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copi3
national intelligence estimate
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
REGIME AND THE USSR: THEIR PRESENT CHARACTER AND PROBABLE FUTURE COURSES
ubliihed2
The loUoumg member orgonbathm ol the Intelligence Aaetsoiy Committee participated Willi the CentralAgency III the preparation ol this cellmate: The Intelligence organization, ol the Departments CI Stale, the Amp. the Naop, the Atr'Poree, and the Joint SUB.
All memberi ol the Intelligence Aaelsorp committee con. curred In thla etttmoteeptember ml. See. hox-eeer. the reservationhe Special Autitant, Intelligence, Department ol State, tond H.
central intelligence agency
SEpltifT
relations between the chinese communist regime and the ussr: their present character and probable future courses
the problem
To estimate the present nature and state of relations between Corornunlst China and the USSR and to estimate tbe probable courses of these relations over tbe next two years.
CONCLUSIONS
The Peiping regime accepts Moscow leadership ln the world Communistand Is becoming Increasinglyon the USSR economically and rnilitarlly. However, we believe that the Pelping regime retains some capability for Independent action, and is in ato influence the fomulation ofpolicy in tbe Far East.
e believe that Moscow will try to extend and mtensify its control overChina- However, we believe it unlikely that, at least during the period ol this estimate, tbe Kremlin will be able by non military means to achieve aof control over Communist China comparable to that which it exercises over the European Satellites. We believe it is almost certain that the Kremlin wiii not attempt to achieve such control byforce.
ver the long run, Sino-Sovietmight be weakenedesult ol efforts by the USSR to mtensify and extend Ita control over Qxnmunist China, disputes over Soviet economic andassistance to Communist China, divergent views concerning the border areas, Communist Chinese efforts toand direct Far Eastern "liberationr divergent views over tbe priority of Far Eastern CommunistIn relation to other worldobjectives.
We beUeve that during the period of this estimate these (actors will be farby close ideological ties andmutual involvement in tbe pursuit of common objectives,the elimination of Western influence from the Far East
Although the Peiping regime willcontinue to attempt to gain legal recognition internationally, to secure Formosa, and to resume trade and commerce with the West, we do not believe that the existing Sino-Soviet solidarity can be weakened byconcessions to Communist China-
Moreover, aa we have previously esti- ing her, would not disrupt Sino-Soviet mated, we believe that Western pressures solidarity during the period of this against Communist China, while weaken- estimate.'
DISCUSSION
e, CornmurUat China and Ihe USSRnited front to tht world. Since the estab-llBhtncnt of theommunal regime9 there has been no reliable Indication that either country hai adopted anyeoune ol action of Joint concern without the consent of the other. Inhe Ctilnese Communist* and the USSRyear treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, and this treaty provides the formal basis for current relations between the two states.1
CURRENT STATUS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
Soviet Communism and the Chinese Communist Party
Tne Special Assistant.e nee, Deportment ol State, baUftM that tha difficult and corcrcex problem of tht potsiDla effect of Wealern actions oo Bino-Sovlel solidarity reejulir- more thorough study than has been uoaalbtn In the course of preparing this or earlier national Intelligence estimates. Ho therefore reserves Judgment on the validity of paragraph flva. preferring to state simplyanlAeant wunkenlaii of Slao-Sovietnlikely crtiriruj the period of thil esrUrnat*.
The Chlnase Communist Party (CCP).the Communist parties of Ihe European Satellites, gained power with IltUe assistance from the Soviet Army. Theis of Independent aehle*ernent which allow Lie USSR credit only for Ideological and moral support until the formation of the Peiping regime in October IMS, have some basis In fact although they underestimate the assistance given by the USSR during the period9 to 1MB.
