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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR CLANDESTINE ATTACK AGAINST THE US WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE US TO SUCH ATTACKo
NIE-3T
This dociztantran roptovod tor ralossa fcitenjh the' HISTOSICM.KBK OS the Central Intelligence Sssray.
Thc intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, theBureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and representatives of the Coast Guard, the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Customs, and the Public Health Service participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the InteUigence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate onugust.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR CLANDESTINE ATTACK AGAINST THE US WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE US TO SUCH ATTACKO
THE PROBLEM
To estimate for the periodohe vulnerability of the US to Soviet clandestine attack1 with weapons of massrior to or concurrent with the outbreak of hostilities on the basis of Soviet capabilities for such attack and USor detecting and preventing an attack.
CONCLUSIONS
Soviets have substantialfor the employment of atomic,and biological weapons forattack upon the continental US.
The US is vulnerable to suchattack because existing and presently planned security measures do net provide adequate assurance that certain methods of clandestine attack would be detected and prevented.
landestine attack on the US the USSR would probably attempt simulta-
For thc purpose of this estimate, the termattack- doca not Include either surprise attack py undisguised military forces or theof conTenUonal sabotage.
term "weapons of mass destruction" lsto atomic, chemical, and bloloelcal weapons, since the stale of development of other conceivable weapons of mass destruction Is such that theirduring the next year ls most unlikely.
analysing US defensive capabilities against clandestine attack, this estimate considers only those security measures that have been Initiated or are In prospect.
neous deliveryumber of atomic weapons, possibly by several methods.
a. The most likely method of attack, because the most feasible and potentially most effective, would be the useircraft to deliver atomic weaponsumber of targetsas the initial act of general
lie delivery of atomic weapons into key harbors by merchant ships is feasible and thereforeerious threat.
of atomic weaponsUS under cover of diplomaticor in the guise of commercialor by landing at someis also feasible. However, sucharc relatively unlikely becausecomplexity and the number ofInvolved.
launching of guidedatomic warheads from merchant
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ships or submarines against near-coastal targetsossibility.
The only method of clandestine attack with chemical warfare agents likely to be employed by thc USSR is the smuggling of limited quantities of nerve gas into the US for disscrnhiaUon against personnel in key Installations. Thc possibility of small-scale nerve gas attacks cannot be overlooked.
The USSR might employ biological warfare (BW) agents against personnel
in key installations well in advanceay. Attacks against livestock and crops with dangerous diseases like foot and mouth disease and cereal rustsossibility at any time. -
t is believed likely that in clandestine attack the USSR would employ those methods not requiringayin thc US, since such methodsthc least risk of loss of strategic surprise.
DISCUSSION
In its struggle with the non-Soviet world, the USSR will have no scruples aboutany weapon or tactic which promisesIn terms of over-all Soviet objectives. Clandestine attack with atomic, chemical, and biological weaponsigh potential of effectivenessimited number of targets, particularly if employed concurrently with, or Just prior to, the initiation of general hostilities. Hence, in planning an attack upon the US, the USSR would undoubtedly consider clandestine employment of the variousof mass destruction available to3 .
landestine attack upon Uie US with weapons of mass destruction would be part of Soviet over-all war plans, and (with thcexception of the use of BW agents) would be undertaken only after the USSR had decided it was prepared to become involvedeneral war with thc US.
iological warfare probably, and chemical warfare possibly, could be employed without detection prior to open war, but if detected and identified as clandestine attack prioray they would cost the USSR loss ofsurprise. It is doubtful whether the USSR would attempt any operations which might be detected and identified sufficiently in advanceour toignificant loss of strategic surprise.
onsiderable extent, the success with which the USSR could employ methods ofrequiring either thc Infiltration ofimmediately prior to attack oroviet sabotagehe US is governed by the ability of American agencies, both abroad and in the US, topotential saboteurs and prevent theirInto the US, as well as to keep under surveillance and control such activities in the US. The chief obstacles to these security measures are:
difficulty of identifying Sovietpersonnel abroad.
impossibility of preventing theall such personnel into the US.
difficulty of imposing completeon subversive personnel orall clandestine operations.
possible existence In the USleeper" organization, the membersare unidentified,
In general, it would be more difficult to prevent Soviet employment of those methods of clandestine delivery which do not require thc assistance of personnel within the US.-Prevention requires not only detection and identification abroad and at home, but also instant and effective counteraction.
