SECURITY INFOB
FOR RELEASE DATE: 5
special intelligence estimate
THE SCALE AND NATURE OF THE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE
1
DOCl'MCMCWW86CLASS.'Jf
OAS& TC- Tg
32
Tneorganizations ofDepartments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Torce, and the Joint Staff participated rath the CentralAgency In the preparation of this estimate. AU members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this estimate on 20 November
central intelligence agency
KIM TO ftCiHBS ttiffift IUL!EQiATELY AFTER USE
central IBTUUOEIICfi aoeigt OmCE of rational estiiiates
2
subjecti sie-si the scale ahd nature car the soviet air
OEfEIBEOTE
Thl. estlast*b* tost assosmeat of thonod nature of tha Soviet air defense effort ktxloh oaa be aad* at present. Th* iac proposes to keep tho subject under continuing rerlev. It Is Imposoifcle realistically to asanas Soviet air defease onpaMlltlee except la refereaoe to ensttaok-Inf foroe. Ia the absence of such as aaaoeed sttasklBa; foroe. ths best that eon be done la is effect to satinet* ths Inventor? of Soviet air defense assets. The iac hopes that this estimate
vlll provide the laUlllgeaoo basisealistic
1
of the Soviet sir defease onpablllttea relative to ao assumed attack.
rocniut
To outlrmt* tba prasent scnlo and nature of tha Soviet air defease synten and th*t of tlie ayater. through
cesiCLusiots
1. Tbe USSR la onrryiac out on Intensive proorprovenent of Its air defonse aysten,riority which is prooabTy second only to tho Soviet atonic weaponsAlthough the USSR alnost certainly fauoe numerous developoantQl and production problems, there annoar to be no lnsolubia eaoncsiic or tochaolocical llr.'totlons which uould prevent tlie dcvolopDeot and quantity produotloa ofquality airterial, provided that thl* TrOfyam contlnuca to receive sufficiently hiltf; priority.
his oetinato considers only active defensee^alnat air attoolis on the TJSST.. It excludes air defenso of th* field foroea, exoept Insofar as It contributes to otratefjio air defenses, and any indiroct a'rcsurea such oa spoiling ottoclia, sabotfice or PuVversion, co well ca civil air defensend various ooononieuch on irtool roiling and dispersal. Chinos* Corsiunlst and Satellite air defensea arc eonsldnrad Insofar on they contribute to tho air defense of the USSR,
.
OSSbVfl lTgo rndair defease systeaonly tho faroee assigned to PVOStrany, the) Sorletorganization, but also has rvailnble to it tboeedefense resources of tho Soviet amy, tactical airnavy not otherwise coendtted. Although the EuropeanCcfflrtunlflt Chinese air defense forces rro leas vailadd to and ara integrated with the Soviet oysters. As of
12 thetrength of tho farcesolly available for air defense of the USSR are eat Ism ted at aboutV?v: aircraft, of vhlchre jets
of the rapid Soviet progress In theand oorollrry dawelo swat In interceptors andweapons, va believe thoti
a. The approaches to the iwst larpcrtant areas In the OSS? sre vwa_ ^vred by an ecrly warning rysteaprras.ndnd paras. lO-OS ofnd nap between pages
2/ , USAJ considers this stotooont lsrallas an extent of radar coverage greater than available evidenoe vould Indicate, It Is known there exists considerable earlycoverage In Western and far eastern sectors of tie USSR, bat intelligence data gives little indication aa to whether or to what extent Important areas in the central portion of the USSR nay be provided vltb early warning coverage.
b. So viot SjrWrooption capabilities haw ooncidsrably irroTooaod vith the wldeo-iread uhnter-offlptaro and tha introduction of :iodsrn cci radar einllar to current DS. orortrtionol nodels (at leastruch Installations havo boon identified ae to poBoible location. There are indications ofadditional sets), under conditions of good day or night risibility this eqnipnent Is probably capable of controlled interruptions of bomber flying at upnotseet, or perhaps hitfior.^
0. The DSSR has now boss all-weather aircraft equipped with experimental AI radar (there have been one slnost eertnlB and several possible identifications of such aircraft). It nay now have sone oll-woather aircraft
, OSAF ooosidere this statenont should both* COBoent that effeotiT* coatrollea Interceptionsspeeds and altitudes stated would be possible onlynew Soviet XI radars liave perf caronoe capabilitiesequal to thoif radar creUo have aolileved
a hlch level of cape tones with the equlpnent. There la ao> evidence tliat the Soviet radars actually possess suchnor tlat training .xsroises ateda andever lurra been attoapted.
vlth mobm fan of AIla operational unite orwrcd afwbn Soviet arm (sea paras.adadf Appendix A) M
d. Sorlat antiaircraft. ctapmfaUltlac ara gradually
lug aa now henry AA guns (estimatedith aodsrn fix* eantrol radar and probably nev oUratoas banana available la Inoreaolruj ananas* la xey Sorlat arras (as* pares.ad para.fhese guns ara sapabls of ocmtinuoujly poiatad fire0 fsrst aad barrage flra0 fast.a boiler* that tbaas gwas will aot ba oapabloigh paraaatsga of kills at theseeven If controlled by tha aoat aodsn flra soatrol aqaiaasat.
a. Sorlat lev laval nafaaais ara also being xaarravad by tha iatfoduetloaaw andine AA gun eettaatsd to bam. (ass para.f
Vf OSaf baa oarefully aaanlaed all armilabla latelll-geaoa on Sorlat fighter units and finds ao positive indication of tbs rtnploynent of airborne iataroapt eonlpnent ia say of tbaas units. lumber, tharaarg* Voluee of aeldease obtaiaad durlag interceptiona Europsan Russia aad durinr both oxorolses and iataroapt operations la tha Tar East pointingositive lank of airborne intercept radar la operational flghtar units.
f. o-alr and alr-to-elr raided missiles eould ba available In limited queatltiee, although there Is no evidence of oporatlnoal training or aayiliijaiul. ussjolasd rooksta ara probably ia United us. (aaandl andf
4. However, tha fbllovloc deflalaaoloa probably still exiat la tha florist air defense aystemi
present there ara probably laauffloieattrained pereoanel. modern later aaptaia,hear/ aa goes to provide effective fines alaportant ereas. Ua are usable to eaUaetsof theae dafleiaaedss.
partloB of tba Soviet air deface*Bstuork which plasma prlaerlly dapaa^dsauafrequencies balawscjaayala* la vulnerable
to long range Jaaadag. of tba lack of latslli-geaa* on aupplei utary lsod Uses, wostlaata tha seriouaacaa of this deficiency.
o. Krlatlng Soviet interception aapabilltlaa underof poor visibility ara seriouslyj by tha lack of adequate number* of all weather -
ad by tht elscert oertela ^adequacy of Soviet tralBinc sad erpa rionoo la all-weather latereeptloo techniques.
5. lha USSR la asking effort* to ovoroooe theae aad other deflelenelee. elieve that theae effort* vlll ftortber ioprore Soviet airut will sot ovareoas all of tha above oa-flelenolea by tha ead
quantities of the aaw equluiatit(radar,eapons,beeone avnllable la moot laportaataasaplo, byhe Soviet fighterare already SO* Jet-equipped, willesAlrely equipped vith aaad lateroeptors,V0.
all-weather interception oapabllltlaoaertalaly laoreeae aonsldsraMy.deflolenoiea la training, asiateaanee,
aad errsrlrnoe probably will still exist. W* eertlaete
ho Deputy Director for Intelligence, ths Joint Staff, wishes to point oat that there ara ao known Soviet all-weather latsrooptora at tba present ties).
top-segrex.
that byorlat fighter strength probably willew nwndred of acne type of true all^weathar It^amptera.^V
a. tha Tulnarnhr Ity of Sorlat ocaaroalaatinna vlll
probably be reduced by the ltratallatloa of aav
higher xreo^araey radio equipment aa wall aa aore land llaaa (aaa paras..
d. Thar* will probably ba other aav de**lopa*ats,
Sorlat air enfaaasa
particularly la Interceptors, radar, guided missiles, sad rockets, deslgaed to eoazrter Weetera progreae In offaaslr* aerial waapons.
fgiflwg n
in world War II were newer fully tested by tha Luftwaffe, whose
The DA,greesew hunh-ed Interceptors could baeona srailablaut considers tt doss not nun asrily follow thatIntBrception oapnbUltirs will slaost csnrtainly iaercasey thatAa there is no eridenee that either tbe aircraft or theequlpMat bars as yet bseoae arailabln, tbs tla* renal*-lag In the period of this estimate la not considered snffloiant to sohlere tho dssired leral of coajpstanoe for the reossssij teohnloal and operating personnel.
he Deputy Director for Intelllgonoe agrees ia general with tha position taken by tha DI/DSAT, vlth reference toaragraph.
leas rnugn unolti against Sorlat ettloa ou to Ida tha hattlavaraodaat aoola. Th* Sorlat organization for air raid warning, oonnistlag largely of risual aad aoalo rrbsaraor potts, was relatively affective tbrouchout tha wartaoaa areas dafansa* war* alerted fifteen alcutst la advanceaid. Roworar, Oaraaa attacka on stratagle target* generallyaw level of affeotlrautaa oa tha part of th* soviet air dacaanaa, Tba Sorlat foroaa vara nor* successful la defenelv* aorer of tha forwardaonea la th* latter etagee of tha var, owing both to anaerlosl auper iorl tj and to larnroveoent ia tha warning and cjontrol ayatan. aaUairoraft fir* wasagainst law flrtac aircraft, althcncbole las* effect ire against aadxnm and high attitude targets.
