DEPT.Of state
COPT HO. fch TRE chief.
ivision
memorandum for the nsc senior staff prepared to supplement
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA
published2
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA
This Supplement trai prepared bv tht Central genet Agency in connttatlun m" fA*
of tht IntcOitence Adcuoni Com mniee
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THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA
he Moslem population of Tunisia isand culturally the most advanced Ln North Africa, andelativelysociety.hen France established its protectorate, the French haveolicy of "association" rather than assimilation which has not altered the nature of this society. Well defined cultural and social barriers exist betweenatives andf French descent (there are0 Italian settlers in thehe proportion of native illiteracy is high, but less so than in other North African areas. Owing largelyrowing and influential French-educated group, the Tunisians have shown substantial capacity for self-government.
2 Political Structure. Tunisia isovereign stale under the rule of the Bey of Tunis, but the protectorate treaty and aconvention3 give France control of defense and foreign affairs and the right to propose internal reforms. In practice, the French Resident General exercises almost total control of Tunisian affairs The "colons" and officials from the metropoleajor role in the government, holdingall civil service posts of any consequence. Despite their small numbers, the "colons" also dominate the Tunisian economy. French commercial interests are allowed special advantages. The French-dominatedgovernment enjoys majorityin public utilities, railroads, and airlines and holds various other monopolies.
ince World War II the French have allowed increased Tunisian participation In the government, although the natives areto make policies or pass laws. There is an equal number of French and Tunisian cabinet members, with the former holding the important portfolios. 1 Francerogram for expanded Tunisianin the civil service, though its impact was largely vitiated by French use of political patronage. Municipal reforms have been blocked by Tunisian refusal to agree that the "colons" should participate in localas demanded by the French, The Tunisians insist that thes French citizens, cannot be allowed to vote or hold office in another sovereign state. Nativein elective governmental assemblies is mostly on the local advisory council level. Even at this levelmall proportion of natives is enfranchised.
The Bey of Tunis, while sympathetic toward the aspirations of his people, holds his position only with French concurrence and finds it difficult to oppose the French. France has used the nominal ruler as its instrument of power. The present ruler, despite fitful periods of stubbornness, has generally yielded to French coercion and threats of deposition.
Nationalism. Nationalist activity indates roughlyut the first effective nationalist party, the Destour, was formed only after World War I.timulated by the Pan-Islamic revival in the Near East, the radical element in the party broke off and formed the Nee-Destour. The Old Destour has since declined into relative unimportance, but the Neo-Destour Party, led by Habib Bourguiba, became7 to be offered cabinet posts by the French.0 the nationalists entered the government after the French promised to institute reforms.
Before the present crisis theleadership of the Neo-Destour wasmoderate in outlook. AlthoughFrench recognition of Tunisian internal autonomy and initiationrogram leading gradually to Independence, the Neo-Destour
leaders aimed chiefly at winning greaterin the government.
he relatively well developed nativelabor movement, primarily theUGTT (General Union of Tunisiani led by French-trained Farhat Hached, has given the Neo-Destour increasingly effective support While the UGTT affiliated with the Communist-sponsored World Federation of Trade Unionst soon withdrew and ;omcd the anti-Communist ICFTU Its new affiliation has given the UGTT and Tunisian nationalism important contacts withlabor in Europe and the US. and has lessened the possibility of Communistover nationalist labor. The Communist Party itself probably has lessIts chic: source of strength lies in its controlmaller union, the USTT (Syn-dscal Union of Tunisianhich has steadily declined in influence and maybe absorbed by the UGTT French efforts to identify the Neo-Destour and UGTTommunist conspiracy arc notby the available evidence.
a. The Current Crisis. The present tension .ii Tunisiarench note of last De-lember which the Tunisian nationalistsa refusal to accept their reform proposals Bourgulba's subsequent attempt tc put pressure on the French by demanding UN consideration of the Tunisian case led to his arrest and an outbreak of strikes and riots ID mid January. Confronted with the need lor quick action the French embarkedolicy of lorce, combined with new reform proposals When the pro-nationalist Chenik ministry refused to negotiate on these terms, the French arrested its members late In March, and induced former premier Bac-couche toabinet which couldreforms This attempt to present the UNair accompli was nullified by theof the new prime minister to secure the support of influential Tunisians for these reforms The French have moved inforces, however, and kept Tunisia under firmtate of siege has been fully implemented and Moslem males overave at-en made responsible for sabotage in their localities. While terrorism has not been eradicated,rench0 native troops in Tunisia can almost certainly control any nationalist uprising
he most significant result of the French policy of force has been greatly to stimulate Tunisian nationalismesult of French repression, the majority of Tunisians now sympathize with the nationalist movement, currently led by Farhat Hached. Thehave become progressively moreand have come to demand complete and immediate independence.
