SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE AIR DEFENSE OF MANCHURIA (NIE 2/2)

Created: 11/27/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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UTION (NIEffice of thc President National Security Council National Security Resources Board Department of State omof of Secretary of Defense Department of the Army Department of Uie Navy Department ot the Air Force Atomic Bnerey Coram LiO on Joint Chief! of Staff Federal Bureau of Investigation Research and Development Board MunlUom Board

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE AIR DEFENSE OF MANCHURIA

Ufa

'BET?

The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, thc Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated In the preparation of this estimate and concur in It. Thisased on information available onovember

SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE AIR DEFENSE OF MANCHURIA

THE PROBLEM

o estimate whether, in the event of UN air Force would participate in the defense of such attack on targets in Manchuria, the Soviet Air targets.

CONCLUSIONS

the circumstances envisaged in thethe USSR would provide aircraft,artillery, and trained personnel as necessary for the defense of ManchurianSufficient resources for rendering such aid are available in the Soviet Far East.

Soviet participation In the defense oftargets could take any of theforms:

participation without

open participation of ostensiblyunits,

open participation of Soviet unitslimited commitment under the Sino-Soviet

treaty.

open participation of Soviet unitsaspecteneral war forced on theunder the Sino-Soviet treaty.

At least initially, the most likely form of Soviet participation in thc air defense oftargets would be theactual participation in action without open

The open participation of Soviet units would be unlikely unless general war should develop.

A substantial risk that the situation may degenerateeneral war already exists. UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, alone, probably would not cause the Soviet rulers to decide loeneral war, inasmuch as the Kremlin's basic decision for or against war would be based on global considerations. The events likely to follow such attacks, however, would carry withreater probabilityeneral war developing.

'I'a

Original document.

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