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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
LIKELIHOOD OF THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF FULL-SCALE WAR BY THE USSR AGAINST THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES PRIOR TO
THE END2
NIE 48
rMat has hoen approved loz release through tee" ujsioricm, fiEVim gaH or the central InteUicence iasocj-.
Thc intelligence organizations of the Departments of Slate, lhe Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Stat!with thc Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this estimate
LIKELIHOOD OF THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OFBY THE USSR AGAINST THE US AND ITSPRIOR TO THE END OF
THE PROBLEM
To estimate whether the USSR is likely deliberately to initiate generalull-scale war against the US and its Western allies, prior to the end
CONCLUSION
balance we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately initiateware believe that the Kremlin prefers to pursue its objectives through methods short of deliberateto war with the US and its allies, and moreover, probably estimates thatfor progress through such methods will continue to existe believe that in thesethe Kremlin is likely toeliberate resort to war with the US and its alliesy the certainty of extensive destruction in the
USSR as well as by the risk that the Soviet system might be destroyed.
We recognize, however, the continuing grave dangereneral war2 resultingremlin action or series of actions not intended to have thator even from actions which, in the Kremlin's view, entailed that risk, but not the certainty thereof. We recognize also the danger that general war might arise from Soviet-initiated hostilities which the Kremlin intended to limitarticular area.
CONSIDERATIONS Soviet Objectives
he principal Immediate Soviet objectives evidently are:
divide the West;
consolidate and extend Sovietinfluence wherever possible. (Duringunder consideration Asia appearsthe best opportunities.);
prevent Western. West German,rearmament;
d. To prevent implementation of the US overseas-bases policy.
c believe the USSR, in pursuit of itswin during the period of this estimate:
to maintain an advanced slateand offset any increase Inof thc US and its allies;
to prevent the development ofto the vital Interests of the USSR orcontrol of the Satellites;
l
to expand thc territorial limitsSoviet orbit;
to undermine and securegovernments not yet under Soviet
to force countries of theolicy of neutrality In thestruggle and to deny thoirstrategic sites, to the US and
The Place of War in Soviel Strategy
he basic strategy under which theappears to have acted tn thc past employs thc following concepts:
tu The preservation of thc establishedstate, the USSR, Is essenlial toecure base and strong support forin other states. In tum, revolution in other countries is necessary for theand completion of the revolution in the USSR.
permanent accommodation Isthis State and the capitalistdoctrine of the impossibility ofbetween communism andand the Inevitability of ultimatebefore one side or thc othervalid.
in that it is subject tocontradictions, bears withinseeds of Its own destruction.conflict, economic rivalry,ill weaken theand create revolutionaryUSSR must provoke and exploitthrough political warfare* and.through the use of Sovietforce.
grave danger exists and alwaysthat the capitalist world, alarmedrising revolutionary tide, will uniteand destroy the USSR.
Potillcat warfare as here used includes all manner of political and economic pressure,action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front acUWUes, Communist Party andtrade union activities, support ol al) kinds ot revolutionary movements, andwarfare.
e. The USSR must seek to avoid the final world struggle until capitalist power has been sufficiently undermined, but must be readyall Umes to assume the offensive if theshould warrant it.
ecent Soviet pronouncements suggest that the Soviet rulers believe that the struggle between capitalism and Communism has reached an advanced stage in which the world is divided Into two camps, and that thecamp is now seeking not only to prevent the spread of the revolution, but also tothe Soviet-dominated camp.
would be unsafe to take theseas an infallible guide toof action in the future. The USSRtotalitarian state and experiencetotalitarian states are subject toand compulsions which maywarning. In the use of foreignan Instrument of national policy.use of war for this purpose canbetter controlled than has been therespect to other totalitarian stateshistory. Therefore. Soviet coursescan never be predicted withparticular the possibility of deliberateof general war cannot be excludedtime merely because such initiationpast Soviet political strategy.the possibility of deliberate initiationwar cannot be excluded even if.the outside, it seemed certain thatof the USSR would be betterother courses of action.
