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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
iran's position in the east-west conflict
NIE-6April
Trie IntelL'frnce organisations of the Departments of Slave, tha Army, tha Nsvy, the Airnd the Joint StaffIn the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Cw.imtlte* concurred in this estimatepril.
IRAN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
THE PROWEM
To estimate the position ol Iran In the East-West conflict* CONCIU5IONS
security interests in Iran havethe past six months teen progressively undermined by political and economic developments that have: (a) weakened the present regime; (b) Induced theto adopt policies favorable to the USSR (and hence unfavorable to thend (c) Increased the Influence of ultranaUonalist elements, which havecompelled the government to adopt policies unfavorable to the West and may force the adoption of additional measures against Western interests.
For the future, US security interests In Iran are threatened by:
o. The ever-present Soviet militaryto launch an attack on Iran with HtUe or no warning, and Iran'sof defending Itself against such an
possibility that the Iranianpolicy ol restrictingin Iran may be furtherto the point of eliminatingInterests.
possibility that disorders Infield area, whether or not Communist-
Inspired, may restrict or cut off supplies of Iranian oil to the West.
d. The political and economicof Iran (particularly as aggravated byhich might result In the breakdown or paralysis of government control and might lead to the collapse of the present regime and the establishment of ft completely anti-Western orviel dominated government.
ith respect to these threats, wethat:
the Kremlin considerswar to be uTunlnent, the USSR Isunder present conditions to takeof international complicationsIn overt military action inKremlin must estimate thatbe at least an even chance thatwould oppose any overt militarythe USSR In Iran.
Iranian OovemmentImpose further restrictions onInterests, but Is unlikely toInterests completely.
camong some of the oil workers, div
impofUix*oil to VnUiibjlo Uil US. bu Uta uaesx* inU to Witter*Use miuutxol th* Soua U* eVfMrfWHty of theol the WiWte Xut and IU pnebokekil iSici on cowntrtei ol tha Hear Kut vUl be dUcuMd Inr,tKwVliiU Sail AffKltno OS SOOUitf tnttiltl*
.
orderscale that would seriouslysupplies ol oil to the West are Improbable so long as the government re-taina effective control of the security force*
d. Although there Is insufficientto indicate that recent events In Iran have seriously shaken theability to maintain Its authority, there isontinuing dangerreakdown of government control and possiblyolitical collapse, which In turn would provide an opportunity for Communist seizure of power, with orovert Soviet assistance. II thetrendto actual nationalization ol the Anglo-Iranian oil concession, exclusion of the West fromparticipation In Iran's economic and financial recovery, further political assassinations. Increased weakness Inand In the control of Army and security forces, and greater exploitation of unrest and Intensification through Soviet subversiveIran la likely in time toecond
ncreased Western economic andassistance. If accepted by theGovernment, would In the short term strengthen the present regime and might In the long run increase Iran'i basic political and economic stability. Suchwould have lo be regardedong range, continuing investment. It could not bo expected to resultirm or permanent alignment of Iran with the West, or Increase significantly Iran's small defensive capability against the USSR.
DISCUSSION
Present Position
ran's strongest eststlng connections are with the West. Iran Is presently dependent on the Western Powers for markets, money, equipment, and technical advice, andcommercial interests (primarily British)ajor role tn the Iranian economy. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company alonefor an est unaot percent of Iran'a national income, providesuarter of the Iranian Treasury's trtaland contributes mstertally to Iran's foreign exchange through purchase of rials for kxal use. Most Iranians are bettertoward the West than toward the USSR. The Iranian Government Is aof US military assistance and has USadviser* for its army and gendarmerie. It has consistently supported the US In the UN.
r This relationship with the West, however, ts seriously threatened- Iran la extremely vulnerable to Soviet attack. In addition, the country's political, economic, and aoctaleiposes It lo subversivehe government's recent tendency to cooperate with the USSR may facilitate Soviet aubverslve activity. Finrlly. the current eruption of anti-Western feeling tn Iran threatens Western interests with expulsion.
Iron's Vulnerability to Soviet Atloclt
S. Iran Is Incapable of effectivelyoviet Invasion. Its armed forces are not only small but also weak In materiel, kaderahfp, and tactical organization. The USSR could setie key points In Iran with airborne troops and to any event could quickly occupy the nrost important areas of the country byInvasion. Rapid Soviet overlandcould be temporarily delayed ifuse were made of demolitions on bridges, tunnels, and other transportation facilities
the invasion routes. Borne guerrilla resistance could be carried oo If gorernroent leaders were able to escape to selected south-em Mountain areas, but the effectiveness of such resistance would be limited.
