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DISTRIBUTION. Office of Ust President National Security Council NaUona) Security Reaourcea Board Depirtmant of State Olftce of SecretaryDtltatt Department of the Army Department of Use Nary Department of the Air Forte Atomic berry Com ml Won Joint Chief* of Start Federal Bureau of lnveiUgauon Research and Development Boardoard
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY2
NIE-iO
The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency In theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this estimate.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY
2
the problem
To estimate the current situation and probable political, economic, scientific, and military developments in East Germany
assumption
That there will not be general war within the period of this estimate.
conclusions
m*Ej Include the Soviet Lone Oftad Soviet Sector of Berlin Tht Orratu DcmocraUc Republic <QDRj does not include toe Soviet Sector of Berlin.
In Easthe USSR isa Communist-controlled state which is being made an integral part of the Sonet Bloc and which is beingindustrially to provide acontribution to the Soviet military and economic potential
The reorganization of the political and economic structure of East Germany along Soviet lines and the incorporation of East Germany into the Soviet Bloc are almost certainly not regarded by the Kremlinermanent substitute for the ultimate formationnifiedGermany under Soviet control.
We do not believe that the Kremlin will give up or weaken its control over East Germany either as part of Itsfor attaining controlnified Germany or as part of its effort tothe Integration of West Germany alth the West and West German
actical manoeuvre, the Kremlin might remove some of its more overtmechanisms including some of Its military forces We do not believe,that the Kremlin would so relax its control over East Germany as to affect the foundations of Soviet authority.
The vast majority of the East German population are opposed to the present regime. There is, however, no evidence of organized opposition. Furtherof the Communist position, more complete incorporation of Eastinto the Soviet Bloc, and continued progress in increasing industrialparticularly of heavy industry, will probably be the principal developments
East Germany will continue to strengthen the Soviet military potential through servinghannel forcritical materials and equipment from the West, through providing scientific
manpower and research facilities, and particularly through the flow of Itsto the USSR. Uncompensated de-Liveries* to the USSR2 are expected to amount to7 billion.
he capabilities of the East German Alert Police, which nowen. are limited byequipment, insufficient tnuning, and low morale. The East German Air Force will probably not progress beyond the planning stage, and the capabilities of the naval force will remain minor.
oviet occupation forces inoised threat lo all of Western Europe and the Scandinavian peninsula These forces includeoviet-manned aircraft and ground forces numberingen, organized intoine divisions, whichechanizedifle armies."
DISCUSSION
SOVIET OBJECTIVE
East Germany, the USSR IsCommunist-controlled state which issr. integral part of the Soviet Blocis being developed industrially toa maximum contribution to theand economic potential Theof the political andof East Germany along Sovietthe Incorporation of East GermanySoviet Bloc are almost certainly notby the Kremlinermanentfor the ultimate formation of aCommunist Germany under Soviet
do not believe that the Kremlinup or weaken its control over Easteither aa part of its strategy forcontrolnified Oermany orof its effort to prevent the integrationOermany with the West and Westrearmament.acticalKremlin might remove some of itscontrol mechanisms, Including somemilitary forces. We do not believe,the Kremlin would so relax ItsEast Oermany as to affect theof Soviet authority.
PROBABIE POllTlCAt DEVELOPMENTS Current Situation
the establishment of theRepublic (GDR) In OctoberSoviet Military Administration wasby the smaller and moreControl Commission, whichSoviet Sector of Berlin andsupervision over the EastThe Socialist Unity Partyis the Communist Party of Easthas been given all key positionsGDR and has become theof Soviet policy.
