PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY DURING 1952 (NIE 53)

Created: 2/19/1952

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY2

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY2

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The intelligence organisations ol thc Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency In theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimateee, however, footnotes of the Department of the Air Force tond 6.

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY2

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet objectives with respect to Gennany and probable Soviet courses of action in pursuit of those objectives

ESTIMATE

Objectives In Germany

The Kremlin has thc ultimate aim of bring-ing under Its control the strategicallyarea and resources of Germany. The Kremlin regards any substantial part ofnot under Soviet control, particularly if associated with the Western Powers,ajor obstacle lo the realization of thisaim andotential threat to its own security, llie Kremlin will not consider as satisfactory any solution of the Germanthat does not promise to bring all of Gennany within the Soviet orbittep in its aim for world domination.

The Kremlin ls undoubtedly aware that an overwhelming majority of the German people Is hostile to both Communism and thc USSR and that conditions are not now favorable for gaining control of West Germany through politicalhe Kremlin also must realize that the Western Powers areto oppose by force any attempt toSoviet control on West Germany byforce. Thus, thc Kremlin must recognize that an attempt to impose Soviet control

* PoliUcal warfare as here used includes all manner of poliUcal and economic pressure. diplomaUcIn the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front acU.lUes. Communist rartr and Coramunlst-con-troiled trade union acimues. support of all kinds of levoIuUoiiarr movements, and psvcholorlcsJ

over all of Germany at this time wouldecision to accept general war. Therefore, the Kremlin Is almost certainly currentlywith the following immediate

prevent the integration of Westwith the West and to prevent theof West Germany.

retain and consolidate Its holdGermany.

the expulsion of the WesternBerlinasic SovietKremlin's immediate objective Inis to weaken progressivelyposition in Berlin. Meanwhile,is exploiting West Berlin as anfor illegal trade andoint atcan beSoviet Political MovesAchievement Of Ils Objectives

In West Germany

Kremlin is aware that thcWest Germany with the West,German rearmament, faces seriousobstacles, and It probablyrearmament will note believe, therefore,Kremlin will continue to pursue Itsin West Germany by politicalleast while the prospect for Wesl German

integration with the West and West German rearmament remain uncertain.

believe that during the period ofthe Kremlin will not give upits control over East Germany loWest German integration with theWest German rearmament. It2 the Kremlin will surrenderadvantages, military andthe USSR derives from Its controlIn return for thean independent, disarmed and unitedwhich it might hope subsequentlyIn order to delay West Germanwith the West and Westthe Kremlin might attempton free elections throughoutbut only to gain time. Thecertainly believes that freeresultepudiation ofEast Germany. Moreover, thenot be satisfiednitedwas not under Soviet control couldneutral, or that Germany, oncenot eventually rearm and turnUSSR. We believe, therefore, thatis unlikely actually to permitto take place, even if theconvinced that by this means itWest German integration with theWest German rearmament. As athe Kremlin might removeits more overt control mechanisms.some of its military forces. We dohowever, that the Kremlin wouldits control over East Germany asthe foundations of Soviet authority.*

believe, therefore, that the Kremlinto retain and consolidate ils hold on So long as il retains East Ger-

In NIE-M. "Probable Developments In East Germany" In which the likelihood of withdrawal of Soviet occupational forces from East Germany was also considered, the Director ofUSAF. wishes lo add the following

"It Is Uie view of the Director of Intelligence. USAF. that the lime remaining2 ts notso short as to preclude the possibilityoviet withdrawal from East Germany If such action were necessary toemilitarized and neutral German state."

many, the USSR will remainosition to use East Germanyever in negotiations with thc West and to prevent Germanon terms unfavorable to the ultimate extension of Soviet control to all Germany. Furthermore, so long as Soviet troops occupy East Germany, the USSR will retain amilitary base for either offensive ormilitary operations against the West and for attempts to intimidate the West.*

n the other hand, thc Kremlin is not likely to feel that thc complete and formalof East Germanyatellite in the Soviet orbit would be an acceptableof the German problem. Suchwould be likely to hasten the rearmament of West Germany, intensify irredentism in West Germany and turn the pressure forunity against the USSR.

S. The Kremlin will almost certainlythe Berlin situation in an efiort toWest German and West Berlinin the ability and determination of the Western Powers to maintain their position in Berlin and in West Germany. To this end, it will probably continue its intermittent harassing tactics. When the present program of constructing rail lines and canals toWest Berlin is completed this year and Western retaliatory power has thereby been reduced, this harassment may bepossibly even to the point of another complete ground blockade. On balance,we believeomplete groundwill not be reinstituted so long as the Kremlin hopes to influence the course of events In West Germany, since action ofrastic nature would almost certainlya storm of adverse West German public opinion. Wc do not believe that the Kremlin will attempt to seize West Berlin by forcexcept in the event of general war.

Possibility Of Soviei Military Operations

To Achieve Objectives In West Germany

t is unlikely that the Kremlin believes that West German rearmament and intcgra-

Note Air Force comment on paragraph 5.

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with Lhc West will produce substantial resultsn the form of divisions and military producllonsufficient Into warrant deliberate resort to general war or actions involving the grave risk of war. Moreover, the Kremlin undoubtedly views developments in West Germany In the context of thc general East-Wesl balance of power. The Kremlin will probably not feel itself confronted wiih the choke betweenwar and at least lhc temporaryof its expansionist goals, so long as it believes that actual or potential German strength Is offset by the increasing strength of the Soviet bloc and/or by military, political and economic weaknesses In thc West.

here can be no doubt, however, that the Kremlin would regard the revival of German military and economic power, even in West

Germany alone,ajor barrier to the achievement of its immediate and ultimate objectives. It is further probable that the Kremlin would deliberately Initiate general war If It came to thc conclusion that West German rearmament, in conjunction with the growing strength and unity of the West, were developing an Irreversable adverse shift in the balance of military power which the Kremlin believed could not otherwise be checked or countered andrave threat to Soviet security. We do not believe that the Kremlin will reach this conclusionevertheless, we continue to recognize the grave dangereneral warremlin action or series of actions not intended to have that result, or even from actions which, in the Krernlin's view, entailed that risk, but not the certainty thereof.

Original document.

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