W
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATI
CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABUJTIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN
Pifbfehtdpril 1M1
JSiSZISS "lotion, of Ihe Dtpwtemit,tn the ptrpejuOw, of Uu. tfttmate TTJ
CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN
THE MOUEM
s^s1 *
CONOUSONS
We bebrve ibat the Chinese Coacu nisls could nerttaunehalarge-eeale attack oo TUwui withouta major ihitt <rf troop from other parts of Chin* into the coastal itaging arras. We further behave that suchredeployment would adversely af fed their corural linenU or operations In Korea end elaewhere
n the absence of US participation tn tbe defense of Taiwan, the Chinese Com-munlsu could, after the necessary rede-plcymcr.t. probably cepturt Taiwanance-scale invasion We behave, bow-em. thai. If the US neat participates tn the derrnae of the Island, the Chinee* Com-EuiuxUi oo not have the capabilityuccessful large-eeaJe tara-sun on Taiwan without substantial Soviet assistance The USSR would probably estimate that It wouldubstantial risk of war with the US if It furnishedof the type and scale that would be required to make the operationWe do not believe the USSR is likely to Incur tfaii darts* of rtak solely onof the advantage to be gained from Chinese Communist conquest of Taiwan1
1 Although military and logistic dinVul-Uaa aeverely limit lawneeSat* Hi hue* Ccenmunkt capabilitiesarge-aceO* Invasion, we estimate that tb*'Chines* ComroumiUcurten'Jy hare the capabilityimited assault on Taiwan. Buchan assault might be launched In theofanding before the DS Fleet could ui terrene effectively and of ex-ptoiling whatever potential dlssllenc* rxUUtm Uir Wand
lthough then la nxtufrkkent Litem.
re^ccavallabkatu^tiinetomakeapoa-lUve prediction, it Is estimated that Ccen-mumst China kt not likely to attemptarger touted attack no Taiwan1 so long ascy with regard to Taiwan remain*and the Chinese Coram unlet* continue to be committed in the Korean The likelihoodommunist uv attempt would be greatlyhowever, under any of theclrrumstancee:
e- If tb* Chinese Comm unlit* shouldects!v, victory tn Korea before summer or should otherwise be able to dls-cogagr themselves from the Korean cam-
peJgb;
f the tactical situation in Korea made the redeployment ol the US Fleet units in Koreanunlikely.
he Chinese Cwnmun'tlt werethat theationalistand Ha defense forces badso weakened that they would distn-
egrate after an InlUal show of Chinese
Communist strength,
st If over-all Cooimunlsl strategy re-Dired the conquest of Taiwanhe risks Involved
The Chinese Cocnmurjsts. Ifded to make an assault on Taiwan, ould be most bkely to attack in theor summer, when weather and seaare most favorable,
e beUeva that the courses of action that Communist China is most likely to follow1 art:
aintain the threat tottempt toetwork forn Taiwan.
in domesticUS support to the Nationalistconstitutes aggression
d Stimulate internationalover the disposition of the araa and International criticism of us support of the Chiang regime.
r Exploit the Taiwan bout tnwith proposalseaceful settle-ment tn Korea,
exercise its capabilitythe small Nationalist-heldoff the east China coast
DISCUSSION
Communistn Assoull On Taiwan
Th* military eapabUIUas of tha Chinas* mmunUrl recuse stem aimed en tin Ittrtnfltri of IU ground combat fortesl, which at present number about two
nooimn These teres* are atam-
Sad rroahly as Mews:
. An BnoWenrdned bat cerlasnlj large abet of Srtd fare* and mfllll* troop* ar* aged In containing cissMenU and bandits th*and estimated to0
. At present the Chinese CommunlsUaid feec* troop* ctv sd ta SM Korean theater of operation* andorce of Me.OOC field tore* pa la laasi nMaacbiarla
Th*ommunlsU haveroops teproyedi South la areailes of the Indochina
er.
tf.ield fore* troops are reportedly deployed along Ih* mission coast nam Ibanghal to Canton.