8. fostvar raarelonnepta. available evidence indicates that the JBSkX haaigh priority In Its pcetwer sUltary pro-gran to the derelopnant of defease* sgainst air attaaks. Ve bellsrs that this prograa haa raceired an civer-ell priority saoond only to the static weapons prograa. This rnloriby la sridant froa anthce-itatir* sUtenaats of Soriet political and military leaders, fron the postwar annhaais on production of aodern air laifanaa aaterlal, and froa the derelopaent of an elaborate air defense orgaalaatioB, tbs FTO-Streny, with the sols alaaion of dafandlng the Sorlat union against sir attack, Soviet concern over air deface* is apparent* for eannple, froa poetvar dsvelonaaata In
tb* Soviet aircraft isdustry, which waa apraranUy eiran tba priority aaaalea oflfih spend, high altitudeaad waa producing Jot flghtara la operational Qnaatdtdaa by atoVm?. another lad) cation ia tho extent to which Satfat air training pto^raaa atroaa Intereeptloahereotajautratad airfield building prograa bordering key strategic areas of tha USSR, vbiobstwork of base* capable of supporting Jot fighter operation*.
9. Raoant Conounist air activity in Bore* has prosldad further iadlsetloos of inarsaalng Soviet eapahilltfe* la tba field of air defense. While air defease problaa* la Kara* sre aat aoesarsbls to those involved la defease of tb*tself, Korean developments have daaaaatrated that* (a) tba DSSB baa been able to develop andirst-class aodara Jet iatar* oeptorb)% has bean able rapidly tohinese Covaaunist-lfarth Korean air asfeaa*haaelatively high degree of orgcainatlonal ability aa weUoad lagiatlaaT capability;the Cfcasarnlste have been able to establish aa *ffestiva early warning system, utilising Worldadar aomlnasnti (d) the Coanualaee haveI ayatsa of sufficient affastlveaeaa to plaoo fightora ia rood position for Tisaal attacks oa UN alrsroft} and (a) tb* CaaxadnU havo developeddsfanaas against low-faying aircraft. Sowover, thus far tha Ccnatunlat air dafenBs system has not displayed an effective all-weather interception capability.
SOVIET WEAPONS AKD EQUXHlKaT CAPABIUTIES^
10. ffffrtT flgalaT Mg Tba largo mxober ofo. early aarartag radars la general us* la tba Sorlet aerly versiag syataa ara jodgsd to*aaloaUy defloiant by OS standard* osarsai af Halted rang* and angle dlaartalnation oheraoterlstlaa. Irjaaiag, tba daaaity of thalr depl oyaaat, as indicated by obserwtloa In tbaK aad soaa Sorlat Far Eastad tba well-lategratad orgaalaatlon booking up these radars largaly aoapaaV aatas fas* tbaaa teebrdonl drrioiexwiss. lt Is probable that large aaabere of this low frequency aqnipc-orrk will ba retained aa tha prlaalpal early varalng radar, bat there isthat tba QSSB is already employing aaaa laasoaafl sets providing areata* range aad asouraoy. at leastrnstillation* sxactUr bo tbaype have baas Identified aa to possible location. There era ladlaatlooa of several addltloaal sets. Ve heliov* that aa ttaa pi as is mora ofa will ba added tot th* present radw ost. Ths radar varadag aervlee nay ba axwaaoatsd by pasatta detoatlea dealaaa la tha fara of radar reaelvura. tha QSSB la* tba capability to deealop aad pleas la operational us*4 aarly waralag radar with uwfaaaauas equivalent ia all respeote to tha bastadara aew ia opata-tlonal oaa.
If Seaar nor* detailed axaajjartloa of tbaaa
u-
H Con*^loatlons. Me bellera that tha Sorlottc^grouad air defence ooenurdcctloao eyatan* uhlohoth point-to-point radio oircoita oad land line a, will ao* aavaally Halt tha aaaxoaaaaaM of th* air defence ayaten, except poaelbly in handling large nultlple attacks. However, tha vida-apreed use of fraqnanaiaa beloweganyole* la th* radio adrouit* aaka* tbaa* olrouita vulnerable to long range Junaliig aad aoaaapt-ibie to uniatantional interference froa nanaad*noaanaria aolaos aad signal fading, in tha light of Sorlat experience with than* fracnjanoiaa, their known Jennlag profiolanoy, and their knowledgeernontarnaasures potential, va eaeuae that dependence upon thaa* radio olrouita iaone by luaiataad uaa of land line*. Such uaa la Indicated by th* fact that tho volnne of radio traffl* on aaa aata ia decreasing. Nut icvai, th* TBJH ia procuring fron th* Sorlat Zoa* of Qeansaa* ntata of UhT equipment, which any Indicate an intaatlon to laaurpcrat* ao^pnant of thin type la Ita olr defense asvseaVs, thna greatly rtinnlag their vulnerability. Ua estimate thatubatnntlal portion of th* Sorlat air dafaaaanetwork could probably ba oosvnrtedR? net,ded thisat has anffoiaat priority.
12. Torocenralcatloes, tha USSR bas gamnilly depended oa aedian and high frequency equipment, which is also susceptible to aolae interference aad Furtherraare the
lack of pretoned iiati-ofaennelin Soviet lntax-
of
eaptora uooldiffioalt problaa in tba paselng/oontrol lataroaptor alroraft from ona atatlon to another under Jaajajajj oonrtltlone. However, tho USSR la capable of otoraoning tbaaa defieianciae ay developing and nroduolag VBP or UBT ariltt-chennal equlpnaat. Sana Sorlat alroraft ara already eaploylag VH7 radio. Ve eatlaateorlat plaa to convert to THT equipnant in flatter naita ia probably underway, and adgfat ba operationally ooaplatad
The USSR presently haa the moxuem/ radio narlgatlonn naay areea to Insure staging of interceptorat desired palate and to aid their return to their baaee.
Qroond Coatrol Interoeot. Tha USSR la currentlyoa fs^snul QCI radar similar to aarreateta. Saab radar la now Twlrvj available for defeaaa of aeleeted areea, sasneatlng or replacing the older, leas accurst* radar
now aaed. Eva* if these radara do not have perforaaaea aharaotar-latlee equal ta those of current UShis develapaant will substantially laareaa* Soviet eepabilitie* for oleee oontrol of Interoeptor alroraft. be USSR will be eepeble of dVveloolnp and producing QCI radar with perforsanoe equivalent to current US operational nedel* In quantity for tha defense of atrategla areas, provided sufficient priority la given to tbl* project.
R haa plaeed great ssphael*
on producing fighter alrorart and va bailer* that It viU eon-tlnma to exert vigorous effort* to develop and produce effective
ietarosptore. th*estlscoy to Soviet
edarn jot Interceptor. It la capablenots at aaa level and Ian an eatiaated ooDbet celling of0 feet. Ita armament suggests that lt vo* designed prlsmrlly for deface* against high slUtude boanera.
V* eetlnate that4 the USSR could tnarseao tha perfoananoa of Its aav interceptors by uaa of efterburners and rochet boost, rnanent for eooh an lavrvaalvoold aoaalstn or Thai earrooe la tha aoa* vlth aemunltlon for about da awaonde of fire. Bcwrer,ir-to-air rockets aright be used.
theight, aa tbe aazt logical step, develop later oeptora oepabla of suuorscnla flight, the tBSH has aaova eon-alderablen reeeareh In this field. The Germand*iign group veiling at Podberetyo Is known to havo been via lingopereonie rooret-povarcd interceptor, repoftedly
a delta ring type dasigned topeed of. In tha absence of any rsnjor devalo- ment aad production problems, ve eatiaateopors nolo, rocket-powered interoaptor might ba available in vary Halted opcratloaal onantttles by
INTERCEPTORS
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Sea Level
j
to Climb
Speed In Knots
nginettMU. Power) (Combat0 fu)
Estimated SovietCombat
18. Airborne Intercept ifaulaaent. We knowS hoc sanplesrld War tl airborne lateroept rqut pmc-nt obtalxad free th* flu raw no asd through lend-lease; however, thors Is so evidence of their intent to adopt and produce ouch World War IX ecjulanaat for standard operational use in air defense units. Ve estxnat* that the USSR has the teobnlsel knowledge and production capability to produce en AT radar superior to World Her II types aa well aa effective passive deteotloo eguipoent of electronic, infrared aad poisibly sonic types. Recent litfsllTgsaas as* ehovn airborne radar lao. region that gave evidence of having tracking, and Intercept capabilities.
_fea>5*
fron an airborne radar alnilsr to the cs-Geraen Ielobteoatela At radar wMeh had several vereioos. Froa this and other lantaattiias ve estleate that the OBSR almost oertalaly now has Halted expert-aentel quantities of aone type of AI equipment, end probably now has ecrae type of AI equipment available for United operational anav-v
,eneldera that tha "other iadioatloas" referred be la the last sentence of paragraph IB era not sufficiently valid to be oonsldered la this estad that the one Incident described docs not coostltut* suffioleat evidence to provide the basis for the conclusion that therobably now has sons type ofment available for limited operational mm.9
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top secret canoe
19. Right and AU-^'enthor Intcrcoptorc. The USSR is eaploy-Ing jot alroraftight Interceptor rolo and baa display* savers! aircraft types which appear to ba either designed for or adaptablo to alL^aathor rolec. We estimate that tha USSR new has some all-weather aircraft equipped with experimental Al radar. Despite the lack of direct evidence we eatlaate that lt say now have snail numbers of all-weather aircraft with acne form of AI equipment In operational unitsew key Soviet areea.*^
20. It la also within Soviet capabilities to developallMioather Interoaptor. Thahich waa9 Air Show, apneare to be the boat Soviet designWe eatlaate that If the USSR should decideimitednode available to opera-
tional units In any eaoo we estimate that the USSR
JQ/. USAF ooneiders that this estimate Is not justified by the available evidence. The litok of AI equipment la operational interceptor unite la believed to be dasonstratad
by tha follovingi a. The physical ehareotorlstles of the alroraft assigned to lntoroeptor units do not indicate the probable installation of any Interception equipment} b. The taotloa employed In Korea and in QUI exercleee In Russian controlled areas are not indicative of interceptions aaaisted by airborne equipment! o. Tbe continued uao of aearohllghta ln Korea and In the Soviet Unionn aid to Intercepting target aircraft} d. The failure of intercepted electronic signals to indicate anything other than one Incident where obsolescent Qeroen AI radar not suitable for an Interoaptor fighter apparently waa employed.
