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SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS AND US SECURITY
SUMMARY
present Government of the Union of South Africa, which came to power6 under Prime Minister D. F. Malan, represents mainly the isolationist and anti-Britishof the Afrikaans-speaking population, many of whom are bent on transforming the Union Into an authoritarian Afrikaner state. In basic economic and strategic matters the Government ls oriented toward the UK and the US. as any white South African*must be. and it is violently antiin its politics. However, Its racial and foreign policies provoke marked unfavorable reactions throughout the colonial and colored worlds, and Its political and culturalto Britain weakens and embarrasses the Commonwealth. Moreover, its domesticof native repression, if persisted in, may well touchajor social upheaval within the next decade. The present government is, however, almost certain to remain in office, without substantial change in character, at least until thc expiration of its five-year term, and seems likely toew lease on power
The Mnlan Government's foreign policy is aggressively nationalistic, its efforts tothe Union's territory and Influence in Africa, and the intransigent attitude adopted by Its representatives in the UN. haveerious embarrassment both to the US and to the UK. This has been particularly evident in Malan'.'. deAant repudiation of anyto the UN for the mandate overAfrica which the Union icccivcd from the League of Nations, and his virtual annexation of the territory. Since the issue ofarouses deep feeling among the Asian and Latin American states, such aciion by a
nation assumed toS ally handicaps the US in exercising international leadership.
International resentment directed against the Union Is greatly intensified by thewith which Malan's Government has preached and practiced its racial program of apartheid, or stricternot only against the Union's eight million Africans but also against the mixed breedsmaller Indian minority. Apartheid has already produced an ominous Increase in racial tensions, and South Africa's avoidanceajor social upheaval within the next decade seems to depend mainly on theeconomic weakness, and political apathy of the mass of the natives, which are still very great. The continuing threat of widespread racial disorders would certainlythe number of South African troops available for wartime service outside the Union, and might well eventuate in outbreaks that would interfere with the supply to the US of South African strategic raw materials. The latter consideration is not negligible, since South Africa produces significantofhird of the strategiclisted by the US Munitions Board as so critical that stockpiling is necessary.the rise in racial antagonismsby apartheid has already caused serious embarrassment tor the UK in its Africanterritories and In ils relations with the Asian Conuuunwealth countries.
Thc measures in Malan's program tending to transform the Union into an authoritarian Afrikaner state haveivisive force within the comparatively small whiteand thc police stale mentality evident in some of these measures is, like the policy
Note: The intelligence organizations of Me Departments of Stale. Army. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred In this report. It contains information available to CTA ai ol IB
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ropaganda liability for the Westhole.
At the same time, thc Malan Government has been led by Its views of national self-interest to adopt certain policies In theand military Gelds which art generally favorable to US security Interests. Stringent Import controls have not only remedied In largeecurring deficit In South Africa's International payments but have also tended to give theetter balancedcomplex which would make lt more use-
ful to the US and UK In time of war. These policies have also worked to tbe economicof the UK. In military matters the government has been favorably disposed toward cooperation with the US and UK as part of its efforts to modernise the obsolescent South African defense forces. The usefulness of this cooperation ls limited, however, by the Union's small military budgets. Itswith internal security, and by political meddling with the armed services aimed at making Afrikaner elements dominant.
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SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS AND US SECURITY
General Character and Posilion of the Molan Government.
The government of the Union of South Africa has been conducted since8oalition of the Nationalist and Afrikaner parties,resent parliamentaryofespite the form of ait Is for practicalationalist Party Government, with the Nationalist leader. Dr. D. F. Malan, holding theand the nine-vote Afrikaner PartyIn the cabinet only by Finance Minister N. C. Havcnga. For some time after theof8 (in which it woninority of thc popular vote) the Malanhold on power was precarious, but there Is now virtually no doubt that it will live out its normal five-year term withoutchange in character. The weakness of thc only Important opposition group, the United Party, was demonstrated in the0 elections in South-West Africa; and the recent death of General Smuts, on whoseand skill the United Party had longalso makes it seem probable that the Nationalists will continue In power
The Malan Government, as any white South African Government must be, is generally oriented toward the West, being well aware of the Union's economic dependence on the UK and US and of the military dangers of itslocation It is an intenselygovernment, but one also permeated with certain strongly anti-democraticA number of Itsthe racial policy of apartheid, the aggressivelyforeign policy, and thc policy on military cooperation with thefor US security lnterestx. and in most cases these implications are unfavorable All these policies have their roots in develop ments long preceding thc accession of theGovernment, but the special emphasis given them is due in large part to the nature of Malan's supporters and to the tensions re-
cently generated by South Africa's racial and cultural conflicts.
