PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF A NON-COMMUNIST REGIME IN BURMA-DOC ALSO MENTIONS-ST

Created: 8/1/1951

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

IRUMAN LIBKARi

I President's Secretary's Files

ori;:sioEsr'

OF THE UXtlBO STAIKS

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVALON-COMMUNIST REGIME IN BURMA

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

prospects for survivalon-communist regime in burma

- NIE-36

The Intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Stan*in the preparation of this estimate. AH memtcrs of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate onuly.

RWIAjMjBRAJtlecretary's Files

PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVALON-COMMUNIST REGIME IN BURMA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for survivalon-Communist regime in Burma, and to estimate Chinese Conununist capabilities and intentions with respect to direct or indirect intervention.

present non-Communistisby

. by

yv' the continued existence of insurgent groups in the country.

The Burma Communist Parly is the most dangerous of the insurgent groups. It has already received some aid from the Chinese Communis Is and will probably receive increased technical and material aid from this source during the next twelve months.

The Burma Communist Party, given such Increased aid, will probably be able within the next year or two to achieve de facto controlonsiderable area of northern Burma. In that event anCommunist-dominated coalition of Insurgent groups would become more likely.

he Chinese Communists have the capability to overrun Burma. They are more Likely to attempt to attain theirin Burma by methods short of open intervention. Introduction oflit considerable numbersontinuing possibility.

of tho Burmese Rogimohe Social 1st oriented Government of Prime Minister Thakln Nu, which assumed ofllce In January 1MB at the time Burma achieved Its independence, has beenforces, principally Communists and (lis-satisfied ethnic minorities, imperiled the very existence of the regime. Although rebelw?re considerably reduced0 when the government gained control over all

RUMAN LlmlAR*

President's Secretary's Tiles'

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considerable territory, includingof the strategic central valley, anil they continue to harass important lines ofthroughout Burma.

he government's Insecure position Is anot so much of the strength of thegroups as of Its own weakness.

I.

J Po-

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litlcal weakness has been compounded by the financial and military (train of combatingInsurrections and by the failure topre-war levels of production in Important basic coiiunoditics, particularly rice. Tn spite of these difficulties, the results of the general elections now underway Indicate that thestill enjoys sufficient popular support to Insure that few If any changes In its non-Communist orientation are likely to take place by constitutional methods.

Jbne example!

estruggle for control of the armed forces between the government and the armyGeneral Ne Win. For some time gov err. ment leaders have beento undermine Ne Win's dominantposition within the army. Ne Win may retire completely from the struggle and leave the government in undisputed control. On the other hand, thereontinuingthat No Win mightilitary coup, which could lead to protracted vtolen.ee.

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fin addition to, and quite apart from, the Ne Win problem, there have been recurrent reporti of dealings between the COtnmunlsts and left-wing extremists whosupported the government, and thereossibility that an crToit to overthrow the government might ccnie from this direction.

In any event, internal crises are likely tolo weaken the stability of the regime In the face of the insurgent and Chinesethreats.

The Burmese armed forces are small,trained, and poorly equipped. The ground forces, regular and auxiliary, number0 men, almost allin Infantry units. The navy Is small and consists of coastal and river craft; It has been effective in assisting in the establishment and maintenance of control of the delta area and prbielpal waterways. The small air force Is capable of small-scale ground support and tactical reconnaissance. Altogether these forces, most of which are concentrated in the strategic central valley, arc superior into the insurgent forces now arrayed against them. The Burmese armed forces cannot, however, stamp out Insurgent guer-rUla operations. The Insurgents are widely dispersed on the fringes of the central valleyoncentration of government forces In sufficient strength to destroy any one major force would leave other areas dangerouslySimilarly, the government has not had adequate forces to occupy the borderand Is powerless to interdictbetween insurgents In northern Burma and the Chinese Communists.

The "anti-Imperialist" conditioning of the present Burmese leaders has resulted Inreluctance to accept Westernor military aid. The Burmesehesitantlyritish military mission which is providing traiulng for the Burmese armed forces. However, Burmato participate litt-sponsoredplan. Tho Burmese Government Is somewhat less distrustful ofnd signed an LCA agreemBnt Inhich thus far har resultedn aid. The US has also made available to Burma ten ex-Coast Guard cutters for use as river patrol craft. However, the Burmese Government does not presently appear ready to assume the obligations that would enable it to receive further US military assistance.