POTENTIAL ALL-WEATHER INTERCEPTORS ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
J
0
Speed in Knots
(Combat0
o 'r. , haracteristic! would be Improved
(Combat Colin*/ tJ ) odified for interceptor role.
Tentative combat cnaracieriilica ifmiiaroukl be leu if equipped ai an oiUiotfur interceptor.
Type* (Combat Ceiling0 /tJ Type-IQ J
< tKene fcnown to be in production.
blOi
will probably bar* United operational quantltlea of some typo of tme-all-woathor lnWceptor
whether or not the USSR la attemptingextensive all-weather interception aaoebllltieethe Soviet astlmata as to bow essential snob oapeMlltlee
are. TMs estimate asanas* that tbe USSR, line the US, la placing great wephacla on the developnant of all weather latarooptlon oepabilitiea. The USSR may eonsidar that alX-weether interception la not essential to its air defeases, pestloulnly as tha aloud oovar over nueb of the USSR generally extends only to0 fast. It any have decided that Infra-red or other systeae will suffice. However, we heve no evidence of the developnant of such systems.
AA Artillerv- Aside from the large quantity. of world War IIndn AA guns atlll ia use by the Soviet forces, the USSR Is producing at least two new weepdns. It appears to have recently begun manufactureew AA goo, probablyn calibre. eapon would greatly Increase Soviet capabilities for defense against highspeed, lov-flyinc aircraft. Available1 ETrT*igh priority anrrtnnlii on tbe caaufaaturlng schedule for this gun.
The USSR has alsoew nodal AA gun, probably of lOOhnbeen seen in substantial nasi tun in slug
auabers W*at theae guns can provld* contlau-mmly pointed fire0 ftot and barrage fire0 feet, with an eatlnated rate of .Mr* ofounds par nlante. however, we believe that they vilL not he capableighof killa at these altituden, even if controlled by th* Boat Dodern fire control ecpjlpawat. This gun Is apparently in quantity production and should betillable in substaatislla sad around key areas by th* sad Thar* ar* sea* IndlawtloTai that the USSR any bemn gun.
24. Fire Control. Tbe SCR-5B4 gun-laying radarsthe USSR under lenMeoee are being sagnutsderelon of Soviet manufacture wliich is now appearingervice, partioularly around Mosoow. This radar, which la being ised in oonnaotlon with the above AA gun, will greatly inereaii tha acoureay of Soviet aatlaireraft Mre. R ia alao capable of producing both analog and digital ccarputora as well tt the elsatroad* direotcTa gives it -mdor lend-lease. Although there is little evidence that the 0SSR is using eleobroolo d'raotora, ve believe that It ia provi'iisg en inproved dlrsotor ooctxnrrently with the nev IA guns and fire oon'xol radar.
ockota. The USSR laa tht oopobillty to develop aad prodice ungulded AA rockets for use acaiost high-speed, high-altitude elroraft. Ofnasn develcxxients in this field
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top-segrei
ia which the USSR has shown Interest, ths TAIFltf is cos of ths few ungulded rockets whloh say hare bssa developed further by ths Sovlata. We have no clear iadioationa as to how far this development has progressed, but we estinate that tha USSR Is bow capable of having an ungulded rocket ln operational use with at least the following characteristics! supersonic speed, aaional esillageet, sad vail dispersion for rocket types.
26- AA Puacs. The devwlopnent of prorlnlty fuses for antl-alreraft aaaiiittlrai nayigh priority Soviet requires*nt. Although v* hare no flra iatalligenas, we believe that tba USSR oould produce operational quantities of such fazes for defense of key areas Irxodnity fuse* oould slso be available for use In Soviet AA guided missiles. In addition* the USSR has asaafsatored experimental lots of eleetrloal tine fuses, following Garaaa wartlae devalopasnts. Us balisva that the USSR la sapabls of having the bo fuses la use at the present ties, although there ia no evidence that they ere la quantity' production.
27. uuldod Hlsaljaa. Tb* difficulty of detcralalag which direetloa the Soviet surface-to-air missile prograa haa taken will notlra estimate of specific missile systsaa undergoing deralopnent The Soviet version of tb*adar oould provide the USSRracking ccpabn'. ty sultebls for operational missile guidance. The USSR also has tbs capability
to provide end will probably smploy eceseand guidance la tb* aloV oours* phaae of aiasile flight. Itlso reported to be developing teralaal galdaaee eoniTsaat and ls probably doing ao. Based upon estimated Soviet oapaMlltle* ln the field of infra-red and radar-technology, va believe that Infra-red or radar terminal guidance equipment could be available However, there Is ao Intelligence to confirm Infra-red teralaal guidance developaaata.
2S. It ia possible thatR oould havo available In
moderate quantity by the end2 around-to-air guided missiles
based oa CeraanI designs. Of thesehs
WASSUtFiLL type had the best parforaanoe, and oould be control l-
abla through lta irarrlmna responsive olant range of
Ua believe that tha QSSR, la view of Its demonstrated eepabllltlea in related fields, could have aa advanced type of supersonic aiealle, with lnaraesed range la operational use eome time during tha. Boeeuee of the lack of Intelligence oa the particular missile systems which oould bainl by tbs USSR no sound prediction of accuracy aaa ba aad*.
29. There la ao Intelligence oa Soviet development cf air-to-air guided miasilea. However, la view ef known Soviet
T oonaldors that available evidence on Soviet progress la missile aad goldaaoa development weald Halt estimated sstIttieu aloat range0 yard*.
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continuation of wartime Oerrnan (level apmenia wo estimate that tho DBS is ospahls at ths preaoat time of having snosobto sir* or radio-controlled missiles. We believe that4 ths USSH
could have la operationalupersonic missile possibly
employing radar or infrared heating.
30. CcTOtermcesnres. Soviet Jamming of foreign propeganda broadcasts hss dsoonstrcted Soviet capabilities for electronic-Jamming at the bo frequencies sadeen appreciation of the value of Jamming These broadcasts, using
frequencies In the LF, KF, and hT beads, are jammed to usolese-
asss la many parts cf the USSR. The OBSR exhibits excellent crganlaetlem control over the Jentalng operations,
The USSR la capable at present of effective Jaanlng and apooflng of LF, MF, and HF orasamlowtlons, although there la ao evidence of the existence of significant quantities of vHF aad OHF Jaxedag equipment. However, Soviet capabilities ia relstcd electronic fields at these freomaeeias Ind tonte thatB la capable of developing aajajpasat for Jauntily of VIT and TJBF frequencies st the uteueut tlx*.
There la little Intelligence as to the existenceoviet prograa for jamming airborne nioro-wave radar bomb-lag, fire oontrol, and navigational aids. The OSSR acquired samples of OS World War II equipment as well as Oerrnan equipment
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sevan yaara ago, aad la well aware of tbe algaiflcanae of oouatcranaenrea, aa Indited above. Tbe possibility of Soviet Jsnadag ef Heat era airborne radar Ins tnnentatlon ia increased by tbe Barrow frequency ranges employed by ua. The USSR ia reported to be working oa Ctf aagaatronaeam use la theeatlaeter bends. It ia oapable of baring intercept receivers operating la tba URT sad SB7 bands ia operational ass st present. The USSR will probably havercing equipnent for operational aaasay froqtauielaa ap to and liwrtndlng UBT sad SRT bands, although it nay have only United quantities of URT and SRT Jaamera.
little is known about Soviet work ladevioaa. Sueh devioes should be attractive toaad are likely to be encountered. The USSR baala training exercises.
STREBQTS, AND COffiAT READHESS OT SOVIET AIR
USSRarga and elaborate airnhlab not only Includes the fumes assigned toO-Stranr) but also baa available toactive air defease resources of the any, teetlaal sir
eaor additional details.
-
forces, navy not otherwise committed, oa mil as the .native defense reeoureee of the police und elrllian org-uilxitions. The furoveon Satellite and Cem-.unirt Chinese uir defenses add to and are integruted Tilth the Soviet syatsn0
he PVOfltrany, Air defense ofUSSR la prxaarily tha responsibilityajor component of the Var rlnistry, separata fron the Any and Air Force, which Is known> Strany (Anii-elr Defense of the Country) and la probably headedeputy "inioter0 headquartersosses not only directs ths employment of the numerous air defense forees which are assigned or attached directly to it, but alaothe use in air defense roles of other military and naval forees nd the civil defense organization*
sriss of reorganlxatione, thsis now organizedumber of Air Defense Regions, capable Of independent optr.itlon If necessary, 1tioraally subject to control froa PTO headquarters ino hub of Vr aye-tan is the "essas Air Defense rtegion, compceed of an Lao, lector and an outer sons which In turn is divided Into ssetore. lash sector is believed to have its own filter and control center, and to be capable of directinc defense opsmtlons in its sons of responsibility* Ringing this hub ore several other Air
Defence) Hogionai VcOgdu, lenLngrad, Riga, Kaunas, Kiev, Dwurkov, Orel-Sverolseile, sol probably Odessa and Tiflia. Bach region reports to asntral headquarters but controls it* oen operations through central oantere at lcear lateral coaaiailoations at all ltveln tie theee regions and their setters together, Insuring flexibleAlso reporting to PTO headquartera, and linked to the above raglona by lateral oom-aunlcatione, ia tha Bakv AirRegion, Outslds thaeon complex ia theefease trganiiatlen of the far test, which ia cparstisns Jy autcnoeous aad apparently subject only tn policy directive' froa Moaocar<,
he 'arly laming> approaahas to tha aaat Importantof tha USSR are believer! to be eell-coeered by an early v> ning system which Includes tortensive radar, visual, and accdv detection mtaoriea, linked by radio and landlina ceoaunloat.ona neto Over the past seven! years there haaubetintial inoreawj in the Soviet early earning system. What the rJSR laelrj In quality of loci; range radar performance iti; it to eospensate for by the quantity of radars deployed in depth* 'he density af deployment and the neU-dmt?gaated organic aatieo aithin the Soviet early earning system largely coapensatcs
SKT footnote toa.