One of the basic conditions of the Union's existence as an autonomous state has always
been the working compromise betweenand British that is expressed bi such things as the official use of two languages, two national anthems and two national flags. Thc British, comprising less thanercent of the total while population but economically the more powerful group, are on the whole content with this situation, and manyfavor lis continuance. Both thepolitical parties claim voters in bothgroups, and the balance is still sothat Malan has publicly declared he would not attempt realization of the basic Afrikaner Ideal of an Independentew electoral mandate.
Nevertheless, Malan's Nationalist Party Is in overwheUning majority anparty and Its main inspiration is the Her-renvolk spirit of the Afrikaners. Mostlook back admiringly to their Boer ancestors of Dutch. German, and French Huguenot extraction, and feci themselvesto the early Voortrekker Ideals of racial purity (free even from Britishrepublicanism,atriarchalfounded on the Calvinist teachings of the powerful Dutch Reformed Church They feel, moreover, that theyoliticalto realize these ideals in present day South Africa. Afrikaner nationalism isand anti-Brltlsh. Historiclong antedate the Boer War. taking the form of Borrs versus Britons, Calvlnlsts versus Anglicans, old settlers versusfarmers versus urbanltes. Isolationist republicans versus British Empire men, and so on.
Partly because of authoritarian concepts implicit In the structure of their Ideal society and partlyimple effort to reduce the influence of their opponents, the Nationalists
have already commenced encroaching with arbitrary executive authority on traditional Anglo-Saxon civil liberties. The freedom of the press has been threatenederies of official attempts to make both domestic and foreign Journalists present Southight favorable to the Government. The Minister of the Interior has been voted authority to refuse all citizenship applications without appeal from his decisionourt of law, and the Minister himself hasthat passports will not be granted to citizens who would unfavorably criticize South Africa while overseas. Furthermore, thc legislative ban on the Communist Tarty, enacted at the end of0 was so drawn as to give the Government very wide powers to suppress other activities it considersand to withhold certain normal Judicial safeguards from persons prosecuted under the law.
There have also been various moves toward making Afrikaner influence dominant in the military and civil services and In thesystem. Some of these, thoughresented by English-speaking Southdo not go beyond ordinary spoils-system politics and the settling of old scores from World War II days, when Malan and many of his party opposed South AfricanOther measures are mainly ridiculous, as for example the order that Afrikaans Is to be used exclusively In Union Defense Force headquarters in alternate months TheAct (Language) Amendmentpassed9 by theTransvaal Provincial Council does, however, raise fundamentalconcerning the rights of the citizen and concerning Nationalist acceptance of Uie basic constitutional principle of equality for the two cultures. By this measure no more dual-language schools are to be opened, and all Transvaal children are to be sentingle medium school, with the decision as to whether this Is to be an Afrikaans or an English school resting not with the parents but with the local school superintendent.
The general administrative competence of the Malan Government should not behowever, as Is demonstrated by the ef-
fectiveness with which It has dealt with the country's economicystem of stringent Import controls, Initiated by theInas now largelyecurring deficit In South Africa'spayments, and has also tended to give theore diversified industrialless dependent on the singleof gold-mining. The Government has been less successful In Its attempts to cope with slow rises In unemployment and In the cost of living; but In0 it negotiated withutually advantageousagreement assuring South Africa of the continued availability of sterling capital. It has also had some success In floating hard currency loans. The country still needscapital (estimated atillion pounds over the next few years) and it must also be noted that, with the whole economy basedheap. Inefficient, and increasingly restive labor supply ofsolution of South Africa's otherproblems ultimately depends on the avoidance of any serious and prolonged racial outbreaks. Here thc economic problem, like so much else in thc Union, comes back to the racial problem and thc Malan Government's much emphasized program of apartheid.
2. The Program of Apartheid.
The racial problem dominates Southaffairs.otal population5 million, someercent isercent "colored" or mixed breeds,ercent Indian. Over this majority theercent of European descent superimpose themselvesaster race,igid color baronopoly of virtually all political,and economic opportunity. Theeconomy is based on thc exploitation of cheap non-European labor, much of which Is migratory between the exhausted ruralreserves and the poverty-stricken urbanxcept for theho have longonsiderable share of the privileges of white men, thehave for the most part been given only rudimentary social services and the mostsort of education. They haveincreasingly restive, and the problem of
adjustment) has for many years grown continually more pressing and more difficult.
