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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
POSITION INAST-WEST STRUGGLE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE
NIE-9
The intelligence organisations Ol the Departments of Stale, the Amy. tho Nary, the Air Force, aid the Joint StaffIn the preparation of this estimate Ail member*e Intelligence Advisory Committee havetheir ccMuuence to the estimate. This paper Is based onavailable on
TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the win and ability ol Turkey to maintain its alignment with the West, and the courses ol action Turkey might follow in the event ol war.
CONCLUSIONS
is determined to resist Soviet expansion. It is solidly aligned with the West because this alignment onersits only hope of effectively resisting Soviet pressures. At present one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy is tolear-cut US commitment to come to Turkey's defense in tbe event of an attack.
New Soviet or Soviet-Satellite successes in expanding the Communist sphere of control outside the Near Bast <even in Yugoslavia) would not significantly affect Turkey's pro-US alignment as long as the US demonstrated that its fundamental aim was to continue the struggle against thehift in US policy to one of hemispheric defense would obligeto abandon its pro-US alignment and fall backolicy of neutrality.
We believe that Turkey is capable of halting at the Straits an Invasion byforces.oviet attack, the Turks could probably maintainresistance fox two or three monthssubstantial Westernhold for someedoubt area in southern Turkey against Soviet forces
Short of general war. Turkey willto support concerted Western action under UN auspkes in opposition toor Satellite aggression elsewhere The commitment of Turkish troops or the provision of Turkish bases would, hew-ever, be contingentirm assurance ot US armed support in event of Soviet attack.
f the USSR were, withouta general war, to secure control of Iran. Iraq, and Syria on one flank ofand/or of Greece on the other. Turkey would probably reacf as follows:
if Turkey were partiallyfrom the West by Soviet conquestof Iran, Iraq, and Syria,probably not alter its pro-USalthough In this event theprobably be obliged to adopt apolicy toward the USSR;
the USSR or its Satellites wrGreece and It the US failed Imilitarily Satellite occupationor refused to consider anGreece by Soviet forces sufficientfor military action againstTurkey's attitude would thenon broadereft no doubt of its determinationand supply Turkey to theits ability. Turkey would probablyits pro-l'S alignment. If. on
th* other hand. Turkey were unable to obtain assurances of such support.would probably attempt to adopt a
policy of neutrality;
c. In the event that Turkey's landwith the West werecut off by Soviet control of Greece In the west, and of Iran, Iraq, and Syria in the east and south, the Turks, lacking firm assurances of US armed support in the event of Soviet attack on Turkey, would probably shiftolicy ofand might eventually makeconcessions to Soviet demands.
If, on the other hand, Turkey were able to obtain firm assurances of US armed support in the eventoviet orattack on Turkey, it would probably still maintain its pro-US alignment.
S. We estimate that under anyTurkey will resist aggression against itself.
n the event of general war, Turkey, if not itself attacked, probably wouldmaintain its status ofbut would do everything compatible with that status toestern victory.
DISCUSSION
Solidity of Turkey's Pro-Weslern Alignment.
The Turks are determined to resist Soviet expansion and to preserve their Independence. They consider that alignment with the DS and Its allies offers Turkeynly hope of effeeUvely resisting Soviet pressures, which since the end of Worldave beenIn 1M6 the USSRhare in conuol of the Straits and the right to station Soviet troops there. It hasclaimed Hie Kara plateau area in northeastern Turkey. Moreover, the USSR has permitted its propagandists to denounce the Turkish regime, vilify Turkish leaders, attack Turkeys close assodalion with the US. and attempt to Incite revolt agates; theGovernment.
The Turks have stood firm against Soviet and Satellite pressure. Theyvoided hastyprovocative actions against the USSR, and haveiilingnesi to discuss points at Issue with the USSR AI the same time, however, they have made it clear that they are strongly averseolicy ofand are detenrJned to resist any Soviet attempts to enccach on Turkey'sor temtorial integrity. Moreover, they have sought to ally themselves with the power or combination of powers most capable ofthe USSR
ne of the main objectives of Turkey'spolicy Is toS commitment to come to Turkey's defense In eventoviet or Soviet-Satellite attack. Pronounce men Is of US interest in Turkey's security and the extension of OS military and economichave given thearge measure of assurance, but they are still deeplyby the lackormal guarantee of prompt and effectivehe event of war. The Turks would almost certainly provide base faciltUes to the US In returnefinite US commitment to come to Turkey's defenseiled toirm US commitment to date. Ihe Turks have sought to obtainUS guarantees by seeking menv* rship in NATO or by advocating an Ea*iemsecurity pact with direct US pai-licipancn. To the Turks, limited association with the NATO fw Mediterranean defense planning representslightover their previous situation. Theythat the formationediterranean blcc without US participation or ihe conflu-sion of mutual assistance agri-emenls with their neighborsS guarantee mifrht
actualti be dUadTintafcous ud tbe*IWnIon. firmly opposed them While they turn mffliacd their idUnDa U>S TrtperUW Treaty of mutual awnSUnre with Prmnct and IM UK. they dearly value Itirect ruerantee of British and French asnsUnce than ai potentlaBy an lnCUrecl nj ot ptuni US aanstanca.arUelpa-Uon to the UN h. aamated to some extent bj Uit Hunt moUve*ora willing than DM member, to make toe UNbut has lllUe confidence In Its prevent eflte-Uvenau U> check Ooviet aggression.
