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riONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PHQB'ABtE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTSWEST GERMAN SITUATION-
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SECURITY INFORMATION
national intelligence estimate
PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN SITUATION2
NIE-57
Th* intelligence organizations o: the DepartmenU of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Join'. Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency in theof Uus estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimateee. however, footnotes of the Departments of State and the Air Force to paragraphs. and 33
probable-political developments in the west german situation 2
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable political developments in the West German situationith particular reference Co the likelihood of the conclusion, ratification, and putting into effect ol agreements to rearm West Germany and integrate it with the West.
ASSUMPTION That there is no general war in this period.
CONCLUSIONS
Adenauer Government will prob-abiy remain in power
The gravity of the issues which remain to be settled, together with the disturbed state oi opinion in France as well as in West Germany, make the outcome of the present negotiations between Westand the West uncertain.
However, while the Adenauerwill continue lo demand virtually complete eo.uality and sovereignty as the price of completing the "contractual" agreement with the Western occupying powers and the agreement touropean Defense Communitye believe it highly unlikely thatwill permit the negotiationsapse.
We believe that, il the Saar issue can be deferred by some formula which will save lace ior both France and West:he Adenauer Government will sign the contractual and EDCprovided:
any restrictions on Westmilitary production are to beor, if contained in theare applicable, at leastto other EDC members;
West Germany is notwith the costs of maintainingUK forces in West Germanycharged to West Germany ascosts).
In signing the agreements. Adenauer will undoubtedly expect that Westwill be immediately linked with NATO through EDC and will beadmitted to membership in NATO, and that West Germany will receiveUS economic aid.
On balance, we believe the Westgovernment will ratify the EDC and contractual agreements.
In the unlikely event that thefailed to ratify these agreements, or in the event that the Constitutional
Court rendered an adverse decision on the constitutionality of rearmament leg-lslatior. and the Bundestag failed to pass the necessary amendments to thethe West German government would almost certainly be politicallyto reopen negotiations with the West on integration and rearmament2
ew Soviet and/or East Germanfor the unification of Germany might delay completion and ratification of agreements for integration andbut probably not beyond the end*
It is unlikely that the present tactics of the USSR with regard to Berlin can seriously aflect the integration of West Germany with the West. Stronger Soviet action against the Western position In Berlin, or Soviet threats to take action against West Germany, would beto have an adverse effect on the West German attitude toward rearmament and integration with the West
Under any circumstances it isunlikely that rearmament can get under way2 on any substantial scale.
DISCUSSION
Present Situation
ii. The integration of West Germany with the West is dependent upon the solution to three interrelated problems, now in various stages ot progress as follows:
a. The Schuman Plan for coal and steel The Treaty implementing this Plan was tigned int has been ratified oy West Germany and approved by thelower house, the Belgian Senate, and trie French Assembly Italy and Luxembourg nave as yet taken no steps toward ratification
b The European DefenseDO. the out-grow*r. of the Pleven Plan Discussionraft treaty to create this Community is proceeding, with the objective Of agreement on the main lines of the treaty ay thef ihe NAT Cour.;ll meeting at Lisbor.
contractual" relationship between West Germany and the Western occupying powers. Preliminary agreement wasonut difflcult issues remain to be settled
he USSR is exploiting the issue ofunification intensively, largely in order to delay or prevent the integration of West Germany with the West. Overtures by the Satellite East German government andby the West Germans and by the Western occupying powers haveIn the UN resolutionommission to examine whether conditions in the two parts of Germany are now such as to permit free elections. The East German government has denied the competency of the UN to act on what It declares toroblem for the Germans and for the four occupying powers However. It is almost certain that the USSR will aim to keep the issue alive in one way or another as long as possible.
Balance of Political Forces Wirhin Germany on the Issues of Integration And Unificationhe Adenauer Governmenl probablybe overthrown at least until3 elections The provisions of tne West
man Constitution do not permit the dismissalhancellor unless the successoralreadyarliamentaryIt does not appear likely that any group opposed to Adenauer could obtainajority.
The Adenauer Government hasitself to Integration with the West-Christian Democratic party maintains that the efforts for German unification must not prejudice or dciay West Oermanwith the West This position is generally shared by the other members of the Adenauer coalition, the conservative Free Democratic Party and the German Party, but these parties are somewhat less willing than Adenauer to make concessions in the negotiations with the West
Among non-polltlcal groups, theposition Is generally supported by the Catholics, who are largely concentrated in West Germany. So [ar. it has also beenby the expanding veterans groups These veterans groups, however, aresensitive about equalityerman military contingent, and there doesinority which opposes integration.