rench reform program. Though the French reform program is still flexible in its details. It appears to call for: (a) creation cf an appointed consultative assembly with one all-Tunisian chamber to deal with all bul financial and economic matters, which are reservedecond French-Tunisian(bi French representation or. elective local councils only when therearge French element In the local population:ajority of Tunisianhe Cabinet: (d) gradual creation of an all-Tunisian civil service excepter lain number of key posts; and (e> the creation of antribunal of appeal headedrench official, to replace the Resident's veto over administrative regulations. Eventually the consultative assembly would become anlegislature. However. France wouldindefinitely control over foreign affairs, security, and finance.
French Morocco
The French protectorate over theEmpire of Morocco dates from the treaty of Fez2 The population of French Morocco isrench nationals and0 others of European descent. The native population is three-fifths Berber and two-fifths Arab in ethnic derivation.
French financial interests were firmlyin Morocco well before thewas established and France nowcontrols the economy. Morocco is the third moat important producer of phosphates in the world, and the source fox about half the
French steel industry's manganese.7 the French had succeeded In abolishing alloreign capitulatory rights with the exception of the US pnvtleges, which are based on an agreement last renewed
olitical Structure. France governs the protectorateeparateheadedesident Oeneral. which functions beside thai of the Sultan andalmost complete coctroi. The relative importance of the two governmentsy the fact that the Frenchs budget (largely provided by France itself) is almost eighty times greater than that of the Moorish government There Is little coordination between the dual Virtually ail officials in important posts are French. Almost the only native participation in the protectorateIs in the advisory Council of Government wnich assists the Resident. legislation is promulgated by decree. Refusal io sign French -sponsored decrees has bren thechief means of opposing French France also enjoys extraordinarypowerstate of selge which has been in force2 Military censorship has been the ruleourthe seven Moroccan regions areby military officials, and the presence0 troops (one-third of them nativei guarantees control of the zone.
hue French controls have left the Sultan at the head ofhadow government, recent events have greatly increased hisand diminished French ability to coerce rum. More vigorous and able than hiscounterpart, he has openly supported nationalism and has close connections with several leading nationalists. His demands lor French reforms in0 and2 have madeymbol of Moroccan nationalism and even appear to have brought many Berbers to recognize his leadership. However, the French colons hare in large measures blocked such reforms
he Fr;nch have traditionallyolicy of "divide and rule" in Morocco by capitalizing on the historic antipathiesthe Berbers and the Arabs, but these groups urc very slowly being weldedingle people. Inecent Frenchto- pit Berber against Arab appears to have backfired, and the French have had to suppress several local anti-French Berber uprisings. However, despite growing Berber association with Moroccan nationalism, the French may still have some success with this policyurther counter to nationalist support of the Sultan, the French havethe old religious fraternities and the urban and rural native aristocracies. Berber chieftain el Glaoul. Pasha of Marrakech. has received special attention.
Vafioncriism Nationalist sentiment,dormant before World War II. has grown rapidly since the war The chieiparties, the Istiqlal tIndependence) and the Shoura (Democraticre technically outlawed, but are allowed to function except in areas controlled by pro-French Berber chieftains, where they have been sternly repressed The Istiqlal is by far the more important. Shoura opportunism having incurred the charge of collaboration with the French. Estimates of Istiqlalvary widely because of the scmi-clan-nature of the Istiqlal and its cellular structure,embersuch larger number of sympathizers appears the most reasonable guess. Party strength is strongest among the expanding middle class and other urban groups The two Iitlqlal leaders. Allal el Fassi and Ahmed Balafrr] itnternai dissension has preventedinglerc opposed lopartly because of the risk to the very limited group of educated leaders. rowing faction of young extremiststhreatens to overcome the restraining influence of the party heads. The Istiqlal has no use for the Tunisian experiment of native participation in the Frenchand instead demandsin principle o( Moroccanact of unity was signed1 between the various nationalist parties tn French and Spanish Morocco and Tangier, but dissension between moderates and extremists hasextensive cooperation.
