NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES AND THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET POWER, THROUGH
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES AND THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET POWER, THROUGH
The intelligence organizations ol the Departments of Slate, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency In the preparation of Oils estimate. All members of theAdvisory Committee concurred ln this estimateovember.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
L CONTROL
Degree ol
Instruments and
Troublesome Issues and
II SATELLITE CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET STRENGTH: ECONOMIC
The Long-Term
The Current
Principal Economic
Limitations on Satellite Economic
Comparison of the Satellites and Western
UJ. SATELLITE CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET STRENGTH: MILITARY
Advanced Bases for the
Satellite Ground
Satellite Air Forces and
Satellite Naval
'.
APPENDIXForces Stationed in the Satellites. September
-Production of Selected Commodities by the Satellites and the0
APPENDIXDevelopment of Satellite Ground
APPENDIXAir Forces.1
TO I' 3ECHET
SOVIET CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES AND THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET POWER, THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the effectiveness of Soviet control over the European Satellites and their economic and military contributions to Soviet strength, through
ASSUMPTION
That there will not be general war within the period of this estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
control over the Satellites istually complete, assuring for the period of
J this estimate the subservience andof these states and continuedand military benefit to the USSR.
rapid collectivization ofalmost certainly provoke strongand adversely affectin the Satellites for some time,
J but it would probably not shake Soviet control over the Satellites, However,yjllectivization is unlikely to bewithin the period of this
Satellite area is beingand integrated Inlo the Soviet eco-
/nomic system. The Satellites supplyhe USSR large, and In some cases critical quantities of raw materials and industrial goods, notably uranium ores andpetroleum products, industrial chemicals, and engineering equipment.
The productive capabilities of theconstitute an important addition to Soviet economic capabilities and warThis increment will become even more significant as production increases and as more complete integration with the USSR is attained.
Satellite exports to the West havethe Soviet-Satellite complex with channels for acquiring critical materials and equipment difficult and in'some cases even impossible for the USSR to obtain directly. The present dependence of some Western states upon the Satellites for coal and grains and the reluctance of some states to forego the advantages of East-West trade prevent Western export restrictions from eliminating thisentirely.
The rising curve of Satellite industrial production began to flatten out in the first half Increases in industrial pro-
(jccni;
TOP GEORET
3 will be limited by del" iencies in skilled labor and competent mar.agement, in raw materials, and in capital equipment.
The industrial capacity and general economic strength of the Satellites will remain low in comparison with those of Western Europe. However, the Satellites almost certainly will continue toarger proportion of their productive capabilities and economic resources todevelopment and to theof military equipment.
The Satellite ground forces are now estimated toen,intoivisions, ofre armoredechanized. The forces have grown in sizeercenthroughe believe they will increase bytrengthen, organizedivisions.
The Satellite Air Forces have only limited defensive and ground attackThe reorganization of these forces, now in progress, does not appear toigh priority and is unlikely to be completed within the period of this estimate.rogramreater sense of urgency could produce effective air forces by
Satellite Naval Forces,significance, are beinggradually and byave the capability ofassistance to the Sovietcoastal operations.
Deficiencies in equipment, and the unreliability and poor morale of thearmed forces indicate that theirsize is not an accurate gauge of their power. However, they areignificant factor in the Europeanoff they advance along the lines projected by the Kremlin, they willubstantial addition to Sovietstrength in Europe and will offset, at least in part, the growth of Western strength in Europe.
Control of the Satellites has pushed the frontiers of the USSRiles west into Central Europe and has established for thcuffer zone now garrisoned by the Satellite forces and anoviet troops. This area provides advanced air bases, spaceorward air defense system, and naval bases. 'Soviet control of the areaoised threat to all ofEurope, the Scandinavian peninsula, and the Near East. J
DISCUSSION
Control Degree of Control
control over the Satellites iscomplete. It ensures the subservience
1 reliability of the governments and con-i. -ued Soviet economic and military benefit frvm the area.
Kremlin has maintained and willits authority over the Satellites through
political, economic, and Ideological means and through the skillful and experienced use of police and military power.
Kremlin has already decapitatedthe old political parties andgroups, but the discontent noweach Satellite will persist and perhaps
elimination of all butfrom the Communist hierarchies
ononoT
been almost completed. "Cleansing" of Communist regimes, however,erpetual process, and there will continue to be purges within the Communist parties, governments, armies, and police forces of each of the
c. The subservience of the Satellites wiil be guaranteed by present Soviet authority, the power of Soviet advisers and missions In the Satellite governments. Soviet economic and military controls, the rigorous training and education programs, and calculated use of terror to create thc sense of isolation,and physical and moral fear.