Soviet theory and practice oilerguide as to when and under whatthe USSR would deliberatelyto war against the US and its allies,no doubt that the USSR is theenemy of the non-Communistin Soviet theory and practice war isand on occasion necessary,for attaining CommunistKremlin presumably prefers if possibleits objectives by courses of actionresort to general war. However.and practice suggest that itresort to armed attack at any
arc such that thc USSRthe situation as highly favorable, or
other method appeared availablewhat the Kremlin considered athe preservation o( the USSR
FACTORS WHICH MIGHT DETER THE KREMLIN FROM DELIBERATELY INITIATING WAR AGAINST THE US AND ITS ALLIES2
Risks Involved and Uncertainty of Outcome
Kremlin probably estimates thatinitial phaseeneral war begunSoviet and Soviet-controlled forcesand hold extensive and importantEurope and Asia and thereby enhancepower position. It might alsoit could, at the very outset, deliveratiack on the continental US ofstrength to reduce materially thefor countering Sovietthe Kremlin would probably nota Soviet atomic attack on thcto eliminate Uie threat of atomicand prevent the mobilization of Uieand military potential,
It Ls Impossible to estimate Uie Kremlin's conclusion with regard lo the relativeof Soviet and US atomic warfareor with regard to Uie relaUvcof atomic and conventional weapons In determining the issuear. Thewould undoubtedly expect the West toto Soviet initiationeneral war by launching an immediate atomic attack on the Soviet orbit, with consequent widespread destruction. We believe, however, that the Kremlin probably estimates that the USSR could survive this attack and maintainrelative strength to carry on Uie war.
The Kremlin might believe that alter the USSR had extended the areas under itsand survived the initial allied retaliaUon, it could fortify its newly-won positions and mobilize Its newly-acquired resources. It might calculate that Uie economic and other losses suffered from continuing US attacks would be onset by the industrial andresources it had acquired In Europe and Asia. While the Kremlin would doubt-
less anticipate difficulties In establishing and maintaining firm control over Uie defeated populations and would also anticipate Internal difficulties, its whole concept of state power suggests that it would expect to copewitb these problems.
n these circumstances thc Kremlin might estimate lhat the resulting Soviel powerwould deter the West fromto recover thc areas overrun by the USSR. Furthermore, Uie Kremlin might believe lhat Uie loss of European and AsiaUc resources. Including manpower, might make it impossible for Uie US to carry Uie war throughuccessful conclusion. The Kremlin would undoubtedly expect the US government to be extremely tenacious andIn its attempt to prosecute thc war. even if denied support from Europe and Asia and subjected to increasing domesUc pressure for peace. However, It might estimate that as the war dragged on opposition in the US to the war might rise to the point where the people would refuse to make thc sacrifices necessary for the continuance of Uie conflict and thereby oblige Uie government toompromisen Uie other hand, the Kremlin would have lo recognize that, despite initial Soviet successes, alubstantial portion of the power potent ia! of thc US would remain, and probably would in time be mobilized and brought to bearontinuation of the struggle. In these circumstances the would expect to be faced with oper-aUons of such magnitude as. at Uie least, to make thc war long and cosily to Uie USSR. The Kremlin would have to consider. In this event, whether or not it could survive the poUtical. economic, psychological and military strainsrolonged war of attrition."
Director of Naval Intelligence would add at this point the following paragraph:
"In weighing this question, the Kremlin would have to recognise the grave danger that In awar of attrlUon Uie USSR would be subjected to persistent and growing air attacks. Including atomic attacks, possibly rcsulUng In seriousbreakdowns and the disruption of Soviet ad-ministraUve and police machinery. With regard to newly-overrun areas the Kremlin would have to (Footnote continued at bottom ol next page)
view of the foregoing, it cannot bethat the Kremlin would necessarilyto sufTer defeatar with theevertheless, theprobably esUmate that suchazardous gamble on itsinimum the certainty ofdestruction in the USSR and attime carrying with it the risk thatsystem itself would bewould probably make thereluctant deliberately to initiate
Prospects For Achieving Soviet Aims By Methods Short of Deliberate Initiation of Gonoral War
The Kremlin probably estimates thatwill continue to exist, at leastthe period of this estimate, for furthering both its immediate and long-run objectives by methods short of the deliberate Initiation of full-scale war against the US and its allies
Communist doctrine stresses the strategic importance of thc so-called "colonialspecially in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, which are regarded asita) bearing on lhe world power balance. Bringing these ureas under Soviet control, or at least denying their assets to the West, Is regarded as one of the most important steps lnfor the final phase of the world struggle. Al present the Kremlin probably sees in the instability of these areas favorable opportuntUes for early Communist gains.
