RESISTANCE OF THAILAND BURMA AND MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THE EVENT OF

Created: 3/15/1951

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

URMA, AND MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURESEVENTOMMUNIST VICTORY IN INDOCHINA1

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RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THE EVENTOMMUNIST VICTORY IN INDOCHINA1

THE PROBLEM

To uses, the will and ii^ty of ITiaiJ^ political and military pressure- or outright invasion in the eventommunist victory in Indochina,

CONCIUSIONS

A Viet Minh victory in Indochinaf accomplished without theof Chinese Communist forces, would result In increased intimidation and subversive activity directed against Thail*xid and Burma, but it would not necessarily lead to the early establish-L'ent of Communist or Communist-doml-nated governments in these two countries.

A Viet Minh victory In Indochinaf accomplished throughommunist military intervention, would Increase the susceptibility of Thailand and Burma to Communist pressures and we believe that, in the absence of effective Internal countermeasures and outside support, these two countries would be obliged to seek an txcornmodatiar. with the Communist powers.

Communist domination of Thailand and Burma, as well as Indochina, would greatly increase British aecuritv problems ln Malaya. We believe that the British under these circumstances would not be able to maintain even their presentof control tn Malayaery corurJderabte increase in their military and economic commitments.

is most unlikely that the VietChinese Communistwould attempt to conquerBurma

If the Chinese Cornmunists, ai'arcontrol over Indochina,their military advance into Burma and Thailand, we believe that both those countries would rapidly fall to theunless the UN or the Western Powers mterposed their ownhinese Ccanmunisl invasion of Malaya -would be more difficult, but wouldsucceed unless Malaya were greatly reinfoiced.

It is most Improbableegional defense of Southeast Asia could beln time to stop the ChineseIf they followed up the conquest of Indochina1ilitary advance Into other countries of the area.

DISCUSSION

In iht event that the Viet Mlnh ahouldin conquering Indochina during 1SS1 without lsjir*-scale intervention by Chinese the prestige of Ho Chi be greatly erthanced throughout Lhermort. the defeat o( the French Union forces despite US support would intensify the feeling of insecurity in the neighboring countries and facilitate theof Communism In the area.

a. Initially, if the Viet Mlnh did not demonthe Intention, either alone or towith the Chinese Communists, to embark on further military aggression, theof Burma and Thailand would continue to oppose Communism internally and would not align themselves with tbe Comrcunlsturma would probably recognize the Vict Mlnh Government and attempt to cultivate friendly relations with It. Theof Thailand, although it also might recognize the Viet Mlnh Ootemment, would attempt to build up its own defenses against Communist forces and undoubtedly wouldIncreased US aid.

iet Mlnh victory, nevertheless, wsuld expose Burma and Thailand to increasedand mtlmldatlon which, In the absence of effective Internal coum term assures (which they might not be capable of taking) and outside aid, might weU lead to the eventual overthrow of the present non-Communist gov-eniments. Under such circumstances, thesecurity problem In Malaya would be greatly magnified

eU^te-ecale participation of Chinesemilitary forcesiet Mlnh victory would cause far greater repercussions in Southeast Asiaictory by the Viet Mlnh alone It would be mMrpreteduccess for Chinese arms ratherictory for Indochinese nationalism ThroughoutAsia, where there Istrongfor the Chinese, It would intensify fears of Chinese mvasion and examination In view of the general weakness of thehe area, however. Chinese Communist military intervention in Indochina would undermine the will of Thailand and Burma to resist and would Increase the probabUity that they would accommodate with the Communist powers.

would probably concludefailure of the US-backed Frenchthat the present type of US aidbe sufficient to provide protection.ciicumjtanccs, the Thai would beyield to military and political pressurewith Communist offers ofpolitical terms In exchange forgovernrnent. Initially, tbewould probably attempt topressure by calling for full UNmilitary rsrotectlon. Should It fail tosuch protection, the present Thaiwould probably be superseded errto the Cooimunists.

would not be likely to yield tomilitary threats or politicalBurma itself, however, thereforces potentially capable ofthe government. If thesecure control of Thailand, withaccess lo the Thal-Burma border,beetter position to reinforceelements. Sufficient outsidefor the dissidents, combined withwould make It unlikely thatretain an intl-Communlst government.

n Malaya, the British, with0 regular troopsegular andpolice, have not succeeded in suppressingocal Communist guerrillas The Malays, although forming the bulk of the present police force and generally support Inc. the British out of fear of the Chinese, wouil continue to contribute little to the British military effort If opposition were increased. The aggressive and econornlcally powerful Chinese element has generally failed towith the British In suppressing the guerrillas,onsiderable number of them could be expected to tum against the British tf Malaya were seriously threatened by Com-munlst China. Furthermore. Communist control over Indochina. Thailand, and Burma would facilitate transborder aid to therebels and deprlec Malaya of Itsrice supply, in these circumstances, the

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to the British would becomeunmanageable, end the British would not be able to maintain even theirdegree ofalayaery considerable Increase in their military and econocisc cornrnrtment

We believe that an attempt to conquer Thailand or Burma by the Vket Minh without Chinese Communist participation islthough border Incursions of northeast Thailand cannot be eacluded.

It theictory In Indochina,ilitary advance Into Burma and Thailand and II the UK or the Western Powers did not Interpose their owne believe that both these countries would rapidly fail to the Communist* because they do not possess the military strength to resist such an invasion Thailand, perhapsoken resistance, would soonovernment acceptable to the Communists In the hope of retaining atemblance of autonomy. Burma, li. directly attacked, would probably fight but would soon beA Chinese CXsmmunlst invasion of Malaya would be more difficult because of the terrain and the presence of British military forces, but It would probably succeed unless Malaya were greatly reinforced

Present or planned outside military aid to Burma and Thailand, although It willstrengthen these countries, will not In the predictable future enable either of them to defend ilseli successfullyhinese Communist attack. Military aid towhich has been chieflybeen of limited effectiveness owing to lack of Burrnese cooperation, and because It has been largely expended in the Burmese internal conflict. The US aid planned for Thailand, whenwould help Thailand to maintainsecurity, but would not enable it to do more thanelaying actionhinese Communist Invasion. The Thai, however, would probably not fight even aaction unless previously assured of support by outside military forces.

In view of the limited capabilities of the countries of Southeast Asia and their wideof Interest, it it most improbableegional defense of Southeast Asia could be organized In time to stop the Chineseif they followed up the conquest of Indochina1ilitary advance Into other countries of the area.

Original document.

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