is no present prospect of aIn Iran's militarythe US mOitarj missionsconsiderably to Increase Iran'smaintain Internal security. It will be abefore the deficiencies of theforces In leadership, organization,can be overcome and beforecan make effective use of modemequipment
lthough the USSR ts capable of Invading Iran at any lime without warning, themay consider the achievement of control over Iran not sufncJently urgent to warrant open employment of military force. The Kreml'n may further consider that Iran'a own defensive capabilities will remain negligible, and that Iran's ability to resist subversion will decline, and that consequently theof an early attack on Iran would be Inconimcosurate with the risk ofcomplications Involved. The Kremlin must estimate that there would be at least an even chance that the US would oppose any overt military action by the USSR In Iran. If, however, the British were to send their armed forces Into Iran to proteO their nationals in the oil well area, the Sort its might take action based on their tnlerpre'aUon off the Treaty
Iron's Vulnerobility Jo Subversion
Iran Is subjectarietyand stresses
a The Iranian economy Is backward,and saddled with extensive absentee ownership. To raise the traditionally low lie-log standard of the bulk of the populationatisfactory level wouldong-term development program considerably morethan any thus far initiated. Inthe weaknesses of the economic system make It subject to periodicor example, crop8 producedunemployment and hardship, and bad management has resulted at present Inof Iran's recurrent financial crises.
b. The centra] government has failed lo gain the full support of the tribes, an only partially assimilated and potentially rvcaJci-Iraol element which constitutes about *Sof the population. Tehran's neglect of provincial interests and Its use of extortion and force in exercising Its authority havecontinuinghenotably In the northern border proline* of Azerbaijan.
C. Iran Is politically unstable. Altbough Iran Isonstitutional monarchy with popular representation, effective control of the governmental machinery atlU rests tn the handsmall ruling group whoseof affairs has been marked byintrigue, and failure to reapond to the country's needs and aspirations. Iran has few stronghe Shah occupies aposition by virtue of his command of the army, his constitutional prerogatives, and the prestige of the Crown. Ultimate power, now-ever, still rests largely with the few hundred landlords, tribal leaders, merchants, armyand clergy who dominate the aorta] and economic life of the country and supply the membership of Parliament Motivated byand class Interests, the variousIn Parliament have engagedon-llnutng contest with the executive ro recent years. Attempts to Initiate political andreform have been effectively frustrated, despite the fact that growing popular desire for better living conditions has Jed1 to endorse politicaleipanded health andfacilities, higher wages, and Improved production methods. The Seven YearProgram, from which much was hoped, was first broached8 but Is stul stalled in the preliminary stages. Meanwhile, the lack of cohesion within Parliament has madeeady vehicle for obstruction lam and special pleading.
d. This lUte ofhas had an unsettling political and social affect which makes the position of the old ruling group Increasingly
insecure. This group has thui farI:1pre-eminence, andstof ihe population, despite Its grumbling, remains politically apathetic. Nevertheless, thererowing feeling of Insecurity end dlssatlsf action, notably among students, white collar workers, and Industrialhis feeling can find caprcssfon only throughmovements. The USSR has worked assiduously to exploit popular Insecurity and dissatisfaction In Iran, not only through Its support of the subversive Tudeh Party but alto through special efforts to revlvs the sepa-ratlst spirit in Azerbaijan and to rouse the traditionally restive Kurdish tribes, whohort-lived 'people's republic" of their own In 1MB. The only other force attempting to exploit this popular discontent Is theultra-nationalist element which blames Iran's troubles on foreign domination of Iran's economy and foreign influences on Iran's way of life. These ultra-nationalists do not at presentarge organised group; there areandful of National Front deputies In Parliament Nevertheless, the popular appeal of their nationalistand the violence of their terrorist fringe has enabled them to exercise, both before and after Premier Rasmara's assassination, anout of all proportion to their numerical strength.
he assassination of Premier Raxmaraeligious fanaticarch and thethreat of terrorism have Increased Iran's Internal tensions and provided new op-port unities for factional conflict andAlthough Raxmara failed to gam any real support from the MaJUs foe his attempts to provide strong leadership, he was aInfluence, particularly with tha army, and hts death points up Iran's shortage of strong leaders. His forcible removal from the scene, together with the hesitancy displayed by the Shah In the face of ultra-nationalist efforts to eapllatlta on the situation, tends toe government's authority and to encourage the Tudeh Party and other groups to advance their special tnteresta Ultra-nationali*ta. without assuming major executive mponsibii-Ky, may be able to Impose their will on the governmentariety of Issues.