arget savaalon of Taiwan In 1BS1 would probablyajor in in ofCommunistrom other farts at China to saasntatn th* security of southeast China whBc th* Invasion Is in procaaa. Wenlikely lhal (he manes Ccacmo-susts eouM aaaa* aueb *ddn trial troopsf!*cung Uwtr tteurJv menu or operauons sis*s DDted above.vsoertaaac, would
raqub*are to UBiplMe
he Cbarsnai CoramH Forcerobably cantata* at saast IJOO acUr* pltoU andooU to tnkUaa Theaumatedsv* atallabl* to Itsrvran of Kt and piston flghters, ground atlaca, light bomber, and transport typci, of which at Mast ISO areto be under direct Soviet control Sovlet-typ*alreran hav* been reported so both the Shanghai and Canton araaa Th*
Chinese Communist*sufficientwithin effective
bomber rang* of Tehran. However,CCAj"ere locatedcelheaelaa)orofwould
for* th* cr-.biew ComjiiinUts couMaximum caTensive air effort ui the Talnnoraoetr, in the absence of Bonct logistic nipportarg* wale, loin duero1 rl Hon and maintenance film: ulllfi would substantially reduce the combat eflec-trvenea* of th* CCAFeek ofcpermUma
h*ommunis: Kavj. email and untested. compiBes aboutaaaala. Ih* bur. eat betne patrol frigate typei Although there are report! that th* navyeceived some subrnarlriei from. It Uthai there are Chinese crews capable of
n th* eventajor amp'ilblouswere attempted. It probaUy would re quire th* aa* of all the aea-gctng troop-lift eapaeny th* Chinese Cornsisrust* canyeterogeneous assortment of aUprang consisting Of Hearten aaotorotorlted yanks,ew armed andmg craft, theosnmunlrta could probablyroops However, the troop capacliy of conventional craft, such as landing craft and roasta] steamers, probably Si no! men* than
k- CUnes* Communist airlift capacity Ist* b* sufficient to carry appron0 troops daring anhour period According to reports, th* Chinese Ccaununlat* are training Momn.OQO au-bcen* troop* which are not now tn In* Invasion coast area
II. Th* Chinese Communist* woulditles ir.ansauh against Taiwan,t wert to take place whll* operations rn Korea war* eon-taweawg liimnmi aiakniai raf ihih in Urnalfhe Ccenmo-oMU would have corsrMerabs* dtSseurty la rapidly redeploying troops and materielrior to an Invauon attempt, they would b* forced to stockptl*ndmost of the troops required for the entire campaign In the vie tally of the ouUoadirig ports to the extent not already aoeompUshed. The relnlorcement and resupply of the assault forces wouldubstantial dairy water-lift and It would be essential for theto maintain air and as* supremacy tn the Straits
ls. Moreovet. It would bempossible tor th* Chinese Communists tosrrr stale assault not only because of the oroaashyubstantiallso bacaast:
* Even Ifes pannitltd an aeceuarynd suppUe* to be assembled tn the three part areas adjacent to Taiwan (Swatow. Anwy. andnch concentrations would beto conceal (see Map):
b In ih* event thai the CorssrrunssUto coordinatefrom widely *rpa.-aud peeht* *long the mast, there wouMour dtffertnUal between the Urn* of departure of assault fortes from asoreports (such a* Shanghai or Canton) and that ofrom Amoy or Foochow.
USSR, tn eadjuon la gtvmgeW leehnlcallaUcIsradUon to socmas*China's capabllltira inand mine warfare
limit
ineaiioe. of ay Use
thai the
of
attack could be
imned attach one Ignored. This attack might beore* of upltd IdU.-tire craft andm*r> thai haveaunched tn airborne operation. Th* Chinas* ComiDu-nlsls might launch lurh an assault in theofanding before the US Fleet roula mlerven* efleeuwiy and ofwhatever potential Itarlrlrinre may exist on
the I
arc?