for the technical deficiencies (by OS standards) of tho radars need (aaa sap on next page)*
38o Tha early earning and oosnunlcationa ccmpononta of tb* Soviet air defence aystsai ar* engaged ln continuoos trainingrass andbelieve that they araigh atate of readiness In neat important areas* Moreover, the USSR Is already starting ta eaploy such improved radar aqalpsenta
Interceptore believe that'the effeotiveneaa of Soviet fighter and interceptor forces la steadily Ingres el ng under th* impetus of extensive re equipment and trainingha interoaptors available for Soviet air defense include bothssigned to the Pffoatrany itaelf and those assigned to tha tactical air forces, the Soviet Navy, and tha Satellite and Chines* Communist air forces, lahetrength of forces potentially available for air defense of the USSR are estimated at0 alroraft, of anionO0> f tbaaa0 of thaa Jcta) are organised into Fighter Aviation of Air Dsfenss (IA FTO) Air Arenas, which are assigned to keyt present believed to be Moscow, Ienlngrad, Kharkov, Baku and possibly Chitao Although the scanty Intelligence previously available appeared toelatively low state of training for Soviet Interoaptor forces, recent intelligence indicate* considerable improvement la this respeoto
bO, Although ths Soviet fighter intereeptor forooowholebebly will not increase substantially in wiseestimate that Soviet Interceptionwillidorably Inoroaoo during this period by tho conversion of all fighter snd interceptor units to .'at aircraft, tbs probable Introduction of improved interoeptors, laproved GOT snd AIsnd tho continuation of present training is isjisna. be artimata that byhe IA PVO will oonsiat ofet liiteroeptors ln operational units. The fighter unite of Tactical Air Arenas and naval Aviation will also have been entirely >rt-equipped, and we eetlaate that the Soviet air fareea willotal ofetl raring aU-eJoather interceptors) in operational unitst0
bl* Blgnt andInterceptor Toroes. There is good evidence that the USSR is employing jet aircraftight Intercept role. Such alroraft, even if not equipped with AI equipment, would still have certain night lntereeptlon capabili* ties, depending upon tbs degree ofhe nee of AI equipment would markedly lsprore Soviet oapabilitiee in this field.
erious deficiency in the pressnt Soviet Air defense system appears to exist in Its United lntereeptlon na naMlltlso under conditions of poor visibility* Do spite the leek of direct
iii
OHiV^AllL 1
evidence, we estimate that ths USSR may near have small mothers of all-eajather alroraft with Sana form of AI equipment In operational
unitsew key Soviet areae0 We estimate that byhe USSR probably will have limited quantities of some type of true all-weather interceptor in operational units* Bye estimate that Soviet fighter strength probably willew hundred such interceptors, the majority of which would be In tbe PVO forosse
ran whan tha USSR dosa obtain operational quantities of suitable all=eeather interceptors, it will still have tonumerous difficulties before it can develop effective all-weather interception capabilities <, If US experience ia any guidep tha maintenance of complicated AI equipment will in itselfserious problems0 More over, extensive training programs and experience in all weather interception techniques will be required before any new all-weather equipment can ba effectively usedc However, present Soviet training programs stress QCI axe raises and controlled cloud and night.flying, not only for IA PVO interoaptor regiments but for tactical and naval fighter units as wallo The increasing availability of modern XI radars should also enhance Soviet all-weather Interception capabilities To conclude that byoviet all-weather interception capabilities will have increased considerably, caring to improved
SeeF footnote to8
equipment and extensive training programs, bat that Tariooa deficiencies will atill exist*
uu. Antiaircraft Artilleryhe Soviet armed foroaa contain large numbers of AAA units, Including both strategic AAA uaita asBlgned to the PTO and the extensive tactical AAof the field forces and navy, which would be available in saur/ cases for defense against atrateglo air attack. Too USSR has available anuns and atuns. These guns and ancillary equipment are being issued to the Satellite forces in increasing mashers and are gradually being replaced with newer weapons*
he USSR Is engagedrogram to strengthen its AAA defensesarked lncreaee in Soviet AAA capabilities has become apparent over the past year, owing largely to thoof improved heavy AA guns (estimatednd new fire control equipment around key areas* Units employingguidad AA rockets or guided aisailes may also be available, although we have no evidence to this effect* In addition the new medium AA gun (estimated ats apparently now being leaned to Soviet troops* Continued Increases In AA strength andare probableb, as Increased quantities of new weapons and fire control equipment become available0
-
ovietir rafonac Foroaa. Tho air defense foroaa of tho Soviet havy, which havo primary responsibility for ehora-based dafanaa against air attack on most coastal areas, alao oontribute to Soviet air dafanaa capabilitiesQ Tho Navy has ita own early warning radar and observer network, which ia tied into the ovar-aTl air defence system and eztendo itaTha Intercept ion capabilities of tha naval fighter forcesircraft.eta) are Increasing with tho conversion to Jet fl&htereo Soviet coaetal antraft installations sen provide sureaoe fir* in defense of taigets lying in or adjacent to coastal areas, and could be assisted by Soviet naval vessels. Thar* will probablyteady Increase in naval air defense strengthU-.
hlo Satellite ard Chinees Ccanunlst Forces. Tha early warning ruts of thspean Satellites in the West and Communist Chinaorth Korea in the East ere linked with ths Soviet systems rod extend its ooverage. Their interceptor andforces, which are gradually being re-equipped" by tha USSR, ara an additional an set, despite their limited capabilities,,
u8<> Over-ell tioabathe Soviet air defenses are steadily Improvingesult of continuous training pro= grams and the intriiuction of new equipment. We believe that. In general, they ito in an advanced stats of readiness, except
^top-secret! I
for tot following ecrioua defieieneieei the leek of sufficient quantities of aodorn equlpaent to prorlda offsetlve defenses for aU laportant areas. Halted lntereeptlon capabilities under oondltione ef poor risibility, and tba vulnerability of present Soviet radio eoaaunlcatione. In addition aa believe that tbe Soviet air defense ayatea, or any of Ites subject to saturation by sufficiently largeir attacks, aaa**
ever, tbaaa deflelenalea sre apparently being gradually as new equipment, auah of lteady in production, la brought Into widespread use and aa presint training programs reach fruition. Continued air defense drill', and exeroleoo, wMoh are Indicated aa part of the seer-ell training prograa, should aarkedly Inprov* the operational efflelenay mt tbe air defense ayatea. Consequently we believe that Sorlat air defense capabilities will isprove substantiallyh,
SOVIET KCOWCaTC CaJnBTLITIBS FOR AIR DSTOSfe. PfffiKCTIQM
U9o Provided that the air defense prograa cxitinuee to ba given sufficiently high priority within over-elleconomic plans, there appear to be no ineoluble aocnoadc problem which
Dl/USAP bellevee that the serious deficiencies listedature and aagnltude to prevent an estimate that tba air sadaawawj are in aa "sdvaooed state of resdlaeea."
Seeor additional details,
top^eceetT
would prevent tho continued iaprotement of tho Soviet airfenyateoc However, aa aro unable to estimate the extent to which other competing eeoncedo and allitary demands wouldimiting influence oa any increase In tba production of air defense eater isle Boreovor, the USSR alaest certainly fence numerous developmental and production problems in providing; sufficient quantities of all types of air defense material*
he chief present weakness is believed to be in the electronics Held. Neverthelssa, despite ths limited else of the pressnt Soviet Bloc electronics industry, mm believe that it is currently capable of supporting the extension, aoderniaav-tion, and maintenance of an early warning system, as wall asave fire control and airborne equipment, for important strategic areas in thelant expansion program la aontinuing, and no serious limitations in tbe availability of manpower and basis plant machinery are fOreseea* The Soviet Bloc ia at present partly dependent on Western sources for specialised production materials, but this dependence sill probably decrease through
51o Extensive Soviet capabilities for the production of fighter aircraft are indicated by the2 productionbelieved to beor variants thereof. Tha present Soviet airframe Industry has tha plant capacity, utilia-
ing present nodale, to produce anO fighter eir-craft annually, although it would require two years to achieve this rate.roduction rate would require Increased eo-gins plant capacity, but there is econ evidence that aaia underwayt. Basic raw aeterlals required for airfraaes and enginee are believed to be In adequate supply. Tba use of certain potentially scares aateriala sight ba al nisi asd by modi-flections in designo
$Za The estimated rate of current production of AA guns of all typee isnnually, while plant capacity Is estisatsd atuns par year,, The USSR appears to have adequate raw materials and plant capacity for theof eariunltiono There ia evidence of substantial rocket production sons of which nay be AA types*
Soviet technological capabilities are considered to be adequate for support of air defense development end production programs, provided that tbeae programs eontinue to beufficiently high priorityB We believe that tha USSR faces nohandicaps in tha ahortage of technological skills needed toalted nuaber of high priority programs, although technical personnel will continue to bereaiuau
AP?. OOVIET AIR DEfEHSEP gjjffijgg
lo EarlyT*rningo Tba UUSR boa bean placing ehLef dependence for its early earning radar on three type* of equipment operating in the TO no* region, thaha(Pegmatit)et known aa DUMBO. The greatest sdrantage of these seta la their simplicity. Then* la also In the early namingroup of radars reported to be ope ratine at frequencies in theu bend and thought to be similar to the American
wealed the active use of American, British, German, and Japanese wartime radars or Soviet version* Vera of in tha early warning system of ths Soviot bloc. This radar serviee may ba augmented by such passive detection evices as radar reoeiverse
a estimate that the existing large numbers of lower frequency equipment will be retained as the principal early warning radar although oa time elapses more sets providing greater range and accuracy will probably be added0 There is reliable evidence thatTl is already empirics some new and improved radar sets similar to the USsee para0
Although this radar ia primarily used for ground control intercept purposes, it ia also uaabla for earlyErsn if this oqutpaant docs not parfora aa vail oa thaa bollava that tho Sovlata havaadar which, if properly employed, la oapahle of auoh acre affeotlve long ra go eeareh then waa possible with previously knom equip-sent* 'Joroovar, in the early warnln. net in the Kvropaan area radars have been identified with characteristics si nil or to the UBadar, which have been tentatively identified a* PRS-3.
