SECRET
ssistant director,one
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH
national intelligence estimate
probable developments in indochina through
The intelligence organizations ol the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency in theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate See, however, footnotes to
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in Indochina throughithemphasis on probable Chinese Communist courses of action in that area.
CONCLUSIONS
believe that the French willtheir war effort in Indochinathe period of this estimate. However, while insisting upon the protection of French interests, the French will attempt to limit their commitments inby demanding additional USassistance and by seekingfor US-UK military support in the defense of Indochina.
The present critical financial situation of France is causing the Frenchincreasing concern over France's ability to maintain its position inand to support simultaneously its presently projected military effort in Europe. We believe that the reflections of this concern will give rise to misgivings in Vietnam regarding France's intentions toward Indochina and accordingly will have an adverse effect upon Vietnamese morale. We believe that this concern will not affect the French effort in Indochina during the period of this estimate, but mayater date adversely influence France's will to continue resistance in Indochina.
Independent of operations in Korea, the Chinese Communists have theto commit and logistically supportroops inThis force could probably cause the present Franco-Vietnamese forces to evacuate Tonkin before effectivecould be made available to them.
We believe, however, that the Chinese Communists will not intervene in force in Indochina during the period of this estimate. *
We believe that the Chinesewill gradually expand the scale and nature of their present assistance to the Viet Minh and may in addition introduce Chinese Communist "volunteer" troops in small numbers. We believe that in pursuit of this policy they will stop short of any degree of assistance which they estimate might provoke major Western counteraction against the mainland of China.
is the view of the Assistant chief of, Intelligence, Department of the Army, that thii sentence should read as follows: "Although the Increased Chinese communist capabilities in South China suggest preparations for an invasion orpresent evidence does not necessarilythat such an Invasion isthe period ol this estimate."
SEC
G. Throughhe probablein Indochina is one of gradualof the Franco-Vietnamese military position. We believe that the Viet Minh will make some territorial gains, but will notecisive victory during the period of this estimate.
he longer term outlook is forimprovement in the combatof the Viet Minh and an increased Viet Minh pressure against the Franco-Vietnamese defenses. Unless present trends are reversed, this growingcoupled with the difficulties which France may continue to face inmajor military efforts in both Europe and Indochina, may lead to an eventual French withdrawal from Indochina.
DISCUSSION
Current Situation
Since the publication ofevelopments in Indochina During the Remainderhe French extended their Red River deltaaround Hanoi and Haiphong westward to Hoa Binh, but heavy Viet Minh attackseriod of two months coupled with harassing action by Viet Minh units which had infiltrated the Delta, have resulted in French withdrawal from the Hoa Binh sector. (See Mapn the Hanoi-Haiphong deltaranco-Vietnamese regular troops currently confront an0 Viet Minh regular troops. Elsewhere inguerrilla-type warfare continues and the Viet Minh still control northern Tonkin, major portions of the Annam coast and parts of Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos. (See Map
There hasreat improvement In the vigor, coordination, and effectiveness of recent Viet Minh attacks along the French perimeter In Tonkin. The Viet Minh haveustained frontal attack in the western delta area, and elsewhere ta the delta haveone division and major elements of another behind the Franco-Vietnamesein the central and southern parts of the delta where they are now conducting harass-tag operations andhreat to the Hanoi-Haiphong line of communications. There hasoticeable increase in Viet Minhcapability in recent months.the Viet Minh have suffered heavy casualties, they continue to attack and have forced the French to commit almost all of their Tonkin reserves to the operations along the western edge of the delta and against Viet Minh units which have infiltrated elsewhere.
This increased capability reflects aincrease in Chinese Communisttraining, and logistic assistance to the Viet Minh. While there is no conclusivethat Chinese personnel, either in units or as individuals, are serving with Vict Minh combat units, there are an0 Communist Chinese with the Vict Minhin technical, advisory', and garrisonThere hasontinuingof transportation routes andfrom South China into Indochina.Communist logistic assistance to the Viet Minh via these routes is at an all time high, while stockpiles on both sides of the border are believed to be in excess of Viet Minhfor present operations.