IS The chief political opposition toprogram continues to come from the Social Democratic Party, led and controlled by Kurt Schumacher. While the Socialare not opposed to rearmament inthis party asserts that integration with the West and West German rearmament at this :lme would expose West Germany to the danger cf attack from the East, before any West German military contingents couldeffective and withoutmpensating assurance of effective Western support Furthermore, they maintain that rearmament jannot be carried outonstitutional amendment. The Social Democrats alsothat Integration would close the door to unification. It is unlikely that the Social Democratic position will undergo any ma-renal cnange beioce the elections3 or that the Social Democrats will cooperate with the governmento promote German integration with lhe West. Generally aligned with the Social Democrats on the issues ofand integration, though for wholly different reasons, are the Communist Party and the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party. The latter has no parliamentary representation but has shown significant strength in recent local elections
nest German Protestantstrong interest in German unification, in large part because the Evangelical Church has great strength in East Oermany. Awing of this Church, led by Pastor Niemoller. denounces integration andThe titular head of the Evangelical Church. Bishop Dibelius. who probably speaks for the majority of that Church, favors moves to unite West Germany with the other Western European states, but declaresunwilling to advocate rearmament or to agitate against tt.
he Refugee Party, as well as theand trade unions, cannot be included in either camp The refugees are strongly anti-Communist and may go along on However, their dominantis tlie union ot East and West Oermany and the recovery of the lost territories, and they will be inclined to follow the political leaders who seem most likely to achieve these objectives. Most Industrialistshe West and with some misgivings accept the Schuman Plan However, anumber fear that integration may prevent long-run restoration of theirimportant trade with the East and that compensating markets will nol be opened to them in the West Trade unions in general, and particularly the Trade Union Federation were Initially favorable to union with the West The unions have been to some extent estranged from the government on domestic issues and of late have tended to lean more lo the Social Democratic position.even those Industrialists and tradewho do not support Adenauer onwith the West are unwilling to accept unification on the terms so far offered by East Germany.
ased on the above positions, thebalance on Integration and re-
t Issues during the next year will depend primarily on the solidarity of the Chrts&ar. Democrats and of the government coalition. (The Christian Democratseats, and the three coalitioneats outotaleats ln thelthough there has been some internal friction among the Christian Democrats, they are likely to hold together on integration and rearmament issues While there may be some defections from the smaller coalition parties, these should be offset by votes from splinter parties, so that on any issueajority vote thecould probably win. even against the solid opposition of the Social0 seats) and the other opposition parties.
n his negotiations with the Western Powers, Adenauer must consider, in addition to the present parliamentary balance, the trend of party strength and public opinion, and particularly whether by concessions he might jeopardize his coalition's chances in thescheduled for3 Recent local elections have producedgains for the Social Democrats and have resulted in the emergence of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party. It Is estimated lhat i: elections were held at the present timeocial Democrats would emerge decidedly the largest party and the Socialist Reich Party would get as much as seven percent of the vote. The recent Social Democratic gains appear to have been due In part to that party's attacks on Adenauer for his willingness to rr.ait? concessions in negotiating with the West, as well as to dissatisfaction withGerman conditions
eneral, public opinion in Westhas swung away from the passive, "ohne mlch" icount me out) attitude towardment prevalent ln0 andnd polls indicate that half or more o! the West German people now acceptThis evolution is due largely to the revival of German self-confidence, stimulated in part by the remarkable economic recovery of the country, and in part by increasing awareness of the key position which West Ger-many occupieshe defense of the West
While this pride makes West Germans more willing to rearm, it also causes them to Insist more strenuously on equality and sovereignty. Therefore. Adenauer must recognize that if he does not secure virtually complete equality and sovereignty in his negotiations with the West, his party may not only lose3 elections but suffer lasting political damage.
n summary, then, the balance of politicai forces is at present highly precarious.must move very carefully in the interest not only oi ratification o: integrationbut also of the survival3 of his party and evenenter government.
Possible Effect on The Balance of Political Forces Within West Germany of:
Confiniied Untftcatton Overtures By East Germany or The USSR"
As indicated above, none of the major parties in West Germany (the Communists aside) would support German unification on terms so far offered by East Germany or the USSR. Only proposals clearly providing for free all-German elections under international sup -vision would remove the objections of the overwhelming majority of West Germans East Germany may offer terms which appearpproach those demanded by the West Germans- However the East Germanwould probably, in the end. proveto the West Germans. It istherefore, that the unificationcan permanently block West German integration with the West.
nification proposal whichto guarantee free all-German elec-:ions under international supervision might delay integration, particularly if the Social Democrats should make partisan use of such
'With respect tohe Special Assistant. Ir.tellitence Department of State,It onkiely that an? Soviet or Cut German unity propasanda mows could materially delay the West Germanrogram or theot West Oermany with the West.
