SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION (NIE 11)

Created: 12/5/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

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-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

O

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DISTRIBUTION (NIEffice of the Frcaldent NaUonal Security Council NaUonal Security Resource* Board Department of State Office of Secretary of Defense Department of the Array Department ot the Navy Department ot lhc Air Force Atomic Energy Commission Joint Chiefs of SUtl Federal Bureau of Investigation Research and Development Board Munition* Board

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

thin dU6MMt has beea corsund Ccco-JO> v al HLVIOIoCGeMral iateOligeocc IW'

IBS

The uitellieenee organizations of the Departments of State tbe Army, lhe Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on Information available

SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

In Korea undlhat thc purpose of the Chinese

Communist Intervention is lo render the UN

position in Korea untenable.

attitude of the Chineseand urgent defensive preparationsshow that this intervention wasin realization of the risk of generalthe United States andand perhaps In expectation of such a

"development.

is highly Improbable that theregime would have acceptedwithout explicit assurance ofsupport.

i. The Soviet Union will probably:

to support Chinesein Korea by the provision ofmateriel, technical personnel, andunits, as necessary.

aircraft and anti-aircraftwith trained personnel, as necessarydefense of targets In China againstat tack.

openly to the military support ofChina, under the tonus ofTreaty, in tlic event of major USoperations against Chinese territory, The Soviet rulers, in directing orthc Chinese Communist Interventionmust have appreciated theof global war and have felt ready toa development.

ntelligence Is Inconclusive as to whether or not the Soviet intention Is to precipitate a

global war now. If the Sovlot-rulers do now intend to bring onar, they might well prefer that It should develop from thein East Asia. On the other hand, even if they do not Intend tolobal war they must estimateroadening of the Korean wareneral war between the United States and China would be advantage-ous to the USSR.

hether orlobal war were to ensue, the USSR could reasonably hope to derive the following advantages from Uie developmenteneral war between the United States and Communist China.

diversion of effective US andlo operations in an indecisivetheir attrition and containment there.

creation of dissension betweenSlates and its allies, which Iswith respect to Asian than toissues.

c The disruption of the coherence achieved by the UN with respect to the originalaggression in Korea.

obstruction of plans for theWestern Europe under the North

speedier achievement ofobjectives In Korea and

n thc other hand, the USSR may estimate that the United Stales would decline thechallenge in Asia, In which case the USSR could proceed to collect the Immediate stakes In Korea and Indochina.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Tlie Soviet rulers have resolved to pursue aggressively their world-wide attack on the power position of the Uniied States and its allies regardless of thc possibility that global

war may result, although they may estimate that the Wealcrn Allies would seek to avoidevelopment. Further direct orSoviet aggression in Europe and Asia Is

- iij<ely,.regardlou'of the outcome of the Korean stCuatlon.

he minimal purpose of the USSR in the current situation is to render untenable thc UN position ln Korea.

he USSR Is prepared to accept, and may be seeking toeneral warthe United States and China, despite Die inherent rink of global war.

he possibility cannot be disregarded that the USSR may already have decided toglobal war In circumstances mostto Itself through the development of general war In Asia. We are unable, on the basis of present Intelligence, to determine the probability ofecision having in fact been made.

Original document.

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