*ihe high command of most Communist parties in the world has undergone frequent and violent changes, which are believed to have been dictated from Moscow. Inthe CCP has exhibited unique stability and continuity in Its leadership. Thisundoubtedly takes pride In Itsrise to power and recognises that Ita capacity for Independent action
he Chinese Communists claim for Mao Tse-tung authority In his own right as atheoretician. This claim has been accepted in part by Moscow, and tht prestige accorded Mao In this respect goes far beyond that accorded any other contemporary non-Soviet Communist However, even those Chi-rteM who would place Mao near Stalin in authority profess allegiance to the Marxist-Lenlnist-BUUnlst dextrine held by th* rulers In Moscow. The CCP leaders have repeatedly and emphatically proclaimed their adherence to Stalinism, their rejection of the "national selfishness" of Tltotsm. and their debt to the Inspiration and example of the Russianand the October Revolution Common Ideology Istrong force bindingthe Chinese and Soviet regimes Pet-ping and Moscow both aim at expelling all Western influence from Asia and at extendingontrol over the entire area Both desire to spread the Communist world
published text of theppended ai Annexbe more irncortanl clause* of this brief and nneral treaty pro'lde (Jul: (a) In theon* party la attacked by Japan or anyul with It and thus la Involvedtate of war. tha rather win IramoeOaUly render military and other assistance by all means at Ita disposal:Ota tee parties wDl coruralt with each other in regard to all Important loleraa-Uonal probkma adhseUDf their commonandach partyn eon* furrr.lt) vrlth the prtndpiea of ecuaMy. mutual broths, and mutualor the national eov-erelgrity and terrltcelal Integrity andIn Ihe Internal affair; ol the other, to develop and consolidate tcorwnslc and cultural Ilea.
SEOR-XT
Soviet Influence! in Communist China
Soviet political tnd economic "advisors" are stationed In China at variousand party levels. We do not believe teat these advisors Issue direct orders, bat the Chinese have been receptive to their advice, whicho be given through Chinese lDtcnTkeclJarfca. Soviet advisors are not only attached to the government and the party and to certain tcopomlc and security organs, but are also assigned to specific engineering,and cultural projects. Neither these advlsora dot tha Kremlin has criticized, at least publicly, the internal policies ofChina or the IrnplemcnUUQn of these policies.
The Korean war greatly IncreasedChina's economic dependence on the USSR The adoption of more severe Western trade controls In1 has accelerated the orientation of Common 1st China's trade to the Soviet Bloc Although Communist Chinese economic dependence on the BlocSoviet Influence in Communist China, the USSR does not directly control theeconomy or operate any of the Industry of mainland China (outside of Manchuria and Sinklang).
The Korean war appears to be directed from Joint Slno-Sovlrt military headquarters. The Chines* Communis ts are undoubtedly strongly influenced by Soviet militaryand It Is probable that no majorare made in the Korean war without Soviet approval.
Except for captured equipment, theCommunist forces are wholly dependent on the USSR for heavy Items of militaryand the large scale of Soviet logistic support has presumably further Increased Moscow's influence with the Chinese military. The Chinese Communist Air Force Isoviet creation and ts wholly dependent upon the USSR for equipment and supply.
Sttucrfion in the Border Areas
Manchuria, the Influence ofpolitical and military leadersto outweigh that of the Sovietthe area. Economic policies also reflectplanning and directives of Peiping. Nevertheless, tho USSR exerts great Influence over economic and strategic developments In the area through Its military and economic advisors. Its Intelligence activities. Itsof rail Uneav, and Ita control of the Port Arthur naval base area. According to tbe Slno-Sovlctoviet control over Port Arthur and participation In theof Manchurian rail lines is scheduled to be terminatedowever, It isthat auch termination would not greatly lessen Sovietanchuria.
advisors and commercialln Inner Mongolia hare economicinfluence, particularly lnMongolia which borders on thePelping has at leastand tha strength of Chineseto be growing.
In Smklang. Pelping has0 troops and appears to exercise effectivecontrol. For geographic reasons, however, Slnklang's trade Is chiefly with tbe USSR and Uie Chinese need Soviet assistance to develop the resources of the area. The USSR exerts great Influence through three Slno-Sovtet companies and through Soviet citizens in the service of the provlrsclal government.
Soviet Influence In the border areas, potitl-cal as well as economic, la extensive At tbe same time, Chinese Communist political and territorial Interests nave apparently not been sacrificed In the Interest of Soviet expansion. The trend0 appears to be towards an Increase in Chinese Communist administrative control.