It is the view of the Director o! Intelligence. L'SAF.oviet withdrawal from East Oermany could delay West Oermar.or anperiod
an East Oerman or Soviet uniiicatlonHitherto the Social Democrats, while continuing their public agitation (orhave assisted the Adenauer Government in framing the West German replies rebuffing specific East German unification proposals. As the critical stages of Integrationand3 electionsthere will betemptation for the Social Democrats to exploit the German craving for unity to the fullest extent.
Other Soviet Actions or Threats:
is unlikely that the present tacticsUSSR with regard to Berlin canthe Integration of West GermanyWest. Stronger Soviet action againstposition in Berlin, or Soviettake action against West Germany,unlikely to have an adverse effect onGerman attitude towardintegration with the West.
Developments tn The Contractual And European Defense Community
Segotiattons:
contractual negotiationsGermany and the Westernare not yet completed, andremain to be solved. Even in theagreement on general4here arec. provisions that arethe Social Democrats and other groupsGermany.
he European Defense Community (EDC) negotiations continue, but are stillsertous difficulties From the Weststandpoint the most serious Issue is that o!his issue is complicated by the. insistence of the Western occupying powers on restrictions on West Germanproduction
lso involved in both the EDC andnegotiations are serious Issues of th?nd form of the West Germancontribution to EDC and or NATO Moreover, the West German demand forin NATO is becoming more emphatic. Finallv. the furor aroused when the French representative In the Saar was given the rank of Ambassador shows clearly lhe disturbed temper ol West German opinion.
White these negotiations continue,restrictions remain in force andource of friction. Although the Westrecognize that the presence of Western occupation troops contributes to theirthe irritations resulting from the presence of these troops and from even the limited use of present occupation powers stiffen theof the West Germans to obtain equality and sovereignty.
The gravity of the issues which remain to be settled in both the contractual and EDC negotiations, together with the disturbed state ofrance as wellestmake the outcome of the negotiations between West Oermany and the WestMoreover, the outcome might bc vitally affected by developments in the NATOsuch as those resulting from French budgetary difficulties, not directlyto these negotiations.
Probable Political Developments2
while the Adenauercontinue to demand virtuallyand sovereignty as the price ofthe "contractual" agreement withoccupying powers and theenter EDC. we believe it highlyAdenauer will permit the negotiationsHis party and coalition areto rearmament and tothe West, and he almost certainlyprior to the elections3 hethe people of West Germanyresults Justified his policy. Therefore,probably seek to avoid the collapseover such issues as the Saarof West Germany to NATO.
e believe that, if the Saar issue can be deferred by some formula which will save face for both France and West Germany, the Adenauer Government will sign theand EDC agreements, provided:
o. that any restrictions on West German military production are to be seUNunposed or, if contained in the EDC agreement, areat least in form, to other EDC
hat West Germany is not explicitly charged with the costs of maintaining US and UK forces in West Germany (hithertoto West Oermany as occupation costs).
In signing the agreements. Adenauer will undoubtedly expect that West Germany will be immediately linked with NATO through EDC and will be ultimately admitted toin NATO, and that West Germany will receive substantial US economicf the major agreements are completed on the terms Indicated, we believe theGovernment will probably be able toa majority ln the Bundestag for thefr ratification However, ratification is likely to come only after an intensive campaign to win the support of West German public opinion. Ratification could be further delayed by adroit East German unification-proposals, especially if the unification issue is used for partisan purposes by the Social Democrats We do not believe that these delays would carrybeyond the end"
Ai noted earlier, the Special Assistant,Department of Slate. believes it unlikely that any Sonet or Bait German unity propaganda moves could materially delay the West Oermanprogram or the Integration o( West Germany with ihe West.
he view of the Director ot Intelutence. USAF.orwt withdrawal from East Germanyelay Wot German rearmament tor an ex-tenced penod.
nder any circumstances, i: is extremely unlikely that rearmament can get under way2 on any substantial scale. While plans can be completed before ratification, enabling legislation would be required to carry out rearmament. The Social Democrats would almost certainly force the issue of theof legislation to implement the rearmament program and possibly even of the EDC agreement itself. Opinion In US official circles and In the Adenaueris divided as to whether theCourt would hold part of thisor the agreement unconstitutional. certainly the laws would not be put Into effect during the deliberations of the Court.ubstantial delay in theof the rearmament program is almost inevitable. If the Court found an essential part or all of the rearmament legislationthe Adenauer Government would be compelled to seek one or more amendments The passage of such amendment* wouldwo-thirds vote of both houses, which could almostno: be obtained in the Bundestag.
n the unlikely event that the Bundestag fails to ratify the contractual and EDCorhe event that the Constitutional Court renders an adverse decision on theissues and the Bundestag falls to pais the necessary amendments to thethe West German Government would almost certainly be politically unable to reopen negotiations with the West onand rearmament
Original document.
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