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CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER SOUTH ASIA
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONSEQUENCES OF COAAMUNIST CONTROL OVER SOUTH ASIA'
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strategic consequences, to the West and to the Soviet Bloc, of the establishment of Communist control over South Asia without either the Middle Earl or Southeast Asia having previously come under Communist control. Whether or not South Asia Is likely to come under Comnviolst control, or whether there Is any likelihood that South Asia wouM fall under Communist control prior to extensive Communist victories In Southeast Asia, Is excluded from consideration.
CONCLUSIONS
most serious effects of the loss of South Asia to Communist control would be psychological and political. It would add to the Soviet Bloc Ave countries, two of them potentially powerful, and would extend Communist control to include nearly half the world's population. In the absence of decisive WesternCommunist control over South Asia would be speedily followed by the loss of much of Southeast Asia. Loss of South Asia would greatly reduce theof the UN to the West, and would greatly reduce confidence In the capacity of the free world to halt the expansion of Communism.
In present circumstances, denial of Western access to South Asia would necessitate serious readjustments in the foreign trade and exchange pattern of the UK and the other Commonwealth
1 foe Uv pvivosa of IhU nUmaU. South AiU will t* Ukrn lo Include India. Patlitan. AffhinliUn, Nepal,tort
countries and would Increase the cost of European commercial communications with the Far East
Communist control of South Asia would probably make the principalmaterials of the area Increasinglyto obtain under cold war conditions and certainly unavailable lo the West In wartime. Of these mica, graphite,jute, and shellac are of particular strategic Importance to the West
Although denial of South Asianwould not necessitate anyreduction In defense and essential civilian consumption In the US, theeffect, In terms of Ihe magnitude of the readjustments required, would almost certainly be serious at any lime upS stockpiles would hsve to be drawn on pending the development of generally Inferior and more expensive alternate sources and substituteMoreover, the West would have to
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accept some reductions In quantity and quality of output until these substantial adjustments had been made.
In the short run, Communist control of South Asia would provide few economic benefits to the rest of the Soviet Bloc. Ihe strategic value cf the commodities rendered available to the Bloc would he meager, except with respect toand rubber.
Although the Communists would face serious difficulties, they would probably have considerable success in gradually mobilizing and exploiting the* substantial economic resources of South Asia. How* ever, the development of an industrial complex of the order of that existing In Japan and Manchuria at the start of World War II could be accomplished onlyong period of time.
The most Important effects ofcontrol of South Asia on Western military capabilities would be: (a) the elimination of any prospect of theavailability of South Asian forces and facilities; and (b) the diversion of West-em strength required to meet the new strategic situation In the Indian Ocean area.
In addition to imposing theseupon the West, the Soviet Bloc would gain access to strategically located air and submarine bases and would gain control of the military potential of South Asia. The Soviet Bloc's development of this potential would probably be limited lo the forces and facilities required to maintain internal security, to defend South Asia itself against Western attack, and to attack Western communications in the Indian Ocean area.
DISCUSSION
AND PSYCHOtOQICAl CONSEQUENCES
he esUbtUhment of CornmunUl control over South Asia wouldajor advance Iv the USSR in its efforts to comrnunlte the world. It would add five countries, two of them Urge and potentially powerful, andifth of the world's population to the Soviet Bloc With the acquisition of South Asia Communism would have gained control of neatly half of the world's population. In the absenee of decisive Western counteraction, the Communist seizure of South Asia would precipitate the rapid transfer of much of Southeast Asia lo Communist control,tr.it liad not already occurred. The coun-Ute* ot the Near East, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia would be under great pressure to accommodate themselves to theCommunist regimes.
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon are former colonial areas which have achievedand considerable prestige as free nations while maintaining beneficial political andties with the West. As such theya concrete refutation of thethesis that tht nauontl aspirations of colonial ind semi-colonial countries can be realiied only through Communisthe fall ofountries to Communism would seriously impair the position of the West In relation to the national and social aspirations emergent In Asia and Africa, and would eliminate the example set by the efforts of the present regimes lo curb Communist subversive actlvlues.