US capabilities for detection,and prevention of clandestine delivery
will be short of satisfactory even inowever, current capabilities arc notand will continue to increase asanticipated internal security programs are implemented. In determining theof clandestine attack which the USSR would be most likely to employ, it must be assumed that the USSR is aware of USmeasures against clandestine operations.
Clandestine Attack With Atomic Weapons Atomic Weapons Available to the USSR
It is estimated that the USSR willtockpile oftomic weapons ineapons lnart of this stockpile might be employedlandestine attack against the US.
Atomic weapons available to the USSRnow andan be expected to develop from SO toilotons TNT explosive power. Their weight would probably betwo and five tons; diameter three to five feet; and lengthalf toalf feeton-ballistic case Is used the length is shortened to the diameter).
Methods of Clandestine Delivery Available to the USSR
USSR is capable of theof clandestine delivery of
a. by disguised aircraft; o. by merchant ships;
smuggling;
guided missiles.
Delivery by Disguised Aircraft
Because of its resemblance to thche Sovietould be disguised with US markings and employed for clandestineof atomic bombs.ne-way mission, theas sufficient range to reach every important target In the US and the USSR has an adequate number of TU-4's and trained crews lo perform such missions.
Present flight regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the military services require that both military and civilian aircraftreviously filed flight plan and enter thc US by specified routes. Air-
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from radioactive mist would still be great with attendant disruption of normal port activities.
Coast Guard, within thc limits ofresources, hasortand smuggling preventionincludes:
patrols in major ports.
surveillance and boarding ofvessels and other small craft,harbor entrances.
time patrol at entrance to tenports.
cooperation with Customs andpilots in halting and searching Sovietmerchant vessels.
As an additional measure, the Coast Guard anticipates early approval by theof Statelan wherebyessel departing for tbe US could, if he so desired, file with the US consular agent at the last foreign port ofertificate which would expedite the ship's entry into the US. This certificate would indicate thedate of arrival In the US, the port of origin and ports of call,eclaration by the master that, to the best of his knowledge, the ship carried no cargo other than thatby US law. It has been proposed that the Central Intelligence Agency coordinate this information and advise the Coast Guard. This procedure would simplify to some extent the control of unexpected merchant vesseland focus the attention of thc Coast Guard on suspicious vessels even prior to their arrival.
There are certain factors which would seriously hamper the Coast Guard inclandestine delivery:
o. There is no device for detecting an atomic weapon within the holderchant ship. The only certom^method'Is "complete unloading of the cargo followed by detailed inspection of the vessel and. The USSRumber offishing trawlers similar in type to US vessels and capable of transporting atomic weapons.
c. During the first quarterhe Soviet orbit (Including China, but excluding
Finland) had under charier moreesternn addition, the chartering of Western ships often leads to their sale to Soviet-Satellite countries. Examinationhip's papers is noteliable method of determininghip- Is actuallySoviet control. Such control can bewith reasonable certainty only with accurate and timely intelligence support.
The Soviets enforce secrecy for their Ship chartering by maintaining their own charter and insurance agencies which enable them to by-pass the usual commercial
In many instances, intelligenceindicating Soviet charter orhas not been received until more than sixty days after tlie transaction occurred. Therefore, It ls within Soviet capabilities to obtain andoreign ship fordelivery before the US could learn that the ship was under Soviet control.
d. Finland is not Included in the Coast Guard list of countries whose ships are to be inspected.ubstantial part of Finnish shipping is thought to be undercontrol.
of the above factors, thebe considered capable of utilizing aship for delivering an atomica key US harborelativelyof escaping detection.