S The govemmeefs ability to maintain lis authority depends primarily oo Ha control of the security forces. This control over theforces may be critically shaken If tha present crisis is prolonged and exacerbated by further violence and mob pressure or if the economic situation Is allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that minimum relief from hardship is not provided. At present,the government retains control over the army and gendarmerie, and so long as Itto do so Ihe pro-Soviet forces wcinot be able to gain power without actual armed intervention by the USSR Martial law Is now In effect In Tertian and Ihe oil area,
O. The Communistdomlnaled Tudeh Party, though It has apparently succeedednified underground organisation and has shown various signs of renewedin recent months, remain* aorganisation whose membership Is drawn mainly from the small intellectua] and Industrial classes. It has accomplished little toward arousing the peasantry, whichthe vast majority of Ihe population, and evidently has not succeeded In eflecUvely peoe-trstlng the army and gendsrmerie or tnup the reserves of arms and equipment necessaryuccessful coup d'etat The Tudeh Party may eventually be capable of seriously Interfering, through strikes and sabotage, with the supply of Iranian oQ to the West At present, however, disorderscale which would seriously reduce thisore Improbable so long as the government retains effective control of the security force*,
fc The USSR's agitation In Azerbaijan end the other northern provinces has apparently heightened fearoviet Invasion rather thanesire for revolt; despite their grievances against the centraland their landlords, the people of these provinces would generally oppose the return of the Russians or their Iranian disciples.
c Although there have been periodicof an imminent Kurdish revolt, theno firm evidence that the USSR has succeeded In transforming traditional Kurdish hatred of the authorities Into an active revolutionary spirit and tn securing the cooperation of the
KurlUh tribe* Even If the Kurds did revolt, they would probably be Ineffective outelde their own tribal areas.
d The pceaent capabilities of otherIn Iran for dlrecUy challenging the government'* authority are also limited. The ultra-nationalists, though theyuccess-fully exploited popular sentiment to get their way on the explosive oO Issue and have gained political Influence In the process, do not now have the organized atrength to establishpolitical control over the government or to defy the security forces. Thetribes coulderious threat only If they were able to submerge their differences and act tn unison. Individual tribalhowever, could be put down so long as the security forces remained loyal. In any event, It is doubtful that any of the tribes could operate beyond Its own territoryreakdown of the central government had taken place.
he USSR might conceivably launch anof Iran with guerrilla forces under the lead of the exiled Baraanl Kurds and Abcr-baijan Democrats. These exiled elements are few In number, however, and would not be militarily effective unless supported by large numb rs of Soviet "volunteers."
evelopment of greater Internal stability tn Iran will at bestumber of years. Expanded US economic and technicalmight bolster the position of those Iran-Ian leaders who have been advocating Internal reform. In terms of material Improvement, however, such US assistance would have to be rooked uproong-range investment Progress would undoubtedly continue to be hampered by Iranian rack of skill, by graft and political maneuvering, by resistance to change by both the vested interests and the population at large, and by lack ofThereeal danger that Western advisers, as tn the past, will either become overwhelmed by the coropleiltles of theor, by their sealousness. Incur the.ihe Iranians. Nevertheless. Western aid and guidance. If accepted by the Iranians, would contribute to the development of greater Internal stability.
Iron's Probable Course of Action
ran's foreign policy la currently unsettled. Between the end of World War II andhe Iranian Oovemment moved closer tn the West, In part because of IU desire forassistance, but mainly because of the menacing attitude of the USSR The USSR attempted unsuccessfully to discourage Iran-Ian association with the West by frontierthreatening notes, and propaganda utterances accusing Iran of allowing the US to organise bases for aggression on fU aoU and reminding the Iranians of the USSR'i "right" to move tn against such bases under the 1W1 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship. The Iranian Oovemment made repeated pleas for US economic and military support, and the Shah and the late Premier Raimara (then Chief of Staff) asserted that Iran was com rnltted to the West' Nevertheless, Iran hasa basic preference for Isolation and mu-tralltytrong attachment to Itsand previously successful policyrecarious Independence by playing the great powers off against each other and distributing Iran's favorsao as to prevent any one power fromominant Influence. Thesehave been reinforced by resentment of past Anglo-Russian interference In Iranian affairs. The Russian CommunWs arehaled and feared like their Cxarist pre-decesso*.- The UK. though no longerfeared, has remained an object ofmistrustIts Interest tn the Anglo-Iranian OU Company and the oooa Iranian-controlled bland of Bahrein-atarget of Iranian xenophobia. Withinmonths strong pressures for theof Western privilegeseturn to th* old policy have emerged, particularly fa view of: (a) annoyance with th* fact that USassistance has fallen abort of Iranian expectations; (b) growing doubts about US wOlfngness and abfiity to protect Iran; (e) resentment of the Anglo-Iranian OO Com pany'a refusal to max* more than limited changes tn It* concession agreem-nt withrritation with Western attempt* to push internal changes; andthe Soviet Union's reversionore friendly attitude
Mb A
move which cumulated an Iranian hope ol staying on good terms with the USSR. During the MlranIts dealings with the USSR, notably through conclusionrade agreement The trend toward nationalism and neutrality, earlier manifested in the eanceUatkw of VOA and BBC rebroadcast faculties, restriction of travel by foreign nationals In Iran, andbargaining over the terms of thaillion Ei port-Import Bank loan, has now culminated In overwhelming approval by both houses of Parliamentesolution forof the oil Industry.
