for theht of the united states
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IFIIIll MfWHIW
apr 9
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
the probable consequences of certain
possible us courses of action with respect to communist china and korea
21
Find Copy
The text or the basic estimte Is identical with the advance copy distributed onecember. The accompanying TABS have been added since that distribution.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments ol State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisoryconcurred ln this estimate on
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST
CHINA AND KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain possible US courses ofand (b) the Communist reaction to these courses of action.
ESTIMATE
Expansion of the Korean WarN Embargo on Shipping and Exports to Communist China
N embargo on shipping and exports to Communist China, i! effective, could reduce Communist Chinese seaborne importsHowever, if exports wereto Port Arthur and Dairen, andxports from Hong Kong and Macao were notthe effect of the embargo would be largely nullified. In addition, lo avoid large loopholes, the embargo would have toestriction* on exports to non-cooperating nations of goods which might be transshiped to Communisthe cancellation of charters and the prohibition of the sale of merchant ships to Soviet Bloc and other non-cooperating countries;ovementsuch as refusal of clearance,and other pressures appliedorld-wide basis.
lthough these controls. If effectivelywould be sufficient to Intensify the existing serious economic strains inChina, their Impact would be long tana and would not, in themselves, force the Chinese Communists to end the Korean war or threaten the stability of the Chinese Com-muniit regime.
must be expected that the Sovietwould not respect this embargosome other states would give onlycooperation The payment ofCommunist China would stimulatethe embargo. Whll* lt is impossiblewith precision the importance ofthey would serve to diminisheffects of the embargo.
Communists could furtherthe effect of these measuresmore of their ships ln theeven though such dislocation ofshipping might impose seriousthe Soviet Bloc, The USSR wouldto expand overland shipmentsChina.
N embargo on exports and shipping to Communist China is unlikely, by itself, to reduce Communist Chinese imports substantially.
xpansion of the Korean War by Naval Blockcde of Communist China
a. Effective interdiction of Communistseaborne imports wouldaval blockade (Including an embargo) of allCommunist seaports, including Portand Dairen. It would be essential to
prevent the use of Hong Kong and Macao as transshipment points for trade withChina.
interdiction would intensifyserious economic strains inChina, but would not ln itself forceCommunists to end the Koreanthreaten the stability of the Chineseregime.
Chinese Communists would beto counter such interdictionwould probably employ minethe blockading ships and mightaircraft and submarines.
- d. The USSR would endeavor to offset the economic effects of the embargo and blockade by expanding overland shipments toChina. The USSR would refuse tothe legality of the blockade. It would probably undertake to escort Soviet shipping into Port Arthur and Dairen and mightto escort Soviet shipping into other blockaded ports. It might resort to theuse of submarines and mines against blockading ships. Enforcement of themight well create incidents which would heighten international tensions, but wethe Soviet reaction to such incidents alone would not result in the USSR Initiating general war.
imited Exponsion of UN Airin Order to Protect UN Forces in Korea from the Consequences of the Growing Communist Air Threat
UN air attacks againstaircraft and air bases in Manchuriaimmediate vicinity of the Yalu Riverimpair the Communist capabilitytheir air superiority over largerKorea and thus to threaten theUK forces in Korea by air attacks.
Chinese Communists would reacttheir aircraft and bringing tomaximum air defense capability.also attempt to increase their airagainst UN forces, Installations, andthe Korean area.
USSR probably would not openlythe Sino-Soviet Treaty, but wouldreact by committing additional Sovier forces to the air defense of Manchuria and North Korea despite the continuing risk of general war.
Expansion and Intensification
of UN Military Operations in the
Korean War
e. Sustained and unrestricted UN airon Communist military targets inand North Korea, combined with large-scale UN ground operations in North Korea could seriously impair the Communistcapability to maintain their position in Korea.
believe that the Chinesereact Initially by attempting toair action against UN forces,and ships in the Korean area.
USSR would probably reactby giving support short ofof its own ground forces and shortcommitment of Soviet air forces toover UN held territory, but includingof additional elements of itsforces to action In and overNorth Korea.
the Communists should find thatwere proving Insufficient toto maintain themselves militarilythe USSR would probably intensifyThis aid might well include theof "volunteer" forces. It mightthe employment of Soviet forcesan extente facto local warthe US/UN and the USSR wouldthe Far East At every stage, however,would probably endeavor tothe possibility of ending the conflictnegotiation if the global interestsUSSR would be served by disengagement
of the Korean Wor byof Notionalist Military Forces
The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping andthese forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide not only
logistic support for an Invasion butair and naval support as well. Even so. Chinese Nationalist ground forces could hardly be read; for an Invasionnd Chinese Nationalist Forceshole are not likely to be ready instrengtharge-scaleertain small units of the Chinese Nationalist Army are already capable of effective employment in small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.esser amount of preparation the ChineseArmy could be employed effectively In Korea. Certain selected divisions could be made effectiveelatively short time for rotational service on the Korean peninsula.
