NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
FEASIBILITY OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
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Intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Stan"in the preparation of this estimate All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this estimate onpril
. FEASIBILITY OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
the problem
Tvthe feasibility of rearming Japanssociation with the US and Its allies, the capability of Japan for effecting such rearmament, and the Soviet reaction thereto.
CONCLUSIONS
Japan's vaiue to the Eastern orbloc rests on Its Industrial potential, its trained manpower, and its strategic location with respect to the Asiaticand to US defense outposts Ln the western Pacific.
Japan has sufficient manpower andfacilities to enable it.ew years, toarge and growingpf it? own military defense: (a) enough raw materialsthose in scarce supply were made available; and (b) the US furnishedmilitary assistance and training. Japan also has the economic capability toajor share of the costs ofand. if Japan were to do so, theosts to the US would probably not exceed current levels of US support to the Japanese economy.
We believe that If Japan were accorded sovereignlyreaty of peace, and If the US provided military protection and economic support, the Japanesewould move toward reconstituting lis armed forces in strength sufficient to defend Japan and could gain adequate popular support for this program. For some time however, progress would be
Impeded by widespread war-weariness, fearsesurgence of militarism, and concern over economic hardships Aobstacle, the Importance of which cannot be accurately estimated at this time, is the constitutional prohibition against the maintenance of armed forces (seehewould undoubtedly use popular reluctance to rearm, as well as thedifficulty, as bargaining points In negotiations for US military andaid.
4 Although the non-Communistwith major Interests In the Far East have varying degrees of apprehensionthe remilitarization of Japan, the present governments in these countriesreconciled to the necessity of Japanese defensive rearmament. Australia and New Zealand, however, would prtaa for the simultaneous development of mutualarrangements with the US
he Kremlin and the Chineseregime will continue to try tothe conclusionapanese peace treaty to which they arearty and will try to frustrate, or at least to delay
and Until Japanese learmamenl by bringing propaganda and diplomatic pressure to bear on Japan, the US. and other non-Communist countries.he USSR would refuse to recognize the validityS-sponsored treatyJapan and the non-Communist powers but would not consider It to beimportant in itself to Justifymilitary action Soviet concern over Japan centers not in the treaty issue as such, but in Japanese rearmament
e do not believe that Japanesein itself would seteneral war between the USSR and the US II, however, the Kremlin were to conclude, in the light of the world power situation, that the rearmament of Japan and it* alignment with the UShreat to the security of the Soviet bloc, the USSR would probably resort toaction at the time and place mostto Itself.
Because of the strategic location of Japin. ft* industrial capacity, and lis large pool of trained civilian and military manpower. Japan's ultimate political alignment willecisive factor in the balance of power tn the Far East. II the Communists controlled Japan, they could'
Ihe Communist controlledIn Northeast Asia.
the US defense line in thePacific.
the Industrial andof the Soviet bloc, particularly into shipping and sea power with the
Communist aggressionand Southeast Asia; and
t. Free Communist forces for deployment elsewhere
If. on the other hand, Japan were to be rearmed and aligned with the West:
West aould benefit from thethe industrial and military resourcesnation were retained In friendly hsnds.
wouldtentlal basemilitary power in Northeast Asia;
US would be able to protect Itsoutposts In the acslern Pacific, and
d Other non-Communist countries would be encouraged in their fight against the spread
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Jopon'stl*ecause of Its present military Impotence, Japan is vulnerable to military attack by the USSR, which alone, or together, withChina, couldarge-scalewith no further warning than we now have. Japan has, hoaever. the potential for creating forces sufficient to defend Itself against such an Invasion or to buildarge militaryapan has sufficient manpower to create large ground, naval, and air forces
apanese Army of upen theoretically could be created within six monthsear aller Japan had agreed to rearmament, equipment and supplies hadavailable,raining program had begun Its nucleus would be0 men now in the National Police Reserve, who are receiving US training and equipment The remainder of such an army and the furtherwould be drawnanpower pool ofillion men. including8 million veterans, theoretically fit for military service. The basic michlneryfor mobitiration still exists, and there are enough vetersn officers ol the Imperial Army at all command arid stafT levels for virtually any site of army required
b. Similarly, there are enough naval and air force personnel, including technicians, to man large naval and air establishments.