Communist Party has had littleamong the natives exceptewareas like Casablancais estimated atdominate the largely Frenchonly Moroccan labor union. Sincedo not permit separate nativehas sought to penetrate thehas recently taken control of itsCommittee, following the deportationnon-Moroccan Communistis no evidence that the Istiqlalwith the Communists despiteattempts to identify themselvesaims. On the contrary, itdenounced Communism.
Algeria
is unique among the Northterritories in that itargeof French descent and Isan integral part of metropolitanpenetration has made Algeriadeveloped and Europeanizcd partAfrica French nationalsoutopulation of someThey completely dominateand political life.
lthough "France has politicallyAlgeria, there has been Little social or cultural assimilation of the native population,harp differentiation exists between the European and Moslem communities. Theof modern educational facilities for the Moslems and consequent reliance onKoranic schools has only confirmed this division. On the other hand, the forces of islam and nationalism are slowly tending to submerge cultural and linguisticbetween Arabs (aboutercent of the native population) and Berbers-
olitical Structure. The three Algerian departments (Oran, Algeriers. and Cons tan-tin e| elect representatives to the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic and the Assembly of the French Union. Thelr administration, however, Is markedlyfrom that of metropolitan FrenchA Governor General appointed by the French Cabinet and responsible only to Paris is interposed between the Algerianand the Parts government. He has broad authority, both legally and in practice, and completely dominates the local scene There areeparate Algerian Assembly, which first meteparatebudget. While the Assembly has limited fiscal and budgetary powers, its "decisions" are mostly subject to ratification by Paris, which remains the principal legislator forThe vast Southern Territories remain under military control pending assimilation into the existing departments.
Moreover, within the Algerian government itself, the French minorityholly disproportionate political influence. Although the Algerian statute7 makes al)legally French citizens, the French have failed to implement the voting rights of the bulk of the natives. The total registered electorate, including the French residents, is. Native voting Is furtherby ballot-stufling and other practices. In addition the French residents and pro-French Moslemsreponderantof seats In the Algerian Assembly, the departmental general councils, and themunicipal councils. Algerian access to posts in the civil service and in industry is severely limited by inability to meet therequirements for higher positions. Extensive native participation is found only In the diemaas, the elective assemblies of the rural villages
Nationalitm. There are two Important nationalist parties In Algeria. The MTLD (Movement for the Triumph of Democraticed by Mc&sall Hadj (now under surveillance ins an extremistrecruited primarily from the laboring classes. It advocates systematic violence in order to win complete Independence from France Party membership is unknown, but was estimatedn 1M5 The UDMA (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto) includes better educated natives of theand small business classes. ItsFerhat Abbas, appears to favor gradual evolution toward an Algerian republic within the French Union UDMA membership is probably less.
Although not now an organized political force, the ulema, Moslem teachers andfigures, appear to be the naturalof the masses. Many of them support the nationalist movements and have beento reconcile the alms of the MTLD and UDMA. They have also shown willingness to ally with the Communists to further their own ends.
The Algerian Communist Party numbers onlyts potential strength lies in its ability to identify itself with the Algerian nationalist movements, In which it has had some Limited though probablysuccess. Communist domination of the COT (General Federation ofy far the strongest labor group in Algeria, hasthe partyseful vehicle forand action. In1ajor role in forming the FADRL (Algerianhich includes the ulema, UDMA and MTLD. The Communists have since played the leading part in thisSo far, however. FADRL activities have not led to much unity of action among nationalists and Communists, or among the nationalists themselves.
Since the uprising5 in theof Constantine, Algeria has beenquiet. Last April, however, the trial of several Communist and nationalist leaders in Algiers led to demonstrations and sporadic clashes with the police. Tighterrestrictions have since been enforced against free assembly and movement and against the nationalist press. Francecan maintain order with0 troops now in Algeria.
