PROSPECTS FOR AN INCLUSIVE MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Created: 3/17/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SECURITY mrORUATlON

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

prospects for an inclusive middle east defense organization

The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Ai my, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency In theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on

PROSPECTS FOR AN INCLUSIVE MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

THE PROBLEM

To examine the possibility of forming an Inclusive Middle East defenseto estimate the kind of organisation which may be possible; and to indicate the major problems which would be encountered in efforts to Improve theof such an organization

ESTIMATE

Stolus of The Middle Cost Command Proposal

L The establishmentiddle East defense organization was first proposed inhen the US. the UK, France, andInn ted Egypt to Join with themounding member In settingiddle East Commandustralia, New Zealand, and South Africa had aready agreed Into the concept of MEC. Inhe sponsoring powers Issued astatement Informing Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Israel of the principles which they would follow in the establishment of MEC. By implication these slates would be Invited lo Join in the enterprise as associate membersuture time.

s. The etated objective of MEC was to strengthen the defenses of the Middle East through the cooperative effort of all statesin Its defense, whether or notorieJly part of the area. OrganuaUonally. MEC would consist of two bodies: (a) thestructure itself, including the Supreme

AHIed Commander Middle East and his staff; andiddle East defense liaisonIn which all sponsoring and associate members would be represented and which would serveink between the command and all the member states. It was envisioned that the MEC organisation would:lans for operations In the area In time of war or International emergency; fb) provide advice, training and materiel to the Middle Eastern countries; and (c) arrange for use of facilities by MEC through specific agreements between MEC and the Individual statessuch facilities, it was statedontinuing aim of MEC would be to Increase the defense capabilities of the Middle Eastern countries In order toroportionate reduction In the peacetlnw role of states not territorially part of the area. It was also stated that MEC would not Interfere Inand disputes arising within the area.

I. The sponsoring powers hoped that the MEC proposal would contributeompromise solution of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy. The Wefd government In Egypt, however,the four-power proposal as an attempt to continue foreign occupation of Egyptian territoryew guise. Practically all politically articulate elements In Egypt have approTfd of the government's position. King Farouk and the present HHaii government are

more favorably disposed toward association with the West tn regional defense, but even they demand prior acceptance of at least the principle of early and complete evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil andofitle as King of the Sudan as well as of Egypt

ajority of the governmental leaders in the other Arab states have privatelyarked Interest in MEG, they do not feel that they have the political strength to run counter to local popular support for Egypt's position.

Although Israel has expressed Itsto cooperate with the Western Powers In building up the defenses of the Middle East against Soviet aggression, it stated that It could not openly associate itself with the MEC proposal at this

Projpecfi for Establish men! of an Inclusive) Middle East Defense Organization

solution of the Anglo-EgyptianIs essential to the estabUshmeut ofMiddle East defensewill not Join until Its controversyUK Is settled, and under presentno other Arab nation la likely todoes not

ettlement of the Anglo-Egyptianthat would permitiddle East defense organization would require British acceptance of at least the principle of early and complete evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil and on British recognition of Farouk's title as King of the Sudan as well as of Egypt Zgyptwill not reduce these demands.

f these demands were met, It Is almostthat Egypt would notiddle East defense organization which included moreominal command structure or which provided for stationing of foreign groundIn Egypt In peacetime. However, Egypt would pnAablyefense organisation If Its function were limited to: (a) coordinating operations plans; (b) planning Western assistance to the Middle East atates for th* strengthening of their forces; andor the development In peacetime,

the use In wartime of Middle East

faculties. In this case, Egypt would

agree to auow British or other Westernec I

nicians to remain in the Sues canal zone

maintenance of the bases- Egypt might

cooperate in the formaUon of an

air force In the Zone. However, Egypt

insist that all ground and air bases In

country be under Egyptian

f Egypt agreed todefense organlsaUon, the otherwould almost certainly be willingThe chief motivation of allcountries would be the hope ofamounts of arms, militaryand economic aid from theThey would also hope that theof such assistance wo>tld Increaseerious Western effort toarea In the event of invasion fromJordan, because of its econom'con the UK, would probably noton the withdrawal of British forcesterritory, Iraq, where nationalistichave so far been kept In check,agree toiddle EastSyria and Lebanon wouldJoin, but would refuse to permitof foreign troops on their eoO.Saud would be willing to Join adefense organization but would Insistthe special advantages In hiswith the US which he nowleaders In all these countries andIraq are more aware of the threataggression than the Egyptian*. a'

he multilateral character and

ally the four-power sponsorship of such a

die East defense organization would be

able to Arab nationalist* only because ofo

inclusion of the US. Arab nationalisti

hope that US influence would

the influence of the UK and would Incurstreatment. Despite Arab suspicion that 41

Israeli and Zionist pressures will Influence

courses of action and that the US Is>t

ted to support the UK In Its controversiesI

the Arab governments, there is anthej

tlon that the US would supply arms andi>i|

aid lo the Arab atatea without binding tbam by "unequal treaties" or Interfering lo their Internalhis doe* not mean that Egypt would accept the substitution of US for British force* on It* territory or that any of the Arab state* would be wining to accord to the US the type of administrative Influence which the UK now exerts tn Jordan and Iraq. It does, however, mean that the Arab states would prefer to obtain military and economic assistance from the US rather than from the UK or France and would prefer to deal with US advisors. Arab cooperation in any Middle East defense organiiatton, therefore, would be likely to Increase to the extent thateans of Increasing US aid to the region and reducing British and French Influence therein.

t Is doubtful that Israel could initially be Includediddle East defensealthough Israel could probably bewith the purposes of the organization through ties with the US and UK. In any case Israel would probably be unwilling to enter Into any arrangement which Involved furnishing military Information to Its Arab neighbors and would certainly oppose anytn Arab ml'ltary strength relative to It* own. Moreover, Israel Is reluctant to take any overt step calculated to alienate the USSR and thus eliminate all pcasiblllty of further Jewish emigration from the Soviet bloc

roblemiiddle East fense Oroo.nl ration

While settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian its would thus probably make possible esUbUriunentegional defense organ-tapabi* of channelling Western mUl-ald and advice to the Middle East state* of carrying out scene preUmlnary defenseand coccdinatlon. It* development

ore broadly effective organisation would remain aa extremely difficult lash.

lthough the evacuation of British force* from Egypt wouldajor Irritant tn AraVWeatera relations. Arab fears andand trttraregtonel rivalries wouldto plagoa negotiations for development of an effaeUvi organlsaUoo. Public opinion, as wen a* many leaders.-would continue to underestimate. Ignore, or be fatalistic aboutlb* threat of Borict aggression, which they "would regard as far less tangible than the question of Western 'Interference" or the Arab-Israeli dispute. Arab leaders wouldsuir^esous of Westernnd would bs concerned lest the defensebe usedeans of applying coUecUvs pressure on them or reestablishing sphere* of influence. Moreover, nationalist resentment against foreign interference In the Arab states might be turned against the regional defense organization, and leademand for the withdrawalforeign technicians from the Sues Canal base and other Middle r- baaee In general,te* would remainprimarilyesire to exploit Western fear of Soviet aggression in order to tmprovs their military strengthii their

Original document.

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