rubber, and tin; nearly one-half of Its raw cob-ton,considerable proportion of Its iron ore; and some of its foodstuffs and petroleum. The US was the source of about one-half of Japan's raw cotton and about two-thirds of Its
omparatively little raw material from Northeast Asiabeen available in the part five years, and Communist China probably would deny Japan all atrelegic materials whenever Japanese rearmament andwith the West had become evident. Korea, regardless of the outcome of theconflict, will not be able to eiporl much food or raw material for some time to come. Because of the burden of supporting theNationalists, Taiwan cannot make food available in Ihe quantities that It formerly sent to Japan South and Southeast Asia can still contribute significantly toward meeting Japanese requirements for food and such raw materials as iron we. rubber, bauille. tin. and coiion. and,esser degree, petroleum,d:
a The areaarge part of It does not tome under Communist control;
b Communist forces already In the area do not seriously interfere with production in the principal industries; and
c Transport of materials is not interdicted
Nevertheless, substantial quantities of iron ore.oal, cotton, and foodstuffs would have to be imported in the next few years from the Western Hemisphere, primarily the US, if Japanese industrial capacity were lo be fully uilltrcd Raw materials in adequateprobably could be made available for Japanese import, although for some materials US allocations would probably be necessary.
8ubstantial rearmament program were undertaken in Japan, dollar aid wouldbe required The magnitude of dollar aid would not have to be excessive, although It would be Increased if there were an undv diversion of Japanese resources fromfor export to armaments production Western rearmament has substantiallythe Japanese balance of payments. The shortage of manufactured products,metal products, on world markets,
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with the Improvedosition of Jspan's customers, hasincreased sales of Japanesegoods Earnings from Its exportswith dollar receipts from pay-as-you-go arrangements with the US should place Japanairly favorable balance of paymentsIn addition. Japan has industrialand skilled manpowern excess of that currently employed Olvrn availability of raw materials, Japsn probably aould be abir to tits exports and at the same timeefensive rearmamentUhcit. cutback in Its livingi.ndannus' dollar cost to the USx! mating the magnitude of aid nower.Kt.dcd
Prospects For Joponese Reormomenl
everal basic farters in the Japanesestrongly favor, though they do not ensure. Japan's rearmament in association with the US and Japan's cooperation with the US and Its allies Ln opposing Far Eastern Communism. Japan's primary desire today Is for anby whkh it may regain control of its own affairs, maintain its national security, and achieve an accepted International status Japan would have preferred toeutral slatus In world affairs in order to bargain freely with all powers and thus obtain maximum national advantage In economic and political matters, events Ln Korea have largely dispelled the Illusion that Japan could remain neutral In the East-West struggleeasonably early end of theand continued faith in US military and economic strength, the Japanese attitude toward the US li likely to remain favorable or at least not to become so unfavorable as toajor obstacle tohe early post-treaty years
ost Japanese leaders in the government and two of the three principal political parlies either strongly favor rearmament or perceive that It cannot be noided Thehole, however, are fearful of direct involvement in another aar.owering ot present living standards, andevival of autocratic and militaristic government In
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government circles there Is some concern over the possibilityhreat to civilian control If high-ranking officers are returned topositionsearmament program Many Japanese would find It difficult suddenly to accept the Ideaearmed Japan.youth today lack the psychologicaland sense of mission common to the prewar and wartime youth ln the armed services.
II. Against these factors, however, must be set Japan's historic fear of Russia, thethreat of Soviet aggression, the enll-Communlst tradition of the Japanese people, their ingrained obedience to authority, their deep-rooted patriotism, and their nationalism, all of which would impel them to fight inof Japan During the la si ten months, there hasrend In favor of self-defense. Given government leadership and thethreat of Soviet aggression, this trend Is likely to be accelerated.
apanese governmental decision to move toward reconstituting Japanese armed strength would require:
eace treaty, signed at the earliestmoment by as many as possible of Japan's former enemies, which would restore Japanese sovereignty.
ecurity arrangement providing for the commitment of US military force* to theof Japan while Japanese strength was being developed.
Ci Assurance of US economic support.
The extent of popular acceptance of adecision to rearm would be influenced by such factors as the disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonlns and the extent tohe Japanese people hsd become convinced that rearmament would be for their ownEvenecision to rearm was taken, however, security arrangements and questions of economic aid would presumably be the subject of continuous negotiation as the Japanese sought to use their strategicto the US to exact the greatest possi-ble concessioni from the US
f Japan were fully sovereign aM rearmed. Its course would probably be determined Chiefly by opportunistic considerations. Thus,
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could be expected to exploit IUposition, to expand ita sphere ofend to make its own accommodation to any significant change In the Far Eastern or International power situation Basically, however, It wouldreferenceestern ratheroviet alignment.