J.rmrrlrations sate. The Sovietdefense cofarminations systen consists of bothradio oireuita and land lines. On ths basis of
/
is known that special radio nalwurka exist for this function utilising frequencies between two and ei^ht oegaoyalea. Since there has been no opportunity to observe these networks under heavy raid conditions, no accurate estimate oon be made of their capability forarga volume of traffic. In moat eases observed the Soviet tr. nets laws tended to slen dovn and become less efficient whsn handling in exaesa of five raids, although we sre unable to state farther or not this dofioieney
2 -
in the ocoiunieationa not iteelf. However, the eon* tlnnoue training procren willffect!Venree of thisrovided sufficient circuits ex*st,
ii. IcEcver, adeficiency of tIn that point-to-point radio circuits on frequencies bold;o. ara vulnerable to lore range jamming ond are susceptible todisruption froa nannoise (electrise! machinery, automotive ignition,s sail as atmospheric noise and signal fading. Positive intelligence on the extent to which land lines beck up radio oircults is lacking, but Soviet experience with the use of such frequencies, their known Jesntln^ proficiency, .nd their knowledge of Allied electronic counter-measures potential sake lt reasonable to assure, that depends, oa on radio is beingst partially overcome by increased use of land lines, 'fcreever,SR is procuring fron ths Soviet Zoneany ateta of cccrrunlcatlcca equlpaent ope ratine ato. in theard and nay intend to incorporate equlpaent of this type In its air defence notatrks. This would -rratly reduce the vulnerability of such circuitsIntentional and deli'erate interference as sell as to intercept,,
So For ground-to-air ool ana tit* ifisa haa bemn .ieponding upon equipment operatinc lnnd iV portions of the radio spectrumG CCI operations dependound-to-eir communicatians which are the only knomnround controller has for passing target Information to hia Interceptors. The trro basic types of HF and HP equipment used ln Soviet alroraft are theormally carried in fighters and the RSB-BISn bomber alroraft. Theground equipment la frequently mounted In vehicles used as mobile communication stations by both the Soviet Air Force and Armyo The ground equipment used by the Soviet Air Foroe Is basically the same aa that usedorld Var XI and consists of the UAK5hs pafnd the type "US"5wo)0 Radio communications equipment recently captured in Ko.eaonstant improvement in manufacturingnd component design. The latest models Of this equipment ara oxosllant.
60 Horrever, thesend IFcircuits are susoeptible to noise interference and jasmine aa are tha point-to-point around networks. In addition, aircraft receivers operating tn those frenuoncles are subject to natural
ferenoe In tha form of precipitation eVitio. Furtrvaramrc, tha lack of prr-tunod multichannel tr-inonltter ir. Soviet inter-oeptore wouldifficult problem in tha passin^ of control of interceptor aircraft froa one atatlon to anotVrjaawlnc conditions. Therefore, the Sovietand HP ground-totem la extremely vulnerableeil-planned electronic attack khieh could completely disruptperatlona
solutions grave deficiency Ilea inof vary high (VHP) or ultraF)i Until recently when VIff algnels inrare intercepted,SR was not known toalternate oennuni cations systemscould boall-wnathor conditions in ths event of disruption ofand HP greond-to-oir circuits, However, the S* iadeveloping ond producing VHP or DhT equipment,onfirm the use of VHP equipmentr*connaisaanoe aircraft, and jet bombers. has also been identified in fighter aircraft in
Korea o
Radar. Soviet ground-eon rol-lnteraeutionis indicated byF
-5-
Jirtsweptions of '. ostem aircraft. Tn th_ part the I. st hasntly placed roost dependence upon the Ri3 fl and thsDO radars, which to do not consider sufficiently vseurutese because of their United discrimination in ranee, height, and bearing. o. radars nay harel functions in tbs far oasto. radars siailar to ths ULre in current 0CI use in Europe. FCH data iniioatss thatrs/lars inseas/sle ronce anyve this funetioa.
psaranoe
Howerer, we now have conclusive evidence that rede's of area tor accuracy bars appeared, itcoent reports andof nev radars in several areas choir eopilpnont similar
to the USadars in oarrant operational use by ths USAl Al- Dsfenss Conaand. If these radars have perfoneanoe characteristic! similar to thuhey will prcvida tbs Sovietsol OCI radar and should be capable af detect-lng boobersarl ana reliable raneeautical sdlas. They also should prwlde reliable covert Me fororthout tnnsponJor beacons,oxtaom range ofautical slice and on altitude; toO feeto The use of tranapont'fT beacons in Soviet interceptor
-6*
top secret canoe
would increase ranee end altitudeor controlled 1ntereeptlon*
10* Radio Navigation Facilities. Th* USSa plocea aajcr reliance for aircraft navigation on radio directionhis equipment, in conjunction with ground radar, appeareaoourate and reliable for air defence purposes, (around dlraatlon flndara inatailed in Integrated chains are the priavuv aid to aircraft navigation. Therana-portable aat In5 an. range, alt ough slnple In design. Is equal or superior in performance to the USof similar type.
heirection finder appears to be theairborne navigation act. It operates intao range,ixed reeessed iron core loop to eliminate drag, and is suitable for homing. Up-to-date seniles obtained in Korea Indicated that this equlpacnt, currently manufactured, la exoellent. An improved automatic direction finderinilar to the USas been Identifiedoviot aanual. Byhs U'-SR could have available aubstantlsl quantities of automatic radio conpass equipment0
-7-
12o low frequencyboth "ixod .jkI transportable, with rota table bean patternsen rc^rted in uae. ihr so Buppl-nont etjuxUrd broadcast eatlons. tamy of tfclch are koyed periodic allytandard morse pall oljx to facilitate their uae aa beacons. The DSS3 has an operational radio altimeterhich operateso. rango and is similar to the OSltimeter. U this altimeter should bo Improved j
13. For blind approach and land Ins, the only knoun aida used by the Soviets otter than Ground direction finders are Oerran Loren. orStandard Boom approach) systems of non-radar character (ILS-type). These consistocalizer transmitter Tilth horizontal sector identification In the form of dots and dashes. Distance from touchdown is established b* two marker beacons and height inform ition Is obtained by uae of an altimetero Although there hare been no indications that ths Soviets are interested in radar blind landing systems similar to the US GCA system, thay have the capability of developing suchs estimate thatU tho USSt probably will have substantial quantities of some type of blind landing system in operation.
IU, Reports confirm that the ITSReparian ntallyyperbolic ravigatlonal syetem emDloyfng pulee tranamit tine teohniqueso TMa equiparnt will probably operate almilarly to the US Loran or the British Gee system nd will provide both lone and shoit range navigational aid0 ytea should be in operationk amd would Improve Soviet navigation capabilities*
15* Irrt-erccptor Aircraft Sincear II, the USSR has placed great emphasis on fighter aircraft In view of the necessity of providing adequate defenses against atonic attack on the USSRo At the present tide the swept winge tha principal jet Intoreeptor available for air defense It compares favorably with the USboth performanee-vd.Bc and mithtoheie capablenots at aea levelnotseet, can climb0 feetinutes, has an estimated combat coilingO feetombat radiusautical odlee. In accordance with tbe Soviet policy of installing relatively heavy armament in this type aircraft, the standardrmament includes onem0 anda0he gun sight is believed to be similar to theater World rer IT type . 5 Be record
In combat against other fighter* indicatea that it may netire oontrol equipmentar witht*rn counterparts. Haover, it has exhibited pronounced effectivenoBS againat the bomber types it has. the
16. re estimate that byhe USSR could increase ths performance of its new interceptors by the use of after-burners and rocket boost. If ths USSR is ooncentratlnt; on suchthe maximum performance characteristics which lt could achieveb would be on tha ordernots at sea leva!notsCCO fast for short periods, with climb0 feet In fiveombat ceiling of0 feet,ombat radiusautical milese Hormvor, lt ia mere likely that the maximum performance ohDracteristlea would be on the ordernots at sea levelnots0 feet, with climb0 feet In fiveombat ceiling efeet,ombat radiuslias0 Armament for such aircraft would probably consist ofm0 orana cannon in the nose, vith ammunition for about six seconds of firoo On the othor hand, unguidodrockets might be used. It is estimatod thatocket would have an all-burnt velocity ofeet per second and high explosive
10
warhead weighing ljj lbs. Ths firs control would probably coos 1styro computing range-only radar sighting system. Radar and gyro liuToraation would probably be fed into an aleotrocomputer..
ho USSR now hasn. RS series gem ml* purpose aircraft rockets, with powder train tine fusee, for use against air as wall aa ground targets, the type of heed being depen ent on the target. Ilowevor, they were not designed forse and cannot oompete with current gun armament. The USSR has shown interest In the Oervsnocket, which'had en operational rungsards0
IS. The German elroraft design group working under Soviet direction at rodberes'ye is known to hare bean workingupnrsonlc rocket-powered Interceptor, end wo eetlnatsrototype probably will be test flown during ls53. It it expected that Soviet designs will be along the lines of the XVS-fceo delta wing series, and the prototype iselta wing type designed topeed of.
AI Kqulpaent. Sea paragraphf DISCUSSION.
ight Interceptors pad All-taether mteroeptore. There is good evidence that the USSR la employing jet aircraft In a
nicht intercept role, uch no have oo evidence ae to the appearance of all-weather jet Intoreeptore in operational unit* of the Soviet Air Faroe, the USSR hoe die played several jet interceptor typns whioh appear to be either deelgned far or adaptable to an all^eather role. Typeshleh were flrat exhibited at5 Aviation Day Show and subsequently at th* Tushlno Air Show inad bulbous protrusions in ths noss direotly over ths jethe most logical explanation ofxtension*hat thay were built to house some form of Al equipmentQ
2lo belie re that as an interim sasaaur*R amy be purrulng two possible alternative*! mployment of ansuoh a* theths Typoay ba an adaptation of thohich has been aodlfied to include AInpleyaerrt wUl plans jet aircraft, suoh a* th* IMS or Typeight bomber* or th*ain-jet stralght-*ing interceptor, to carry AI equipment and an operator ln addition to tha pilot. There ia no affirmative eridenoe of production of the Typeimilar interceptor, but such productionossibility. On one occasion the USSR haa employed an airborne radar in an unidentified, probably aalti-englned sir-craft that gave evidence of having the eapebf lily to search for,
trackp uointain contact with and arget nireraft0 Tbendould houaar aaeller Al equipment, though the performance capabilities of thend the Typere suoh that they would not be effective against Jet bombere. Theas probably been employed in Korea! but there ia no indication that thin has been in an all-weather role -.
