CRITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH POLICY TOWARD INDOCHINA

Created: 1/10/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

appro vxd for release date: 5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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Memorandum lor tbe Director of Central Intelligence Subject: Critical Developments in French Policy toward

Indochina

Aa the result of tlie current French cabinet and budgetaryritical French reappraisal of their Indochina policy appears imminent and may have major Implications for the US. Plagued by continued Inflation and limited financial capabilities, all levels of French official and public opinion are rapidly gravitating toward the opinion that France itself cannot simultaneously support rwo major military efforts, one in NATO and the other in the Far East-Postwar French military policy has reflectedwith two needs: (a) not to be overshadowed militarilyesurgent Germany, and (b) not to abandon the French position overseas. The French calculate that, even with projected US aid of all kin.is, the cost to France of meeting these twola likely to rise2 to overillionroughlyillion in Indochina andillion for NATO. They calculate, however, that their maximum practicable military budget will fall short of this figure by0 million.

Since French Interests ln Western Europe axe paramount, it appears that any retrenchment must come in the Far East. Among the signs are (a) General deecent remarks on

the disproportion between the expense ol the war ln Indochina and the French stake there, (b) Premier Pleven's recent request for early high-level conversations on Indochina in the context oJ the whole Far Eastern problem; andhat many French poli"cans are becoming convened to the belief that French withdrawal from Indochina ls inevitable and should not be too long postponed. Embassy Pails estimates that the "snowball has started to form" and that, tn the absence either of some form of Internationalization of the Indochinaor of substantial additional US aid, public sentiment for withdrawal will gain steadily and perhaps accelerate

Under these circumstances the French Govornmentconcluded (hat ihe only chance of solving lisshort of retrenchmen: lios in convincing the USitself can no longc support the major burden ofwar The French have consistently arguedIndochina struggle must not be regarded as ainterest but as ar integral part of the over-alleffort of the West Consequently presentappears directed toward: (a) securingUS aid to relieve the French financialsecuring some form ol Internationalization ofS-UK commitment to defendactingarning to the Chinese Communists,concerting of joinl defense measures as recommendedSingapore Conference and (c)f possible,in Indochina on Ihe Koroan model. It appearsFrance intends to press lor early decision on thesetheir grave implications for French colonial policy.Government may well consider that it must act alongsooner or later anyway and that it cannot afford to waitChinese invasion is imminent or German rearmament in

SHERMAN KENT Assistant Director Nalional Estimates

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