Instruments and Techniques
Nationalization and direct operation by the governments of thc vital industrial and commercial sectors of thc Satellite economies simplify Soviet control. Soviet authority over these economics Is exercised in addition through reparations arrangements, trade and financial agreements to Implement specific production schedules, the use of Sovietin key positions throughout theJoint companies (notably In Rumania andnd the CouncU of Economic Mutual Assistancehich functions both as an effective control Instrument andacade for "Joint planning."
Direct controls arc exercised through the Communist parties. In addition, theuses the Cominform to furtheramong the Satellites and to helpa uniform political and propaganda line. Although the Kremlin permits and encourages programs of cultural, economic, and technical collaboration among thc Satellites, It appears determined to bind the Satellites Individually to the USSR, rather than lo unify them.
The secret police and security forces ln each of the Satellites are large, carefully. and well trained. They are infiltrated *nd often dominated by experienced Soviet personnel.
Large Soviet military missions arethc reorganization of the Satellite armed forces, which are adopting standard Soviet methods, doctrine, organization, and equipment Soviet commanders, advisers.
and technicians are located ln key positions In the mUltary forces and defense ministries, in effect adding the Satellite forces to.theThe purging of the officer corps has been almost completed, politicaloften occupies as much time and effort as mill Wry training, and the Satellite forces will remain dependent upon the USSR for all of their aircraft and for most of their tanks and heavy artillery.
he final lever of Soviet control consists of the Soviet forces stationed within these countries or along their borders. The forces stationed within the Satellites and In theZone of Austria were estimatedo consistrom the Soviet Army (including military0 security troops,oviet-manned aircraft*
Troublesome Issues ond Forces
A number of Issues and forces remain which will constitute Irritations for thein Eastern Europe, but which will not jeopardize Soviet authority. Six ofnationalism, the traditional hatred of Russia (except in Czechoslovakia andestern cultural tradition (especially inCzechoslovakia, andeligion, territorial conflicts among the Satellites, and ethnic or religious minorities within thefrom the history of this area.imposition of the Soviet system. Soviet economic exploitation of the area, and the current decline of the standard of living-are direct products of the recent changes. The Kremlin in the past has shown such skill and resolution In coping with the unrestfrom these issues and In discovering and obliterating hostile forces that, in time of peace, none of these Issues Is expected to develop into moreuisance or anupon the Communist program within the period of this estimate.
A rapid collectivization of agriculture would almost certainly provoke strongand adversely affect agriculturalin thc Satellites for some time, but
For farther detail eonccmini Soviet forces sta-uoned .ithtn theee Appendix A.
It would probably not shake Soviet control over the Satellites. Although collectivization Ls fundamental to Stalinist philosophy, it has been proceeding very slowly in the Satellites and the rate is not likely to be increased sharply during the period of this estimate.
II. Satellite Contribution* lo Soviet
Strength: Economic The Long-Term Program
During the first years after the conclusion of hostilities, the USSR ruthlessly extracted from Eastern Europe the immediatelyeconomic benefits. The means usedoutright requisition1 of materials and equipment and the imposition of bilateral trade pacts on terms overwhelminglyto the USSR
A revised program began to take form lateroviding for the carefully planned Industrialisation of the Satellite countries and their integration into the Soviet economic system to achieve the following results:
of these countries and ofdevelopment by the USSR andof Soviet-type socialized economies.
Satellite contribution ofresources and production toand military strength and theof the Satellite economiesthey willermanent,valuable addition to Soviet strength.
dependence of thethe USSR and their independenceWest, depriving the West of theit formerly enjoyed In
J. Development of Satellite strength so that the Satellites,roup of them, may have the capability of conducting Soviet-sponsored localised war and so that the Satellites may make their maximum contribution to Soviet strengtheneral war.
long-range program has beenInay lhat the IndustrialImmediate military capabilities olshould advance simultaneously.while the Satellites arc in aslate of war-readiness, there Is no
Indication that the program envisages the outbreak of war at any particularr that the long-term program Is being sacrificed to achieve greater Immediate war-readiness.
reorganization of the economies ofis directed by the Kremlinagencies as the Council of EconomicAssistance, which provides machineryeach national economy withthe USSR, for allocating rawequipment, and foreign exchange,arranging specialization and divisionThe Satellites Import from theof the raw materials and capitalfor industrialization, but the in-
* dustries developed are those which canmost to the economic potential of the USSR. Thc Satellites have thus been forcedattern of production and tradeto the interests ot the USSR.