t is unlikely that the present movement away from the West would lead Iran to align Itselfe vehemence offeeling against the BritishanlfesU-tlon of Iran's basic resentment of foreignrather than an expression of pro-Soviet sentiment; the number of Iranians whosuppoc: the USSR i. very smalt. Soviet sympathisers who have Infiltrated the ultra-nationalist faction wOi probably try to steer Iran closer to the USSR If the ultra-national. Uts should succeed In solidifying theirposition of vantage. It is probable,that other pressure groups would unite to prevent the alignment of Iran with the USSR Th* great majority of Iranians, and particularly the present regime, ar* unlikely to be won overriendly Soviet policy even Ifolicy were long continued. The favorable Impression which the USSR created by Its recent actions has already begun to wear off, In view of the limited usefulness of the trade pact, the failure of the Soviet-Iranian border commission to produce concreteand th* USSR's continuing roleard bargainer on such matters as Iran's gold claims.
IS. It Is also unintely that Iran wtueliminate Western Intereststhe small group of ultra nationalist deputies tn Parliament has succeeded In ex. plolttng popular feeling against the British and has been able to seise the Initiative In the period following Premier Rarxnara'smost o* th* governing group would probably wish to retain *om*ounterbalance to Soviet pressurea
Despite Parilament'a overwhelmingof the principle of oil nationalisation. It Is not certain that the Anglo-Iranlan OUwill In fact be obliged to cease It*In Iran In the near future, not onlyof the magnitude of the economic, legal, and technical problem* Involved but altoof the self-interested opposition of many members of the ruling class
It There Is little doubt, however, that Iran has embarkedourse involving aof lis connection* with the Westuarded extension of Its dealings with the USSR. Although the Ornish may be able to patch up their relations with Iran on the oil question, ultimate expropriation of the oO company has at least been brought closer, and the curtailment of the few other commercial advantages which the UK stUl enjoys In Iran will undoubtedly continue. The Shah and some other leaders will probably continue to try to obtain Western economic and military aid, but Parliament's wfJllngneaa to accept such aid Is far from certain. In any event, the Iranian Oovemment can be expected to Insist that US help be provided on Iranian terms, to refuse any overt commitment to the West, and perhaps to waver tn it* support of the US In the UN. Although the Iranianwill probably not cancel the US mQl-tsry missions, It may well further curtafj the freedom of action of mission officers and other U3 and UKran will probably be willing to develop additionalend cultural lie. with the USSR, though it will attempt to control th* extension of Soviet Influence. Iran would probably not go so far as to grant the USSR an oUr to agree to establishmentoint Irano-Sovlet oil company.
n th* event of war, Iran's policy would probably be as follows:
a If Iran were attacked, the Iranians would offer some resUtance, meanwhile calling for US and UN aid. .
If an isolated Soviet or Satellite attack took place against some other country, Iran would remain neutral or. at most, support the UN without contributing armedhough Iran Is unlikely to restrict th* supply
ol oil to the West, It would not allow tha use ol Iranian territory for air bases.
t.enera) war In which Iran was not initially attacked took place, Iran wouldattempt to remain neutral. Thereemote possibility that Iran might attempt to avoid provcoatlon of the USSR by curtailing the supplyo the West, though the flnan-tia! loss involved would militate against such amove.
he extent to which lran'a association with the West can lo strengthened IsA satisfactory British-Iranian settlement cn the oil Issuererequisite to improvement of Iran's relations with the West. An expanded US economic assistance program would tend to strengthen the position of those who have looked to the West forore explicit US pledge of military support, either unilaterally orS-backed regional security organisation, might quiet the present fears of the Shah concerning tin remotaneas of Western support. The assaas-naUco of Premier Raxmara, however, has not onlya leading advocatero-Western alignment but has greatly strengthened the position of the ultra-nationalist leaders. The success of further US gestures would bequestionable by Iran's underlyingnd fear of foreign Influence aid by Its awareness of Its extreme vulnerability to Soviet attack. Host Iranian opinion would probably remain skeptical about the degree, permanency, and unselfishness of US Interest tn strengthening the country. Evenore favorable attitude toward the US, most Influential Iranians would probably oppose any attempt to align Iran firmly with the West on the ground that such an arrangement would be unduly provocative to the USSR and at variance with the tradition of maintaining an Independent position with respect to the great power*.
Original document.
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