Smuggling of Atomic Weapons
An atomic bomb, Including the fissionable material, can be broken down into relatively small components which could be smuggled separatelyeriod of time Into the US. The various components could be so packaged that unusual handling precautions would not be required and radiation detection would be most improbable. Assembly of the bomb would present certain difficulties but none of an insuperable character.
Although it would be theoreticallyto manufacture clandestinely within the
* These figures do not include the additional Western ships engaged In trade wtth the Soviet orbit but not under direct charter to the Soviet orbit.
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all the components of an atomic weapon with the exception of the fissionable material, it would be difficult to procure and process the necessary material Therefore, it is unlikely that the USSR would attempt theof an atomic weapon within the US.
Smuggling under Vie Cover of Diplomatic Immunity
Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, components for an atomic bomb or, lesseven an assembled bomb could beto Soviet diplomatic representatives in the US as household effects or suppliesfear of official Inspection by the Bureau of Customs. In addition, no government agency is specifically charged with thefor observing the off-loading,and disposition of such shipments.
This method would require thc closelyeffort of several Individuals ln the US to receive the weapon and deliver it to the target area. It is unlikely that such anwould be detected even by constantof official Soviet representatives in this country.
Smuggling as Commercial Shipments
It is feasible to smuggle an atomic bomb through customsommercial shipment, and many types of imports from the Satellites could be usedcover" for such an act. furthermore, the number of Importing firms in the US is so large that thc appearanceew firmhange ln the imports of an old firm would not automatically arouse the suspicion of the Customs authorities.
The Bureau of Customs is well aware of the possibility of attempted smugglingomplete atomic bomb or its components. Customs inspectors have been alerted to watch for shipments; of the weight and size characteristicomb, and such shipments from countries within the Soviet orbit aresuspect. Although the Bureau of Customs is capable of detecting shipments of this type it would have considerable difficulty detecting bomb components.
Theoretically, there arc numerousby which the USSR could circumvent cus-
toms inspection. For example, commercial shipments from abroad received at American ports and consigned to points other than the Port of entry, are usually transshipped,customs Inspection,onded carrier for transportation to destination. Customsis made Just prior to final delivery to the consignee, but 'hijacking" or "switching" en route is possible. However, such methods would involve elaborate arrangements as well as thc existence within the US of an efficient organization to establish dummysubvert employees of bonded carriers, etc These requirements greatly increase the risk of detection.
While It would be feasible for the USSR to ship an atomic bomb as parthipmenteutral country, the USSR would have to resort to one or more transshipmentthereby Increasing thc number ofInvolved and the risk of detection.
Because of the complexity of theoperations, the risk of detection, and the availability of simpler and more secureIt is considered relatively improbable that the USSR would endeavor to smuggle an atomic weapon Into the US under thc guiseommercial shipment.
Smuggling into Secluded Coastal and Border Areas
A more serious threat, well within Soviet capabilities, is the smuggling of an atomic bomb, especially if disassembled,oviet port Into an Isolated section of thc US.security coverage ot all coastal andareas is practically impossible.muggling operation could involveomboviet-controlledvessel or submarinemall boat which would bring it ashore. Here it could be loadedruck for assembly anddelivery to the target area and possible detonation ln the parked vehicle.
This would be the most difficult to detect of those methods which require the assistance of SovleUcon trolled personnel within thc US. The weapon would be in the hands of Soviet-controlled personnel at aU times and would not come under the direct scrutiny of govem-
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ment authorities. However, the requirement for several completely reliable Individuals within the US, some of whom must possessqualifications, mightartialto the use of this method.
capabilities of the Coast Guard,Air Force for air and sea patrols willlimited until these services areon an expanded wartime basis.shore patrols are very limited inthe Coast Guard has:
all lifeboat stations andlo the threat of smugglingweapons across beaches and intoareas and inlets; and hasintelligence in this regard.
emphasis on activeboarding of small craft at inlet entrances.
coordinated over-all plan has yetfor thc detection and preventionsmuggling of atomic weapons into thesecluded points. Untalan isand put into effective operation, theremain vulnerable to this threat.