The Current Plans
A high percentage of Satellite nationalunprecedented for this area, is being devoted loarge proportion of which, in turn, is scheduled for the expansion of industrial capacity, particularly in heavy industry For example, forty percent of Czechoslovakia's capital investments scheduled for industry, and the planned Eastern German annual percentage rises fromo15
While It Is likely that few of thegoals set by the plans will be achieved, these goals are significant in that theythc revolutionary character of thc changes planned and the consequentsize of the contributions the Kremlineach lo make lo Soviet strength. For example, lhe present plan provides for anof Industrial production In Poland5 ofercent over that Sixty percent of the national income of Poland Ls to be derived from industryompared withercent In Hungary, the share of the national income derived fromis scheduled lo rue fromercent9 loercent3 in Czechoslovakia is to beercent greater than thatnd
1' ODOHBf
heavy industrial production5 Is planned toercent greater than thatiesent plans schedule Eastern Germany's Ir.-jstrial production5ercent of that
principal Economic Contributions
he principal economic contributions of the Satellites to the USSR consist of theflow of certain raw materials and of fabricatedhe following are the most important:
a. Thc Satellites0 are estimated to have supplied approximatelyercent of the Soviet Orbit's uranium ores andwith Eastern Germany accounting forercent, Czechoslovakiaerceni. andercent.
astern Germany. Czechoslovakia.and Poland export lo theercent of the total annualof their engineering Industries, or an amount equal to aboutercent of Soviel annual production. Some Items, notably electronic equipment, electric motors, diesel engines, industrial Instruments, and machine tools,articularly importantto Soviet industrial and militarybecause of the highly skilled laborIn their manufacture, ln addition. Eastern German and Czechoslovaklan exports of industrial equipment to other Satellitesthe capacity of those countries for supplying thc USSR
c. Overercent of the petroleumproduced from crude and synthetics by the Satellites (including thc Soviet Zone of Austria)urnished the USSR, primarily for stockpiling and the supply of Soviethin the Satellite area.illion tons of petroleum products refined from crude and synthetics were madeto the USSR by the Satellites, compared with Soviet production ofillionarger amount ls being provided
The table Inndicates0 of various selected raw materials and manufaciured equipment by the Satellites, compared with Lhc producUon of thoseand products by the USSR.
d. The chemical industries in the Satellite area make an Important direct contribution to the Soviet war potential, with Easternand the Polish coke-chemical Industry providing the largest shares. The chemicals of which Satellite production ls mostin relation to Soviet outputercent of lhe USSR'snitrichc Satellitesto the USSR substantial quantities of the chemicals used directly In thc Sovietof explosives.
The scientific and technical personnel of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, andesser extent of Poland andajor addition to Soviet capabilities. Although relatively few of these scientists and technicians have been moved to the USSR, the products of their skill are of great value to the Soviet economy.
The Satellites serve as media forfrom the West and from the Far Eastand equipment which are important to the Soviet war potential and which the USSR finds difficult and in some casesto obtain directly. These materials and this equipment, through trade agreements concluded by the Satellites with the West, are obtained by the USSR for Its own industries and for Satellite industries working for the USSR. This asset is diminishing due tocontrols over thc export of stralegicHowever, the present dependence of some Western European states upon the Satellites for coal and grains and theof some slates to forego the advantages of East-West trade prevent Western exportfrom eliminating this advantage
Limitations on Satellite Economic Capabilities
he Industrialization programs In effect in the Satellites8 or earlier encountered difficulties1 primarily because of theof the Satellites to obtain lhc necessary supplies of materials and equipment. The rising curve of Industrial producUon hasbegun to flatten out. and future planned increases arc unlikely to be achieved because
of shortages. It Is almost certain Uiat none of the Satellites will fulfill1nd export schedules, and full successlans is virtuallyurrent Satellite deficiencies constitute an important limiting factor on Soviet plans for the Satellites.
planned expansion of Industrythe supply of available skilledmanagement and estimated abilityskilled workers, technicians, and
Satellites lack adequate suppliesof the raw materials necessaryodem industrialiron ore. copper, lead. xinc.molybdenum, tungsten,and pyrites, and tin arein supply. It is unlikely lhatcould be increased sufficientlythe expanded industrial economyOrbit and at the same time toto the West at the present level.
