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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN SITUATION2
(PPSOVCOKIMSt
MIW3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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national intelligence estimate
PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN SITUATION2
The intelligence organizations ol the Department* of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Centra) Intelligence Agency In theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Commillee concurred in this estimate onee, however, footnotes of the Departments of State and the Air Force to paragraphs,
PROBABLE-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN SITUATION 2
THE PftOBlEM
To estimate probable political developments in the West German situationith particular reference to the likelihood of the conclusion, ratification, and putting into efTect of agreements to rearm West Germany and Integrate it with the West
ASSUMPTION That there is no general war in this period
CONClUSfONS
Adenauer Government willremain in power2
The gravity of ihe issues which remain to be settled, together with the disturbed slate of opinion in Fiance as well as In West Germany, make Ihe outcome of the present negotiations between Westand the West uncertain
& However, while the Adenauerwill continue lo demand virtually complete equality and sovereignty as the price of completing the "contractual" agreement with Ihe Western occupying powers and the agreement touropean Defense Communitye believe it highly unlikely thatwill permit the negotiations to lapse
e believe that, if the Saar issue can be deferred by some formula which will save face for both France and Westthe Adenauer Government will sign the contractual and EDCprovided:
a that any restrictions on Westmilitary production are to be seli-Imposed or, if contained in the EDC agreement, are applicable, at least in form, to other EDC members;
b. that West Germany is not explicitly charged with the costs of maintaining US and UK forces In West Germanycharged to West Germany ascosts).
n signing the agreements, Adenauer will undoubtedly expect that West Oer-many will be immediately linked with NATO through EDC and will beadmitted to membership In NATO, and that West Germany will receiveUS economic aid.
6 On balance, we believe the West Oer-man government will ratify the EDC and contractual agreements.
n the unlikely event that thefailed to ratify these agreements, or in the event that the Constitutional
ed an adverse decision on the constitutionality of rearmamentand the Bundestag failed to pass the necessary amendments to thethe West German government would almost certainly be politicallyto reopen negot-ations with the West on integration and rearmament2
8 New Soviet and/or East Germanfor the unification of Germany might delay completion and ratification or agrecimnts for Integration andbut probablv not beyond the end2
t is unlikely that the present tactics of the USSR with regard lo Berlin can seriously afleel the Integration of West Germany with the West Stronger Soviet action against the Western position in Berlin, or Soviet threats to take action against West Germany, vould beto have an adverse effect on the West German altitude toward rearmament and Integration with the West
nder any circumstances it isunlikely that rearmament can get under way2 on any substantial scale.
DISCUSSION
Pre lent Sitiiflon
he Integration of Wert Go many with tho West Is dependent upon the solution to three Interrelated problems, now In various stages of progress as follows:
o The Sct-uman Plan foe coal and steel The Treaty Implementing this Plan was signed In1 It haa been ratified ty West Germany and approved by thelower house, theSenate, and the French Aiscmbty. Italy and Luxembourg have as yet taken no steps tovard ratification
b The European Defense Communityhe outgrowth of the Pleven Plan Discussionraft treaty to create this Community is proceeding with the objective of agreement on the main lines of the treaty by Ihe time of the NAT Council meeting at Lisbon in2
The Special Assistant. Intelligence. Department of Stale, dors not concur In thla coneluUon. buthe!eves tbat II I* unlikely that ana- Soviet or Tan German unit, propaganda moves eoulddelay the Writ German rearmament pro-trim or the integration ot West .Germans ssllh the Weil
ll la ih* m* of u* Director ot Inteiugence.hatSorlet withdrawalelay Writ German rearmament for an ea-lended period
ft A -conliactual" relalirsnshlp between West Germany and the Western occupying powers, Preliminary agreement was onovember IMI, but difficult issues renain to be seltledhe t'SSR Is exploiting the iMue ofunification Intensively, largely in order to delay or prevent the Integration of West Germany with the West Overtures by the Satellite Fait German government andby the West Oermarut and by the Western occupying powers havein the UN resolutionommission to examine whether conditions In the two parts of Germany are now such as to permit free elections. The Cast German government has denied the competency of the UN to act on what It declares loroblem for the Germans and for the four occupying powers. However, it is almost certain that the USSR will aim lo keep the issue alive In one way or another as long as possible
Bolonco of Political Forces Wiihln
Germany on the Issues af
Integration And Unification
IS The AcVnaucr Oovernment probablybe overthrown at least until3 elections The provisions of the West
man Conslllu'lon do not pcimit thehancellor unless the successoralreadyarliamentary ma-jority. II does not appear likely that any group opposed lo Adenauer could obtain suchmajority
The Adenauer Government hasitself to Integration with the Wist.Christian Democratic party maintains thai the efforts for German unification must not prejudHC or delay West Germanwith the West. This jxtsltion Is generally shared by tlie other membets of the Adenauer coalition, the conseivatlve Free Democratic Partv and theGciman Party, but these parties are somewhat less willing than Adenauer to make concessions in the negotiations with the West
Among non-political groups, theposition is generally supported by the Catholics. who are largely concentrated ir. West Germany So far, it has also beenby the expanding veterans groups These veterans groups, however, aresensitive about equalityerman military contingent, and there doesinority which opposes integration.