maintain the fiction thatemocratic multi-party state,have permitted the existence"bourgeois" political parties, the
The Director of Intelligence, USAF. comment* on conclusionsndnd the supportingas follows
"Conclusionsive high assurance that Soviet forces in East Germaoy will not be reduced materially even for the purpose of prerenUng West Oertnan rearmament Althoughogical bads foreQef. we should recognise that the Soviet Union may not toe* upon the advantages of poised military threat or control curtly as we do at any one time. The poaBMlity ahould not be excluded from considers-on that the Sonet Union may see Its way cleat to stalemate or destroy the effecUreness of NATO through such devices asof forces and InsistenceeutralGerman state, while pursuing ItsobJecUvee with force elsewhere "
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal Democratic Party. The Communists use members of these parties to disseminate both covert and overt propaganda to West Germany. Inhe Communists created two new parties, the Democratic Peasants party and the National Democratic Party, to enlist support among elements of theeluctant to Join the SED or not desired within the SED. In 1M9 all political parties were forced Into the National Front, anthrough which the1 SED directs and controls al) political activity.
The vast majority of the East German population are opposed to the present regime. There is, however, no evidence of organized opposition. The regime has gained somein the last two years as the result ofeducation upon the youth, the slow but steady rise In the standard of living, and better concealment of Soviet controls and exploitation However, the wide-spreadof conditions ln West Germanydissatisfaction.
The regime has made great efforts to win over the youth (age, who comprise morehird of the population and who have had no adult experienceemocratic government Although about one-half of the youth are members oforganizations, probably not more than half of these arc now active supporters of the regime.
Substantial progress has been madethe last two years In merging Eastwith the Soviet Orbit East Germanyember of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistancen organization established by the USSR to help coordinate the economies of the Communist states of Eastern Europe. East Germany has trade agreements, cultural accords, and treaties of friendship with the USSR and with most of the Satellites, and itrade agreement with Communist China However, the status of the GDR differs in several respects from that of the other major Satellites: (a) the USSR has notutual assistance pact with the ODR or permitted It to conclude one with any of the other Satellites; <b) the
USSR has not created East Ocrman armed forces comparable in size to the armed forces of the other Satellites; and (c) the USSR has not made theormal member of the Com in form.
Proboble Developments2
The SED will probably become asmaller but more reliable and effective party as former Socialists and unreliable or suspect Communists are replaced by members of the Free German Youth. The privileges accompanying membership in the numerous mass organizations controlled by the SED will probably be Increased to order totheir growth, and It will probably become Increasingly difficult for East Germans to avoid participating In these organizations without Incurring serious political andpenalUes. The "bourgeois" parties will probably be permitted to continue their sub-atrrlent existence and the National Front will remain The amount of active support which the regime receives from the youth willIncrease
A number of issues and forces willto be troublesome for the Kremlin2 but will not Jeopardize Soviet authority ln East Germany. Three of thesedesirenified Germany, theGerman attitude toward the Russians and other Slavs,ense of Identification with thefrom German history. Others, such as the loss of the territoriesthe Oder-Nelsse. the Imposition of the Soviet system, reparations and general 8oviet exploitation of the area, and the attractionree and more prosperous West Germany, are direct products of the recent changes. However, East German political, economic, and social life is completely controlled by Communists subservient to the Kremlin and open opposition lo the regime will almostnot develop
here Is little likelihood that the Kremlin willreaty of peace with Eastuntil It has decided that It cannotthe integration of West Germany with the West and the rearmament of WestWe do not believe the Kremlin will reach this conclusion2 Even if the
Kremlin shouldeace treaty with East Germany.s probable that the Soviet occupation forces would remain in Easton "request" of the GDR
PROBABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
Current Economic Situationast Germany constitutes approximately one-third5 Germany in total area,arable land, and industrial capacity. When the Kremlin stopped the removal of capital equipmentast Oermancapacity was less thanercent that6 he USSR has been attempting to restore the East Oermanand to enlarge the East Germanbase Although recovery has been steady, the Kremlin's program has been handicapped by East German dependence on the West for some raw materials and industrial equipment, by the effects of Soviet removal of capital equipment, by the loss of East German access to Slleslan and West German coal fields, and by uncompensated East German deliveries to the USSR.
