MILITARY INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE LARGE-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA IN THE

Created: 4/28/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

no.

ASSISTANT DIBECTOH.OSE

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

MILITARY INDICATIONSOSSIBLE LARGE-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

RELEASE IN FULL

Published2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

MILITARY INDICATIONSOSSIBLE LARGE-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

5

r.,pxcv'M ?or zr-lsase through tieWiaiiiftonca Agency

The inielligence organizations of thc Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency In theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on

MILITARY INDICATIONSOSSIBLE LARGE-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate, on the basis of military indications, Communist intentions with regardarge-scale military attack in Korea in the immediate future.

CONCLUSIONS

There haseneral strengthening of Communist military capabilities in Korea since the beginning of the armistice negotiations. The enemy is creditedreater offensive potential than he had previously enjoyed and is believed capable ofajor ground attack with little warning, and air attacks which initially could be of substantial proportions.

In recent weeks there has been increased enemy activity in Korea, There have also been reports, partly unconfirmed, of aggressive enemy intentions. Theseand reports do not constitute acceptable indicationsommunist intent tolarge-scale offensive action in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the increased military activity in Korea and the general situation in Korea maypreparations taken in anticipationolitical decision either:

a. Toimited offensive, with little or no warning; oroarge-scale offensive.

DISCUSSION

Capabilities in Korea

uring the armistice negotiations, the Communists have substantially increased their capabilities in Korea. They havetheir losses, re-equipped their units,their troops, and reorganized and redisposcd their forces. They have built up their ground forces from ano the present estimateersonnel. Qualitative improvement has accompanied the quantitative build-up; they have madeadditions of armor and artillery and have substantially Increased the fire power of

all units.etailed chart of build-up since1 is attached hereto as Annex)

Thc Communists have made excellent use of the long period of fairly static operations to improve their logistical position.esult the supply position of the Communists inareas, despite continued air and naval attacks by UN forces, is far better than at any lime since the Chinese CommunistIn Korea.

The enemy ground forces in Korea couldajor aitack with little warning. It is estimated that the Communists have the

logistic capability to maintain the momentumajor offensive foroays. Difficulties in connection with the movement of supplies from forward dumps to theunits would be the limiting factor.

Thc capabilities of the Communist Air Force in the Koreanorth Korea,and Northeast China) have improved steadily and rapidly. During the armistice negotiations, the estimated Communistaircraft strength in thc Korean area has increasedircraft to the present totalircraft plusransports.an increaseet fighters to the. There areombat aircraft deployed in south and central China which could not be committed In Korearedeployment. Thereufficientof operational airfields In Manchuria from which attacks by thc above aircraft could be launched against UN forces. An apparently effective system of air control and warning is believed operating in North Korea.pilots tn Manchuria have been engaged ln an intensive training program. Thehave alsoignificant capability to supportizeable air force in Manchuria.

The Communist Air Force in the Korean area could launch an air attack which might inflict substantial damage upon Unitedground forces, naval and airand lines of communications in Korea.orce ofiston-engined fightersight bombers could be made available, but without unusual success in countering UN efforts against this attack, it is believed it could not be sustained.

Indications of Communist Military

Intentions in Korea

Giound

recent weeks there have beengenerally unconfirmed, ofenemy activity In Korea,

a The movement of two Chinesearmies, one forward towards the western sector and one eastward towards thc central

sector, has been accepted. The movement of three other CCF armies toward thc western sector has been reported but is unconfirmed.

b. Reports of PWs and other information point to the possibilityorward movement of some armored vehicles from thc Wonson area on the east coast. Elements of thc 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions arc accepted aslo or in direct support of front-line units on the west and west central fronts. Other elements of these two divisions remain unlocatcd. During the past several months unconfirmed reports have also referred to the southward movement of thc Northorps.

the past few weeks there havePW reportsew offensive.however, have continued toenemy defensive plans, includingof defense fortifications nndof front-line units.

Tho possibility that the enemy lslo relieve some front-line units is further suggested by PW reports that theh Army will relieveh Army and that theh Army Is to be relieved in thefuture. There is no confirmation,that the relief of any front-line units is under way.

There has been one recent report that North Korean guerrilla forces are being trained Lo Infiltrate UN linesactic which has preceded previoushisreceives some substantiation from the recent capture by UN forcesmallof llnc-crossers.

Air

hc most significant recent Incident with respect to enemy air activityisual sighting onprilet aircraft on Tatungku airfield andn Anlung airfield. This is approximately twice the number ofever before sighted on these airfields and very nearly the lotal estimatedtrength In Manchuria Although an error of up toircraft in this sighting is possible, this report Is regarded as substantially Subsequent observations during thc day

TOP i

that this total has been reduced toircraft on both fields. Possible explanations for this concentration are that bad weather precluded the use of other Manchurian airfields or that thisest of personnel and facilities under crowded conditions. It is also possible that thisa "show of force" designed lo influence the armistice discussions.

ther indications lhal the enemy may be preparing for increased air activity, possibly

including operations over South Koreaarge scale, were; (a) theprilver the Seoul-Suwon area on what appeared tohoto-reconnaissance flight; (b) recent increased willingness of enemy pilots to engage UN(c) reported repairs of Pyongyangand (d) observation of some vehicle activity at Taechon airfield onpril, the first observation ol activity at any of the three airfields in the Sinanju area in some time.

&

KA

ivisions) Approx.ivisionsand Immediate Rear

AND DISPOSITION

ivisions) Approx.ivisionsand Immediate Rear

Rounds CCF4 Divisions

RoundsCF8 DivisionsKA Meczd Arty Brigs

None

2lvs NKA1 Meczd Div

1 Armd Div

4 Meczd Arty Brigs Totalks fcSP's

Following UN Counter-Offensive

EFFICIENCY

Supplied Thaness Disease Than Las'. Year Intensive Tramlng Program

ENEMY CAN NOWAJOR OFFENSIVE WITH LITTLE WARNING.

Prepared by, DA

SECRET

Original document.

---

---