ApproilmalelTO Nationalist troops. malnlT lnfantij. arr aUUooed on Taiwan. The armored lore* has an estimated strength0 men andUfht tanks &iir> suit of cenUnistt
SOI
of the
aslst ijoand farce, are *pparenUr than at the tin- of she rfauonahfl defeat oo the mainland Chiang Kai-shek has snada strong efforts to remove aU personnel ofooatle lorallr asd has placed pollUral "ad-
m all mlStlarvat the ;
mpaSed by i
aaaaat
b. The Chinee* nationalist Air Fore* (CHAT)eported over-all strength of Mi aircraft, of trhlrhre operaUnoal Thar* an no Jat aircraft In th* CNAF In It*
r^5ln*ou7 cran^the kuiMt of "hichels About halt of th* KaUooaUst fleet ti ereisiajiUy laid up foe repair or overhaul *J. though naval personnel are fatrt? well trained the pot-Tlca) Intrigue* <rt the sector oPVen OV trwel from the Heeyi
he Chinese Na'JonalBt Oerecnurwnt ha* taken far-reaching step* to ruard again*Communist sabotage on Taiwan throughaureelllanee and drastic methods Nevertheless, the Cotnraisnarta appear to have maintained some unSesgrseind ornantiatw
A
Ung that Pelplng probably hai no* ahan-nt Ita plan* lor an Invasion of Taiwan, sal troope along th* coast oppo-Talwan and wleiutfkd construction work earby airfields could IncUcaUarly assault on Taiwan c* oo totM ot amaUar NstkeialUtheid Islands off tb* coast (such as Chtntawn or lasted] which ihinesecoald capture at win.oo (he other band, bt raertty mees-ot defense against axUscapetcdHaUcoahsl auMUnes
heCotnmsnttU iI eastv oatrot ottt Taiwan to be ofm ace In Ssutciahst bands. Taiwanthe last major remnant ol ante to the Ccenaiunnd aof alltat*hat Taiwan wDI idaseS-anUUd; oalnland, and Lbey will regard Lbreal to their tscartlT unUl tht Island ker thtlrlthough Ihe Chinese lunlsl leaden are apparently anslous toadlh Ihe conquest of Taiwan and have tedlj pledged Ihemseltat lo Ihe -llfttra-ot the Island, recant Chinese propaganda laced leas emphasu on Taiwan and hastha rvgrbnt to an early tniastan PL (Sea apptadU B)
tt ussr aught faror an tarry Chines* raasrt conquest of Taiwan tn orderhe usne* of defrost and ot. staging are* foe further Cmamunistm to ibt sowth stotr- th*hinese Oentnrmsata. however, win Jty view the probkesd of TeJwer. not tr. on but tnM world StaaAM illy and to tht attaaUOo tn U* Far Rest -tlealai If theae target (onssdeiaUons there fromarly assault onresent In;putt st torrltlvt effect onowers and serve* as an adfltUteal point for Chinas* Conmunist anU-
Mssm
tonf as tht US Fleet It charted with thtOf maintaining thtith respect to Taiwan, thtrefon. we believe it unlikely that the Chinas. CtaMMM wlljcsrgi stall seaaull on th*less tht ussr prorldt* suSksrotto offset im effect ot to* parucipaUcn of us force* In th* defease
The USBA msthi hoc*ocld famishaid to latun th* teems of aiM on safwan without prectp)-Utlnr general war It would realise,hat fnnUanln| such aid would involve arisk ot war with the US It would probable
of war with tht us tf II
lowr5ghthe of Taiwan
of war. We do not belk-re th* to Incur this degree of of the advantage to b)
. of Taiwan In 1k1
M- Tht etttmptt of tht following I
otatstcty BI eaer ceVrnstt-stB tht tacUcsJ sxuauoe Si Korea made thet tht US Flsrl enlikrly:
c. If the Cwkaesewet* cctv itnred that th*Satkeiantt Own-Kill and it* dtlsnst forts* had become tc weakened that they would dudnieexst* aftertf
i circumstances, however, we Wl the Chineseo restrict their actlrlUe* with respect to Taiwan to tat fo&owtng: a MsmlamthtthreattoTaraai.:
totwork foractivity on 'iarwsn;
ta domeaUC ea^tsujandasupport to the Hstlonslkrtagirvattoa against China;
RECENT CHJWSE PROPAGANDA IINC ON TAIWAN
Chinese Cocununtsl* In theirforeign propaganda aa wellKitheir publictake Taiwan ChangM nan occurred,tn the relaH-et emphasta placed on"liberation- and In th* timingoperation. The IM* Kew Tear*!Ihe Central CctemiUae of tht ChinewFartj auerted that tht ltOQ taskliberate Taiwan. Hainan Island, andth* tart remnant foreta otRatahek (anf. and accomplishof imlfyuig China, net allowing th*lore**alum lo