The Character of Current Sino-Soviet Relations
a consideration of the availablewe conclude that the Pelpingthe European Satellitesla notand completely controlled by thecooperation is baaed uponacceptance of Moacow leadership
Annax "IT for Uneat of the agreementCommunist China and the USSR on thtHallway, Port Arthur, and Daireii.
tn the world Communist movement. aIdeology, and the common objective of eliminating Western Influence from the Far But. This relationship is further solidified by common hostilityesurgent and non-Communist Japan and to US power ln the western Pacific. It li greatly reinforced by the Kremlin's need for an ally in the Far East, and by Communist China's need for Soviet assistance In training and equipping Its armed forces and In devetoplng its economy.
We believe also that the site and potential of China, the strength and cohesion of the Chinese Communist Party, the traditional Chinese xenophobia, and the Inherentencountered by foreigners in exercising control In China, have permitted the Chinese Communists to retain some capability foractionapability to exert an Influence upon the shaping of Communist policy In the Far East,
The Chinese Communist regime appears willing to subordinate, at least temporarily, those Chinese national Interests which are ln-compaUble with tha intarrarta of the USSR, to tubrrierge any fears it may have of Soviet expansion at China's expense, and tofor China's traditional unilateralof playing foreign powers against oneoint Slno-Sovtet policy ofto eliminate Western influence from Asia Chinese Communist leaders probably estimate that close Sino-Soviet collaboration will ensure Chinese security from Western counteraction, and ensure Soviet economic and military aid without ending China's
The Kremlin appears to recognize that Communist China now possesses theand some capacity to pursue Ita own Interests. Moreover, the Kremlin almostsees in the present relationship the opportunity to use Communist China to weaken the Western position in Asia. On the other hand, the Kremlin probably views the releUonship also as an opportunity to extend 8oviet domination over Communist China by subversion, by making Communist China economically and militarily dependent upon the USSR, and by Soviet pressure upon the borderlands.riendlyChina provides the USSR with ain depth,aluablesource of manpower and other resources, and Is an Important political andasset.
Future Course of Sino-Soviete believe that tht following factors will tend to ensure the continuation of Sino-Soviet solidarity during the period ol this estimate: a. The cohesite force af common Ideology will probably ec-tlnu* to bind tbe two regimes together.
b The military and economic dependence of Communistpon the USSR willat least for as king as the Korean war continues without settlement.
c Continued US assistance to theGovernment on Taiwan, tbe US-Japan Security Pact, and the ever-presentof US action against Communist China Itself will tend to draw Communist China and the USSR together.
d. Neither the USSR nor Coriununiit China now appears capable of altering the current relationship to Its advantage withouttho attainment of Its ownhinese Communist effort unilaterally tothe retatsonshlp or to leave the Bloc would result tn the cessation of Soviet economic and military aid and support and in seriouswithin tbe Chinese Communist Party and tho armed forces. It might lead to armed conflict with the USSRremlin effort to reduce Communist China to the status of the European Satellites might lead to armed conflict with Communist China and would divide and confuse the International Communis! movement
n the other hand, the following factors may. sooner or later, weaken Sino-Soviet
a. The history of Slno-Russian relations Is full of conflicts over Sinklang, Mongolia, and Manchuria During the last century there has bean almost continuous Russianon Chinese Interests in those areas. The Sino-Soviet Treaty0 temporarily
ended such border disputes. II Is difficult to believe, however, that such longstandinghave been permanently settled. We think that they are likely to recur, ln one form or another, and that they must beln assessing the probable course of Sino-Soviet relations In the future.
provided assistance and advice' Tiberstlon" movements of otherIn the Par But. Pelping may attemptIts own sphere of influence.traditional aspirations to primacy tnEast, and there is evidence that theCommunist role in other Farmovements hu beenhu not been permanently defined.
present, tha interests ot China aremost part confined to the Far Eut;the Kremlin are world-wide. Hence,Communists may view theof Far Eastern objectives withand impatience than do themight postpone act (on ln the Farof situations elsewhere In thoChinese Communists might tnakeupon the USSR, or even takewith long-range SovietThis Is applicable to thewhichotential source ofthe two regimes
Chinese Communist program ofIza'.Ion ind military rnodernrrallcndepends on Soviet materialassistance FrKUons mightof Soviet Inability or disinclinationcapital equipment Sovietsuch supply might be offensive topride.