Although French losses have been heavy, the combat effectiveness of the French forces remains high. The combat effectiveness of the Associated States' forces is for the most part not yet adequate to fit them forcombat operations. These forces are primarily performing static defense roles, but some units have conducted themselveswith the French in offensive operations. US MDAP aid has been of critical importance to the regular French forces during recent operations, Although the attrition rate in French equipment is high, MDAP logistic assistance is compensating for these losses.
s:
There haa been little significant change in the political situation within Vietnam, the most important of the Associated States, since the publicationnd the factors discussed inhich limittrong Vietnamese government still apply. The death of General de Lattre has had an adverse effect upon Vietnamese morale as have the suspicions of the Vietnamese that the French may be weakening in theirand ability to defend Indochina,
We believe that the spirits of the Viet Minh leaders have been raised by the recent death of General de Lattre, the expanded scale of Chinese Communist assistance, theeffect which the sustained Viet Minh offensive has had upon the French, the re-occupation of Hoa Binh by the Viet Minh and their discernmenteakening Franco-Vietnamese will to resist. Tlie consolidation of Communist control within the Viet Minh area continues and has effectively countered internal opposition. The food shortage isalleviated by rice gained from within the French perimeter. There is no evidence of serious friction between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists.
Viet Minh And Franco-Vietnamese Capabilities And Probable Courses Of Action
We believe that the Viet Minh willbe able to continue to infiltrate the French lines in Tonkin, but will be unable toecisive victory during the period of this estimate. However, the over-alleffectiveness of the Viet Minh will almost certainly continue to improve and the Viet Minh will probably be able toeries of harassing attacks on French positions in Tonkin. Elsewhere in Indochina, the Viet Minh will increase their terrorist and guerrilla tactics.
The French Government is increasingly concerned over France's ability to maintain its position in Indochina. Thererowing official feeling in France that it cannotsupport presently projected military efforts in both Europe and Asiagreater US aid. Tlie French now estimate that, with present US aid. the2 military budget that is politically andpossible will fall several hundred million dollars short of their projectedfor NATO and Indochina together. The French, if forced to choose between Europe and Indochina, would view theircommitment as of lesser importance, bul the necessity forecision isto arise during the period under review. Moreover, there hasrowing feeling that the distant and costly Indochinese war offers few rewards even If won. This feeling is Increasing political pressure lor someof the French burden In Indochina. The various approaches by which France isto achieve such alleviation of the burden are: (a) by insisting that much of theburden for the defense of Indochina be shifted to the US; (b) byS-UK commitment to participate in the defense of Indochina in the event of more active Chinese Communist intervention: or possibly (c) by including the issue of Indochina within the context of any general Far East settlement which might arise out of Korean negotiations. Should these approaches prove unsuccessful, the French would seriously considerfrom Indochina.
Within the period under review, however, we believerench military withdrawal from Indochina is unlikely despite thedifficult financial situation which has caused isolated demands In Parliamentithdrawal. Strong factors still hold the French to their present commitments. These include: (a) the Intangible but powerfulof prestige; (b) the knowledge thatfrom Indochina would haveelsewhere In the French Union; (c) the concern over the fate of French nationals and investments in Indochina; and (d) thefeeling that no settlement wiih the Viet Minh or with Communist China could be achieved lhat would preserve any Frenchin Indochina.
Within Indochina, we believe lhat there will be no improvement during lhe period of this estimate in lhe morale or the political strength of the Vietnamese. The efforts of
the French and the Bao Dai regime to resist Communist pressure will continue to beapatheticallyeople who do notmuchersonal stake in the war effort and apparently mistrust French motives more than they recognize any danger from the Communists. This mistrust of French motives would be further heightened in the event that the French should be impelled to take military measures to subdue growing "third force" movements which are opposed to both the Viet Minh and the French
Chinese Communist Capabilities And Probable Courses Of Action
The Communist Bloc continues to view Indochinaey to its desired goal, tbat of eventual Communist control over allAsia. The immediate importance ofto Moscow and Peiping lies in the fact that the existence of aViet Minh compels France to divert much of its financial and military resources to Indochina, prevents the Associated States from gaming generally recognizedstatus, and hinders the establishmenttable non-Communist state on China's border. The potential importance ofto Moscow and Peiping is great: the fall of Indochina wouldsychologicalof the first magnitude for the Communist Bloc, would undermine the determination of the governments and peoples of Burma and Thailand to resist Communist aggression, would facilitate further Communist conquests In Southeast Asia, would hinder theof Communist China bystates, would provide the Communist Bloc with control of additional sources of food and strategic materials, and would deny to the West the strategic position and the resources of Indochina.