in capital equipmentthe program. For example,planned hydroelectric projectsequipment which neither the USSRSatellites themselves can provide inquantity and which cannot now befrom the West. Petroleumdrilling equipment, complextools, precision instruments,for manufacturingare all vital for fulfillment olprogram for expanded production,are now difficult to obtain.
supply of agriculturalfor financing thc purchase ofabroad is unlikely to be Increasedbeyond its present level
critical materials andfor industrialization of thealso now in short supply within the
Comparisonhe Satellites and Western Kurope
he productive capabilities and economic resources of Satellite Europe are low Inwith those of Western Europe. The total of the national incomes of the Western
European states (Including West Germany and thc UK) is at least three times ai great as that of the Satellites, and the estimated rate of growth of the Satellite economy throughs about the same as the estimated rate of growth of the Westerneconomy. The Satellites will almost certainly continue toigherof their national Incomes lo miliiary
III. Satellite Contributions lo Soviet
Strength: Military Advanced Bases for the USSR
Control of the SatelllLcs has pushed the frontiers or the USSRiles wesl into Central Europe and has established for theuffer zone now garrisoned by anoviet troops, organized intoivisions,atellitehis area provides advanced air bases, spaceorward air defense system, and naval bases. Soviet control of the areaoised threat to all of Western'Europe, the Scandinavian peninsula, and the Near East.
The bulk of the Soviet forces In thearea is concentrated In Eastern Oermany and constitutes the spearhead of Sovietstrength. Soviet-manned aircraft based in the Satellites now. ofre Jetonventionalightttackeconnaissance planes. The largest concentration of these craft is inGermany, whichhile Hungary and the Soviet Zone of Austria together.. and. There has been no significant Increase in the size of these forces during the past two years, but Jet fighters are gradually replacing conventional ones and Jet light bombers have begun to
Satellite Ground Forces
ground forces of the Satellitesen. and the internalforces constitute an
Allied divisions are approximatelyercent larger than Soviet and Satellite divisions, bolhnd in present numerical strength.
* li 'i'
These ground lorces are now organ-IrM inloivisions, ofre armoredechanized. These forces Increased In size approximatelyercent from0 throughhey are growing in strength and quality at anrate, and it is believed that they willan additionalercent in size byt that date, they will totalivisions, of whichill be armored andechanized.
The Kremlin is reorganizing the Satellite ground forces so that they will conform to the Soviet pattern. Great differences still exist among thc Satellite forces in training,morale, and general capabilities. The Bulgarian army Is apparently the most loyal and formidable, although even it is notompletely reliable Soviet Instrument. Itsivisions are almost fully equipped with Soviet materiel, reserve stockpiles are available, and morale is good. There arerained reserves, of whom0 are sufficiently trained for immediate
No other Satellite force will attain the present capabilities of the Bulgarian armythe endhe Rumanian and Hungarian ground forces most closelythe Bulgarian standard, but even these armies lack standardized equipment andand are not considered completely reliable. Onlyercent of Rumanian equipment, for example, Ls of Soviet manufacture. The ground forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany are much less advanced and reliable than the Balkan armies, and the USSR couldw rely upon themeneral war except for subsidiary duties.
ithin the period of this cslimate. the Kremlin Is likely to be uncertain of the loyal support of the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Eastern German ground forces. While the ground forces of the other Satellites are now more reliable, the loyalty of even these armies may be severely shaken if the present disparity in miliiary power of the West and the Orbit is
substantially reduced or if the USSR should suffer reverseseneral war.
The Satellite forces are not now fullyHowever, the command structures and the Soviet role are such that coordination can almost certainly be achieved within the period of this estimate.
The Kremlin hasrogram for standardizing the equipment of theground forces. The Satellites are now manufacturing for their own useand non-combat vehicles, light artillery, small arms, ammunition, and parts. They are dependent upon the USSR for most of their tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavyand for some of their light artillery and small arms.
Asndicates, trained ortrained reserves of the Satellite ground forces amount toen. This figure Is deceptive, however, because:
of these men have had recentor have used Soviet equipment, whichstandard lh all of these armies,have been subject to thc degree ofsought by the Kremlin in the
industrialization andare causing increasingespecially In the Satellitesindustrially.
Is little equipment availableexcept in Bulgaria and except forand stockpiles of Soviet forcesIn Eastern Europe. Even theBulgarian army lacks adequate signalequipment.
