NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
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The intelligent organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Stallwith the Central Intelligence Agency in theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on
SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
THE PROBLEM
To assess: (a) Sweden's strategic importance; (b) its present policy in the East-West conflict; <c) the possibilitieshange in this policy; and (d) the consequences of Sweden's position to the NATO powers and the USSR.
CONCLUSIONS
location, natural andresources, and considerable military potential give it substantial strategicto both NATO and the USSR. Of chief importance is Sweden's potential role in the defense of Scandinavia,Norway. Moreover, itswhich flanks the Baltic and North Germany, would be valuable either to the USSR or the NATO powers for air bases, early warning facilities, and otherinstallations.
The Swedish armed forces are atcapable only of fighting delaying actionsajor Soviet attack-On the other hand, Sweden's alreadymilitary potential and resourcesthe basearked expansion in Swedish military capabilities, perhaps to the point where, in coordination with the NATO Northern Command forces, they could successfully defend large areas of Scandinavia.
Despite its pro-Western andoutlook, Sweden will almostcling to its "alliance-free" policy as long as possible, even in event of war.
In the eventoviet move against Finland, Sweden would very likelyits own defense preparations, might enter into exploratory militarywith the West, and wouldits neutrality policy. However, only if Sweden were convinced that the Soviet move into Finland was merely afor an early invasion of Sweden or Norway, would it probably enter intodefense arrangements with the West.
However, Sweden might join the NATO powers in the eventoviet attack on Norway, if the Swedes thought that NATO was capable of extendinglarge-scale assistance. Moreover, Sweden would certainly fight if attacked.
The chief unfavorable consequence to the West of Sweden's "alliance-free"is that it severely hampers theof Scandinavian defensesoviet attack. On the other hand,adherence to NATO under present circumstances would increasetensions and might lead the USSR to reduce Finland to Satellite status.
In event of war in circumstancesas at present, we believe that the USSR would seek to by-pass Sweden
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its invasion oiowever, as NATO capabilities to defend Norwaythe Likelihoodoviet attack on Sweden would also increase.
f Sweden remained neutral while the USSR occupied Norway and Denmark, Sweden would be effectively isolated from the West. Its valuable trade with the West would be cut of! and it would be forced, under Soviet economic pressure, to make an important contribution to the Soviet war economy.
espite its neutrality, Swedenwould not actively resist theof Western aircraft, although it would officially protest. Sweden would more actively defend itsainst Soviet overflights, whileto avoid serious complications with the USSR
DISCUSSION
Strategic Importance
eographic. The Scandinavianof which Sweden forms the greater part, lie* across the most direct air approaches te Western USSR from air bases in NorthGreenland, Iceland, and the UK, or from carriers In the Norwegian Sea. Conversely, It lies athwart the air path from Soviet bases in the Moscow area io most of the UK.Iceland, and North America. It could provide air bases, early warning facilities, and other rnihtary installations to either the USSR or the Western allies. It alsotrategic position with respect to control of the Baltic and its entrance. Moreover,lies across the logistically preferable routes of Soviet advance toward the valuable air and naval base sites along the Norwegian coast. Finally. Sweden flanks the Northplain, the chief military route across Western Europe, and if held securely by the NATO powers, could be usedase from which to threaten Soviet lines ofacross Germany and Poland and through the Baltic, as well as the Soviet BalUc flank.
* The Auutflnt Chief off the Anay. would changelence lo read. In event of war is circumstance* iubttanuaay as at present, we belleee. on balance. UiaiSSR would bi-pau Sweden In Itaof Norway."
olitical, Economic, andtable, politically mature democracy of about seven million people. Its presentgovern-
ment enjoys solid popular support. Sweden hasmall Communist party,anhich has beenln strength.
s one of the most highly industrialized nations in the world, Sweden is an Important producer of ships, ball and roller bearings,machinery, engines and turbines, electrical apparatus, steel, armaments, and numerous other manufactures, as well as high quality iron ore. The Swedish Botors firmand produces excellent naval andguns. Sweden's aircraft industry is capable ol producing modern jet fighters to replace current piston engine types and of supporting the Swedish air force at itsstrength. Its marine engineering and aeronautical installations are capable ofresearch and development work.basic scientific and technologicalIs excellentumber of fields. Its scientists rank with the world's boat inmetallurgy and medicine, for example, and it expects tomall underground atomic pile operating
ercent of Swedish trade is with the West, the UK and West GermanySweden's largest customers. Sweden's large exports of iron ore. lumber, pulp andbearings, machinery, and ships,ake an important contribution to Western European economic strength. For example, aboutercent of the free world's Iron is de-
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from Swedish ore The West German and UK steel industries are particularlyupon Swedish ore imports, which(or perhapsercent of West German andercent of UK iron ore consumption
lthough trade with the Sonet Bloc is o! more importance to Sweden than to most other Western European countries, it accounts forercent of total Swedish trade. It consuls chiefly of an exchange of iron ore, ball and roller bearings, and machinery for coal and some mineral ores. This trade has been declining steadily over recent years, and under Western pressure Sweden has adopted East-West trade controls comparable to those of the European NATO countries. It sells no munitions to the Soviet Bloc and onlystrategic goods, such as iron ore and ball bearings, where necessary to obtain such essential imports as Polish coal.
