number offirms in the US ts so large that the appear; anceew firmhange in the imports" of an old firm would not automatically arouse the suspicion of the Customs authorities. Theoretically, there are numerous methods by which thc USSR could endeavor to circumvent thorough Customs Inspection; however, they would Involve elaborate arrangements as well as the existence within the US of an efficient organization to establish dummy corporations, subvert employees of bonded carriers, etc. These requirements greatly increase the risk of detection.
more serious threat, well withinis the smuggling of anespecially If disassembled, from ainto an Isolated section of the US.operation could involve the transferoviet controlled merchantsubmarinemall boat whichIt ashore. Here It could be loadedtruck for assembly and subsequentthe target area.
Guided Misiuet
It is estimated that the USSRype missiles with ranges of atiles which could be launched from merchant ships or submarines. Such missiles could operate at low altitudes and could have considerably better accuracy than the German operaUonal missiles of World War II. Although there is no conclusive evidence that the USSR has on atomic warhead suitable for usehip-launched guided missile, the construction ofarhead Ls estimated to be withincapabilities.
A Soviet merchant ship or submarine could reach Its launching posiUon with litUc chance of detection by maintaining radioand avoiding normal shipping lanes. Therefore, this method of clandestine attack appears well suited for employment of atomic weapon against critical near-coastal targets. Including key harbors.
CLANDESTINE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE* ATTACK
It is estimated that Uie USSK is capable of producing a'variety of BW agents Ini: antities for extensive clandestineagainst man, animals, and plants.
Many types of BW agcntSLare well suited for clandestine attack, and could be employed by thc USSR even well In advanceay as part of an over-ell plan to impair theefTecUveness of the US. In contrast to clandestine attack with atomic and chemical weapons, clandestine employment of certain BW agents would entail much less risk of identification as enemy action.
a. Very small amounts of these agents would be required initially. Such amounts would be almost Impossible to detect when being brought into this country under the cover of dlplomaUc immunity or through smuggling operations. In addition, it would not beto have some BW agents procured and cultured locallyrained bacteriologist.
he effects of BW agents are not apparent until hours or days after dissemination.
c. The results of many BW agents resemble natural outbreaks of disease, and it would be difficult to connect clandestine employment of such agentsostile act.
BW Attack Againtt Personnel
n clandestine attack, it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficientof BW agents to produce largeof casualties Ln urban areas. However, BW agents could be employed clandestinely to incapacitate key individuals and personnel In vital Installations. Dissemination of some airborne BW agentsuildingwould cause casualtiesarge portion of the personnel. Similar results probably could be obtained from agentsoutsideuilding and carried into the building by air currents soon after dissemination.
* Biological warfare Is the employment of Urine microorganisms, thetr toxic products, or chemical plant growth regulators to produce death oramong personnel, livestock or crops.
12
ls likely that the onlyagents which the USSRay would be those causingto the US, since the outbreak ofdisease would probably arouseas to its source. The statistics ofHealth Service on the Incidencediseases In Uie US are madeundoubtedly are known to the USSR.
BW Attack Against Livestock
landestine attack against animals, foot and mouth disease constitutes Uie most serious threat to this country. The disease is highly contagious, and thereelatively long period during which an animal with this disease ls capable of infecting other animals before the symptoms become apparent lobut an expert. Individual herds could easily be attacked, but more widespreadcould be Initiated by Infecting animals in "feeder" stockyards. Widespread outbreaks of disease could also be brought about by contaminating the anti-toxins,and other blologlcals manufactured in the US for Uie inoculation of animals.
The USSR could smuggle viruses ofdiseases into the US or might possiblythem In this country. In the former case, the virus could originate in Uie USSH or could be prepared by Soviet-controlledfrom infected animals In South orAmerica.
BW Attack Against Crops
is estimated that the USSR mightemploy some form of cereal rust inBW attack against USsuch attack Is unlikely becauseuncertainty that this disease woulda wide area.
ther possible BW agents might be effective against US cropsesser degree. However, it is considered that the results of an attack with these agents would not be serious.
ariety of chemical growth regulators could be employed against crops as BW agents. These chemicals are disseminated by spraying them on Uie area under cultivation. This type
of attack would be impractical against large areas because of Uie amount of chemicals
TCVould bV posslbUv-to employ^as BW agents insects which are in themselvesor which spread crop diseases. However, there is no Indication that tbe use of insects as BW agents has been developed and such employment ls considered unlikely.
CLANDESTINE CHEMICAL WARFARE
Although the Soviets have large stockpiles of standard CWhese agents are not well suited for clandestine attack and their employment for that purpose is highlyThe CW agents most likely to be used for clandestine attack are Uie nerve gases, GA and GB, primarily because of their extreme high toxicity which Is considerable greater than that of other known CW agents. Thc USSR probably has sufficient quantities of nerve gas for fairly extensive clandestineIn common with atomic weapons, nerve gases are not suited for employment prioray Inasmuch as theirphysiological effects would make their identincation as enemy action relatively easy.
GA and GB are odorless, colorless liquids which become effective anti-personnel agents when dispersedog or an Invisible vapor. GB Is approximately three times more toxic than GA. Exposureethal concentration usually causes death within an hour. About one-fifthethal concentration is sufficient to cause incapacitation for several days. In general, the persistence of nerve gasesatter of hours rather than days.
In clandestine nerve gas attack, it would not be feasible to build up Uie concentrations
" The term "CW agents" as used herein refers to those toxic chemical agents suitable forIn mass quanUUes for chemical warfare. These agents are to be distinguished from thccountless number ot poisonous chemicalwhich are readily available to Sovietfrom commercial sources end are suitable for contaminate i food and water supplies andoisoning key individuals. Employment olommercial chemicals Is considered to belonal sabotage and Ls not Included In this estimate, j
required for employment against population centers or other targetsizable area. However, clandestine attack Is well suited for employment against personnel in key Install*-Uons when the objective Isapacitalionigh percentage of theand physical destruction of thcby an atomic weapon Is not paramount.
ffective clandestine attack againstIn key Installations would requiretuning and positioning ln disseminating relatively small quantities of nerve gas. The gas could be releaseduilding by means of an aerosol bomb similar to those used for insecticides and equippedime mechanism. It would also be feasible to at-
tack buildings by spraying nerve gases In the vicinity.
hc USSR could attempt to bring nerve "gases Into the US by any o* the.methods of* smuggling already discussed In connection witli clandestine atomic attack, viz.,immunity, smuggling through Customs, or Introductionoint outside Customs surveillance. In all Instances, the successful smuggling of nerve gas or of the complete aerosol dispensers would be considerably easier than Uie smuggling of atomic weapons. Nerve gas could be easily disguised as one of any number of commercial exports from the Soviet orbit or transmittediplomatic pouch.
Original document.
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