II Is the declared policy of the presentto solve the problem by depriving non-Europeans even of those scanty privileges within South African society which they had previously been granted, moving the natives as much as possible to their own nativewhere they arc to progress under the tutelage of an absentee white government, and reducing contacts between Europeans and non-Europeans In normal society to the barest essentials. In theory the natives will be given some compensating economic and socialin fact the Government hasno action on this aspect of the matter, and has confined its attention almost entirely to measures of deprivation. The natives, for example, have already lost such benefits as unemployment Insurance and school-feeding for children.
The "Cape Coloreds" or mixed breeds, who have taken great pride in the extent of their Europcanization, have been rendered bitter by the enforcement of Jim Crow laws against them One act passed by the Malanforbids marriages between whites and non-Europeans; another requires theof all South Africans according to race, thus making thc color line virtually impossible to cross. The coloreds. along with the other non-European races, resent also thc Group Areas Act0 which authorizes totalsegregation of thc various groups in their residences and places of employment The Indians, who live chiefly In Natal, areboth by Europeans and by natives and are frequently made the object of native racial resentments, as In the Durban riots The Indian Government has made frequent efforts to improve thc lot of theIn the Union; but the Malanwill discuss solution of the problem onlyasis of repatriating the Indians, and sinceercent of them are South African-born and do not wish to leave, this solution is quite impracticable.
This policy of apartheid nevertheless enjoys wide support among the white community The Government owes its electoral successes80 partly to Its espousal ul this
program; lt expects to succeed in futureby the same means. Even thethough disagreeing on certain aspects of the policy, still accepts the basic conceptell-defined color line, and has been unable to formulate an alternative to apartheid which has any prospect of electoral appeal.perhaps, the white population fears the enormous non-white majority within which It lives; and as anti-European discontentthe conviction strengthens among Europeans that increasingly repressivewill be the only practicable safeguard of white supremacy.
Non-Europeans look upon apartheidethod of transforming South Africalate whose benefits arc reserved foronly, and their resentment grows as the policy becomes more repressively applied. Since the Durban riots ofacial tension has erupted into violence with growing frequency and with evidences of Increasingly competent organization on the non-European side. Inoreover, thc smallParty succeeded for the first time In recent years in inducing several Important native organizations to stage Joint protest meetings with it. Though the great mass of the natives still continue unorganized andIn much beyond tribal concerns and their hand-to-mouth struggle for existence, thc heightening racial tension gives Increasing scope for the efforts of agitators andlessens the Influence of allforces among the Europeans. As things now stand, the active forces all work Inexorablyorsening of thcand South Africa's chance ofajor social upheaval within the next decade seems to depend on these factors ol native disunity, economic weakness, andapathy.
Even if the Union itself should escape such an upheaval, however, thc apartheid policy will still have created serious problems for the UK in its Commonwealth and colonialTo the Malan Government apartheid is notomestic program but almost an ideology of universal application, affecting its relations with the Asianountries as well as its attitude on purely
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matters. Correspondingly, manyleaders tn colonial Africa, observing South African racial policies, are further prejudiced against the spread of white Influence In Africa, and fear that the UK may not prevent the export northward of apartheid but may, on the contrary, modify Its own policies to mollify thc Union. Nor are these nativeentirely groundless. There are parallels to the apartheid attitude among white settler groups in British Bast and Central Africa; and In decidinghe difficult question of whether or not to confirm in his chieftainship Seretse Khama, the Bechuanaland native who had married an Englishwoman, the UKobviously had its hand forced by the need to consider the political repercussions in South Africa.
3. Nationalistic Foreign Policy.
Current South African foreign policy is the product of four not entirelyhe fact of South Africa's dependence on the support of larger powers, economically andeep-rootedgrowing out of the country's geographical remoteness and particularly strong in the Afrikaner part of theouchy national pride that is quick to scent affronts to the country's rather recentlyn imperialistic belief in the Union's manifest destiny to absorb certain territories and to extend its influence to the north. No South African Government can disregard any of these factors Inoreign policy; in general Malan's emphasis has been very much on the last two of them.
So far Malan has shown himself well aware of the dangers of isolation, an attitude derived partly from South Africa's economicand partly from apprehensions of Indian "imperialism" in Africa, but mainly from fear of Communism as an explosive force both internationally and at home. For this reason, as well as for domestic poliiical considerations, he has to date played down live traditional Afrikaner demandepublic whollyof the British Commonwealth. The idealepublic has been by no meansby Government leaders, who even now are fond of referring to Britain asoreign
ut the Union continues to beat major Commonwealth conferences and to cooperate with the UK on suchmilitary, and police matters as directly involve South Africa's Immediate Interests.