Transportation facilities from Southinto Indochina continue to be improved, and there have been numerous indications of Chinese Communist troop buildup andalong the Indochina border. Theseincrease the capabilities of the Chinese Communists either to invadeIn force or to give military assistance to the Viet Minh.
If the Chinese Communists should decide to intervene directly in Indochina, they have anroops available in South China for such an invasion. We believe that of this number they could actually commit and supportroopsof operations in Korea. Logistic and transportation difficulties would restrict the operations of these troopseries of limited offensives, between which time would befor replenishment of supplies and repair of transportation facilities. An Intensification of the Korean hostilities would probablyreduce the flow of supplies forunless the Soviets undertook tothe Chinese Communist stocks. Such Soviet aid would be probable in the event of Chinese Communist commitment of forces in Indochina. It may be assumed that thecomponents of the Chinese Communist troops south of the Yangtze are adequately equipped with normal infantry light weapons and that their training is sufficient to attempt an invasion. An armistice In Korea wouldthe number of Chinese Communist troops and the logistic support that could be made available for operations in Indochina; transportation deficiencies would stillimiting factor, however, although the level of logistic support could be raised somewhat by use of the facilities of the Chinese Communist Air Force.
These Chinese Communist troops, added to those of the Viet Minh, would probably be able to force the French and the Vietnamese troops to evacuate Tonkin before anyassistance could be brought to bear. The Chinese Communists are unlikely to commit Jet aircraft to Indochina, so long as hostilities in Korea continue. However, the CCAF,only piston-type aircraft, wouldwith surprise, have the capability to neutralize the French Air Forces In Tonkin. An armistice in Korea would of course vastly increase this capability.
The Chinese Communists might risknvasion of Indochina In any oneumber of circumstances: in order to counter anblow by the West and/or the Chinese Nationalists;iversionary attack In the
eventenera! Far Eastern or global war; if the Communists believed that the Westto attack Communist China regardless of the latter's policies In Southeast Asia; or In the event that Communist leadership should decideotential shift In western policies mighterious threat toChina that could not be countered through present Communist strategy.
e believe, however, that thewill not invade Indochinaperiod of thislthough theChinese Communist capabilitiesChina suggest preparations for anof Indochina, present evidence doesindicate that such an invasionOther considerations,militateirect intervention byChinese
a. Present Communist strategy Is bringing considerable success in Indochina, maythe determination and ability of both the Vietnamese and the French to continueand may provide the Communistsotential tool fur aggravatingamong the Western Powers.
o. Recent western moves liave probably made world Communist leadership aware that the West, and in particular the US, maythe war in Asia to the Chinese mainland should Communist China invade Indochina. Any such awareness is probably somewhatby Communist recognition of dividedin the West as to the merits and timing of such retaliation. On balance, however,that the war in Asia might be expanded and that drastic retaliatory action might be taken against the mainland of China Issufficient toajor factor dissuading the Chinese Communists from openlyin force in Indochina.
'The Assistant Chief of. Intelligence, Department of the Army, prelers that this firstbe deleted. Sec footnote ton page 1.
c. Despite the importance of Indochinaabove, it is unlikely that its present economic and strategic importance to Peiping and Moscow is great enough toarge-scale Chinese Communist invasion with arisk of initiating general war.
We believe that the Chinese Communists will, short ol open intervention, graduallythe scale and nature of their present assistance to the Viet Minh. Even assuming continuing heavy commitments in Korea, the Chinese Communists will face no forbidding difficulty in increasing the present level of technical and logistic assistance to the Viet Minh. Logistical support will probablyprimarily of such items as light arms and ammunition, vehicles, some field andartillery, and communication and medical equipment.
The Chinese Communists will alsoto commit technical and advisoryto the Viet Minh and may introduce Chinese "volunteer" troops. We do nothowever, that the Communists, during the period of this estimate, will commitin numbers that would assure amilitary victory for the Viet Minh or that they believe would result in majorcounteraction against mainland China.
Consequently, throughheoutlook In Indochina Is one of gradual deterioration of the Franco-Vietnameseposition. We believe that the Viet Minh will make some territorial gains, but will notecisive victory during the period of this estimate.
The longer term outlook is for continued improvement In the combat effectiveness of the Viet Minh and an increased Viet Minh pressure against the Franco-VietnameseUnless present trends are reversed, this growing pressure, coupled with thewhich France may continue to face in supporting major military efforts in both Europe and Indochina, may lead to an eventual French withdrawal from Indochina.
Original document.
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