owever. Sweden's dependence on foreign sources for two-thirds of its raw materials and practically all ot its coal, coke, and petroleum products renders its economy criticallyto external pressures. Any majorwith the flow of imports such as would occur in wartime would inevitably have serious disruptive effects on the Swedish economy.
rmed Forces. Sweden isman armed forces. These forces are the largest and best in Scandinavia, although far less than Sweden's resources can support. While the forthcoming defense budget will probably be considerably above that of the present fiscal year, Sweden will still be spending onlyercent of Its gross national product for defense It ismodern jet aircraft (and buying others from the UK I. enlarging and modernizing its fleet, and expanding ground force training. However, the armed forces suffer from serious weaknesses which would sharply limit their capabilities in time of war. The quality of Swedish manpower and basic training Isbut the armed forces are lacking in combat experience and in staff and command training for large-scale operations Serious logistic deficiencies also exist.
army0 comprisesregulars, although moblllzabletotalsen. mostsemi-trained.0 monthperiod Is inadequate by NATOMany items of modern equipment,tanks, heavy artillery, and electronicare obsolete, in short supply, orlacking.
navyell-roundeddesigned for coastal defense. It isfor high standards of seamanship,maintenance, and discipline, but itsagainst attackajorthe USSR, would be strictly limitedand delaying tactics and escort The USSR could rapidlysea power in tbe Baltic. Theeffective Swedish naval units are twoantiaircraft cruisers, twelvecoastal destroyers, two fastfrigates, twenty-one submarines,motor torpedo boats.is excellent and the mineis apparently well developed.navy is weak in modern equipment, aand modernization program Is For example, all submarinesto be fitted with radar, sonar,by the end
he Air Force, second strongest in West-em Europe, is considered by Sweden to be Its first line of defense. It5 of them in operationalfxe jets. Of Sweden'sirfields, six can now sustain jet Tighter or medium bomberfour more can sustain Jet fighters and be developed for bombers,urther ten can support limited jet fighter operations. Sweden's air defenses have been greatlyby electronic early warning equipment from the US and UK, but the air force'sis inferior to that of the USSR, and it suffers from critical logistic deficiencies,fuel.
n the light of their military weaknesses, the Swedish forces are presently capable only of fighting delaying actionsajor Soviet attack The duration of their defensive
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would depend upon whether they had sufficient time to mobilize and upon theof substantial outside support. On the other hand. Sweden's already sizeable military potential and resources provide the basearked expansion ln Swedish militaryperhaps to the point where, inwith the NATO Northern Command forces, they could successfully defend large areas of Scandinavia.uild-up ofdefenses, however, would require outside assistance.
weden'scandinavian defense. The ultimate test of Sweden's strategicto the USSR and the NATO powers lies in Its potential role in the defense of the Scandinavian peninsula in event of war. Should war come, the chief objective of both sides would probably be to control theair and naval bases and radar sites along the Norwegian coast. Sweden, because of its strategic location and sizeable armed forces, might well be of critical Importance todefense While Sweden's strategicto the NATO powers is primarilyonce these powers were strong enough to defend the Scandinavian peninsula (and perhapsweden would havevaluease for offensive air and perhaps eventually naval and amphibiousagainst the Soviet Baltic flank. The logistical difficulties of supplying NATO forces in Sweden in the face of probablelocal air superiority ln the Baltic area would doubtless limit NATO use of bases in Sweden itself, but the valuable Norwegian coastal bases could be protected and Soviet egress from the Baltic made more hazardous.
