CURRENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST

Created: 4/6/1951

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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CURRENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST

Office of National Estimates CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Content

SPECIAL IN TKGE KC E ESTIMATE

CURRENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST

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Tho Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint StaffIn the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this estimatepril.

CURRENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST

THE PROBLEM

.; To examine the scope and nature of Soviet andduring tho past throe months and to estimate theot such activities, with particular reference to the

CONCLUSIONS

uring the past three months, the Soviet Union and its Satellites have continued, and In some cases accelerated, their programs for increasing the military ami economic capabilities of the Soviet bloc.

. In areas other than the For Kast, Soviet and Satellitefor war had reached such an advanced stateanuary

hat large-scale operations could be initiated with little or no

warning. Available intelligence on recent Soviet and Satellitein those areas discloses no specific indicationsoviet intention to undertake aggressive action.

During the period under review, the USSR has placed special emphasis on the Soviet Far East; Soviet air activity thero hassharply and strenuous efforts have been made to develop tho area's economy, particularly for military purposes.

It is clear, that the USSR is pursuing its lorg-range program to mako the Soviet Far East logistic ally and militarily self-sustaining. Since tho beginning of tho Korean conflict, thishas apparently been pressed toward completion with more urgency, in order to prepare for any evsntualily.

he current increase In Soviet activities in Lhe Kar East does not in itself proTtde any firm irdicauoaoTtet Intent to launch an early offensive in that area. W* bellevo, hwever, that those activities Indicate the seriousovietespecially with air forces, ir. theighting. Tho form hat this increased parUolpa'Jon might taket clear.

n view of the advancrd state ofoparedaevi fort is by no means certiln 'hat, eve* if *heid reached alor general war,scislonled by military, economic, or polilcal activitiesndicative thin those we have observed

DISCUSSION

he foregoing Conclusions are based upon the following summary of Soviet and Satelliteuring th* past throe months:

Ji- MLUiaty =

LL

Thcro is, however, no firm evidence thatslrengihrisen or that "here has (MM any major red^nlnv-ment of units.

TRUMAN LIBRARY Japcrsorresident'ssFJ

USSK and tho European Satellites, airs generallyccpt for some increase

Army. Soviet support of Chlneso Communist and North Korean forces In Korea has continued, but there has been no evidence lo confirm reports that ths USSit has actually supplied heavy equipment to the Chineseong-range program of logistical and technical support for the ChineseCommunist Army Is still in progress. The Chlneso Communist forces in Korea are currently being reinforcedresh troops of the CCF 1st andield Armies, withossibly en route. The type o! equipment of iheae forces Isbut two artillery cU-risioos hive been identified in tbe combat area.owever, no significant changes In the strength, organization, or composition of the Soviet ground forces in the Far East have bean noted. .

Wavy. There have been no significant changes in Soviet or Satellite naval activity in the Far East. Although the Soviet naval budget1 Is approximatelyercent higher than -thathoso funds will probably bo used primarily for

a long-range naval construction program, as welt as toexisting unitsUto of war-readiness.

b.ho Soviet Union has continued to pressits program to increase Soviet war-readiness and to bring the Satellite economiesomparable position. Soviet' activities in tha Far Kast increased considerably during0 andail and water transport facilities In the Far East are being expanded; emphasis in petroleumIs being shifted tos of greater military value and jet fuel is being produced at one plant. Soviet stockpiling of

"ARRV S. THUMAN1roory'* Kilo

mm

essential materials continues throughout the Soviet orbit; the Soviet strategic stockpiling program appears to have beenin the Far Kast.

olitical.oviet and Satellite political activity has undergone no significant chango. Tlie USSR hasits support lor the North Koreans and Chinese Communists as woll as its confidence in ultimate victory. In the propaganda field, there hasreater efforMe prepare the Soviot and Satellite peoples psychologically for war. Japan has beenlinked io US "aggression" in Korea and lhe issue of Japanese rearmament has been coupled with that of German rearmament. Chinese Communist propaganda has been placing increased em* phasisong war and on tactics of attrition, and mostit has stressed tho rolatlvo unimportance of air and naval power in the Koroan fighUng.

hanges1 in the military position of theits Satellites havo had no noticeable major effects onand Chinese Communist offensive or defensivewere already great enough to permit tho initiation of largooffensive action with little or no warning. There arohowever, that the Chinese Communist forces in Koreaconsiderable additional logistical and technicalthe USSR in order to maintain theirizable Communistort in Korea may nowboth in order to give some relief to Communist linesand to provide direct assistance toforces. The combat readiness of Soviet air units in thehas

and the limited offensiveof the Communist Chinese Air Force have gradually increased under Soviet guidance and support. Soviet ground and naval capabilities In tho Far East remain substantially unchanged.

HARRYS. TRUMAM LIBRARYST President'sle iP3K%

t la not clear what form Increased Soviet participation In the Korean fighting may take. However, (he rapidly increasing tempo of Chinese Communist and Soviet air activity in the Far East, and the evident need for greater air participation,ew phase of air activity is about to begin in Korea. It would be logical that Chinese Communist elements would operate against UN ground forces and lines of communication, and that initially Soviet air elements would operate In strength behind North Korean lines. If thisshould fall to obtain desired results, Soviet participation might be increased.

Original document.

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