2?o It ia also within Soviet capabilities toruejet interceptor, and we believe that ths USSR will decide to ooooentrate on production of this rather than an interim type* It la conceivable that the USSR sdghtersion of the tain jet. swept winghich la capable of carryingilot and radar operator, for thii type of Thyaa flovn in the Tuehlno Air show in Julynd appears tothe best Soviet design now known.
73. /itlalroraft Artillery. Soviet light antiaircraft guns were lr general bollistically oomparable in performance to those of other major pernors by the endarid ror II. Byham.was standard. It haa sinesn the Satellite armies. This gun resembles in design theUO mm. Bafcrs gun. Pieces which have been
13*
TDP-^ECEEll
oaptured In Korea ar* aimed by direet layingourse and apeed eight. ATorsion mounted on the chassis of tha obsoletelight tank im known as ths Asmnmition and co-carriage sights bare probably bean Improved sines
2*. By the end of world war II, the Soviet medium AA gun ana theh ballisticomparable to those of thejs. Flak gun with which Germany entered the war. It ie mounted on an efficient ll^ht-welght four-wheel carriage similar to the fnni.llar Before deelgn. The wheels ara raised from the eround when the weapon ie emplaeed, but remain on ths carriage during firing. Since the gun is hand-loaded, ltelatively slow rate of firs. Although anphb version was developed, as far as Is knownemained the standard medium AA gun until fairly recently.l9lh model has an improved tube assembly and recoil neohaniem and en lncresesd muzsls velocity. It is believed to use the seme marriage as ths
tUthat
at KHiEOJjovsx, nd possibly others have recentlyev gun, reportedly ofaliber and almost certainly designed for AA use. m. Is ths -scat probable
-Hi
caliber, vine* It i* one already standard in tie .Soviet weapons system.. In addition, there are collateral reports of Soviet AAA units being equippedewa. AAhe appearance of an AA gun of approximately this caliber, to supplant or supplement the Sovietm.eapon for countering low level air attacks, haa beenfor acme time,, High priority eaphoale on theact or ing schedule of the new weapon is apparent. It is believed that un wouldigh rate of0 rounds perigh traverse and elevationigh nuzzle velocity, possibly augaanted byand an off active oilingeet. Ths gun nay have liquid cooling to permit sustained high rates of fire. Employment ofun by tho Soviets would greatly increase their oapabilitlss for defense against air attacks In tho low and medium altitude sense. No intelligence concern* ing other weapons or gun programs in this oategory arc known0 Tn the period under consideration it is estimated that eaphasls will be placed on improvements of tham0 gun and related equipneoto
26o The ll SR has also developed what laew heavy AA gun which was reported in 'jxn-easing numbers inPhotographs of these guns cnplaoad in Uoseow suggest German .
-15
denial influence, indicating contributions by Oerrnan speeiA-lists In tha USSRo Tha gun probably incorporates automatic fuss otttlng and loading and possiblyemote-control laying. It is equippedoblle carriage. Sealed neasurements from photocraphs giro the gun an estimated oalibera0 end other reports, notably Pr souroes, tend to sonfirn tho oalibers believe that this gun aaa provide continuously pointed Ore0 feet and barrage fire to uOfOOO factaata of fire ofounds par minute. This estimate is In part supported
Ithat AA aervloe practice has been conducted In the USSH against targe to tomad at0 foot. The slant range for this practicepproximate theestimated aboven0 gun. This trainingun and fire control with Merfcrmanoe superior to thsm. tf-lyub and Uis PUAZirector. Photographsadar similar to the XR-5SU radar employed for fire control (see. Ho ever, wa believe that this gun will not be capableigh percentage of kills at theae altitudes,If controlled by the most modern fire control equipment. Th* USSR has undoubtedly stand.xdiaed this new equipment and is systesMtlsolly installing it in AA unite in strategic areaa0 rsplasing thon. gunso The now gun is pceeibly also being furnished for fixed chipboard installation.
2T. ^onfirnad report*a. jw have boon receivedairly ra liable source, andunolo nay have bean developed. It could be expected to have on appreciably higher effnotlve calling thana* gun.
28. ha vol Puna, Soviet navalantiaircraft guna are of modem deaign and manufacture and oloaely parallel Tfcatem Kuropeanr II equipment, except for rate of fire* Ac ins-tailed in current fleet units, these guna arc not aa numerous or aa well located for sector defense as InUS or British units, however, modern Sovirt fleet units are estimated to be capable of moderately effective antiaircraft fire against heavy planes and lose effective fire against single engine, htgn speed alroraft.
29o latest Soviet dostroyers of thslass mountm. dual-purpose guns, arranged in two tela mounts, one forward and one aft. The performance of this gun ia unknown, but it may have characteristics similar to cither thench dial-purpose or thealiber. Since this gun was first man^oaadt mayostwar develccsento Other antiaircraft guns mounted on this type ship includem. and estimateda. guns. Thenn. gun Is
.17
believed to be of r II vintage and oonson to many Sorlat naval veaeolOo rhila tha S5 ma mayeparata postwar development, having beon noted Initially Int laaval vara!on of the reported neva0 guu* This pun lt mall suited for use on shipboard, and
a nevm. gunbeing shipped from Krasnoyarek to installations of the Ministry of Shlpbulldiiur for probable Installation on destroyers and possibly eruiserso Theia. gun has not as yet been identified on naval vessels) however^ it must be anticipated as naval dual-purpose armament on ships and in coastal defenses,.
ire Control Radar. The USSR vas provided withS, British, and Canadian radars under lend-lease during TTcrld War IIj these have found widespread use in Soviet and Satellitearge number of searchlightsontrol radars of British design were also supplied during tla mar, aid similar sets have been observed fitted to Soviet naval needs.
ntelligence lndioatee that theun-lsylng radars furnished the Soviet Union under lend-lease are being augmentedersion of Soviet manufaoture which Is now
appearing In Borvlee, particularly around "oecow. This radar rriu providexaollont initial data at maximum rangesm. gun. Although thaaaa da vol oped duringWar IT* it la still employed aa the mainstay of modernfire controlatern natione. Sorlat use of thoads for development appears to have been logical and time-earing. It oporataa in thaa. band snd provides autoiatlc tracking of the target and automatic data transmission to t'ra director. The total number of these radars reliably retorted in ths Moscow urban area sxeceds the number of acta given the USSR under lend-lease moreears ago. while ntirmal attrition would have probably precluded completeof this number. Therefores the ur.SK must be granted tba capability to manufacture theype in quantity within tha period throughThere Is also an unconfirmed report of radar fire control for the reporteda0 guno The Soviet tube industry ia known to be in quantity production ofklystrons, and detectors of the types required for fir* control radar.
adar controlled searchlights for illnwjnation of attacking alroraft are being used by the Communists to aid night interceptor aircraft ln Korea.
ew radar hoe appeared under radonea on tha now Soviet eruieerao Uthough lt ia believed to ba primarily for suyfaae fire Oontral, peeelble us. for untialreraft firennot be dlaaounted. There haa been one report of the oevelop-eenthlpboard veralon of thsadar.
lit. Directors. The only known Soviet fir* eontrol director in general use ia the aachanical type designated thaadar data can be introduced into ths PDAZOlthough there ia no direct evidence that the necessary ncccssorts* have been rtor.ever, the lend-lease. radar wa* dectgned to work vithnd 'HO, and tb* USSR received aany ofirectors over seven year* ago. Although there la no evidence to eonfira or deny that th* Soviet* are enlncdirector* with their fire eontrol radar, the DSSH he fullof both analog and digitalfor gcnarcl aathe-Bstleal use ond la capable of rcprcduclnc the electronic direct ere.
Itikely that the UJSR la providing an iaproved director *on-evxreotly with tbs new AA gans and fir* eontrol radar. On tb* ether hand, tbeay consider an isaaoved eeehardeol director adequate for it*he aommandogeretnd bO werefrom the Oerraana. and the latest German directorfi Kssanuv-degerat blF* about to go into prwjdmotion, waa alee available to the UBS".
th* ICSft alao has tha potential to duplicate thaartPS and haa had access to German gyre development* (for level and cross level stabilisation) superior to current US operational equipraonto Ths USSR Is capable of equipping fleet units with fire control systeas equal to currently operational US systemsii0
he USSR employed imguided rockete as antiaircraft weapons durine rorld Var II whan h$ man andbd rockets ware used against low-level air attack froa launchere having four andockethose rockntaaximum celling of0 feet and were employed normallyarrage type defenses No fire control system othering sight was used0
f ths German developmenta in thefield in wrdoh the USSR has shown an interests the ungul ed rockst ta IF UN is one ol ths few wMefl may have been further envelopedths
U mj/ Uttle positive intollicenoo
lr-to-alr rockets arr dlsouosed In paragraphs
errnan versions of this rocketiquid fueledolid fueled cscdel, each ofeen flight tested before ths end of hostilities,. Two launchers wars proposed by the Cem;ne80 track lAuneher and the0 trackach being mounted an thsn0 Flakun carriage. Firs control for the missile was to be tha standard German dirts torr KD-uO equlped with modified ballistic eans0
of possible AA room osnufaot ae lo available. Oar-Tar. technicians ass cola tod nlth TAIFUN were romovsd toS rrhere an invnstlgstlto prograri was It la known that ths Russians had access to ths Oarnan develenamnla and expressed conal arable lntorost in thsir potential, but aa havo no clear lJYttoatlono as to whather or how far ths Soviets have developed this rocket.estlaats that the Soviets oould have reprodueed German rockets designed to pceeess ehareoteriatlca of supsreonlo speed, small dispersion, and an eporitlonal ceiling00 feet, and that the Soviets may have progressed keyond that point cither on tha batls of Oerrnan oevelopanate or on ths basis of purely Sorlat dsvelofamnte deeaed to be bettor. Fuel for these rockets vould notimiting footer in thsir production or use.