he chief pollUcal opposition to Aden-auer's program continues to come from the Social Democratic Party, kd and controlled by KurtSch-jmacher While the Socialare nol opposed to rearmament inthis party asserts that integration with the West and West German rearmament at this time would expose West Germany lo the danger of attack from the East, before any West German military contingents coulderTccUve and without any compensating assurance of effective Western support Furthermore, they maintain lhat rearmament cannot be carried outonstitutional amendment. The Social Democrats alsothat integration would close the door to unification II is unlikely that the Social Democratic position will undergo anychange txfotc the elections3 or thai the Social Democrats will cooperate with the government2 to promote German Integrationtst Generally aligned with the Social Democrats on the Issues ofBnd integration, though for wholly different reasons, are the Communist Patty and the neo-Naii Socialist Reich Parly. The latter has no parliamentary representation but has shown significant stiength In recent local elect on*
n geieral. West German Protestantstrong Interest in Gtunan unification, in large perl because the Evangelical Church has great stu-ngth tn East Otrmany. Awirg of this Chuich, led by Pastor Meniolltx. denounces integration andThe titular head of the Evangelical Church. Bishop Dibelius, who probablyfor Die majority of that Church, favors moves lo unite West Oermany with the other Western European states, but declares him-self unwilling to advocate rearmament or lo agitate against It
itv The Refugee Parly, as well as the indus-trialistsi and trade unions, cannot be Included in eitherhe refugees are stronglynd may go along on re-anic:mM M* cem is the union of Fast and West Oermany and the recovery of the lost territories, and they will be IncJined lo follow the political leaders whe aeem mosl likely to achieve these objectives. Most industrialists favorwith the West and with some misgivings accept the Sehuman Plan. However, anumber la; that integration may prevent lonj-run restoration of theirImportant trad* wilh the East and lhat compensating markets will not be opened lo them in the West. Trade unions in general, and particularly the Trade Union Federation were initially favorable to union with the West. The unions have been to some extent estranged (torn the government on domestic issues and of late have tended to lean more to the Social Demociatsc positioneven those Industrialists and tradewho do nol supporl Adenauer onwilh the West are unwill>ng to accept unification on the tcims so far offered by Easl Germany.
ased on the above positions, the par liamcnUry balance on integration and re-
a
armament issues during the Mat yearthis pride makes West Germans more
depend primarily on the solidarity ofto rearm, It also causes them to insist
Christian Democrats and of thestrenuously on equality and sovereignty
coalition (The Christian DemocratsAdenauer must recognize that if
eats, and the three coalition parliesdoes not secure virtually complete equality
tats outotaleatssovereignty In his negotiations vlth the
the Bundestag.) Although there hashis party may nol only lose3
some internal friction among thebut sufier lasting political damage.
y^.on.edefcct.anMromthesmal.er
coaimon part.es these should be cJTsetaUncation ofange-
voU* from splinter part.es. so that on any |lifnUt,utf [he ajorityhe
mcnt could piobably win, even against the ' *
solid opposition of the Social0 . ,
scats) and the other oppositiontffcc* onPo,lT,co,
forces Within Weit Germony of:
n his negotiations with the Western
Powers, Adenauer must consider. In edrfition Confmued fni/icafion Overturesthe present parliamentary balance, the Ctrnany or The VSSRof party strength and public opinion. s indicated above, none of theparticularly whether by concessions he parlies In West Germany (thejeopardise his coalition's chances In would support German unificationelections scheduled for3 terms so far offered by Fast Ocrmany orloctl elections have produced sub- USSR Only proposals clearly providinggains for the Social Democrats and free all-German elections underresulted in the emergence of the neo- supervision would remove the objectionsSocialist Reich Party. It Is estimated the overwhelming majority of WestIf elections were held al ihe present time Cast Oermeny may offer terms whichSocial Democrats would emerge decidedly to approach those demanded by thelargest parly and the Socialist Reich Germans However the East Germanwould get as much as seven percent of posals would probably, in the end. provevole. The lecent Social Democratic gains satisfactory lo the West Germans. It Islo have been due In part to that party's likely, therefore, that the unificationon Adtnauer for his will.ngncss to palgn can permanently block Westconcessions in negotiating with the integration with theaso dls>alisfaction with Intern. ttnirietlion propo4a, whlcn
al Oerman conditions Memtd to |uaianlecjl.OermanIn general, public opinion in West Ccr- Hons under international supervisionhas swung away from thenc delay Integration, particularly u* the(count me out) altitude toward re- Democrats should make partisan use olprevalent In0 and early
reiprcl to pjrar'sphj " the Special
more 01 AsaM.nl. Intelllcence. Dep.rlrr.eM of State