EutOfnas official lUUsUci assert thatutput to IBM exceeded the irsfl leve: by1 Plan scheduled uiercent bir rcasc In ir.diutrial output overmikingercent that ot IBM
Industrial production0 Is estimated to have beenercent of8 level and1 to have equalled6 levei."progress has been made toward greater economic independence from the Westercent of the foreign trade of East Germany was with the Soviet Bloc, and this percentage will almost certainlyHowever, although there has beer, slight but steady improvementhe standard of living1 was only two-thirds that
Progress toward nationalization ofa goal of the East German regime, has been made easy by the traditional role played by the German state In the economy.to orocial East Oerman figures,ercent of industrial production0 came from itate-owned and Soviet-owned installations, with the percentage much higher for certain individual industries, such as synthetic fuel. This figure was scheduled to mount
government controls agricultureof seed and fertilizer, theStations, the Farmers' Mutual(Communist-controlled farmand discriminatory cropThere has. for all practicalno collectivization of agriculture.
Five Year Plan
Five Year Planriginally to0eveals quite clearlyorganization of the East GermanIs modelled on the Soviet patternthe principal Soviet economicEast Germany for the next few years are:
expand East German Industry,those heavy Industries equippeddirectly or Indirectly toor capable of early conversionproduction. The averageinvestment in industry under thescheduled to exceed then industry in this areaercent, and Industrialscheduled to increaseevelmphasis hasupon the machine constructionindustries and upon thosemanufacturing heavy equipment.
absorb the East Oerman economyof the Soviet Bloc and to ensureEast German contribution to Blocand military strength. Theagreement signed oneptemberthe USSR and the GDR provides forSoviet exports of grain, coke. Ironpig iron to East Germany and forincreasing East Oerman exportsUSSR of machinery,precision Instruments, and
East German Economic Contributions to Soviet Strength
ast Germany Is an important medium for obtaining from the West, especially from
West Germany, materials and equipment which are important lo the Bloc war potential and which the USSR and the other Satellites find difficult lo obtain directly. We estimate that at least one-half of the total imports from West Germany are clandestine, andarge portion, perhaps as much as one-half, of the total Imports from West Germany are shipped directly to the USSR. Thematerials and equipment are obtained for East German industries, primarily those which deliver products to the USSR, and for the industries of the other Satellites.
Soviet-owned industrial enterprisesanufacture about one-quarter of the total industrial production. Theyominant position in the basic chemical industries and control about one-third of East German brown coal production, two-thirds of the potash production, one-half of thecapacity, and one-half of cement capacity. SAG plants controlf the electric power generating capacity and produce aboutercent of the electric power. The East German regime has noover the SAG plants, which obtaintreatment in the procurement of workers and which receive materialsriority basis at prices fixed below production costs. Most SAG production is delivered to the USSR or exported on Soviet account.
2C. East Germany receives no compensation for most of its deliveries of goods and services to the USSR. We estimate that thesedeliveries to the USSR averaged7 billion (in current dollars) annually6deliveries0 are estimated to have amounted to about one-quarter of the East German gross national product.
the Kremlin realized In JM6 thatof East German factories wasumulative detrimental effect upon production for reparations by other factories. It transferred some plants designated for dismantling to Sovietbut left them in East Germany to be operated with German labor and rawew of these plants have since been "sold- to the GDR
he most important goods provided the USSR by East Oermany are:
a. Uranium ores and concentrates. East Germany Is estimated to have supplied0 approximatelyercent of the Soviet Bloc's uranium ores and concentrates. Thismay have declined slightlyut East Germany remains the largest single source of fissionable material available to the USSR.
b Engineering equipment East Germany exports to the USSR approximatelyercent of the total annual production of itsindustries. Some Items, which involve the use of highly skilled labor inarticularly Important contribution to Soviet Industrial and military expansion, notably equipment for electrical installations and railroads, mining,and metal-workmg machinery,instruments, and machine tools The size of the East German engineering industry is Illustrated by the fact thatajor plants employorkers andaboutercent of the total value of East German industrial production
c Synthetic rubber East Germany exports to the USSR aboutercent of its synthetic rubber production, or an amount equalercent of Soviet production. East Germany is the only Satellite whicha significant amount of syntheticand It makes most of the chemicals used in synthetic rubber production. Its exports to Poland and Czechoslovakia constitute an additional contribution to the Orbit's military potential.
