FLYING SAUCERS (WITH MEMO ATTACHED DATED 520924, SUBJECT: FLYING SAUCER S)

Created: 10/2/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

a

2

OCT ?

IS^OaXTXfllof Central Intelligence

Director (Intelligence)

Director, Offico of Scientific

Intelligence

Saucers

1. determine: (a) VJhether or not there are national security lnaltcaticns ia the problem offlyingb) irbether or not adequate study and rosearch is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such national security implications; and (c) what further investigation and research should be Instituted,nd under rtftat aegis.

2. PACiS ANDhas investigated the work currently being performed on "flyins saucers'1 and found that the Air technicali;er.ce Center, DI,ight-Pattersan Air Force Ssae, is the only group devoting appreciable effort and stud/ to this subject, that ATIC is eoacer.tratia:ase-by-case explanation of each report, and thatffort is rot adequate toevaluate, and resolve the situation on anbasis, 'fa* current problem is discussed in detail ia TA3 A.

3,ying sa-icers" pose tvo elesent3 of danger raich. have national security implications, 'ihe first Involves nass psychological considerations and the second concerns the vulnerability of the United States ta air attack. Both factors are aapllfled in 'HIS A.

I. ) that tho Dircotor of Centralarlviso tho National Secirity Council of the implications of tho "flyins saucer" problea and request that research be initiated. raftandwi toC, for the (b) fliat "

the XI riisc-ass this sublet uilh tho Psychological. "Tierandun to thoaycoolo^ical Strategy Hoard, is attached foras TAO C. (e) "hat CIA, .with tho cooperationnd other interested c'oaartTcnts and agencies, develop andfor adoption b/ tho "ASC a

OCT ?

of Central Intelligence

Director (Intelligence)

Director, Office of Scientifio

Intelligence

Saucers

determine! ether or not thero aro national security inplicaUons In the problem of "unidentified flyingb) vnether or not adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problea in its relation to such national security i'jiplications; and (c) what further investigation and research should be instituted, by whoa, and'hat acgla. '

FACTS A3 DlSCVSelOri-Oal has investigated tho work currently being performed on "flyincnd found that the Air Technical Intelligence Center, DE,tght-Pattersen Air Force Base, is the only croup devoting appreciable. *ffort..and.ajwdy to this subject, that ATIC is concentre tin;ase-'oy-case explanation of each report, andt this effort Is not adequate toevaluate, and resolve the situation on anbasis. The current problea is discussed in detail in TA3 A.

saucers" pose two olotents of danger which have national security implications, ihe first involves nass psychclOTieal considerations and tho second concerns the vulnerability of the United States to air attack. Eoth factors are amplified in TAB A.

"

i. ACTIOSThat the Director of Centraladvise ths -rational Security Council of the duplications o* th* "flying saucer" problea and request that research be initiated. raft raeso-randuri toC, for the DCI'a signature; (b) That the SCI discuss chic subject tia the Psychologicalorforsndoii to the Director, Psyci-elo'dcal Strategy Foard, is attached foras TA3 C. (c) that cia, .with tho cooperationnd other interested ceearticnts and agencies, develop aad reccwvnd for adoption by the ihc a

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policy of public info ration,ll ninl-ilte concern and possible panic resulting froa tho nraerous sightings ofobjects.

.Qntoto cm.

Assistant Director" Scientific Intelligence

TABto DCI, through DDI, Subject; flying Saucers.

IAStoecurity Council vith enclosire. TABto Director, Psychological Strategy Board with enclosure.

^Deputy Dtrector/XntelLlgo

DOS

Approved (disapproved)!

nireotor

SEP2

KSimUfDuti Ftttl Dlreotor of Central Deputy Director (Inteni5er.cc)

Plying Saucers

ans cocductod by tho Offico ofto detorairo whether there aro natlf.il iccurltytha problem of "unidentified flyicslyingadcowato study and res?irch is currently bain* directed to

this probloa it its relation to such rational security Implications; and Uhat further investigation ard research should be instituted, by ifhOBjnder what aegis.

lt vas found thai theit oftudyirs ths preblea la the Directorate cfT, vhlch Ms charged the Air Teehaiaal Intelligence Center (IVIS)espoasitillty forhe reports cf sightings. At ASIC thererena of threa officers and tvo secretaries to vhlch cere, through official chan-.els, all reports of sightings. This group conducts ir.Testi-ntlon of the reports, consulting as required tith othsr Atr ?oree and civilian technical personnel. orld-wire reporting system has been instituted and rajor Air Forceea have been ordered to rakef vnldentlfiel flying objects. Tho research is being cer*iu;tedtiso basis and is deslgnad toatisfactory explaratien of ertch indlvlduil ef shting. ATIC his concluded aa arranger-ant idthenorial Institute for the latter toa bHncMrs indo;dng syatca for offioial. reports cf sigblings.