The loss of the 8outh Asian members of the UN (India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) to the Soviet side would greatly reduce the eflec-Uveneu of the UN to the West either by enlarging the obstructionist bloc or, If the new
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were not recognised, by weakening any UN claim toruly world organization.
ommunist victory In South Asia would greatly reduce confidence In the capacity of the free world to halt the expansion ofThe cwununltation of South Asia coming on the heels of the Communist victory in China would create the Impression through* out non-Communist Asia. >frka, and Europe that the advance of Communism was
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Effect on tho Economic Position of the West
IS. In general, the economic consequences of Communist control over South Asia wouldon conditions tn other areas at the time such control was attained. At the present time. Communist accession to power In the region would necessitate the diversion ofresources to the Middle East andAsia, as well as serious readjustments in the foreign trade and exchange pattern of the UK and the remainder of theThe British would lose theirInvestments Inoss which would, however, be tn part balanced by the probable cancellation of the UK's obligation to repay the remainder of sterling balances earned by India during Worldhe UK, Australia, and New Zealand would,at least, be hard pressed to AndIn dollar markets for many goods now obtained from South Asia and similarly would have to develop new markets for goods now exported to India. The loss of South Asian bunkering and drydocking facilities and civil air transit lights would substantially Increase the cost of British trade with the Far East, particularly with Australia and New Zealand. To what extent the Communists would In fact enforce the above restrictions, and whether the effects would be as serious at some future date as they would be at the moment, cannot be estimated.
t Is possible, however, to estimate theot the loss of Western access to the several strategic raw materials and theof widely used though less criticallyllems of which South Asia Isajor source. The principal commoditiesare as follows: *
oreIndia currentlyaboutercent of theconsumption of manganese ore,about S5 percent of that used bySince the Indian product IsIn grade to that obtainableImportance is greater than thesefigures would Indicate.
India Is virtually the soleto the West of the more critical classesand sheet muscovite mica, which ismanufacture ot vacuum tubes andequipment, boileroxygen breathing equipment.
Ceylon is now the onlynon-Communist source of nighlump graphite, which is usedof carbon brushes for
and jute productsIndia andfurnish virtually all the jute andwhich enter world trade. Jute Ismaterial used In bags and balefor transport and storage of bulklike grain, fertilizer, cement,
productsIndia Is the chiefof premium quality kyanlte, whichhigh-grade refractory used in electriclinings, electrical and chemicaland spark plugs; furnishesf the world's supply of high-gradeexports considerable quantities ofand castor oil; and provides aboutof the world's supply of opiumpurposes. India and Ceylonclose toercent of the teaInternationa) trade and about two-thirds
'India also has unequalled reserves of monaOterctn which thorium (of potcnUal use tor atomic energy! and rare earUii can be obtained, and altoource of beryl, of some etralcKlc Importance tn beryllium copper. Althoughhasfar prohibited thtof nwna-tdte, It has entered Into netotlaUot) forale to She US. India leitrKU theof beryl and the US has been able to obtain only
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of the black pepper. Ceylonelatively minor source of rubber for theworld. In addition, Indiaotential source of coking coal and iron ore for Japan.
Communist control cf South Asia would probably make these prlmjpai strategic ma-terials listed aboveifficult to obtain under cold war conditions and certainly unavailable to the West In wartime. The Communists would probablv initially beto continue supplying strategic materials like manganese, mica, and graphite to the West If the latter did not apply to South Asia the export controls now in force againstcountries, since the loss of theproducts, machinery, and otherItems whkh South Asia now obtains from the West in the course of trade wouldonsiderable strain on the South Asian economy. In addition, the Communist* would probably continue to export less critical Items like tea, black pepper, and possibly lute In exchange for foodstuffs and other products not now subject to Western export controls.radual drying up of South Asia's trade with the West would almost certainly take place, because the West would seek to develop alternate sources of critical materials and the Communists In South Asia wouldto move toward greater self-sufficiency.
Denial of South Asia's products to the Westesultommunist accession to power would require substantialon the part of the US and even greater readjustments on the part of Its allies. The West would have to spend time and money in developing generally Inferior alternate sources, would have to develop substitutein some cases, and would have to accept some reductions In quantity or quality ofuntil these adjustments had been made. Moreover, the US would be under greaterto give financial assistance to Western Europe to the extent that this area's already meager dollar resources would have to be used for the purchase of those substitute materials available only In dollar areas. Also, theattraction of the Soviet Bloc to Japan would be greatly increased, alnce Japan Is looking increasingly to South Asia forraw materials.
he Impact on the West of the denial of South Asia's strategic materials would depend on the extent to which stockpiling goals, had been achieved and alternate sources expanded at the time that South Asia's resource* were cut off. Although denial of these resources would not necessitate any significantIn defense and essential civilianin the US, the over-all effect. In terms of the magnitude of the readjustments required, would almost certainly be serious at any time uphe present outlook with respect to the principal strategic commodities named above is as follows:
US couldIts own steel production byIts manganese stockpile. SignificantIn the output of other Westernwhere little stockpiling oftaken place, could also be averted Ifwere made available inquantity. The US stockpile ofmanganese, whicht the ends probablyto cover US Import requirementstwoalf years. In the longsupplies of manganese could befrom otherGold Coast, South Africa. BelgianAngolawhere some expansion ofto meet the increasing demand forIs already taking place. However,In output sufficient to make upfor the loss of Indian manganeseseveral years in view of manpowershortages, transport andbottlenecks, and various otherand some curtailment of steelmight be required to prevent depletionstockpile before these other sourcesInto full production. In any event,the superior Indian ore would requireIn metallurgical practiceloss in rate of production and
of the Indian supplyand sheet mica would requiremeasures In the US. whereIs aboutercent complete, and even
more stringent curbs on consumption in the other Western countries, where stockpiles are virtually nonexistent. Present US stocks of these critical classes of mica representear's supply. Development of new sources would be very costly and the efforts being made to develop substitutes cannot beto show usable results for several years.