Although probably recognizing that It has little chance2 of making territorial gains in Europe without deliberate resort to general war. the Kremlin probably believes
the logistical and security problems ofacross broad expanses of conqueredadequate support and control of extended Soviel forces; the danger of the Ideologicalof Soviet occupation forces; theof widespread guerrilla resistance, probably supported and directed by the Allies: and. perhaps most important, the possibility that Alliedon the Comment might be held throughout thc inlUat phase of the war. and might in time be built up lufflelenUy toajor counter-oficnMve."
lhat current and future economic difficulties, particularly in the UK and France, andinterests and attitudes among the Western Powers may preventosition of strength In the West. Furthermore these difficulties may make Western Europe increasingly susceptible to various possible Soviet maneuvers, such-as the "peace" campaign, the relaxation of tensions, trade overtures, exploitation of the fear of war, and intimidation by the display offorce, and may make possible thc growth of the Communist movement in the West.
FACTORS WHICH MIGHT INDUCE THE KREMLIN DELIBERATELY TO INITIATE GENERAL WAR
In view of the above considerations weit unlikely that the Kremlin wouldinitiate general war2 solely for the purpose of expanding the area under its control. With respect to China we believe that the USSR would react to theexpansion of the present conflict in Korea by giving increased aid to the Chinese Communists, even to the extent of committing Soviet forces and therebye facto war between the US and the USSR in the Far East, but would probably not deliberatelygeneral war.
If. however, the Kremlin concludedestern attack on the USSR were Imminent and unavoidable, and that Soviet chances of surviving such attack would be Improved by seizing the initlaUve and attacking first, it would almost certainly do so. We have no way of knowing what interpretation the Soviet leaders may be placing upon the information available to them concerning Western plans and preparations. But in view of apparent long-standing Kremlin concern over any real or imagined threat to Soviet security, of MarxisL warnings over thc ever-present danger of capitalist attack on the Communist world, of expressed Soviet suspicion of various recent Western military measures, and of various recent statements by Western public figures and of articles in the Western press, we believe that the Kremlin Is probablyover Western intentions.
are. however, cogentprobably lead lhc Kremlin toa deliberate Western aitack duringunlikely. The Wesl will still be (ardegree ol mobilization which theconsiders necessary for aon the USSR. Western forces oncontinent will still be fareffective offensivethe present military power ofand the growing military forces of the
Satellites.
Even if thc Kremlin did not anticipate an Imminent attack by the West, it woulddeliberately iniliate general war If lt came to the conclusion that an irreversible adverse shift In the balance of military power were developing, that it could not otherwise be checked or countered, and that itrave threat to Soviet security.
The Kremlin may estimate that already the balance of military power is shifting to Its disadvantage because ol: (a) progressiveof the West; (b) the Increase in Western defense producUon; (c) recentmobilization measures and the prospect of German and Japanese rearmament; and (d) thc Increasing atomic capabilities of the US
However, we believe it unlikely that Uie Kremlin will,onclude lhat the foregoing developments will necessarily resultajor shift in thc balance of military power. The Kremlin probably foresees many
difficulties In the implementation of aunited and lusting Western program for building military strength and corresponding opportunities (or exploiting these difficulUes. It may estimate lhat sooner or laterrogram will fall because of poliUcal anddifficulties among and within Uieof Uie free world, and that meanwhile Uie Soviet bloc, firmly under Kremlin control, can continue to improve its relative power position.
On balance we believe it unlikely lhat the Kremlin will deliberately initiate general ware believe lhal the Kremlin prefers to pursue Its objectives throughshort of deliberate resort to war with thc US and its allies, and. moreover, probably es-Umates that possibilities for progress through such methods will conlinuc to existe believe lhat in these circumstances Uie Kremlin Is likely to be deterredeliberate resort to war with Uie US and its allies2 by Uie certainty o( extensive destruction In thc USSR as well as by the risk that the Soviet system might be destroyed.
Wc recognize, however, thc continuing grave dangereneral warremlin action or series ofnot intended to have that result, or even fromhich, in the Kremlin's view,that risk, but not the certainty thereof. We recognize also the danger that general war might arise from Soviet-initiated hostilities which thc Kremlin intended to limitar-Ucular area.
Original document.
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