TIC has received0 official reports of sightings plus on cnoarous volune ofcre cills, and yress reports. During2 'lore, sZtJsXtl reports totaled 2fO. Of0 reports. Air Force ccrdesercent as ve^Vired jed

of these received fron Jaouary through2 it carriesercent ur-grcVtlrsa.

A. In Its lcauiry into thiseao. fron CIVa Office of Saiontifie lr.talllgcr.ee consultedepresentative of AirForce Special Studies Croup; discussed the problen with thoao in charge of the Air Forao Frojoct'rlrht-Fatterson Air Force IXtso; reviewed ft considerable volune of Intelligence reports; oVc'ted tho Soviet press and brcaticast iaiicas; and conferred withho have bread knowledge of the technical areas concerned.

robably valid if tha

puiToao Is liMted to aexpiration. Hovever, that study does not solve tho norc fundamental aseaots of tho prcblon. Those aspects aro to deUradxw definitely the nature of tho various fMBflUM vhich are causing thesend to discover mans

flndvi8ual oreffects, ray be identified irrediately. Tho CIA consultants stated that these soluUcns vould probably bo found on tbo rargins or just beyond tha froa.iers of our present Vnovlcdge in tb* fields of atmospheric, ioncsaherlc, and extraterrestrial pheccena, vlth the addedtpresent dispersal of nuclear vasto produoto tight alsod*J U^ o pcrfom

and syatorRtlae tho faetora vhlohfucdarantal. problon;

tho fields of fljndaneotal sciencebe Investigated in order to reach nn understandingphonccana involved;

c>. taVo necraeendatlocs for the Inltiitica of approprlato research,

Dr. Julius A. St rat tec, Vice President of the lhssnchuaotto Institute of Technology, baa lamented to CU thatrouo could be eoastituted at that Irstltuba. Sirdlarly, Projcet Lincoln, thoce's air cef er.se project, could ha charged vith seas ef these respoaalMllties),

C. Tha fl>lnta- saucer situation contains tvo olerents of danger uhleh.ituMicn of international tension, have national security inpUcatioas, Those aroi

a. ith vorld-vide sighting reported, it Wt fecad that, up to the tine of the investigatleo.there hid bean in the Soviet press no report or acrsasflt, even satirical, en flying saucers,ccykod* cne hvnaorous nantlea of the aubjeet. tate-controlled press, this could result only froa an official policy decleicn. Tho question, therefore, arises as to whether or not these sightingsi

..could ba controlled,

w.

could bo predicted, and

could be usedsychological vnrfaro point of vlou, oither offensively or defensively.

Tho jjublic concern vith the pnenenoM,is reflected both in the vnltcd States KeU and Jn tho pressure ofupco tho Mr Force, indicatesair jrcporUcn of cur Focu2ticT It renuily condttioaed to the acceptance of the inedible

btSL's sap fw *

he United States AirtCa yIU undoubtedly sivaya defendcabiratlon of radar screen-iaj and visual observation. . is credited uilh tho present capability of delivering an air attack against the UnitedStates, yet at any given atasnt now, there ray beown officii! unidentified sightingses. Atcnent cf attack, ve are nowposition ybsre ve cannot, en an Instant basts, distinguish rard'Jire froa pbanton, and es tension counts vo will run the increasing risk of false alerts end the even greater danger of falsely Idsntifylig the real as pcantcn.

3oth ef these rroblcas are prlmrtly cosraticnal la nature but each contains readily apparent Into Ul gen co'fac tors.

n operatioralf viou. three actions are required i

steps should bs token to Icoroveboth visuallectronic chanten son the eventattscc, inst-.nt srd positive identification of ecenr planes

cr rtUttles caa be tads).

study should be instituted to dotimlco what, ifcould ts radc of theso chenccwia by Unitedwrfare planr.ars and vhat, if any, defensosplanned in anticipation of Soviot attests to utilise them.

order to idnlolee risk ofationalo* aatablishel es to vbat should bo told thathe pbenccsM.

nteirtgenee problems vhich require deten-;Lc,itlon

. a. The present levol of Soviet knowledge rogardlnffthase ,.

b. Possible Soviot intentions ard cnoablUUe3 to utilize those rbencsatna to the ootrlivnt of United Statoa aofurity interests.

e. Tho reasons for silence in tho Soviet press regarding flying saucers.

research, differing in character andthat presently being porforrwd byFcrce, will betest the specific reeds of cetfc operations sndresponsibilities in this field as regardso dischargedxlsurt offectlvrness only;iero is known regarding tha exact rnturo of these phenon*na,

coesider this rrcblsa to bo of such Inpertance thatta brought to the Attention of tbe Fattoral Securityorderw=unlty-vldc coordinated offort towards itsba initiated.

UUHAtl.STi ssistant Director cientiflo IntelUgeace

Original document.

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