d. Synthetic fuel. East Oermany furnishes to the USSR about one-third of its synthetic fuel production, an amount equal to aboutercent of Soviet synthetic fuel production orercent of total Soviet POLThe synthetic fuel Industry of East Germany is the largest and most highlyin the world and now produces almostercent more than estimated domesticIt is estimated that the current East German POL stockpile probably amounts toercent more than the current combined annual needs of the domesticand the Soviet occupation forces.
e. Armaments. For the past three years East Germany has been converting part of Its industry to the production of small arms, weapons components, and munitions. It may recently have begun to manufacture heavy armaments equipment, such4 and Stalin tanks. Although available evidence does not provide data adequate for estimating the current level of arms production in East Germany, East Germany Is the largestcenter for armaments manufacture among the Satellites.
Limitations on East German Economic Capabilities
following deficiencies constituteimportant limiting factors on thefor expanding East Germanproduction:
planned expansion of industrythe supply of available skilled laborand estimated ability toworkers, technicians, and managers.
Germany lacks adequate suppliesof the raw materials necessary forindustrialised economy.ore, coke, copper, lead, zinc,molybdenum, tungsten,and pyrites are extremely limitedMost of these raw materials aresupply throughout the Bloc.
in capital equipmentthe program. Machine tools,machinery, and electricalare the principalit has been difficult, if notobtain these items from the West,clandestine trade. Most of theequipment needed in East Germanyshort supply throughout the Bloc, butwill become less significantproduction Increases.
Probable Economic Developments2
Plan2 schedules anIndustrial production of approximatelyover1 level- It Isthe over-all increase In productionexceedercent. However, the levelin the key industries and theparticularly those manufacturing military equipment, may more closelythe target percentage. Stockpiling will continue and East Germany will become an increasingly important advance supply area. The number of plants owned and operated by the state will probably increaseAll industrial facilities, with the possibleof some small plants, will probably be state-owned and operated)
There Is no evidence that the regime plans to Increase agricultural collectivizationgricultural production andare already effectively controlled.would stimulate opposition and might result in reduced production.
Uncompensated deliveries to the USSR will almost certainly continue2 at approximately the average annual rate of7 billion (in currenthough they will probably be concealed more skillfully. The SAG's could be "sold" to the East Germanwith little loss to Soviet control or exploitation and with propaganda benefit, but there is no evidence that this transfer will be made.
PROBABLE SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
East Germany inherited an important portion of Germany's scientific tradition and resources. Although war destruction,of able scientists, dismantling, the deterioration of laboratory facilities, andregimentation have hampered scientific development, the number of scientists in Easi Germany now approximately equals thefigure andniversities,echnical schools, and numerous research departments and institutes remain important centers foi' scientific research and education.
Scientific research In East Germany5 has been primarily In the applied fields, as distinct from basic or pure research, and has concentrated upon the development of substitute materials and the improvement of processes in heavy industry. Research upon important military items, such as guidedwas transferred to the USSR6eaving research uponew mill-
ary Items of lesser Importance In Eastany
Nhe USSR is encouraging scientificsearch in East Oermany. The GDRample funds for research, andtreatment is given to scientists. Lftjanylists have been returned to Eastfrom the USSRprogram to
Jure scientists from West Germany haslilUe success, but contacts between the seien-kists of East and of West Germany doute poUUcal and scientific benellts forUSSR. Scientific research in East Germany complements Soviet research in certainuch as electronics and bacteriology However, the principal benefit to the USSR from East /German science is not accessuperior (body of knowledge but the use of additional 'scientific manpower and research facilities.
cientific research In East Oermany will probably continue along the lines nowA rapid expansion of enrollment in the educational institutions is planned.the current low standards of higherin East Germany will impair theof the increased number ofworkers produced by this program.