i.me any '. tn ourreat, the various mi He*t no assurance of ar n,i Taiwan during thetubcdlnattd Taiwan to general struggle against Americaarticularly In Korea netnt FUp-lng broadtails dtrtetad at hat* ttattd that the rvtory onot be long deferred.'" the principal amphaaU ktj"<ali lo the "people of Taiwan" le urine for liberation with Ux "people" on the mainland and on appeal* to nationalistand ptsltiial leaders lo return borne and Join tht "new China" rather than to remain on Taiwan awaiting eiternunatm It It apparent, however, that tht ttsroee ofCotnmooiH propsgtnda lo ipeclf" adate for Beading Taiwan It net. By llstll proof that toeh an ope raucn at not plantisd for
rropaeanda wMh rat-perl le Taiwan began lo Shin In boe but IK" b)ninedl auly afur the colhreak of Korean hosUllUes Without openry stating hat scOoB bad been postponed, tht pmenc* of US Beet unit* tn Taiwan waters peovtdtd an eacoat for lack of an rmroediale oflenWvt. while major attta-Uon was located on tht eggressivt dtslgnt of
American icperlslaa-uly IBM. Tor-elgii Unruster Chouri-iiiM trienlit position In acabled to tht UM SecTttarr-Otawral:
a mseparablt part of th* tst-rrtory of ChinalstorV oal fact rtcognlsed by the retire world, but It also confirmed b* toe Cairo Declaration.
th* Pi**dam Declaf aUoQ, and tht sUoaUoO
taken by
the Chin
star* tht tweoder af.he name of the Ceo'ml Ptoplt'i Ocm-metn of tht Paoctoa Repubbc ofny Minitary rlepabv Iht United fflattt Oee-ptcpta* ar* Irrevoe-Ubcraie Taiwan with-
r, Iht Taiwan Issue, while nerer d. had gtreo way tn propaganda lomerican threat lo Chins iromas lowered to tbe statusgboard from which US fores* war* to Invade China In urgingesist atl*-k. Donf the pit Tfbrra-.Ttb Ctuen-ylng. In a
i St* October IMO.tUled
"At the tame Ume we rautt realise clearly that tht Chiang bandits, who art cornered Bi Taiwan and directly under tht command of ibt AsdstUu bnpesltllsts, while moo po-titiMi toetsottr-ofltastT* against the mainland, may stOl despatchhips sad planes to attack ear coastal roor caajar 1
and (U
acUrlUe* We
most therefore ttmiftben ouragibn* attack and against rrJUlritlon, con-soudau'our internal ranks, tlrengthen our unity, be determined in the suppression of
trrfc criminal element, and cccMMaic
1put of Dm'M up of th* theme of "defense" of China, which was uUstsed to DM ttuMtnfoe InUreentseti lan Irtatlc In fropiei Chinau typical of tht treataMa! at th* Talwma kam* It staled Id part:
UMt trier/poppet Chiang will faO at the Orel well prepared blow cJ theUbeeatwo Array, who wO! be attrd by tha heroic lilandrrs. tht American Imperialist* bar* rjeeaJed that they mart drop tht tnaak and reaortaked act of aggreaafcm in order to retaat control of Taiwan Thli wa* tha taunedlat* reaaiiQ torecision to aand the US Tth Fleet an an attempt to prerenl the llberatlcti of the island, with th* further despatch of air and grwuodission* and
mmm
trait ruch a* India and to weaken Or actret-tie* in Korea. FamiliarDS armedagakatt Taiwan, ataa other parti of Chin* territory, and maintaining onegime thai rtprmrttwar* made. The Chin we
gal* peech
to th* SwutuRy CormcD oatfoeernbar:
"Ttegardieas of any military measure* ofby the Colledo*emceet. and no iwatttr how it may arrcerai*urpote* th* Bam* of the TJosMd Hauona. the Chinaae people art firmly determined to reccer Taiwan and all other lerrttoew*to China rrem 'he grip of the Vailed Stats* aggrtesorab* trrr-ecahl* and immoeabl* will of th* Alt million people of China"
la th* etrtow*tBcatl and at> ofBcial. ralalmg to wan Br* proposals, tha Chinese Communist*wisted that ta*
withdrawal of t* swroes from Taiwan Is on*
of the baalc roeiditloo* for any *ttllera*ol of
the Korean hcatillUea and nrjatrf
talian
Original document.
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