38. AA Puna, fyt'oteohnlc and eoohanioal tlaa fuses are known to be ia use by the Soviets. Electrical timeartime German developnant, are known to have been exploited by the Soviets and aanufaetured in experimental lots during. such fuses ware considered by ths Oernans to be cheaper and better than mechanical time fuses for AA we believe that the Soviets are capable of having these fuses in quantity for AA use at ths
- tt -
top-segrex.
present iioei heravar, wo have no Intelligence tint they are ln quantity production.
yfm There ia no evidence thatid any work on proximity fusee before the defeat of Oeraany. Ho .ever, Soviet interest in captured Oernan experimental fusespsrent in th* feet that Oernan *clent 1st* and technicians fasdlsr mith problem* peculiar to proximity fuse* were taken to tha USSH. Moreover, tbs cscchs wore working onuse for both AA aad air-dropped projective? e Tho detailed knowledge eforldroximity fuses which has become available to the USSR would forthrr aid in any development of this devise. Thar* is evidence that the USSR is minlaturitlnc various com-sonants, suoh as resistor* and oapacitaro. of the gsrarel type neeeasary la tbe design and manufaetur* of proximitylthough th* USSR has tho capability to do so, there is no evidence of the development of sub-miniature vacuum tubes sufficiently sturdy to withstand tha initial shook ef Oring. It Is pceaible that th* USSR has continued develepaant of an eleotroctatio proximity fuse following the Gorman wartime development,
hO. Ammunition. Llttla information Is available regarding Soviet development* in antiaircraft artillery ammunition, taown Soviet aaanaxltlon is of eonventional high explosive, armor
piercing* jbJ fragmentation type*. Reports of shell burst observation* from Korea lndloato tha pooaibla deralapment of inoendioammunition. The LTiSRapability to develop and produce hyperrelooity projoetllee ln conti nua-tlon of Oarraan Vorld Var II developments.
nl. SurfAoe-Lflunohed AA Qulded Ulaalios. Examinationintelligence indicatea that tho overall Sovietprogram Is based on German Vorld Var IIview of the lack of current intelligence onactiaatcc are based on iiamaul wsrlassithe Oernan designs end lcnnVJecae alcctronlo squipnent,continued Soviet development prccraa. Aside fromof one or several of the Oernan aarfacc to atrmiaailea being observed, the beat Indications ofprogram are1 (a) test of fuels which might be appliedtypesj (b) indications of recent developments inat Isningrademsn group working on buttypesj (a) high priority exploitation of gwldanee syrtenstype in th* Soviet Zens of Germny shortly after rsrld(d) the reported buildingirborne radiofor test ef TJASSKRFAIX andinthat RHEINTCCRTER we* tested
in WiTj and (f) tha existenceaSSKRMJI. road convoy eon-cietlnc ofrailer unit* reported to contain test equipment
^tdp^segrex,
apparently for ore-flight tooting and training ofg) onadar reliablyr todaided aisaile plant in the eubtirbe of Moscow; andeport ofctive hoadng equipment deralopnent in tha USSR.
ba. Tho USSR baa tho capability to produee optical guidance and control systems for subsonic and auperaordc ndasllae ocoparabla to$ typao. It ia unlikely, however, that this guidance eystem would be adopted, Soviet productionereion of theautooatio tracking fire oontrol radar gives then one which the US and UK have found particularly euitod for guided sdeaile development work. Modification of this radar, which la within Soviet capabilities. Bight sake lt suitable for tost range tracking and even for operetionel guidance. Ae an indication ofodifledis capable ofedluB boaber type aircraft up toards. Ths usseaoon to pornit trackingissileards is also within Soviet capabilities. The ITSR alao has tho capability to provide and will probably en ploy command guidance in tha mid-course phase of missile flight. Sods nlsailo somoand receive re of the Stressburg type have been procured fron the Soviot Zona of Germany. In addition, tha USSR is capable of developing Urnlnel guidance oquipaent and is probably doing so. In tbe light of estimated Soviet capabilities in the field of infrared and radar technology, the USSR could now have in progress
Infrared and radar torodnal guidance prograaa, although thara la no Intelligence to ecnf IraaTolopaant0
U3* Saa paragraphf DISCUSSION.
hlto Alr-to-Alr Quldod Nlsolloo. Saa paragraphf
DISCUSSION.
aarohllghta and Balloona* Sorlat soaroblights aro oon-sldsrad good by US standards* Tbey vary In dlaastar froa bO oa*a. atUmad after tha OS Sparrynoh light. Is predominantly an Aa sserehllght* Radar control is utilised for rapid neutering on the Urget* The Soviet Army assd barrage balloons vlth oapacueAee at cWv>oo anan* ft* during World War II* The oeillng of those hell none is00 feet respectively end vhen used in tandea,0 feet*
Counteraeasuree0 Seef DISCUSSION.
O SI>5
dr-'is of the
' SOVIET AIR BBFEKSBS
ORGANIZATION OF TJ5 SOVT-ttfcVR iVSW
1/ The Unlatry of thee cane the Ministry of War Intien the Naval Koreas became the eeparete Naval .ijnietry Tbe titles of all Ministere of the MV have not been determined since this ch an re jit is necessary to describe the orranlMtion as it was know prior to the change* Since the reorganisationt is possible that the PVO Strany has been removed from the Bar Ministry and made an independent agency responsible for coordination and control of all aotivitles relative to air defense, including those of the Navy. However, there ie no intelligence to indicato whether this bas in fact occurred.
1. The iVO Strany. As an Indication of tho importanca attached by tho UTSR to the air defense of the Soviet homeland, this mission is believed to be assignedor component of the War ilnlatry, soparate froa the Army and Air lores, which la deaigrutad pVO Strany (Air Dafanaa of the Country). The PVO Strany is probably under the ministerial controleputy Minister of Tier for Air Defense.his post vas apparently created Tills officialual rolo in the air defense system. Aainister of "ar for Air Defense ho is believed to have ministerial responsibility for the over-allof administrative, technical, andment matters inair defense polled st set by tbe Soviot Oanerol Staff and the
Politburo or ita successor iretitution, and ha probably participates in tho developnant of air defense policy. Asenief far Air Defence, ha exereisee over-all ooordinotlon of air dafanaa field units ianludinei igh degree of Supply andsoerdinationi (b) technical training} (e) peraonnel assignaent and adadalstratieni andegree of control over operational deployment of units. In addition, the headquarters of ths Coeaander* in-Chief forence appsora to exeralee an eparetlonal control function ever the air defense -trueturn within the Soviet union proper.
2. Tbs nisei on of PTO Strany la the air defense of theOnion, utilising all existing allitary, police, endfunctioni appear
to include, (a) datestion of appraeahing hostile air fnroesi (b) alerting the central Pro authorities as veil as all facilities in the laaadiata aad adjacenta) initiation of event sr action by flgbtor aircraft sad miairereft trtdllsryi end (d) eala-tsaans* af surveillanee sear ell flights af Soviet aircraft,
3, Ths Coanirtlsr ln-cbief far Air Defense has, at least tss deputy QinOe, ens for Mentor Aviation af Air Defense and cos for Antiaircraft irtdllsry. Basso serviees ead clreatcrateo in tba heedquerters organisation lnaluds beside tieeatarate af Air Defense, tbs Staff af PTOarestorate of CorvtnTrioa-tioas, aDirectorate of PTO,ereeanel Direetorote,
lonal Orsanlsatloo ef the PVO. Aa exhaustive anelyele of air daoaaanloaUona nata has rsToolad tho general sajUlneo af ths air oafenee system which aaa bsaa reorganised la ssmissIv* etarec aloasIt la olvidedaabcr of Air Dszaaaahese ar* able ta function ind* pendent Jy, but normally ar* eubject to eeorolnatloa and control froa the central PVO headquarters in noeeew. Esah of tba PVO regions haa Ita aaa PVO headquarters, although tha exeat organisational atruetare ef thl* headquarters la not knewn. Varieae airlaaenta auoh aa radar, ground ebeerver patta, antiaircraft artillery, aad flatter arlatlan, are assigned or etteabed to these headquarter* a* required by the alaa and importanse of the area to be defended.
hub of the ays teeh* Moscow AirosgMssed of an Innera dint sly surreeadlagand an outer acne whichtself divided into Meter*.ef sactcro ln thie outer acne ie believed to havelaareeacd free five ta eight. Each sector reportsof two coctroi center* in soseow, seah of whlahaeetorsc- Zaah cectorelieved toilter watercenter of its own, and to be capable of directing operations within it* area of responsibility,
the Moscow Air Defense Region are several other Air
Defence Regional Vologda, Unlngred, Riga, Kaunas, Kiev, Kharkov,
Ural^Srordlovslc and probably Odessa and Tiflls. each of those regions sorrtrols sir defense operations in its assigned ana. sitter through tho regional control oaator or through subordinate sector control eentere, of which each region has at least tsroQ lateral communication cxlstc between regional headquarter a, and between sector control centers <>
lso reporting directly to central PVO headquarters aad Uaked to the above regions fay lateral communication, is ths Baku Air Defense Region, which apparently centrals air defense operations la aa area ringing the Caspian Sea an ths west, north, end east, extending probably aa far east aa Ashkhabad, The vital ctrategle iaportance cf Of the petroleum industry located within the region, plus its relatively expeced peripheral position, haa lededtrong, well-OBsrdinated air defence system,,
8, Outside the Eur ops an complex is tbs Air Defense Organisation af the Par Eaet0 Tola system operates directly coder the Coaaunder-in-Cbief, Par East, who assigns aonoe of reaponaibllity to the subordinate ccnaaads but exerclees coordination aad control frem Dstbsrawako This Par East organisation apparently eperatcebeing subject only to policy directives on air defense Betters froa higher headquartara In
ther Forces Available for Air Defence, Aside froaracc presently assigned or attached to the PVO regional headquarters, there are numerous other unite and organisations which contribute to
soviet air defense potential,. These include i (a) tho air defence oosayouuiito of tha Soviot foroaa abroad, vuah aa tha oroup of Soviat foroaa in (toroanyi (b) thaateilite and Chine aa comanlat air dafanaa foroeai (a) tha air dafanaa eonpsnsnta of tha Soviat feavyj (d) tha onti-aireraft artillery aeaigned to tha Soviat army; and (a) tha Soviat uetieal air foroaa. All of thaw forces, insofar aa thsir air defsnse Dilations are concerned, ara probably linked with ths rTO Strany, though DOt aubordlikitc to It. Antiaircraft unite of tba Soviet Amy and fighter reginente af tba taatleal air foroaa aay act only have local air defense missions in the area where they are deployed, bat say bo assigned or attached to the PTO regional headquarters ehoold the naed arise, finally, tbs Soviat civil defense organisationlthoosh under tha WD, is believed to eons under ths localcontrol of the rVO-Strany daring air attaaks.