RUMANresident's Secretary's Files'

The Insurgent Threat

he piiucipal insurgent forces in llunna arc thea Cornrnuuisty lT J j

' e ri valJ^Coommnlst

and remnant^l

(of the Peoples Volunteer Organ liatlon

^ rajly_ uima)^

n ainorohous left-wing1 the ami-Japanese movementpast these groups have frequentlytheir strength by fighting oneBurmese Government can probablyto keep these insurgent groups fromthe extstenee of the regime, ifcontrol over Uie Burmese aimedand if the insurgents do not receiveoutside -

erious threat, however, lies lo theUiat the Burma Communist Party will succeed in its renewed effotts to fotin ancoalition against the government. Tlw Burma Communist Party still retainsover small disaffected left-wing elements of the old anti-Japanese resistance movement (PVO) and fias enteredruce with the rival "Communist Party

; However,

the coalition is still too loose for over-allmilitaiy operations against theand it is doubtful that the various groups will cooperate with the Burma Crunmu. nlsts over an extended period of time unless they become convinced that the latter have the power to achieve ultimate vlctoiy. The Karens, particularly, have been antl-Conunu-nUt In the past, and are unlikely to cooperate except for immediate military advantage.

Chinese Communist Aid to (he Insurgonls

he most dangerous internal threat to the Burmese Government comes from the Burma Communists supported ay Communist China. The Burma Communists have, reportedly after two unsuccessfulucceeded inlalnlng some ^assistance from the^vklcncethat any subgtaiitjal

[haV

seWarJbeen. provided^

In the absence of eiftctlvo eoun*er-pressure, the Chinese Communists probably will Increase their technical and material aid during the next year.

llne Burma Communists are still too few in number, too inexperienced and too undLvlpHned lo ahsofb the amount of military aid necessary to win control of and administer the entire country within the next

year, " _. the aid

they arc capable of utilising and are likely to obtain, the Burma Communists fill probably be able within the next year or two to achieve de facto controlonsiderable area ot northern Burma, Krom this secure area, the Burma Communists In tbe futuie would then be able to mount stronger uillllaiy andattacksihen particular, the possibilities of an ellcclivc anil-government coalition of insurgent groups would be enhanced, and the internal stability of the government would be fuilher Jeopard-bcd.

Other Chineseourses of Action

eyond tin: threat posed by the prospect of an increase in Chintz Communist material and technical aid to the Itmio* Communist guerrillas, the Burmese Government isthreatened in both the long and short tun byChinese CoinnmnistsJ

tit

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SIlMAM^riwl'ftc^ President's Secretary's Ki less

a

These forces

could be deployed across trie Himna-border at several points simultaneously, and, although the terrain Is difficult, it would not seriously impede the movement oi lightly equippedase Communist forces, particularly ifaken durbig the October-to-May dry season.

The presence of Chlnere Nationalist troops In.mdvr area and thoof-.'i disputed and undrllneatcdbetween Bum* and Chbia providefor diplomatic pressure on the Burmese Government and even for Chinese Communist militarynto Burmese territory. Because the Hurmrse Government would be unable to opposesuch military operations, they would weakrn its prestige and at the same time facilitate Chineseaid to the Im rim Cvfuinuiilsts.we believe that limited nulitaiyin the border arras must be regardedontinuing danger.

The Communlili havr no immediateof gaining control of Burma except through the intervention of large Chinese Communist forces. ^

jvlth which 'lan

n spite of the relative Burma could be overrun, [.

open invasion Is Improbable in the near future even If the Chinese Communists are able to disengage in Korea. The Chinese Communist and Soviet leaders probably retard the present internal situation in Burma as favorable to an eventual Communist victory without resort to open invasion with Its attendant risks,of Indian and UN intervention.

here is,ontini ng possibility that Chinese Communist "volunteers" innumbers might be Introduced toist the Burma Communist guerrillas. The likelihood of such action would behe efforts of the Burma Communists were to encounter serious obstacles. If their forces were threatened with destruction, or if the Clilnese Communist and Soviet leaders for any reason desired to hasten Communist control of Bui ma and calculated that it could be doneinimum risk of Western retaliation. The Communist leaders prubably do notIndian or UN intervention as likely in any event short of open invasion.

RUMAN LIBKARs. President's Secretary's Files'

for Survivol of the

Present Burmese Regime

here Is little prospect that the Burmese regime can survive over the long run unless it can greatly increase its political and military strength. The attainment of this strength will depend upon the consolidation of thrpolitical support, the improvement of government administration, and theand revitaliialion of the armed forces.

with its

ight posstbhvj

. .considerable sentimentettlement with the Burma Communists would be generated among politically conscious elements within the goiernnient-controlledH" JJ the dominant elrments wltrtlnOvc govem-inent probably would not succumb to such pressure. Bather than arrive at anwith the Communists, the Burmese would f

own resources as long as

Is little doulit that li Burmainvaded by Chinese CommunistHui mese Government would make afor anncd UN'{the liurinese Government likewisearmed UN Intervention If theshould introduce "volunteers"numbers, or If they shouldstrong military or diplomatic pressureto imperil the existence of the regime.

the other liand. If the Burmaforces should gain extensive militaryIn northern hhe

Burmese Government would initially seekoutside aid. Tnircumstance.

he greatest immediate danger to theregime lies In the possibility that, by propaganda and subversion and through an undetected Improvement In Communistcapabilities, the position of the Burmese Government will be undermined without the leaders acknowledging the threat and taking effective couriu'rincttseies.

Original document.

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