Since Ceylon Is theof high-grade amorphous lumpthe US would have to draw on Itsnotably for such uses as carbonhigh-altitude aircraft, and would havespecifications for otherInferior grades of graphite mightbo used. At the endhewas close to Its goal, whichthree times the amount consumedby the US during the latter partWar II.
and jute productsThe lossserious, involving far-reachingand costly adjustments,countries like those of Westernsubstitutes are less readily available.
ofsubstitutes for Indian kyanlte isway, and the loss of the Indiancause no serious difficulties. lossshellac would involve higher costsinconvenience since differentwould have to be developed forthe vaiions uses of shellac. Loss ofwould Inconvenience the UK. whichmost of Its supply from theThe loss of India would cut offsupply of coking coal and IronJapan.
Effect on tha Economic Position of the Soviet Bloc
n the short run. Communist control of South Asia would provide few economicto the rest of the Soviet Bloc. The USSR would probably exploit India's thorium-bearing monailte for atomic energypurposes, and the Blochole could probably use the limited amounts of rubber, cotton, and cotton textiles available for export, as well as moderate amounts of mica,Iron and manganese ores, beryl, and Jute products. Transporting these products to the Soviet Bloc would present serious problems, however, and In any event the amount of goods that the Soviet Bloc could absorb would be relatively small. In terms both of South Asia's present exports and of total Soviet Bloc consumption Moreover, the strategic value of these materials to the Bloc would be meager, except with respect to monatlte and rubber.
IB. Conversely, uv. Soviet Bloc probably could and would provide onlyommunist South Asia struggling with the major Internal readjustments arising from the transfer of economic and political powerommunist regime and from the probable cutting-ofl of major WesternJust as South Asia's principal exports are commodities for which the Soviet Bloc has no great immediate need, so its principal presentpetroleummachinery and other metalindustrial chemicals, and foodstuffs-arc items which the Communist world cannot easily spare. The USSR's willingness and ability to make up for the loss of Western products would be sharply limited bydemands within the Bloc and by the Bloc's grave shortage of shipping facilities.
nitially, the shortages of food andwould be major problems to aregime. South Asia now Imports about four million tons of grain annually. This deficiency would probably be metariety of measures Including some Imports from the USSR, ruthless rationing and crop collection methods, and, If the Communists werewell entrenched to clash with religious sentiment, use for human consumption ofillion tons of grain nowby monkeys and cattle. Much of South Asia's food deficit could be provided by mainland Southeast Asia If that area were Communist. Loss of the six million tons of petroleum now Imported from the Middle East would almost certainly cause an initial decline in Industrial output and for some tune create bottlenecks In production. However, thewould probably not be crippling. Some
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could be obUIned from Ihe Soviet Bloc and much Ml burning equipment could be con veiled to coal The denial of apart part* and other capital equipment. Industrial chemicals, and miscellaneous metal products previously obUIned from the West wouldfurther curbs on Industrial output
II. Despite these difficulties, the Communist* would probably have considerable success In gradually mobilizing and exploiting theresource* of South Asia Although the area is predominantly agricultural and characterired by widespread poverty. It has the largest industrial plant in Asia outside ofuge labor supplyon-sidrrable number of skilled and semi-skilled workers, and basic raw material resourcesto support an extensive industrial expansion During World War ii,m-onstraled considerable potentiality for capital formation, and the Communists in other area* have shown their ability for effective mobillra-Uon of resources in predominantly agrarian areas characterised by low per capitaThus, production In certain keyparticularly ateel. would probably rise alter the Inliial period of readjustment, and there would probablyradualin agricultural output. However, the development of an Industrial complex of the order of that existing In Japan and Manchuria at the start of World War II could beonlyong period of time.