s. We have estimated that the ultimate objective of the Kremlin Is the establishmentommunist world dominated fromWe do not believe, however, that the leaders of Communist Chlnn would accept complete Soviet domination of China,
Whether future leaders ot China will do souestion; If they doerious clash of Interests Is certain.
e believe thai Moscow will try toand Intensify its control over Communist China. However, we believe It unlikely that, at least during the period of this estimate, the Kremlin will be able by rsonmlUtary means toegree of control over Communist China comparable to that which It exercises over the European Satellites. We believe it Is almost certain that tho Kremlin will not attempt to achieve such control by military force. The military conquest of China wouldong, difficult, and expensive
2ft. We believe that for the period of this estimate the factors tending to divide the USSR and Communist China will be farby close ideological ties andmutual Involvement In the pursuit of common objectives, particularly theof Western influence from the Far Eut,
lthough the Pelping regime willcontinue to attempt to gain legal recognition Internationally, to secureand to resume trade and commerce with tbe West, we do not believe that the existing Sino-Soviet solidarity can ba weakened by non-Communist concessions to Communist China.e have previouslywe bellove that Western pleasures against Communist China, while weakening her, would not disrupt Slno-Scvlet solidarity during the period of this estimate.1
' The Special assliUnt, Intelligence, Department of State, believes Ibat iht difficult and com pie* problem of tbe possible effect of Western acUooa on Sino-SovWi soildarttv requires mora thorough statfy lhaa bu bam poaaok In the course of pcrporlogor earlier Mtsonal lctalaperxt estimates. Be therefore reserves Indjrntm oe the vaUdlly of paragraph twenty-Ox. preferring to stale simperignificant weakening ot Bt no-Soviet solidarity li unllkaly during the period of Ibis estimate.
SEC
"A"
THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, ALLIANCE, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, fully determined toJointly, by strengthening friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialistthe rebirth of Japanese Imperial Ism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that mayIn any way with Japan In acta of; Imbued with the desire lo consolidate lasting peace and universal security In the Far East and throughout the world In conformity with the alma and principles of the United Nations; profoundly convinced that the eon-soildation of good neighbourly relations and friendship between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialistmeets the vital In teres Is of theof China and the Soviet Union, have towards this end decided to conclude the present treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiary representatives: Chou Bn-lal. Premier of the Grovernment Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs,for the Central Peoples Government of the People's Republic of China: and Andrei Yanuarjevlch Vyshlnsky, leTnlster of Foreign Aflalrs, acting for the Presidium of theSoviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Both plenipotentiaryupon exchanging their credentials, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon tho following:
Arh'd. 1
Both contracting parties undertake Jointly to adopt all necessary measures at theirfor the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other stale that may collaborate with Japan directly or Indirectly In acts of aggression. In the event of one of the contracting parties beingby Japan or any state allied with It and thus being involvedtate of war, the other contracting party shall Immediately render military and other assistance by all means at Its disposal.
The contracting parties also declare their readiness to participatepirit of sincere cooperation In all mternatlmuu actions aimed al ensuring peace and security throughout the world and to contribute their full share to the earliest Implementation of these tasks.
Artide 2
Both contracting parties undertake In the spirit ot mutual agreement to bring about the earliest conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan Jointly with other powers which were Allies during the SeconJ World War.
Article. 3
Each contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance directed against the other contracting part* and not to take part In any coalition or In wiy actions or measures directed against the other contracting party.
Article 4
Both contracting parties. In the Interests of consolidating peace and universal security, will consult with each other in regard to all Important International problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union.
Article 5
Each contracting party undertakes. In the spirit of friendship and cooperation and In conformity with the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for the national sovereignty and territorial Integrity and non-interference to the internal affairs of the other contracting party, to develop and
consolidate economic: and cultural tiesChina and the Soviet Union, to render the other all possible economic assistance and to carry out necessary economic cooperation.
Arricie. 6
The present treaty comes Into forceupon Its ratification; the exchange of Instruments of ratlflctUcn will take place in Peking.