In general. Malan has tended to emphasize those Issues of external affairs to which the electorate responds aa South Africans rather than as Britishers or Afrikaners; and ameans of thus appealing to the national pride has been the adoption of an intransigent attitude in the UN The Government ofprotests there against the Union'sof its Indian minority have occasioned various South African denunciations of UNnd on thc question of the Union's accountability to thc UN for thc League of Nations mandate of* South-West Africa the Malan Governmcni has been openly defiant. It has not only proceeded to theincorporation of South-West Africa In the Union but, after agreeing to the International Court of Justice's Issuing an advisory opinion on the status of the territory, It made it plain, in almost contemptuous language, that the Government would Ignore the finding ifto South Africa, as proved to be the case. "In nonnounced Malan onare we going to throw South-West Africa to thc wolves."its threatening phrases, however, the Government has never reached the point of withdrawing from the UN; and indeed, on the Indian minority Issue it bus indulged in the gesture of agreeing In theonference with India and Pakistan to hold Joint discussions on the question as recommendedesolution of the UNAssembly. The Government has shown no Indication, however, of allowing UNto alter in any significant way its aciion on this or any other question.
A second pervasive note In Malan's foreign policy is the imperialistic one of expanding theerritory and generally asserting Its hegemonyarge part of Ihc continent. By legislation regarding South-West Africa in9 and by holding elections there for the Union Parliament Inhehas already in ellecl added to theifth province larger in area than any
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the other four. In9 Malan moved toward the acquisition of additionalby announcing that the UK would be asked to cede the three native territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland which adjoin the Union and are economically dependent on It The latter development was clearly envisaged ln theiament's South Africa Actut in thethe Union has become so widelywith the Idea of oppression of unlive races by Europeans that the UK would find It almost Impossible to reconcile cession with Its claims to champion native rights in Its African colonies and toair deal for black and white alike. The demand also stimulated some apprehension among British settler groups in the neighboringhich already have sizable Afrikaner minorities within their borders. After his Initial move Malan did little further to press Ms demand; but the possibility remains that in the event of war, acquisition of thc three territories might beondition of the Union's full cooperation.
The extension of its political influence In Africa has probably been one of thc Union's motives In participating in several projects for Pan-African technical cooperation. It clearly figured largely In Malan's proposal9 for an African Defense Pact. This, as he outlined it, would be tied in with the NorthTreaty and would consist mainly of an agreement between the Union and the other African Governments (except Ethiopia and Liberia) to preserve thc continent against Communism and other threats to Western civilization. Closer examination of themade clear, however, that these "other threats" included India, and the policy of using black combat troops; and none of the other powers involved has yet indicatedinterest in thc Pact. The Union,is still pushing the Idea and trying to make military cooperation with the UK in lime ol war conditional on the conclusion of apact which, the Nationalistswould encourage South African rather Ihan British leadership on the continent
4. Miliiary Cooperation wiih tho West.
The primary fact In any consideration of the Union's potential effectiveness as aally Is that South Africanegree unknown In North Atlantic Treaty states, focuses on the basicof internal security. As Internalhave increased in South Africa'smulti-racial society, the Malanconcern with this requirement has grown; but at the same time there has been an Increasing official apprehension over the Union's strategic isolationritical world situation. Both concerns have occasionally taken rather ridiculous forms, such asa militia of0 "Skletriflemen, and Informally requesting the US for9 bombers, reportedly for the purpose of defending Africa against the Indian Navy. In the main, however, the Union continues to follow standard British military methods and has been making an attempt to modernize its obsolescent defense forces for both offensive and Internal security purposes. The defense forces are currently maintainedtrength of,eserve of Morale is low,chiefly because of thc government'smeddling with personnel assignments and of the general military and administrative ineptitude displayed by Defense Ministerand Chief of Staff Du Toil.
In the Korean war the Government, after considerable delay,ontribution of one fighter squadron (but withoutand the men were scheduled to arrive in Japan towards the end of October. The Government has similarly approved thcof one armored division with airfor service outside Africa in defense of the African continent. In Middle Eastern operations)eneral war should break out; but General Uu Toll has stated that complete equipment would have to be furnished this division Irom outside sources. South African military bates would presumably be made available fur US and UK wartime use,lan has been drawn up for the Union to buildavy that could gradually lake over the naval responsibilities of the British SouthSquadroniew lo the eventual
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of the Simons town naval base from thc UK to thc Union. In return, of course. South Africans expect military equipment from the UK In amounts greater than they have received to date, and they are perhaps even more anxious to obtain US military equipment. They will probably try to get as much as possibleree grant. It Is likely that two immediate ends hi Malan's mind In proposing an African Defense Pact were the preparation of domestic public opinionearmament program and the provisionechanism by which this rearmament could be partly financed from abroad.