the West German people now acceptlhat any foelet oe East Cernan
ment This evo'ution is due larr" to the unity propaganda moves could materially delay the revival of German self-con Adi-noe, West Cvrman rearmament proeram or the Integra-in part by the remarkable ecoi-omx. recovery f of the country, and In par.asing j^
awareness of the key position which WcrstGer- eesN dtlay Wert German rearmament for ao ea-many occupies In the defense of Ihe West. tended period
East Orm-an or Soviet unificationHitherto the Social Democrats, whileeir public agitation forhave assisted the Adrnaucr Government in framing the West Oerman replies rebuffing specific Fast German unification pioposals As the critical stages of integrationand3 electronsapproach, there will betemptation for the Social Democrats to exploit the German craving for unity to the fullest extent
OtteV Soviet Aetiom ort Is unlikely thai the present tactics of theh regard to Berlin can seriously affect the Integration of WeaVt Ocimany with the West. Stronger Soviet action against the Western posHion in Beilin. or Soviet threats to take action against West Germany, would be unlikely to have an adverse effect on the West German attitude toward rearmament and integration with the West
Dcveloymthts in The Contractual And European Defense
negotiations:
The vontrartual negotiations between West Germany and the Western occupying powers are not >et completed, and difficult Issues remain to be solved Even In trrtagreement on general principles,onhereumber of provisions that are unsatisfactory to the Social Democrats and other groups in West Oermany.
The Euripean Defense Community (EDC) negotiations continue, but arc stillserious difficulties From the Weststandpoint the most serious issue is that ofhis issue Is complicated by tbe insistence of the Western occupying powers on restrictions on West Ocrmanproduction
Also involved in bo'h the EDC andnegotiations are serious issues of the amount and form of the West Ocrman ft nancial contribution lo EDC and/or NATO Moreover, the Weal German demand forin NATO ii becoming more emphatic Finally, the furor aroused when the French representative In the Saar was given the rank of Ambassador shows clearly the divtuibed temper of West Ocrman opinion
hile these negotiations continue,restrictions remain in force and aresourer of friction Although the Westrecognize lhat the presence of Western occupation troops contributes to theirthe irritations resulting from the presence of these iroops and from even the limited use ofccupation powers stiffen theof the West Germans to obtain equality and sovereignty
SO The gravity of the issues ahlch remain lo be settled in both the contractual and EDC negotiations, together with the disturbed state of opinion in Fiance as well as in Westmake the outcome of the negotiations between West Oermany and the WestMoicover, the outcome might be vitally affected by developments In the NATOsuch as those resulting from French budgetary difficulties, not directlyto these negotiations
Probob'e Politico! Developments2
owever, while the Adenauer Government will continue to demand virtually complete equality and sovereignty an the price ofthe "contractunr agreement with the Western occupying powers and the agreement to enter EDC. we believe it highly unlikely that Adenauer will permit the negotiations lo lapse. His party and coalition are publicly commiled to rearmament and to integration with the West, and he almost certainly hopes lhat prior lo the elections3 he can convince the people of West Oermany lhat the results justified his policy. Therefore, he will probably seek lo avoid the collapse Of negotiations over such Issues as the Saar or admission of West Germany to NATO
e believe that, if the Saar Issue can be deferred by aome formula *hJch *iU save face for both France and Wtst Germany, the Adenauer Government will sign theand EDC agitemcnU, provided:
3d. Under any circumstances, ft is extreme) unlikely that rearmament can get under wa in on any substantial Kale. While plan can be completed before ratification, enablln legislation would be required to carry ou rearmament The Social Democrats wouli almost certainly force the Issue of the con stitutionality of legislation to implement th-rearmament program and possiblyhe EDC agreement Itself. Opinion in US official circles and in the Admauer Govern ment is divided as to whether theCourt vould hold part of thisor the agreement unconstitutional certainly Ihe laws would not be put Into effect during the deliberations of the Courtubstantial delay in theof the rearmament program Is abnost Inevitable. If the Court found an essential part or all of the rearmament legislation the Adenauer Government would be compelled to seek one or more amendments. The passage of such amendments wouldwo-thirds vote of both houses, *hich could almostnot be obtained in the Bundestag
JS. In Ihe unlikely event that the Bundestag falls to ratify the contractual and EDCor In thr event that the Constitutional Court renders an adverse decision on theissues and the Bundestag fails to pass the necessary amendments to thethe West Ocrman Government would almost certainly be politically unable to reopen negotiations with the West onand rcaimament
Original document.
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