Sweden's Present Policy in the East-West Conflict
he Swedish people and governmentfirmly attached to their policy offrom militaryo the Swedish public, which overwhelmingly supports the "no-alliance" policy, the most persuasiveIn its behalf is the peace that the country has enjoyed forears The Swedes are cognizant of thethreat to Swedish security, and aof them are convinced that involvementuture war is inevitable. At the same tune, they maintain their armed forcesevel which they hope will deter an invasion.they see no irnroedlately persuasiveto their current "aluance-free" They are under no delusion that they couldoviet attack withoutsupport, but they are confident that,of their non-membership in NATO, the.Western Powers would attempt to come to their assistance Ln event of Soviethile all four non-Communist parties support in principle the "alliance-free"the leaders of the Liberal andopposition parties have criticized theof the policy by the SocialGovernment as being too rigid, doctrinaire, and lacking in foresight They contend thatinimum Sweden should undertake technical military planning with Denmark and Norway, ln order toWestern aid to Sweden in event of war. They also profess great concern over theof Sweden's official "alliance-free" policy on Westernmall but vocalled by some of the Liberal party press,Sweden's largest dally, has goneand attacked this policy, arguing that better security would be found in affiliation with NATO.umber of high-rankingmilitary officers apparently share this view, which, however, has not at this Juncture gained any appreciable public or political
espite their official "alliance-free"both the Swedish Government and people are pro-Western and anti-Communist. The Swedish peopleeep-seated fear and distrust of the USSR. This distrust is based largelyong history of wars with Tsarist Russia, which was Sweden's traditionalbut It has been strengthened in theperiod by the USSR's aggressivepolicies, incessant Soviet attacks on
* Sweden's small Communisthil* notto neutrality asrofesses to regard itraud, allegingwedl&fc foreign poller la actuallyand non-neutral
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grants of asylum lo politicaland the recent disclosures of Sovietin Sweden Swedish relations with tbe Soviet Bloc, especially with Poland, have worsened over thc past year.
sympathies, as well as itsinterests, are with theparticularly the US and UK.reservations over certain aspectsforeign policy, there is afor the American people. Swedishhas become more overtly Western insince the conflict in Korea, andsince over-alt NATO defensivehave begun to grow.
Sweden itself were attacked bywe believe that it would resist withresources. Public opinion polls havethatercent of the Swedishdetermined to resist Sovietercent favor non-resistance. Ifwere invaded and occupied, remnantsSwedish forces would flee to Alliedand the Swedes would almostguerrilla warfare and sabotage
Possibilities ofChange in Swedish Policy
the Cold War. Despite 1Uand anti-Communist outlook,Is unlikely to change Its formalpolicy during peacetime, and willpressure in this direction.be particularly resistant toalthough such threats might leadtoore cautious approachrelations with the West. Swedenforced to make further limitedto the Soviet Bloc in responseeconomic warfare measures as adeny it Polish coal. It would notto Soviet pressures to alter Itsor military pohcies-
the other hand, the Swedesthat the advantages of joiningbe outweighed by the definiteinternational tension and the possibilitySoviet action againstmost Swedes, relativelythe state of their own defenses, have not been greatly impressed to date with NATO military assistance to Norway and Denmark.
owever. Swedenlready undertaking some form of limited covertliaison with Norway and might extend this to include covert joint planning with the Norwegian and perhaps Danish high(and through them indirectly witharticularly If NATO strength had grown and international tensions had(for example, from Soviet action againsthe Swedes, however, would be very sensitive to any hint of Western pressure In these negotiations, which might only increase their wariness. -
lthough opposition leaders havethat the disappearance of Finlanduffer for Sweden would necessitateof Sweden's policy, we do not believe that Sweden would Join NATO even if the USSR occupiedecent publicpoll indicates that onlyercent of the people wouldeparture fromIn this event. The Swedish Government's initial reaction would probably not beso much by the reduction of Finland to Satellite status as by its assessment of what the next Soviet step would be. If It werethat Finland waspringboard for an early Soviet military move into Sweden. Sweden would almost certainly maketo the West for some form of military ties. On the other hand. If Sweden believed the USSR intended to move no further than Finland, it would almost certainly not make any Immediate overt change in itspolicy. Sweden would almost certainly expand its own defense preparations, however, and would probably be more willing to step up covert military talks with various Western Powers Moreover, the progressive build-upoviet military threat from nearby Finland, and the influx of Finnish refugees, wouldcertainly increase public hostility to the USSR and therefore would gradually make the Swedish Government more willing to engage in some form of military cooperation with the West
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in event of war. We believe that Sweden would still prefer to remain neutral as long as possible As long as Norway were notthe Swedes would hope that the area might not become an active theater oland that Sweden could keep open some lines of communication with the West.enmark were invaded, which seems likely in the initial stagesonflict between the USSR and NATO, the Swedes probably still would BMlntehi their neutral positionthey would certainly mobilize and might secretly consult with the Westernover joint defense measures ln case Norway and Sweden were attacked.