The present treaty will be ralld for thirty years. If neither of the contracting parties gives notice one year before the edcpiraUon of this term of Its Intention to renounce the treaty, it shall remain ln force fur another five years and will bu further extended lnwith this rule.
Done in Moscow onn two copies, each In the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts being equally valid.
On the authorisation of the Central People's Government of tbe People's Republic of China
CHOU EN-LAI
On the authorisation of theof the Supreme Soviet of the Union ot Soviet Socialist Republics A. Y. VY8HINSKY
SEOsTET
ANNEX "B"
THE AGREEMENT ON CHINESE CHANGCHUN RAILWAY, PORT ARTHUR, AND DAIREN BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declare lhat since IMS. fundamental changes have occurred In the situation In the Par East, namely:Japan has suflerad defeat; the reactionary Kuomlntang Government has beenChinaeople's Democraticew people's government has been formed ln China which haa united tbe whole of China and haa carriedolicy of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and has proved Its ability to defend theindependence and territorialof China and the national honour and dignity of the Chinese people.
The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Onion of Soviet Socialist Republics declare that thisew approach to theof the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalren.
In conformity with these new circumstances tbe Central People's Government of tbe People's Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme Eovtst of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have decided to conclude; the present agreement on the ChineseRailway, Port Arthur, and Dalren:
Article 1
Both contracting parties agree that theGovernment transfer withoutto the Government of the People'sof China all Its rights in the Joint administration of tha Chinese Changchun Railway with all the property belonging to the Railway The transfer will be effected Immediately on the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1BS2.
Pending the transfer, the existing 8lno-So-vlet Joint administration of tha Chinese Changchun Railway shall remain unchanged. After this engagement becomes effective, peats (such as manager of the Railway,ef the Central Board, etc) will be periodically alternated between representatives of China and lha USSR
As regards concrete methods of effecting the transfer, these will be agreed upon and determined by the Governments of bothparties.
Article ?
Both contracting parties agree that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the JoinUy-uUilaed naval baa* Port Arthur, and that thein this area be handed over to theof the People's Republic of China Immediately on the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end ofhe Government of the People's Republic of China will compensate tho Soviet Union for expenses which It has Incurred In restoring and constructing installations since IMS.
For the period pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops and tbe transfer of tha above-mentioned nut'.allatlons, the Gcrvcmmenta of China and the Soviet Union will each appoint an equal number of military representatives tooint Chinese-Soviet military conv roisslon which will be alternately presided over by each aide and which will be tn charge of military affairs in the area of Port Arthur; concrete measures In this sphere will be drawn up by the Joint Chinese-Soviet militarywithin three months after the present agreement becomes effective and shall be put into force upon approval of these measures by tbe Governments of both countries.
The clvD administration In thearea shall be under the direct authority oi the Government of the People's Republic of Chins. Pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the sona for billet ting Soviet troops rn the area of Port Arthur will remain unaltered tn conformity with existing frontiers.
In the event of either of the contracting parties becoming the object of aggression on the part of Japan or any state that may collaborate with Japan, andesult thereof becoming involved In hostilities, China and the Soviet Union may, on the proposal of the Government of the People's Republic of China and with the agreement of the Government ofAR, Jointly use the naval base Port Arthur for the purpose of conducting joint military operations against the aggressor.
Article 3
Both contracting parties agree that the question of Dalren harbour be furtheron the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. As regards the administration of Dalren, It fully belongs to the Government of the People's Republic of China. All thein Dalren now provisionally administered by or leased to the Soviet Union, shall be taken over by the Government of the Peoplesof China To carry out the transfer of the aforementioned property, theof China and the Soviet Union will appoint three representatives each tooint commission which, within three months altar the present agreement cornea Into effect, shall draw up concrete measures for theof the property; and these measures shall be fully carried out la the course0 after their approval by the Governments of both countries upon the proposal oi the Joint
Artide 4
The piweent asp^ement comes into force on the day of its ratification. The er hange of instruments of ratification will tplace in Peking.
Done In bfoscow onBM, In two copies, each In the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts being equally valid.
On the authorisation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
CHOU EN-LAI
On the authorisation of theof the Supreme Soviet of Ihe Union ot Soviet Socialist. VYSHINSKY
secj*-Et
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Original document.
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