5. Implication* for lhe US.
For reasons going back In most cases to the complex South African racial situation, the Malan Government's policies havefor US security interests that are both more varied in nature and greater in extent than might be expected from so small aNot all of these consequences are bad. The Government's economic policies have tended to give Southetter balanced industrial complex which would make it more useful to the US and UK In time of war. These policies have also worked to theadvantage of the UK.
Similarly, In military affairs, thehasumber of decided movesbetter cooperation with both the US and the UK and has shown itself eager, within the limits of small military budgets, to modernize its defense forces. Nevertheless, political considerations have been allowed to interfere with militaryin theof less competent Afrikanerto Important posts. In clumsy attempts to push the use of the Afrikaans language, and In curtailment of the cooperation formerly ex-istuig with the UK In training faculties. The objection to arming natives expressed Ui Malan's African Defense Pact proposals would notefusal on the Union's part to enter defense arrangements with thc Euro pcan colonial powers, but doesoint of possible friction with them and servesr minder that only white combat troops could be stationed in South African territory
The Government's repressive racial policy and the unrest it has encouraged clearly have adverse implications for US security In case of war. the Internal securityof South Africa would be such as seriously to reduce the number of troops that might otherwise be contributed to thecause. Any outbreak of racial violence, whether Communist-Instigated or not, would Interfere with the supply of South African strategic raw materials to the US. (Theconsideration ls of importance since the Union produces significant quantities ofhird of the strategic materials listed by the US Munitions Board as so critical thatIs necessary; in four of thesethe Union9 accounted forof total US imports that ranged fromoercent.) Moreover, the rise In racial antagonisms elsewhere encouraged byhas already caused seriousto the UK In Its African colonialand in its relations with thc Asian Apartheid iseady-made invitation for propaganda from thebloc directed against both the Union and the countries associated with It.
Still oilier consequences unfavorable to the US have been produced by the Union'snationalistic foreign policy, and inby Its intransigence In the UN. For this intransigence has been exercised on those issues of colonialism and human rights which possess an appeal even for long established states like those of Latin America, and agreat appeal for the newlypeoples of Asia whose favor is now being sought by both the Soviets and thc West.on their policies by India raise no great problem for the South Africans, and indeed seem mainly to reassure them of the essential Tightness of those policies; but such attacks doerious problem for thc US. The US has repeatedly committed itselfolicy of encouraging the progressive development of non-self governing peoples toward eventual self-government, and US ability to exercise leadership among the Asian and Latinmembers of the UN depends In part on their belief in the sincerity of this At the same lime, thc US cannot en-
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ountry so firmly within the Western camp as South Africa ts. Despite such compromises as US representatives have been able to work out. the effect on US prestige with the anil-colonial bloc is Inevitablyand the task of the Sovietls correspondingly facilitated.
Thc Nationalists' domestic policy ofto make the Afrikaner element dominant in South Africa also'nas certain unfavorable implications for the US in that It tends to put the most isolationist elements In theandivisive force within the relatively small white community. The police-state mentality evident in some of theseIs also, likeropagandafor thc Westhole.
Those policies of the Malan Government which are favorable to US security Interests will almost certainly remain ln effect, since they have not been undertaken ln deference to US views but to serve South Africa's own immediate interests. Those policies adverse to US Interests are so deeply rooted in popular emotion that the likelihood of their alteration seems slight.
Nevertheless, South Africans doertain sensitivity to world public opinion; it Is chiefly seen In the irritability with which they respond to outside criticism- Theof their own unusual Importanceation and of the essential rightness of their views are not vulnerable to direct attack but are in some degree subjectery gradual process of erosion, In part through South Africa's widening circle of Internationalln the UN and elsewhere.hange would, of course,atter of the ralherfuture and the other forces operating may not allow time for ft to occur. Within the Union Itself lhe underlying sense ofover lhe worsening racial problem.by fears of an expanding Communism, occasionally finds expression, even Incircles, in some small hesitations over the racial program and in more pronounced indications of concern over South Africa's ties with the West. There is thus some slight prospect that South African policies adverse to US interests might change In response to currents of outside opinion, but such aal best promises toery slow process.
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