World Reaction^ to Joponese Rearmament
A US decision to assist Japanesewould not cause seriously adversetn any non-Communist country with major Interests in the Tar East Australia* and New Zealand, however, will require US guarantees against future Japanese military aggression These countries,esult of their World War II experiences, i" reluctant to see Japan rearmed despite Increasingof the threat to their securityin the expansion of Communism in the Far East They therefore desire safeguards against both Coaimunlsl expansionism and resurgent Japanese militarism The Western European nations and the UK accept theand desirability of Japanese
Because of the deep-rooted Chinese fear ofS decision to rearm the Japanese would tend to reinforce the Sino-Soviet alliance.
he USSR wouldS-sponsored treaty between Japan and the non-Communist powers Instead, it would insist that the proper procedure would be for the US.SSR, the UK, France, and Communist China toreaty for submission to the other Interested parties. The main provisions which the USSR would insist should be Incorporatedreaty, all designed lo facilitate eventual Soviet penetration ol Japan, would be:vacuation of occupying troops; (b) "demilitarization" of Japan; and (c) "democ-letlzation" of Japan according to Soviet ideas
'In vie* ol the declared opposiiwn ol Avilitlian labor Itidtnearmament, anlabor Parlr- In the lortheofnini central eircUon wouldhe Bkrhnooo of oetalnlnsl oli an- so Japanese rearmament, evenmutual aeeurHy ajranifnirnu In the fa tint
Territorial settlements, the USSR would claim, would only require ratification of provisions in the) and Potsdam (IMS)The effect of this would be toSoviet possession of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, establish Chinese Communist control over Taiwan and the Pescadores, and return the Ryukyus and Bonins from USto Japan. Because the real concern of the USSR is over Japanese rearmament ratherreaty, Soviet reaction to the signingS sponsored treaty would take the formropaganda campaign of accusations that the US was planning "further aggression" from Japan, threats of counteraction based on the Sinc-Sovlet treaty, and IhreaU of economic pressure Implicit in emphasis on the economic disaster that would result if Japan cut Itself off economically from the mainland By such propaganda, the USSR would try not only lo prevent orreaty but also toUS foreign relations with thenations in Asia If the US shouldon the present basks and actuallya treaty with Japan without Sovietthe USSR would declare that the USSR did not recogntre its validity and was In no way bound by any of the treaty provisions Nevertheless, the USSR has probably already discounted the proposed bilateral US-Japanese arrangements and would not consider the formabration of these arrangements In aagreement as sufficiently important In Itself to Justify direct military action. This Is true primarily because Soviet concern over Japan centers not in the treaty Issue as such but In Japanese rearmament
he Kremlin wouldiewrearmament, particularly Inlon with US, Western European, and Oerman rearmament,erious obstacle loof Soviet objectives and ultimately,as pariumulative threat to the security of the USSR Soviet reaction torearmament would be strong, especially if Itcale that promised toilitary force potentially capable of offensive action The USSR would probably make dlp-lomalic eountermoves comparable lo those elicited by the prospect or West Oermanand would attempt to thwart or
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llmll Jspant' rearmament by propaganda and other means short of direct militaryTheseInclude:
Attempting to create further dissension between the US and lis allies over US policy In Asia.
o. Arousing victims of former Japaneseto resentment against the US.of Its role In building up Japan, and
r Continuing to accuse the US ofdesigns in Asia and of deliberate violation of international agreements.he USSR would also attempt to weaken Japanese popular will to support the US by at least:
0 Continuing to make increasingly pointed references to SLno-Soviet treaty provisions for Joint action by Communist China and the USSR against renewed Japanese aggression; and
b Exploiting Japanese desires for trade with the mainland, particularly North China and Manchuria.
f.eriod of time. Soviet leaders came to the conclusion that they could not prevent Japanese rearmament by suchthey would probably consider further courses of action At that lime, the Kremlin undoubtedly would take into consideration the relative world power situation of the USSR (Including atomicarticularly the extent to whkh Western European and West Oerman rearmament had developed, and the military situation of the Chineseas well as the scale and rate of progress of Japanese rearmament. We do not believe that Japanese rearmament In Itself would seteneral war between the US and the USSR If, ho* ever, the Kremlin were toin the light of the world powerthat the reannsment of Japan and Its alignment with the US would shift the world balance of power suffickntly tohreat to the security of the Soviet bloc, the USSR would probably resort to military action.
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APPENDIX A
PROVISIONS OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION PERTINENT TO THE QUESTION OF REARMAMENT
The following provisions of the Japanese constitution are relevant to the problem of rearm-
inr Janan:
"Chopter II. Ranunc-otion of Wor
Articlespirinf sincerely to en International peace based on Justice and order, thepeople forever renounce warovereign right of the natron and the threat or use of force as means of settling International disputes.
"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land. sea. and airwell as other war potential, witt, never be maintained The right ot belligerency of the slate will not be recognlred."
"Chapter VI. Judiciary
Article fj The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine theof any law, order, regulation or official act."
"Chopler IX. AmenoWu
Articlemendments to this Constitution shall be initialed by the Diet, through avote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the aflUrnative toteajority of all votes cast thereon,pecial referendum or at such election as the"
Original document.
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