Guided Missiles Launched from' Merchant Ships
It is estimated that the USSRype missiles with ranges of atiles which could be launched from merchant ships or submarines. Such missiles could operate at low altitudes and could have considerably better accuracy than the German operational missiles of World War LL While there is no conclusive evidence that the USSR has an atomic warhead suitable for usehip-launched guided missile, thc construction ofarhead is estimated to be withincapabilities.
A Soviet merchant ship or submarine could reach Its launching position with Utile chance of detection by maintaining radioand avoiding normal shipping lanes. Therefore, this method of clandestine attack appears well suited for employment of atomic weapons against critical near-coastal targets. Including key harbors. Intense air and sea patrols would be required to minimize this danger.
Clandestine Attack With Chemical Warfare (CW) Agents
he term "CW agents" as used hereinto those toxic chemical agents suitable for employment in mass quantities forwarfare. These agents are to befrom the almost countless number of poisonous chemical compounds which are readily available lo Soviet personnel fromsources and are suitable forfood and water supplies and forkey Individuals. Employment of such commercial chemicals is considered to besabotage and is not Included in this estimate.
lthough thc Soviets have large stockpiles of standard CW agents, these agents are not well suited for clandestine attack and their employmenl for that purpose is highlyThe CW agents most likely to be used for clandestine attack arc the nerve gases, GA and GB, primarily because of their extreme high toxicity which is considerably greater than that of other known CW agents. Thc USSR probably has sufficient quantities of nerve gas for fairly extensive clandestineIn common with atomic weapons, nerve gases are not suited for employment prioray inasmuch as theirphysiological effects would make theiras enemy action relatively easy.
A and GB are odorless, colorless liquids which become effective anil-personnel agents when dispersedog or an Invisible vapor. GB is approximately three times more toxic than GA. The Initial characteristiceffects of GA and GB are contraction of the pupil of thc eye, twitching eyelids,of vision, tightness of the chest andin breathing. Exposureethalusually causes death within an hour. About one-fifthethalis sufficient to cause incapacitation for several days. In general, the persistence of nerve gasesatter of hours rather than days.
n clandestine attack, lt would not beto build up the concentrations required for employment against population centers or
other targetsizable area. However, clandestine attack Is well suited foragainst personnel in key Installations when the objective tsigh percentage of the personnel, and physical destruction of the installation by an atomic weapon ls not paramount.
Effective clandestine attack againstIn key installations would requiretiming and positioning in disseminating relatively small quantities of nerve gas. Nerve gas may be disseminated effectively eitheruilding or in its immediate vicinity.
The most likely method of disseminationuilding would be by means of an aerosol bomb similar to those used forand equippedime mechanism. When disseminatedonfined spaceubic feet,ound of OB wouldoncentration lethal to aboutercent of the people exposed forinutes.
If released in thc vicinity, nerve gases will easily penetrate most buildings under proper weatheredium size building could be successfully attacked with one0 gallons) of OB disseminatedarked vehicle equippedompressed air source and adequate spray nozzles.
Thc only method of clandestine attack likely to be employed by the USSR would be the smuggling of nerve gas into thc US for dissemination by saboteurs. Whue underinternal security measures the US isto this method of attack, the necessity of relying upon Soviet-controlled personnel In thc US might deter the USSR fromnerve gas Into thc US.
The methods available to the USSR for smuggling nerve gas Into the US correspond with those already discussed In connection with clandestine atomic attack, vis,,immunity, smuggling through Customs, or Introductionoint outside Customs surveillance. In all instances, the successful smuggling of nerve gas or the completedispensers would be considerably easier. Nerve gas could be easily disguised as one of any number of commercial exports from the
Soviet orbit or transmittediplomatic pouch.