n terms of supportilitary effort, therefore. South Asia could probably, with only minimum Soviet Bloc assistance: (a) supply small arms and ammunition and some artilleryarge ground army; and (b) provide logistical support for whateverSoviet forces and equipment wereto defend South Asia against Western attack and to altack Western communication! In the Indian Ocean area (see paraommunist South Asia could not. however, without substantial outside assistanceong-term capital Investment program,more than Insignificant amounts of heavy artillery, tanks, armored vehicles,equipment, naval vessels, and air-erafl
MlilTARY CONSEQUENCES Tht Existing Situation
orces. The natlonsof South Asia possess forces in being of.rainedastof manpower. The armies of India and Pakistan, comprising moreercent of the above active strength, are trained andforce* of good fighting quality. Both countries have *mall air forces designed pri-marily for support ol ground operation*ew light naval surface vessels
acilities. South Asia's other military assets Include:
rge number of excellent airfields and air base sites (notably In West Pakistan) mtth-ln medium and heavy bomber range of major Industrial and governmental centers In Soviet Central Asia and the interior of CommuiUt China. The raU and highway net and port facilities are adequate for maintenance of Urge-scale operation* from these base*.
ajor ports, airnd other facilities whkh could beor maintenance of communication* between Western Europe and the Ear East and for logistical support ofmilitary operations in the Middle or Far East;or the support of air and naval action against these communkatkms.
Limited facilities for production of arms and equipment. Although these facilities can supply significant amount* of small arms and ammunition. South Asia ts dependent onsource* for most other major items of material.
estern ffiferetfi. At present thepotential of South Asia Is not available to the West *lth certain exception* such as British base right* ln Ceylon. There Is,an obvious Western Interest In denial of this potential loCommunHm and In thefuture availability of some of these force* and facilities in certain contingencies Inonsidered that, If reliUons between India and Pakistan can be unproved, the military strength of Pakistan rrLjhteffectivetabilising factor In the Middle East and that Pakistani*
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become available to the Weit In the event of fat nth the Soviet Bloc.
Effect on Weilern Military Copobilitiei
he roost important consequences oftit -oi of South Atla on Western mlli-tary capabilities would be: (a) the denial of any prospect of the eventual availability of South Asia's forces and faculties: and (b) the dlveiof Western strength required to meet the new strategic situation In the Indian Ocean area. Denial of acceu to South Asia's ports and airfields would, In Itself, greatly hinder Western aea and air communications In that area Even in time ol peace, the fall of the subcontinent to Communism woulda diversion of Western military re-sources to the Middle East and to Southeast Asia lo check the further expansion ofthrough subversion. In the event of war. the vulnerability of Western seaborne CuiD'tmiilcations, particularly those with the Persian Gulf area, to attack from bases In South Asia wouldiversion offorces lor their protectionto the diversion of Soviet strength to such operations.
Effecl on Soviet Bloc Militaryhe immediate military advantages which the Soviet Bloc would derive from Communist control of South Asia would be: (a) relief from the potential danger of Western airfrom Pakistani bases; <b> denial of the facilities and military potential of theto the West; (c) diversion of Western military resources to the support of the Middle East and Southeast Asia; and (d) access to bases from which Soviet submarines, surface raiders,ircraft could attack Western commur';*tions in the Indian Ocean area In the event of war.
S3 The Soviet Bloc would also gain control of South Asia's military potential, but thiswould not Immediatelyet gain In Soviet Bloc military strength. South Asia's existing military establishments would probably have been demoralised and disrupted In the process of Communist accession to power; new Communist-controlled military establishments would have to be created. In any case, any Indigenous military forces would, for some time, be fully employed tn maintaining internal security, or committed lo the defense of South Asia In the avert of war.
he extent to which the Sortcl Bioc would eventually build up Communist military strength in South Asia would probably be limited by the following considerations:
arge-scale buBd-up of military force* and installations wouldeavytn technical and material assistance, either through direct supply of military end-Items or through development of South Aria's now limited war Industry. This Investment could be made only at the expense of military and economic requirements elsewhere In the Bloc which are likely to remain pressing for many years to corn*.
o Difficulties of access and control wouldoviet investment In Southisky one. Unlike Communist China, South Asia has no major landwith the present Soviet Bloc and would therefore have to be supplied almost entirely by sea and air. In the event of war. the South Asian military establishmentlines would thus be gravely vulnerable to Western naval interdiction
c There would be slight strategic advantage In building up South Asia's military strength beyond that required for Internal security, defense of the subcontinent itself, andof Western communications In theOcean area.arked change in the global balance of naval power, any surplus military strength In South Asia could be used only against adjacent continental areas, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and even there Its employment would facelogistic difficulties, while Soviet and CM res* Communist forces are alreadyfor such operations.
e believe thai the Soviet Bloc wouldthe military potential of South Asia only to the extent required to maintain Internal security, to defenda Itself against Western attack, and lo attack Westernin the Indian Ocean art*.
Original document.
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