ol the Korean Warof Non-Communist Guerrilla
Forces Already in China
The Chinese Communists have succeeded in greatly reducing the strength of guerrilla forces throughout China and these forces do not nowignificant operationalEven if guerrilla capabilities were developed, the guerrillas could be employedonly in conjunction with other courses of action directed against Communist China.
of the Korean War byof Several Courses ofConsidered Above
a. An intensification of UN operations ln Korea and an expansion of the war to include bombardment of Manchuria and anof Communist China's seaborne Imports, if successful, would probably have theeffects on Communisthe Chinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale operations inines of communication in Manchuria would beommunist_China would be forced into an increased dependence on the USSR for military supplies and other criticalhinese Communist capabilities for military operations in Southeast Asia would be reduced substantially; andn increase of Soviet commitments in the Far East would reduce Soviet capabilities elsewhere.
o. Tbe USSR would almost certainlyits aid to Communist China in response to these US courses of action. This aid would probably Include increasing commitment of Soviet air defense elements in Communist China and North Korea. If the Communists found that such measures were provingin countering the US effort, the USSR would probably intensify its aid This aid nught well include the introduction offorces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extente Jacic war between the US TJN and the USSR would exist in the Far East. At every stage, however, the Krerr.:tn would probably endeavor to keep open the possibility of ending the conflict by political negotiation if the global interests of the USSR would be served by disengagement.
c. It Is recognized that precise Information on enemy Intentions Is rarely available and that enemy counteraction under the various circumstances here considered cannot bewith complete accuracy. However, all aspects of the Soviet problem considered, we believe it unlikely that the USSR willchoose to precipitate global warof the implementation of the courses of action examined In this estimate.the possibility of war bycannot be discountederiod of high international tension such as would
TAB A
COMMUNIST CHINA'S SEABORNE TRADE
During the last half0 Communist China's seaborne imports reached record levels. These imports consisted primarily of raw cotton, chemicals, crude rubber,products, steel and steel products, metal manufactures, and pharmaceuticals. At least three-fourths of these Imports passed through Bong Kong and practically all were carried in non-Communist registered shipping Seaborne imports into Communist China reached even higher levels during the first half1 and the composition of these imports did not change significantly.
F-uring the latter half1 there hasecline both in seaborne imports into Communist China and in the tonnage oiommunist registered shipping engaged in trade with Communist China. There arepossible reasons for the decline ln thetrade of Communist China. Among these are: Western export controls. Increased imports from the Soviet Bloc, institutionystem of selective buying by the Chinese Communistshortage of foreignresulting from heavy imports0 and the first hall1 Information now available does net permit even an approximate estimate of the relative Importance of these factors.
art of the decline in the tonnage of non-Communist registered shipping involved in trade with Communist China has been offset by the diversion of Communist Bloc shipping lo carrying Communist China's foreign trade. States of the Soviet Bloc are buying oradditional ships for use in this trade.
ft1
TAB B
COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN MANCHURIA
Present Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are due directly to Sovietin terms of equipment, operationaltraining, and, in many cases, theparticipation of Soviet personnel. Insuch capabilities, the following factors are pertinent:
a. Fighter Aircraft.irst-line jet fighters of theype are located in the Mukden-Antung area ofdditional first-line jet fighters, which are now located in the Peiping-Tlentsln. Tslngtao, Shanghai, and Canton areas, could be deployed forin the Mukden-Antung area.
o. Earlyadar defense system has been installed and set ln operation, with the assistance of Soviet radar engineers,and advisers, which is believed to give practically continuous early-warning coverage from the Manchurian border south toisual system supplements the electronic early-warning system.
c Antiaircraft Artillery. Manchurian air defensesubstantial number ofartillery pieces as well as largeof automatic weapons. The majority ol these are Soviet manufactured77 mm. pieces. Reports continue to Indicate that the total AAA strength is being increased by shipments of SovietHeaviest concentrations are located in the Mukden area. Shanghai, and in theof Canton. AAA defenses appear to be employed for the protection of the industrial area, harbor facilities, airfields, and major junctions in the communications and supply systems. Reports indicate that the AAAinclude gun-laying radar.
d. Aircraft Control. The Communist air defense system in Manchuria has thefor limited ground-controlled interception.
ommunist air defense capabilities inare estimated to be as follows:
c. In the Dalren-Mukden-Antung-Harbin area of southern and eastern Manchuria, the Chinese Communistsajor aircapability against daylight bombing missions. At night their air defensewould be considerably less.
b. Communist air defense capabilities in southern and eastern Manchuria are such that considerable losses of US aircraft could be expected, at least initially, during aof systematic air attacks. Underof prolonged air attack, the ability of the Chinese Communists to maintainwould be in direct proportion to the amount of support which the USSR would render.