Both the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs are well aware of this threat, butthat it is practically impossible to insure detection ofmall-scale-activity.
Tlie most Important phase of protection against clandestine attack with nerve gases Is the local security of key governmentalas provided by special guards, police, and military personnel. Exceptery few installations, present Inspection of entering personnel and patrolling of adjacent areas Is
Inadequate to prevent clandestine attack with nerve gas.
the next year, at least, thereno self-operating test to provideof the presence of nerve gases.military gas mask providesagainst GA or GB in vapor formconcentrations higher than those likelyencountered. Equipping keyspecialized air Alters offers littlea source of additional protection.are prohibitive In size and cost andcompletely effective. Thc effects ofmay be reduced by prompt recognitionunique symptoms, Injectionsew minutes ofartificial respiration combined with
Clandestine Attack With Biological Warfare (BW) Agents
Biological warfare is the employment of living microorganisms, their toxic products, or chemical plant growth regulators todeath or casualties among personnel, livestock, or crops.
On the basis of available information on Soviet interest and activities in BW, Soviet scientific and technical potential and USin the development of BW, it Isthat:
a. Tlie Soviets arc capable ofariety of BW agents ln sufficient quantities for extensive clandestine employment against man. animals, and plants.
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Thc level of knowledge of the SovieU and their capabilities for disseminating BW agents arc at least equal to those of thc TJS.
BW agentsew and untried weapon, and evidence of their effectiveness ls based solely on limited experience and research-In general, biological warfare involves adegree of uncertainty than any other weapon of mass destruction. This mighteterrent to Soviet employment of BW,against personnel. On thc other hand, the USSR might consider that thiswould be outweighed by our limited defensive experience and by the Isolatedlocation of the US which would offer an excellent BW target.
Many types of BW agents arc well-suited for clandestine attack, and could be employed by the USSR even well In advanceay as part of an over-all plan to Impair the mili-tary effectiveness of the US. In contrast to clandestine attack with atomic and chemical weapons, clandestine employment of certain BW agents would entail much less risk of identification as enemy action.
small amounts of thesebe required initially. Suchbe almost impossible to detectbrought into this country underof diplomatic immunity oroperations. In addition, ltbe difficult to have some BW agentsand cultured locallyrainedwho was immunized againstequipped to handle dangerous
agents do not produceand their effects arc nothours or days after dissemination.
results of some BW agentsoutbreaks of disease, and it wouldto connect clandestinesuch agentsostile act
Clandestine BW Attack against Personnel
is likely that the onlyhich the USSRay would be those causinglo the US since thc outbreak ofdisease would probably arouse sus-
picion as to its source. The statistics of the Public Health Service on the Incidence ofdiseases In the US are made public and undoubtedly are known to the USSR.
In clandestine allack, it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficientof BW agents to produce largeof casualties in urban areas. However, BW agents might be employed clandestinely to Incapacitate key individuals and personnel In vital installations.
Tests In the US with simulated airborne BW agents have demonstratedimited air space can be contaminated byof relatively small quantities of BW agents. Little is yet known regarding the likelihood of disease among personnel who arc exposed to airborne BW agents, andopinion in the US disagrees as to thcof disease likely to result from such contamination. However, dissemination of some airborne BW agentsuilding probably would cause casualtiesarge portion of thc personnel. Similarprobably could be obtained from agents disseminated outsideuilding and carried into thc building by air currents soon after dissemination.
Detection and identificationWagainst the civilian population isupon the alertness of healthhaving responsibilities for the control of epidemic diseases, assisted by practicingand diagnostic laboratories. TheHealth Service is supporting these efforts by improving the reporting of unusualof diseases, training medical officers to investigate epidemics, encouraging research on Improved methods of diagnosis andand strengthening relationshipsthe medical and allied professions and official health agencies. In addition, theCivil Defense Administration isa program of public education in biological warfare.