PROBABLE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
East German Armed Forces Ground Forces
he Alert Police, organized8 to pro-ride cadres for an East German army, has an estimated strength0 men. organized Intolert Units.chools, and small
* The Assistant Chief of. Department of the Army. In view ot tht poUUcal situation resulUng from the Soviet-inspired German unification and -peace" campaigns, believesa)or czpamloo of the East German Alert Police Forceess likely at present than It did several months ago. However, the following factors are pertinent:
The signing of the "contractual" andDefense Communitygreements by West Oermany. which commit West Oermany to parUelpaUon In Western Defense would materially change the poUUcal BtuaUon and might lead tolempo In the rearmament of East Germany.
The present Alert Units are organized as cadres specialist units The Alert Police Force has not expanded sincehen It reached its present strength. Its capabilities are limited by Inadequate equipment,training, and low morale. It isthateriod of six months the present Alert units could be enlarged and combined to form an armyivisionsotal strength ofen and prepared for combat within the framework of Soviet corps Although It is impossible to determine whether such an expansion will be undertaken, present conditions and pastseem to indicate that such anis not probable2
Air force
East Oerman Air Policeestablished inutthus far indicates that Itsbeen limited to registeringand politically reliable youngto drawing plans for an air forcepilots and crews are probablynow in the USSR, but theprobably notermaninto the Soviet Air Force or form anair force3
Naval Force
capabilities of the East Germanare currently limited, and thenot considered completely reliable.is being unproved through theof all whose loyalty is suspectintensive political East German naval units have be*n
ut of an esUmated total strengthlmostre officers
eorganixaUon of the Alert PoUce Force re-tortedly wa* punned for mid-December.s postponed becauseack of senior staff and commanding officers The returnecond group it ISO staff officers from advanced training in the JSSJt is expected Id
Therefore,. of. Department of the Army, believes that an expansion or the Alert Police2 must not be discounted, and that the last sentence of paragraph SS shouldajor eipanslor. of this force2 appears leas likely at present than It did several months ago, the possibility of such an expansion must not be discounted."
e
ln Joint training operation* with Soviet naval forces. These units are now capable of limited anti-submarine, mine-laying, nunesweeping. and patrol operations.
Soviet Occupation Force*
Control of East Germany has pushed the frontiers of the Soviet Orbit deep into the flat coastal plains of north'central Europe. East Qermany provides the USSR anoffensive and defensive position Soviet control of the areaoised threat to all of Western Europe and thepeninsula.
The bulk of the Soviet forces in thearea is concentrated in East Germany and const! lutes the spearhead of Sovietstrength Soviet ground forcesIn East Germanyen,Intoine divisions, whichechanizedifle armies. There has been no significant change in the composition or quality of these forces within the past two years, and there is no evidence that any change will occur within the period of this estimate.
Soviet air strength in East Oermany is estimatedircraft. Tlie movement In the fall1 of Soviet Jet fighters from sU East Oerman air bases temporarily reduced Soviet air capabilities, but apparently these aircraft are now being replaced The quality of the Soviet air force stationed Ln Easthas improved greatlyet fighters have now replaced piston-engine types* and Jet light bombers are increasing in number on East German airfields. Of the SovieUmanned aircraft now stationed In East Germany, were Jet fighters.istonet light bombers.iston lightttack bombers.ransports, andeconnaissance planes
he extensive Soviet program of airfield Improvement and construction in thearea has concentrated most heavily upon East Germany, whereirfields can now support sustained operations, andbably can support limited operations by medium bombers. The network of Eastairfields is the best equipped ln Eastern Europe and provides the most extensive and up-to-date facilities for night-flying and all-weather operations. Moreover, within the past six months, there hasonsiderablein POL storage facilities and greatln the service and repair facilities.
Original document.
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