A Soviet attack on Norway, even though il by-passed Sweden, would require theto decide then whether to fight or to risk being almost completely isolated from the West. Although government leaders have been reserved on this point, they might regard an attack on Norway as necessitating theof Sweden into the war. If the Swedes thought that NATO was capable of extending immediate large-scale assistance, we believe that Sweden might Join the Western Powers. If. however, the attack should come before NATO strength had been bunt up and thethen believed that quick andWestern aid would not be forthcoming, Sweden would probably decide to remain
Despite Its neutrality, Sweden probably would not actively resist the overflight of Western aircraft, although it would officially protest. Particularly if these overflights were at high altitude, the Swedes might only go through the motion of interception and AA fire, and the strongly pro-Western air force might actually assist lost or disabled Western aircraft. Sweden would more actively defend its neutrality against Soviet overflights, while attempting to avoid serious complications with the USSR. After Sweden had beenthrough Soviet occupation of Norway, however, the government would feelby Soviet pressure to protest more strongly and might take more activeagainst Western overflights. Even in this case, the Swedish air force would beto carry out in practice the moremeasures ordered by the government
The Consequences of Sweden's Position to the NATO Powers and the USSR
During Peacetime. Despite Sweden'spolicy, its growing militaryand determination te resist alreadysome deterrent to aggressive Soviet actions. Sweden's East-West trade controls already parallel those of the European NATO countries. Moreover. Soviet policy toward Finland is probably somewhat restrainedesire not to force Sweden closer to Uie West.
The chief unfavorable consequence to the West of Sweden's "alliance-free" policy Is that it severely hampers the development ofdefensesoviet attack. Sweden's nonadherence to NATO limitsmilitary planning and coordination,Sweden full access to NATO advice and assistance, and reduces NATO ability to aid Sweden In strengthening Its own defenses.
n the other hand. Swedish adherence to NATO would be considered by the USSRurther step toward Western "encirclement" and would increase international tensions. Although it would almost certainly not be consideredasus belli by the USSR, It might lead the USSR to reduce Finland to Satellite status.
n event of War. If war came during the period of NATO weakness, and beforedefenses in particular had beenstrengthened, we believe that the USSR would make an early effort to secure the valuable base sites on the Norwegian coast So long as the USSR considered that it could quickly occupy Norway without going through Sweden and that it could rely on Sweden's remaining neutral. It would probably observe Swedish neutrality. The USSR could thus avoid: (a) the necessity of diverting large forces to cope with the Swedish defenses; (b) damage to Swedish industry and facultiesesult of the fighting: and <c) the necessity
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garrisoning Sweden and ot coping with Swedish guerrilla warfare. Moreover, once the USSR had occupied Norway. Sweden would be almost wholly Isolated and itsexports to the West cut off. Under these circumstances, it would probably be forced lo yield progressively to Soviet pressures and to reorient its trade toward the Soviet Bloc. II the USSR would provide the necessary raw materials Sweden could be forced toaluable contribution to the Soviet war economy.
n the other hand, the USSR mightthat an initial attack via Sweden was essentialuick and decisive conquest of Norway. Soviet observance of Swedishwould deprive the USSR of the most logistlcally preferable avenues for invasion of Norway, or, should lt succeed in occupying Norway, of its most direct line ofto ita Norwegian bases. Moreover, aSweden wouldotential base for Western intelligence operations, it would probably give refuge to fleeing Danish and Norwegian forces; and it might be usedase for resistance activities in Norway.and Finland.
On balance we believe that, insubstantially as at present, the USSR would seek to by-pass Sweden in its Invasion ofowever, as NATO capabilities to defend Norway increase, the likelihoodoviet attack on Sweden would also increase.
If Sweden were attacked, or if it declared waresultoviet attack on Norway, over-all Scandinavian defense capabilities would be increased, and the USSR would be compelled to employ substantially larger forces than otherwise.2 at least, it seems unlikely that the Swedish and NATO forces would be capable of more than aaction, although Isolated parts of Norway might be held.
If, tor any reason, such as the eventual growth of overall NATO capabilities, the USSR did not immediately undertake theof Norway. It would probably look upon Swedish neutrality as advantageous,eutral Sweden would help screen tbe Soviet Baltic flank and would prevent the NATO
powers from making offensive use of Swedish
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