TAB C
CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES
The Chines* NaUonabst Armytrengthersonnel organized intonfantryrmoredara-trooport commands, 5regiments,ndependent battalions, The bulk of these forces is disposed onsome combat elements are located on Matsu, Quemoy, and the Pescadores Islands The Nationalist Army has no significantof trained reserves, and under presentIts mobilisation capacity IsThe mass induction of Formosan youths would nol be feasible unless the US greatly expanded its proposed MDAP. Even in this event, the dependability andof Formosan troops would beAt the present time, the Nationalist Army Is short of some types of ammunition, arms, and other equipment, and the materiel that is available is heterogeneous and poorly maintained. Because of these materielthe lack of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (Including the lack of interservicche combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army is poor.
he Chinese Nationalist Air Force consistsombat groupsactical aircraft. Of this total, however,are serviceable for combat. Theseofight bombers andiston fighters predominantly of Worldesign.of the lack of spare parts and improper maintenance facilities, the combatof this force is very poor. Underof sustained combat, particularly if opposed by jet aircraft. Its capabilities would be reducedegllgabie factoray or two. In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force Is believed to have the organizational structure and necessaryto absorb and utilize the additional equipment. Including jet aircraft, necessary to make it an effective force.
The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists ofiscellaneous craft, the largest of whichestroyer-type vessels Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval opposition, thewould be capable of transporting up to two divisions in assault by means oflanding craft and following up with five or six divisions lifted by other shipping. While the Nationalist Navy could not, by itself,blockade the Chinese mainland. It could give limited supportlockade.
The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping andthese forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide not only logistic support for an invasion butair and naval support as well. Even so, Chinese Nationalist ground forces could hardly be ready for an Invasionnd Chinese Nationalist Forceshole are not likely to be ready instrengtharge-scaleowever, certain small units of the Chinese Nationahst Array are already capable of effective employment in small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.
elatively short time certain selected divisions of the Chinese Nationalist Army could be made effective for rotational service on the Korean peninsula. The ChineseArmyhole could be employed effectively ln Koreaesser amount of preparation than would be requiredarge-scale Invasion operation of the Chinese mainland.
tab d
estimate of the present 5trength and capabilities of anti-communist guerrillas in china
strength ond locotion
The maximum total number of effective guerrillas throughout all China which can with any certainty be said to exist at thetime is. Dormant or potential guerrillas exist in unknownbut the utility of this category is and probably will remain small pending all-out war or revolution in China.
Active guerrilla forces are located for the moat part in inaccessibleregions and on Nationalist-held offshorePrincipal regions of activity continue to be the Pearl River and Canton area, the Kwanglung-Fukien border, the Kwangsi-Kweichow border. Siechwan. the Cheklang coast, southwestern Yunnan, and scattered areas ln the Mongol and Moslem northwest.
their physical composition ond condition
The term "guerrillas" is an elastic one Since these resistance forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition from one unit to another. Generally speaking, guerrillas fail into the following categories: (a) ex-Nationalist forces, some of whomallegiance, but most of whom owe noto Taiwan; (b) discontentedand peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of traditional secret societies, and (e) minority racial and religious groups. The most active and effective units are those in categories (a) and
Guerrilla forces sufferack ofdirection and coordination,elative iack of organization, quite often from lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from serious deficiencies in arms andand, perhaps most Importantly, from an almost total lack of communication facilities.
In addition, guerrilla forces sufferack of adequate food, clothing, and medical supplies.
their motivation ond allegiance
o single political program unites orthe guerrillas. Economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the basicforce behind guerrilla activity at the present time is the struggle for existence and self-prcservation.
espite Nationalist and independent claims, the Chinese guerrillas are likely for the most part to follow whatever leader and whatever political group can support and maintain them.
Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is primarily that now beingby Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist guerrilla effort, however, remains largelybecause of the hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.
Independent elements continue toubstantial guerrilla potential in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. It is believed that the claims of one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla assets in being are valid, but this group does not have the resources to maintain Itselfoutside support.
their continuing decline in strength and Effectiveness
Communistdissident elements have beenand, with the furthercontrol by Peiping and the forming byof an effective anti-guerrillaChina, guerrilla strength andunder present circumstances willcontinue to decline.
perhaps surprisingly lowuerrillas should not beto the successes of the Chineseanti-guerrilla program. Thisalso reflects more accurate USconcerning anti CommunistChina than was available when earlierwere prepared.
Their Present Capabilities
guerrillas have attime the capability for:
(a) Sporadic raids;
(b> Occasional sabotage operations;
Raids, feints, and diversions against the mainland from the Nationalist-held offshore islands;
Providing intelligence concerningChina; and,
(c>otential nucleus for amovement in mainland China.
guerrillas at the present time dothe capability to;
Delay or disrupt the movement from one front to another of the Chinesearmies;
Seriously interdict Chinese Communist lines of communications or logistic support;
Attract to their ranks substantial numbers of defectors from the Communists;
Significantly aid military operationsationalist invasion be launched ln the near future.
capabilities are unlikely towithout sizeable outside support andof the Chinese Nationalists.
Wawt--r
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: