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SPECIAL ESTIMATE ?
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
21
ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved for
^ ffif SECRET :> I
i
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
SE-20
1
Final Copy
The text of the basic estimte is identical with the advance copy distributed onecember. The accompanying TABS have been added since that distribution.
The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated with the Central InteUigence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the InteUigence Advisoryconcurred ln this estimate on
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THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST
CHINA AND KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain possible US courses ofand (b) the Communist reaction to these courses of action.
ESTIMATE
Expansion of (he Korean WorN Embargo on Shipping ond Exports lo Communist China
UN embargo on shipping andCommunist China, if effective, couldChinese seaborne importsHowever, if exports wereto Port Arthur and Dairen. and ifHong Kong and Macao were notthe eflect of the embargo wouldnullified. In addition, to avoidthe embargo would have torestrictions on exports toof goods which might beCommunisthe cancellationand the prohibition of the saleships to Soviet Bloc and othercountries;ovementsuch as refusal of clearance,and other pressures applied onbasis.
these controls, if effectivelywould be sufficient toexisting serious economic strains inChina, their impact would be long
; term and would not. in themselves, force the Chinese Communists to end the Korean war Jor threaten the stability of the Chinese Com-jmunist regime.
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must be expected that the Sovietwould not respect this embargosome other states would give onlycooperaUon. The payment ofCommunist China would stimulatethe embargo. While it is impossiblewith precision the Importance ofthey would serve to diminisheffects of the embargo.
Communists could furtherthe effect of these measuresmore of their ships in theeven though such dislocation ofshipping might impose seriousthe Soviet Bloc. The USSR wouldto expand overland shipmentsChina.
a UN embargo on exportsto Communist China is unlikely,to reduce Communist Chinese
xponsion of the Korean War by Naval Blockade of Communist China
a. Effective interdiction of Communistseaborne imports wouldaval blockade, (including an embargo) of allCommunist seaports, including Portand Dairen. It would be essential to
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the use ct Kong Kong ands transshipment points for trade withChina.
interdiction would intensifyserious economic strains inChina, but would not in itself forceCommunists to end the Korean war
or threaten the stability of the Chineseregime.
Chinese Communists would beto counter such interdictionwould probably employ minethe blockading ships and might em-
* ploy aircraft and submarines.
USSR would endeavor to offseteffects of the embargo andexpanding overland shipments toChina. The USSR would refuse tothe legality of the blockade. Itundertake to escort SovietPort Arthur and Dairen and mightto escort Soviet shipping intoports. It might resort to theuse of submarines and minesships. Enforcement of themight well create incidents whichInternational tensions, but wethe Soviet reaction to suchwould not result in the USSRwar.
imited Expansion of UN Airin Order fo Protect UN Forces in Korea from the Consequences of the Growing Communis! Air Threat
UN air attacks againstaircraft and air bases In Manchuriaimmediate vicinity of the Yalu River couldimpair the Communist capabilitytheir air superiority over largerKorea and thus to threaten theUN forces in Korea by air attacks.
Chinese Communists would reacttheir aircraft and bringing tomaximum air defense capability.also attempt to increase their airagainst UN forces. Installations, andthe Korean area.
USSR probably would not openlythe Stno-Soviet Treaty, but would prob-
ably react by committing additional Soviet forces to the air defense of Manchuria and North Korea despite the continuing risk of general war.
urther Expansion and Intensification of UN Military Operations in fhe Korean War
and unrestricted UN airon Communist military targets inand North Korea, combined withUN ground operations in Northseriously impair the Communistcapability to maintain their position
believe that the Chinesereact initially by attempting toair action against UN forces,and ships in the Korean area.
USSR would probably reactby giving support short ofof its own ground forces and shortcommitment of Soviet air forces toover UN held territory, but includingof additional elements of itsforces to action in and overNorth Korea.
the Communists should And thatwere proving insufficient toto maintain themselves militarilythe USSR would probably intensifyThis aid might well Include theof "volunteer" forces. It mightthe employment of Soviet forcesan extente facto local warthe US/UN and the USSR wouldthe Far East. At every stage, however,would probably endeavor tothe possibility of ending the conflictnegotiation if the globalUSSR would be served by ciscnga^pmegt.
xpansion of the Korean War byof Nationalist Military Forces The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping andthese forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide not only
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xpansion of fhe Korean War by Utilization of Non-Communist Guerrilla Forces Already in China The Chinese Communists have succeeded in greaUy reducing the strength of guerrilla forces throughout China and these forces do not nowignificant operational Even if guerrilla capabilities were developed, the guerrillas could be employedonly in conjunction with other courses of action directed against Communist China.
Exponsion of lhe Korean Warombination of Several Courses ofConsidered Above a. An Intensification of UN operations in Korea and an expansion of the war to include bombardment of Manchuria and anof Communist China's seaborne Imports,would probably have the follow-ing effects on CommunistChinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale operations Inoes of communication In Manchuria would
beommunist China would be
forced into an increased dependence on the
USSR for military supplies and other critical
hinese Communist capabilities
for military operations in Southeast Asia
would be reduced substantially; and finally
n increase of Soviet commitments in the
Far East would reduce Soviet capabilities elsewhere.
b. The USSR would almost certainlyits aid to Communist China in response to these US courses of action. This aid would probably include increasing commitment of Soviet air defense elements in Communist China and North Korea. If the Communists found that such measures were provingIn countering the US effort, the USSR would probably intensify Its aid. This aid might well include the Introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extente facto war between the US/UN and the USSR would exist ln the Far East. At every stage, however, the Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep open the possibility of ending the conflict by political negotiation if the global Interests of the USSR would be erved by disengagement.
c. It Is recognized that precise Information on enemy Intentions is rarely available and that enemy counteraction under the various circumstances here considered cannot bewith complete accuracy. However, all aspects of the Soviet problem considered, we believe tt unlikely that the USSR willchoose to precipitate global warof the Implementation of the courses of action examined In this estimate. the possibility of war bycannot be discountederiod of high international tension such as would
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TAB A
COMMUNIST CHINA'S SEABORNE TRADE
l. During trie las', hai/0hina's seaborne imports reachedevels. These imports consisted primarilyaw cotton, chemicals, crude rubber,leum products, steel and steel products,anufactures, and pharmaceuticals. Athree-fourths of these imports passed through Hong Kong and practically all were carried in non-Communist registered shipping. Seaborne Imports Into Communist China reached even higher levels during the first half1 and the composition of these imports did not change significantly.
uring the latter half1 there hasecline both in seaborne imports Into Communist China and in the tonnage of non-Communist registered shipping engagedrade with Communisthere are sev-
eral possible reasons for the decline ln thetrade of Communist China. Among these are: Western export controls, increased Imports from the Soviet Bloc, institutionystem of selective buying by the Chinese Communistshortage of foreignresulting from heavy Imports0 and the first halfnformation now available does not permit even an approximate estimate of the relative importance of these factors.
art of the decline in the tonnage of non-Communist registered shippL-ig Involved ln trade wtth Communist China has been offset by the diversion of Communist Bloc shipping to carrying Communist China's foreign trade. States of the Soviet Bloc are buying oradditional ships for use in this trade.
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TAB B
AIR DEFENSE
resent Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are due directly to SovietIn terms of equipment, operationaltraining, and. in many cases, theparticipation of Soviet personnel. Insuch capabilities, the following factors are pertinent:
Alrcralt.jet fighters ofype arethe Mukden-Antung area otdditionaljet fighters, which are now located inTsingtao, Shanghai,areas, could be deployed torLn the Mukden-Antung area.
adar defensebeen installed and set in operation,assistance of Soviet radar engineers,and advisers, which is believed tocontinuous early-warningthe Manchurian border south tovisual system supplements thesystem.
Artillery.ubstantial number ofartillery pieces as well as largeof automatic weapons. The majorityare Soviet manufactured7 mm. pieces. Reportsindicate that the total AAA strength is
CAPABILITIES IN MANCHURIA
being Increased by shipments of SovietHeaviest concentrations are located In the Mukden area. Shanghai, and Ln theof Canton. AAA defenses appear to be employed for the protection of the industrial area, harbor facilities, airfields, and major junctions in the communications and supply systems. Reports indicate that the AAAinclude gun-laying radar.
d. Aircraft Control. The Communist air defense system Ln Manchuria has thefor limited ground-controlled Interception.
ommunist air defense capabilities Lnare estimated to be as follows:
a. In the Dauen-Mukden-Antung-Harbin area of southern and eastern Manchuria, the Chinese Communistsajor aircapability against daylight bombing missions. At night their air defensewould be considerably less.
b Communist air defense capabilities in; southern and eastern Manchuria are such that considerable losses of US aircraft could be expected, at least initially, during aof systematic air attacks. Underof prolonged air attack, the abilityhe Chinese Communists to maintainiveness would be Ln direct proportion tomount of support which the USSR would render.
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7A8 C
CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES
The Chineae Nationalist Armytrengthersonnel organized intonfantryrmoredara-trooport commands, 5regiments,ndependent battalions. The bulk-of these forces ls disposed onsome combat elements are located on Matsu. Quemoy. and the Pescadores Islands. The Nationalist Army has no significantof trained reserves, and under presentits mobUixaucn capacity is The mass induction of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US greatly expanded its proposed MDAP. Even ln this event, the dependability andof Formosan troops would be At the present time, the Nationalist Army ts short of some types of ammunition, arms, and other equipment, and the materiel that is available Is heterogeneous and poorly maintained. Because of these materielthe lack of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (Including the lack of lnterservicehe combatof the Nationalist Army is poor.
I. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consistsombat groupsactical aircraft. Of this total, however,are serviceable for combat. Theseofight bombers andiston fighters predominantly of World War JJ design.of the lack of spare parts and improper maintenance facilities, the combatof this force Is very poor. Underof sustained combat, particularly if opposed by jet aircraft. It* capabilities would fee reducedegllgable factoray or two. In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force Is beUeved to have the organizational structure and necessary per-pannel to absorb and utilize the additional
equipment, including jet aircraft, necessary to make lt an effective force.
The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists ofisceUaneous craft, the largest of whichestroyer-type vessels. Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval opposition, thewould be capable of transporting up to two divisions in assault by means oflanding craft and following up with five or six divisions lifted by other shipping. While the Nationalist Navy could not, by itself,blockade the Chinese mainland, it could give limited supportlockade.
The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping andthese forces were greaUy expanded, and unless the US were wilUng to provide not only logistic support for an Invasion butair and naval support as weU. Even SO, Chinese Nationalist ground forces could hardly be ready for an invasionnd Chinese Nationalist Forceshole are not likely to be ready instrengtharge-scaleowever, certain small units of the Chinese Nationalist Army are already capable of effective employment Ln small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.
elatively short time certain selected divisions of the Chinese Nationalist Army could be made effective for rotational service on the Korean peninsula. The ChineseArmyhole could be employed effectively in Koreaesser amount of preparation than would be requiredarge-scale invasion operation of the Chinese mainland.
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TA8 D
ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN CHINA
Strength and Location
. The maximum total number oterriilas throughout all China which can (Lith any certainty be said to exist at the ores-eat time is. Dormant or potential guerrillas exist in unknownbut the utility of this category is and Probably will remain small pending all-out war or revolution in China.
Active guerrilla forces are located forost part in inaccessibleregions and on Nationalist-held offshorePrincipal regions of activity continue to be the' Pearl River and Canton area, the Kwangtung-Fukien border, the Kwangsi-Kweichow border, Szechwan, the Cheklang coast, southwestern Yunnan, and scattered areas in the Mongol and Moslem northwest.
.Heir Physical Composition and Condition
he term "guerrillas" is an elastic one since -rhese resistance forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition from oae unit to another. Generally speaking, Ouerrillas fall into the following categories:ex-Nationalist forces, some of whom pro-Ass aUeglance. but most of whom owe no al-/igiance, to Taiwan; (b) discontented land-fords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) memberstraditional secret socleUes. and (e) minority racial and religious groups. The most active *ad effective units are those in categories (a) *ad
. Guerrilla forces sufferack otdirection and coordination,elative lack of organization, quite often from lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics. .Aom serious deficiencies in arms and anununi-+jon, and, perhaps most importanUy, from anost total lack of communicauon facilities.
In addition, guerrilla forces sufferack of adequate food, clothing, and medical supplies.
Their Motivation and Allegiance
No single political program unites orthe guerrillas. Economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the basicforce behind guerrilla acUvtty at the present time is the struggle for existence and self-preservation.
Despite Nationalist and Independent claims, the Chinese guerrillas are likely for the most part to follow whatever leader and whatever political group can support and maintain them.
Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is primarily that now beingby Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist guerrilla effort, however, remains largelybecause of the hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.
Independent elements continue toubstantial guerrilla potential in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. It is believed that the claims of one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla assets in being are valid, but this group does not have the resources to maintain Itselfoutside support.
Their Continuing Decline in Strength ond Effectiveness
Communistdissident elements have beenand. with the furthercontrol by Peiping and the forming byof an efiective anti-guerrillaChina, guerrilla strength andunder present circumstances willcontinue to decline.
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he perhaps surprisingly lowuerrillas should not beolly to the successes ol the Chinesenist anti-guerrilla program. This lowalso reflects more accurate US know. Udge concerning anti-Communist resistance ft> China than was available when earlier es-yV^-Tjates were prepared.
-fheir Present Copobililies
li. Anti-Communist guerrillas have at the
present tune the capability for:poradic raids, (b) Occasional sabotage operations: fe) Raids, feints, and diversions against the
fvainland from the Nationalist-held offshore
(fjands;
(d) Providing intelligence concerningnist China; and.
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fe)otential nucleus for amovement in mainland China.
he guerrillas at the present time do not have the capability to:
Delay or disrupt the movement from one front to another of the Chinesearmies:
Seriously Interdict Chinese Communist lines of communications or logistic support;
Attract to their ranks substantial numbers of defectors from the Communists;
Significantly aid military operationsationalist invasion be launched in the near future
uerrilla capabilities are unlikely towithout slieable outside supporte vita lizatkon of the Chinese Nationalists.
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Original document.
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