Spanish Morocco and Tangier
"zone of influence" inone-twentieth the size ofderives from4f anillion, about 7of Spanish descent. Only one-third ofis considered arable and the onlyraw material is iron ore.to the UK. Spain, andrain on Spain's economy. there are limited possibilities fordevelopment. Spain lacks the necessary' investment capital. Spanish Moroccoigh Commissioner whoalmost dictatorial powers, and is responsible directly to Generalissimo Franco On the Moroccan side, the Sultan's deputy, Ihe Khalifa, Is the native ruler. Reforms68 provided the Khalifaremier and ministry but gave him little power. In addition to the large Spanish ground forces ofhere arehaiifian troops which are under Spanish control.
nationalism The chief naUonallst party, the lslah. has about the same proportionate strength and influence in the Spanish Zone as the Istiqlal in French Morocco. The minor Wahda Party is almost defunct. Spain isew Al Maghreb Party, designed to give the Impression Spam ls receptive to nationalism, but this party probably will be no more successful than previous onesby the Spanish. The Lslah and Istiqlal cooperate ine-unified andMorocco. In view of Spam's attitude toward Communism and its tight control of the region, organized Communism is virtually nonexistent.
Spain has recently modified somewhat its hostile attitude toward local nationalism,ong period of repression. As part of Spam's current policy of endeavoring to win favor Ln the Arab world, it hasapprochement with the nationalists lslah leader Abdelkhalek Torres has been allowed to return from Tangier, and lslah has beento hold political meetings and to publish its newspaper, supposedly free fromThere is no indication, however, that Spain Intends to grant more than civil rights or that the conflict of nationalist and Spanish Interests will be resolved.
ranofer. The International Zone ofis geographically an enclave In Spanish Morocco. Of the estimated population of,0 are Europeans, over half of them Spanish. The zone has become an entrepot for European transit trade, smuggling, and financial dealings be-
. m
cause its statutes permit uncontrolledo( commoditiesrec currency market. During World War IIominant position in the Tangier administration.5 England and France, with the support o! the OS and USSR, ousted Spam from this positionforced her to accept even less thanew committee of control was formed to represent the US. UK. France. Spam. Italy. Belgium. The Neiherlands,and the USSR. However, the USSR has so far not exercised its right to participate. There are an toternaUcnalixednd an appointive Legislative Assembly representing the participatingThe administration is headedneutral" Administrator, at present aIn practice France plays arole in the Zone. Owing to French control of the Sultan of Morocco's appointive powers, the Sultan's representative (thend the Moroccan members of the Assembly are predisposed toward France.
Tangier hasocal point for North African nationalist activitieseadquarters for exiled nationalists. All the important Moroccan parties and the French Zone Communist Party have branches In(the Communists haveewmembers and no realhe French and Spanish have taken sporadic repressive measures against the nationalists without reference to the other participating nations.
Nationalist riots broke out In Tangier onhe fortieth anniversary' of the Treaty of Fez. Although responslbUlty could not be determined, Spain has used the riotsretext to request increased participation in the Tangier administrationeturn to the prewar agreements36 Specifically, it requests appointmentpanish Police Commandant and Assistant Administrator for Public Order, andof the Mixed Bureau of Informationntelligence)panish director. The other powers are concerned lest reopening the question of Tangier's administration lead the USSR to assert its right to participate. They appear willing to grant atortion of the Spanish demands, but intend torocedural method which will not stimulate the USSR to take an active Interest Ln the Zone.
Libya
The new United Kingdom of Libya, which became independent insof three provincesTripolitania. Cyre-nalca, and the southern desert area of the Fezzan. The sparse populations of these areas are widely separated from each other by the Sahara (which comprises almostercent of thend have accordingly developed strikingly different attitudes andThere are:ripolitanians who arc partially detribalized and sedentary and divided by conflicting urban and rural interests; (b)emmornadic Cyre-naicans who, on the other hand, are united by tribal bonds and still widespread allegiance to the orthodox Moslem Sanusi religious(c)0 Fezzanese oasis-dwellers and nomads, who have little contact with the coastal regions; and0 Italians settled in Tripolitania. whoeading role in its economy. The vastof the population are illiterate and politically apathetic.
Libya is extremely poor and lacking in most natural resources. Fuel is practically nonexistent, although oil may be found along the Cyrenaican coast, and the French have reportedly discovered iron ore (and perhaps oil) in the Fezzan. Agriculture supports over three-quarters of the population and withcontributes overercent of theexports, mainly to Italy and Greece. These cover at present onlyercent of Libya's imports,ayments deficit which has fluctuated between two and eleven million dollarsven with foreign help the Libyan standard of living is one of the lowest in the Arab world.
Because of its economic weakness, Libya is almost wholly dependent on foreign aid. Great Britain has been Libya's main support since it occupied the area in World War II. In return for various concessions. Britain
underwrites the major part of Libya's budget deficit (currentlynd Its adverse balance of payments. Prance does the sameuch smaller scale for Its sphere of Influence in the Fczzan. These powers and Italy have donated limited sumsibyan Development and stabilization Agencyinance Corporation which were set up by the UN Commission for Libya to help the new state The USarge amount of separate assistance, which may0t consists of direct payments for the US bases, technicallocal US expenditures, and UN technical aid contributions.
olitical Problems Sue months ofhave brought little change in the fundamental disunity of the Libyan kingdom. While Tripoiitania adhered to the conceptnited kingdom through fear of renewed domination by Italy, the Cyrenaicans have been largely separatist in outlook, fearing domination by more populous Tripoiitania. After the UN decision9 in favornified Libya. Tripoiitania reluctantlyas monarch the Amir Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica, who was almostreluctant to head the new state. Time has only widened the breach between the two areas:onstantly reasserts his preference for Cyrenaica. and the TripoLi-tanlans show increasing distaste for their "Shepherd Chieftain."
he separatism of Tripoiitania andis expressed in the nation's political forms and the provision for two capitals. At the insistence of Idns, supported by theederal form of government was adopted which insured that the Tripolitamar. majority would not dominate. The elective lower house of the Assembly recognizes the numerical superiority of the Tripolitanianseating ratiout the three provinces have equal seats in the royally ap-pointrd senate In the nation's first elections last February pro-government candidates gained at leastf theeats tn the lower chamber:eats (Including all those from the City of Tripoli) went to presumably hostile candidates. The able and pro-Western
Prune Minister, Mahmud Muntastr, gives Tripoiitania high level representation In the government, but he has little support cither from his province or the king in his efforts to strengthen national union. Except fur Muntastr and the able CyTenaican Defense Minister, All Jarbi, few of the ministers have the capacity to view Libyan affairson-provincial standpoint. Most members of the legislature also are politicallyand thereerious lack of trained administrative personnel.
The chief opposition to the government comes from the Tripolitanians, whoominant influence in the kingdom. While Tripoli is the center of agitation, the Cyre-naican coastal towns of Bengazhi and Dema are also opposed to royal conservatism and royal control over their economic Interests. The Tripolitanian opposition was seriously crippled when its leader. Bashir Bey Saadawi, was deported after the elections. HisParty immediately lost most of its strength, mergingeterogeneous group of opposition parties. There is no recognized Communist Party; pro-Communist leaderCI belli and several of lus lieutenants were deportedeveral trade unionsarge number of anti-foreign malcontents in Tripoiitania supported Clbelli. but theappears determined to suppress any renewed Ctonmunlst activity.
In view of the present weakness of the potential opposition to the government, the Libyan policen Tripoiitania andn Cyrenaica) would be able to control any outbreak shortajor revolt. In the unlikely event ofevolt, the British garrison probably would assist in its suppression. Libya wants its own national army ofnd Is negotiating with the British for military assistance andThe Britishufficient for the near future, however.
External Relations. The new Libyanand especially King Idris. are strongly pro-Western in their orients turn, owing both to Libya's need for foreign aid and the strong ties developed with UK during the war. Since then. British Influence has been
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in Libya; the UK provides the bulk of Libya's outside economic assistance, UK advisers are the backbone of theandritish troops stationed in Libya provide the country's chief security force. Perhapseaction toinfluence, the Libyans are now more strongly pro-US. The USajor airbase in Libya, as does the UK. France remains in de facta control of the Fezzan. which it occupied in World War II androops as well as French advisers there. Italy still maintains substantial interest in its former colony and is anxious to reassert its Influence in Trtpolltania, where the dominant Italian commercial interests arc expanding.
ibya has only slight relations, at present primarily cultural in nature, with Egypt and the Arab states. The King and most Cyren-aicans fear the ascendancy of adjacent Egypt and have shown little desire to join the Arab League. Egypt Itself apparently hasto dominate the new kingdom, though its influence has declined with the expulsion of the pro-Egyptian Saadawi. However,Tripolitanlan urban elementsew politically conscious Cyrenaicans still regard Egypt as their champion against Sanusland Western "imperialism" and call for closer ties with the Arab world.
Original document.
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