Because of US medical and public health capabilities, it is believed that there islittle riskidespreadepidemic resulting from clandestine BW aitack. However, under present internal se-
iionn "f-
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measures, personnel in most vitalwould be vulnerable to such attack.
Clandestine BW Attack against Livestock
he USSR could smuggle viruses of animal diseases into the US or might possibly obtain them in this country. In the former case, thc virus could originate in the USSR or could be prepared by Soviet-controlled personnel from infected animals in South or Central America.
iseases could be spread among livestock by contaminating their food, smearing their muzzles with the virus or spreadingmaterial on the ground where it would be kicked up with dust. Individual herds could easily be attacked, but more widespreadcould be initiated by Infecting animals in "feeder" stockyards, or at livestock auctions. The Department of Agriculture has indicated lhat widespread outbreaks of disease could also be brought about by contaminating the antitoxins, vaccines, and other blologicals manufactured in the US for tlie inoculation of animals. Ih the manufacture of theseproduction processes are continuedong period of time and government supervision and physical security ofand processing operations are insufficient.
landestine attack against animals, foot and mouth disease constitutes thc most serious threat to this country. The disease is highly contagious. Furthermore, thereelatively long period during which aanimal is capable of Infecting other animals before the symptoms become apparent to anyone but an expert.
Tlie occurrenceW attack against animals would be extremely difficult toor even identify as enemy action. The Department of Agriculture is aware of this threat and special instructions have beentoounty agents and other field representatives. The Department of Agriculture can be expected to Isolate and eradicate resultant outbreaks of any known animal diseases, with the possible exception of foot and mouth disease.
t Is estimated that the USSR mightclandestine BW attack against US live-
stock, even well in advance of anyay. Although such attacks could be carried out with relative ease andizable economic losseriod of several years, they would not create afood shortage in thc US.
Clandestine BW Attack against Crops
Certain fungi, known asttack cereal plants and may reduce the yieldiven localityercent or morej From time toew variety of rust appears ln the US, to which our cereals are not resistant; The principal remedy is to develop and plant varieties of cereals which will resist the new rust. This requires several years.
It would be feasible for the Soviets to smuggle into themall quantity of rust spores to which our cereals arc not resistant and disseminate them over wheat fields under cover of darknessand-operated blower. Depending on especially favorable weather conditions and other unpredictable factors, this rust might continue, to spread and attack both winter and spring wheatarge area.
Other possible BW agents which might be effective against US cropsesser degree include viruses causing tomato blight, potalo blight, etc. However, it is considered that the results of an attack with these agents would not be serious. Blights of this kind arcto distribute widely, and can becombatted by spraying the infected plants.
A variety of chemical growth regulators could be employed against crops as BW agents,weed killers, etc. These chemicals are disseminated by spraying them on the area under cultivation. While the results areto the area sprayed, the effect does not spread. It would be impractical tothese agentslandestine attackarge area since the amount of chemicals required0 poundounds per acre.
It would be possible to employ as BW agents insects which are in themselves harm-ful or which spread crop diseases. However,
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is do indication that the use of insects as BW agents has been developed and such employment is considered unlikely.
t would be extremely difficult to prevent orlandestine BW attack against crops. As in the case of BW attack against livestock, the Department of Agriculture is well aware of possible clandestine BW attack against crops, and can be expected to bring any plant disease under control or provide suitable replacement cropsew years. The Department of Commerce hasa program which, if implemented.
would restrict the opportunities which exist for the use of small civilian planes byfor spray dissemination, etc
t Is estimated that the USSR mightemploy some form of cereal rustlandestine BW attack against US crops. However, such attack is unlikely because of the uncertainty that this disease would spreadide area. In the event of an attack of this type, there would be no riskirect adverse eflect upon the war effort, because of the abundance andof domestic food production.
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Original document.
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