o:hift in Turfc-y'. Allay,.
b* Turks expect that the Wert mav tuffer further dfpkmnr or mflJUry reveree* butthai the US and Its allies wOl be aMe ultimately to contain Soviet hnprrtaunn orSSR to event ofeduction In the US power postUonesult of further reverses tn th. cold war would not alterbasic alignment aa long at the USfirm MBurance of USk emit of Soviet attack on Turkey.
ceptabk to theught be brought Into the rovernnieDt, andecurity meai-urri would be tightened. It li unlikely,that Turkey wouM agree to tentorial ronceuinns. request tbe US mlllUry million to taavt Turkey, ot olbervlee appease the USSR
If the USSR or IU Satellites were to attack Oreece and^tf the"JJ
broeScr^tei^coeuiC^Uonion-atdexaUonA would taelude: (a) the degree of military prepareclneM In Wertern Europe; <b> Western military strength In North Africa and
UM Eastern Mediterranean; (c) the atttude of the US toward Turkey and US airetef le plansTurkey; and (d) theof tbe Western Powcn tn genraLajid of the US tn particular toward MMnco. WeTurkey would probably Still mainULT. IU pro US alignment, provided the US left no doubt of IUto support and supply Turkey to the utmost of Its ability. If. on the other band. Turkey wen unable to obUUn assurances ol such support, It would probably attempt toolicy of neutrality.
n the event that Turkey were outflanked completely by Soviet control both of Owm Id the vest, and of Iran, Iraq, and Syria to the ith. tha Tl
of
of
olicynauy make substantial If, en the
were able to obtain nrm asauranees of US umed support hi eventoviet or Betel-it* attack upon Turkey, It would probably
all la Inro-US
he adoption by the USolicy of hemispheric BolaUon would cause Turkey eutceneUcauy Y> abandon Its pro-US aUgn-tt'
tbe Weit tn thai
In time.body of
ment and eccemunodatleei wfth the would probably grow"id might eventually dominate Turkish policy, but at present Itmore likely that the Turksfor their Independence, no matter how auKMlalourse miehl
Thend Weaknesses of Turkey's Portion.
Turkey Is on* of the strcagest anU-Com-munkst countries on tbe periphery of the USSR and tbe onlyhe Near Eastot offering rubnantuu resUvuice toaggression.
o. Turkey* strength derives to aextent from the national unity and he.
ET
ol lis population. In spile ollow standard of Irving and occasional bitter controversy over internal issues, the great majority of the Turkish people are united In their opposition to the USSR and fully support the government's policy offur key with the Western Powers. The basic and long-standing antagonism of the Turks toward the Russians remain* strong. Elements of the Kurdish, Greek, andminorities and even some Turks might be susceptible to Communist subversion ifsecurity broke down, but such ais likely to occur onlyesultoviet invasion Turkey's politicaland relatively free press constitute sufficient cutlets for what little dlsaSecUon exists, and subversion Is effectively controlled by the Turkish security services. At the same time the extension of democratic procedures istronger base for Turkish aa-tlonal power.
b. Another major source of Turkish strength Is Its army. With US aid theArmy has recently developedan-pact, modem force ofen. Itheoretical mobilisation potentialen, although it could not equip or provide logistic support for this number.the full-scale reorganisation ofdefense establishment envisaged In the US military aid program Is not yet completed, the combat effectiveness of the armed forces has already toereased considerably despite the temporary dislocations inherent tofrom old to new methods, weapons, and equipment
urkeys position Is weak In the following respects:
major Improvements madeby the US military and economicthe Turkish armed forces havesupply services, are criticallytechnically qualified NCCs. and stilleffeciive air force.
economy is unable to. supportdefense burden. Because thelargely agricultural, Turkey Is heavilyoo outside supplies both forand military materiel. Themate tain log large defense forces Is aTerkcy'a resources. Because of the lack of industrial development, the number of trained mechanics Is limited. t
e. Turkey Is particularly exposed to Soviet pressure because of Its gvographlcel position. It is located oo the Soviet periphery, far from Western centers of strength, and flanked on the east and south by weak and unstablethat are themselves highly vulnerable to Soviet aggression. large Soviet and/orfarces could be hurled against Turkey with little or no warning. Because theof Soviet/Satellite land attack from the Balkans and the Caucasus are widelyTurkey would, to the event of war, be obliged to divide Its limited forces and fight on two fronts without good totcrconnecting transportation facilities.
espite the shortcomings ofrmedIts economic weaknesses, and itsvulnerability, Turkey Is capable of putting up considerable resistance toor Soviet aggression. We believesof halting at the Straits and possibly even at the prepared defenses in eastern Thrace an invasion by Bulgarian forces.oviet attack, Turkey Is believed capable of delaying Soviet advances Into the Interior of the country by stubborn defensive fighting. The Turkish armed forces could probably maintain some form of organized resistance for two or three months, Aarea to southern Turkey could be held for some time if the Turks receivedassistance from the Western Powers. In any event, with outside support the Turks could probably main tain guerrilla warfare against Soviet lines of communication hi
Strategic Importance of Turkey.
he alignment of Turkey with the West is of primary strategic importance to the USof Turkey's political and military strenflh and Its geographical position.adjoins Soviet and Soviet Satelliteand lies across one line of SovietInto the neak and unstable countries of the Middle Bast Tbe Turkish Army wouldajor obstacle to Soviet advances to the Middle Bast through Turkey. Furthermore.
Turkey's pro-UBonjunction with iti miutarr strength, deters th* USSR from attacking Turkey, because Implicit la Uat alignment kt the possMity that aaon Turkey mlgtrt bead tbe OT lo attack the USSR.
n tbe event of general war, Turkey mightorward air base for US air forces, although treirjucUcei of air faciuue* and their protection from Soviet arr and ground attacks would be neceasary before the US could use Turkey effectivelyase for air opetb-Uoos against the USSR and Its Satellites At present.alremcly vulnerable to air
supporting medium bomber operationsight bomber operation. Howerer. the U3 M,
s long as Turkey controls the 8train, Turkey night to able to prevent thehe Mtd.
IB. In Um unlikely event that Turkey should abandon lis pro-US alignment, tbe affect on
la BtUe doubt that pro-Western elements to most of the adjacent countries, who nowrecarious balance of Influence, would be seriouslyf Turkey aban-
Probobla Turkish Course* of Action in Its Evan! of War.
IS We believe Tarkey wSJ fltabbarnly rcsttt any aggraaason upon rU territory whether or not outsideorthcoming In case of attack, Turkey will alrnost certainlyto tha US for military assistance, to the UK and France for aid under theTreaty ofand to the UN for such support as It can give
W. In the eventatellite or Soviet attackYugoslavia. Iran, or even Oreece.would not on IU own Intervene militarily 'i would Increase tts frontier security and aake every effort to avoidovm:
altack. If the UN or the US requested the use of Turkish bases from which lo Institute
coufit
ply
asd In tb* event of an
the e> ,il of further Soriet or SatelliteIn other parts of Europe and Asia.would support UNshort of comrnruaenthot would oppose large-scaleof Western resources
against the Soviet Satellites which wouldWestern potentUUllks against the USSR ttself.
ue nflitary
IS If tht Korean ccaiSict should lead to full-scale war between the US and Communist China, tbe Turkish reaction would be ambfra-kajt- Co tbe one hand, Turkey would berapport action against the Chinese that all nations threatened by Soviet Imperialism must stand leather and by IU drain* lo demonstratethe US Ita reliability as an ally. On
ever, gtve diplc
roiKht continue to provide the ecrvices of ihe Turkish Brigade.
IS In tbe eventeneral war to which Turkey Itself was aot attacked, the Turks probably would initially adopt astatue. Nevertheless, Turkish political leaders, both government and oppmltKa. have frequently SsfSSMSfl the rlew that Turkish neutrality to the East-Westar or peace is neither advisable nor possible. Consequently, even though Turkey were not attacked, the Turks would cooperate with the West and do everything compatiblecn-belikeareat status loestern victory.
Original document.
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