Satellite Air Forces and Airfields
mission of the Satellite Air Forcesdefensive. These airircraft, andrained pilotsKremlin is now engaged In anrapid development of these forces,al first upon Poland andand aircraft are now practically all
For further details concerning the development of Satellite ground. seeC.
' For further details concerning the Satellite Air Forces, see Appendix D.
TUP .
World War II design and construction, but jfighters are appearing in Increasingnd Intensive Soviet training of carefully selected Satellite pilots Is assuring Sovietdoctrines, techniques, and tactics. The Chechoslovakian and Rumanian air forces arenow being completely reorganized andbut these forces will probably not beand. efficient within the period of this estimate.
An extensive program of air fieldand construction Ls being carried out in all of the Satellites except Albania. There areirfields In the Satellite area;f these have runways capable of sustained heavy and mcdiurn-bomber operations. Thels upon Eastern Germany,ields can now support sustained, andimited, operations by heavy bombers, mediumand Jet fighters, and wherether fields are being Improved. The Eastern German network is the best equipped in thc Satellites and provides thc most extensive and up-to-date facilities for night-flying and all-weather operations. This network and the Hungarian network already surpass present needs for the aircraft types currently based in those coun-tries
The Soviet forces stationed ln thc Satellites are supplied with antiaircraft equipment, but intensive development for the Satellites of early warning radar networks,antiaircraft, and civil defense began only In the spring Progress has been
most notable in Poland. Rumania, andEven now. the Satellites possess only small amounts of World War II radarand spotters are still employed to report aircraft movement. None of the Satellites hasodern and effective antiaircraft command.
Satellite Naval Forces
The capabilities of thc Satellite navies are currently negligible, and the personnel of these navies Is not yet considered completelySoviet control is being Improved through the placing of Soviet naval officers In thestructures, the elimination of all whose loyalty is suspect, and Intensive politicalcourses. Small numbers ofships, notably of mine and escort types, have been turned over to the Satellite navies. Byhe Satellite navies will probably be able to provide appreciable assistance to the Soviet navy hi such fields as minesweeplng. minelaylng, escort, and coastal defense duties. Summary
In summary, because of deficiencies Ln equipment, loyalty, and morale, the Satellite armed forces as such do not now possess the capabilities which their size would appear to indicate. However, they arector in Ihe European balance of forces If they advance along the linesby the Kremlin, they will form aaddition to Soviet military strength in Europe and will offset, at least in part, the growth of Western strength.
appendix a
soviet forces stationed in the satellites.
Secdmtv
AlUCBAft
0/
Germany
480
0
so
il
0 0
ft
Zone ot Austria
1
ID
220
100
Theie figures include all Soviet forces stationed in the Soviet Zone of Austria.
' These divisions are organized Into lour mechanized and two rifle armies. The latter two armiesot two corps
figures for Ihe Soviet-manned aircraft stationed in Hungary Include those stationed In the Soviet Zone ol Austria.
APPENDIX B
PRODUCTION OP SELECTED COMMODITIES BY THE SATELLITES AND THE USSR
I960
Production
Metric Tons!
Production as Percentages of
Production
plus Satellite Production
Me tali
Ore
Iron
Steel
Colic
Metals
and Lignite
Oil
Product*
(Synthetic)
)
Acid
Rubber
Abrasives
Products
Items'
Bearings
Tools
oo a
Cars
*
0
Cars
Electrical
Tubes'
Lamps'
Power'
Includes the Soviel Zone ol Austria.
crude only.
"This includes products from shale and synthetics.Not available for this report.
are calculated on the followtne basis: machinery Items, units; heavy electrical machinery, thousand kilowatts; electron tubes and electric lamps, million units; electric po*er, billion kilowall-hours.
production.
APPENDIX C
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SATELLITE GROUND FORCES, IMMSM
Country
September.
2 3
c
S3 a
D! visions
si*
a.c:
(2
p
Eastern Germany Poland
Cicchoslovakla
Albania
Hungary
Rumania
Bulgaria
TOTAL
0
SO.OC'J
24
2B
5
24
2
s
1
2 77
0
'Ob.
0 0
6
1
4
9
1 13
6
Plus Eastern Oermany.
ATELLITE AIR FORCES1
FiL'hcers
41
0
ll
14
41
IC
c
GERMANY POLAND
4
CZECHOSLOVAKIA HUNGARY
ALGARIA TOTAL
figures Include those for the small Polish Naval Air Pore7
c v
o
5 10
25
3
3
S0
-
0
Original document.
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