Tht KARLI tARNTSQ AMD AIR DEFENSE CONTROL STSTEM
t present the pariphsral radar aat around the borders of the Soviet Onion is fairly oojapaete, Uthaugh aape are believed to exist in coae arose. Most iBportant areas in the Soviet Far hast
and tha area fron Murmansk to Ashkhabad in the Uootom USSR are
believed to be well-covered by an early warningnetwork, which
includes extensive radar, visual and sonic systems We do not have
sufficient intelligence toirs evaluation of ths
]
warning eyateB In th* interior areas to the eastt ef the Urals but we believe that coverage probably alao exlate ln nany of those areaa. What the USSR laoka in quality of lone; range radar performance, it haa Bought to eoopeneete for by the quantity of radara employed in de^th, rom available evidence the USSRppr*tfiatee that the organisation for UaaesrtHeting and acting upon early warning date la at leaet aa lnportant aa the radar itself* and haa taken atepa to back its radarood reporting ays test.
The Army* aavy. Air Foroe, and UVD ell have units ve aid in the detection of hostile aircraft, which are incorporated la the national UK ayiten. Air Force EM units are asBlgnsd areaa of reeponaibility, snd integrated Into the sector or regional aat ia the area where they are atattooed- Basal early warning foroas are aaaigned areas adjacent to Bevel baaea and lnportant sea approaoboi. Amy units' are deployed In areaa adjacent to lnportant amy field forces and installations, la the interior of the USSR, the EJI set Is under tha operational eontrol of PVO Strany and ita subordinate eoheloas*
There la evidence that the Soviet early earning ayston haa been substantially extended
iadicatee that9 sind particularly in tha la at few months of that year tbs oarly yarnlnj facilities ntrs aaUrlally Increased. Farther ere, sir wsrninc nets sre now In oo la to no* that ere connected with major troopartis ularly in Germny. end with unit* of the foreos of the Far Kast. Suoh nets wrcr* observed to pass traffic of the risual spotting type, mash of it actual track* rather than practice* The number of suoh nets was sstlnatcd0 at.
here haa alsoteady growth in the air earning network for the Croup of Soviet Occupation Faroes Oornany from autnmo9 through the spring Hathta* was known of this aetwerk9 and probably none existed. This laereae* probably rerwdns oaphaala co tho air defonss of the Scrlct Zona. Thereo eridenoeinal static level ha* yet been reached 0
By0
that,
warningoth radar end visual spotter types, bad been Installed In increasing numbers along the periphery ef the USSK. Including sane remote Icocllticc. Bya patterned build-up of voatnxncatlaoa facilities, particularly along the perimeter severed by ton Tactical Air Foroon of the Far Eastern kllltary District* suggeete'l an overall atrenjpihening ef
air defense faeilltlsSo BrX thero nore indications thateast four separata air warning note were in existence in the Per Easternee If lo program also in believed to be vol! under way to sakeapabdlltiee of the Satellitea more effective*
l5o Tiaual Warning Networks Tied in with the elootronie earning eyetemupplaoaatalnetwork known as the THOfi (Sluahba Vesdushnege rSablyvdsayavyasl "Aerial Qbeervatien, Warning, and Cccwnanoaticot oonsista of too services: Troops VHOS and VNCS Strany.. Troops VNOS ia organised primarily for ths early sonio and visual detection of aneay aircraft to warn troop units against attack} it is manned by Amy personnel and forme an integral part of field armies* Information cellos ted is also forwarded to PVO Strany0trany plays in the borneole similar to that of troopsts peats probably are manned mostly by Army pareunia)Vp although in aany areas there are auxiliary pasta manned by civilian memberso
BOS air warning reginenta, battalions, and oompardeB are integral units of PVO Corps, divisions, and brigades assigned to PVO Stranyo The VHOS company consists of numbers of observation pests (military) and auxiliary observation units Ths number of personnel assigned depends to some extent on the location
and air traffic expected to bo ar*ountercd0 Thaompany Past (collection canterefined sector) usually hocpoets free whlah It eolAsetn and filter* early warning Information,, This information io in come caaec eonsolidated with and follows the eano ehannelB aa that received fron eleotruole warning posts, although distinct VNOS reporting channels have also been identified* Tobservation post* have been located in tho USSR. The area* of moot oonoontratad vienal/aonic cue ui'age era in the wast fron the Baltic to the Black Sea and in tho Par Seat fron Vladivostok to Ritolacvek0 Most pacta In important coastal and land approaches haveour to eight sdle spreadc The major posts usually have teams of four or fiveuxiliary (elvilian) poet* arc organised in regions vtaae there arc no military poota and are found in such locations a* light-housesg weather stationsB forestry stations, eta? There In net ouch evidence a* to th* extent ofoverage in the intcrlea* US3i, although it may be fairly extensive 0
he 3NI3 (SXuahbavyari) is the Soviet lavy counterpart of the VHCS and ls usedimilar ssuuwr. Uaval coastal obeervation pscta arc organiaed with Ravy peraoanelc end like naval radar stations, send Eft* informationevel Collection CentorD where lt is integrated into ths regionalrtwork.
18* Satellite Early TTarnlnc Systems. owing earlyof the European Satellite* ia an extension of, and ieIn with the Soviet early Turning system, rhile probablyby Insufficient eleotronle equipment and trainedauppleiasnta and further extends Soviet detectionexample,that EST Infornation
fron the Southern European Satellites is transmitted direetly to tho Soviet systea* Ths Satellite radar net is supplemented by an extensive risual/soalo early warning network, whioh today forms the prinoipal element of the Satellite early warningimilarly, Soviet early warning in ths Far East is extended into Chinareater preponderance of radar than la new credited to the European Satellites* Tbs present deployment of known radar in China slums oorapUeta ooastel coverage as far south as Hainanew installations inland around important bases er cities* troth cf this radar net is also supplementediSuel/ecnis net, the extent of which la not known0
ilter Center Facilities, formation from early warning radar and observer posts is collected at sector and regional filter centers. Ths radar organic to any fighter divisions stationed in tho area also is tied into those centers, where there is believed toommand element with operational control of tbs air defense forces in ths aaatcr or region. Each center coordinates and controls the air defense operations undertaken by its loner echelon
tioir, truthwhich Istefinitc Wrritorlal Fighter intersopt operations within thlo urea arc usually aontroll^ by the fighter- dirtaionm than* tbs carps, whieh arc staffed to provide tha Air Seotlon ia the filtor center ahara figtrber operations are oocrdiiiatad with other air defense
lpaont eaployed la Soviet filter Qcntoro ic not kuowc^amiliar with both Allied and German World War II cystoma and oethoxis ef filter control. The efficiency of Soviet filterfacilities seems high at present in decline with aeall sumbure of oirfK-aft, although tha evidsnaa thus for obtained app&ieo to conditions favorublo to ths Sovietfts4ima.tr ho* efficient euoh facilities vould be in dealing vdth Sars*air attacks.
nindimatao that tho normal time lag botwemn the receipt of air warning Infcraationilterand itsoumably afteric about os* ta &ro flAnotos. Since the normal timo required to trunfiait an air tawrning scooaga io abaut thirty ceaonds, any givon air warning radio station can transmitdetection reports on four targets during this Interval, ris&blllty el filtor cento? operation appears to bo cmphaciaedrn the Far Facto The filterat several Pubcrcilnato FarhsuiaV quarterop in addition to uaijrttlning normal close ca^dinfltioa an rogardn all sir varning activities, are known to have aaahansod areas of responsibility in ooToral large sonic air warning eaarpiaas;,
21. Tho effect cf this syatom of control from unit up through scoter to regional control points* has been to alter the Soviet sir defense eye tee fron one of defended points ss In rerld tar IX, to one of defended areas* Tnis system is acre ia keeping with ths high nobility (despite ita limited renge) of the principal inter-oeptor weapon,lthough the paint system is still utilised where concentrated AA defences are found 0
The reporting ecmpeneat of the En* system ia oonsidered to be currentlyigh state of readiness, especially in tho' "eri* time end Sakhalin regions of the Far Eaat and prefeebly also la the Caucasus and around tha periphery of European Russia. There are numeroua reports of rapid and efficient oosneinioatlooe between radar locations, filter eentere, and control palate. There have been frequent small eeals ar drills largelycoter basis* together with regularly eoheduled aa>ar drills for tht purpose of coordinating these defense sec tore within the everell early warning systamo Tho aosnaaxlsation and roportlng drills also include past* islpation of the vlsuel oboerver eysten, whlah evidenceee as beingood state of training and readiness in thone areas share lt ban been cheersome radar posts in ths Far East area are known to beay. Some indications of roundemanning have alao been noted la the Soviet Zona af Qereeay and in European Russia c
-
top-segreil
SOVIET IffTKROEPTOR FORCES
Wa believe that Soviet interception acpabllltlaa are steadily increasing under tho impetus of extensive re-equipment of training progress. Almost half of th* operational strength of the soviet sirs ocnpeoed of fighters, and these foroe* are being rapidly re^equippedlroraft 0 The fighter* available for Soviet air defense include not only those assigned or attached to the PVO Sttway but alsoighters sssigned to the tactical air aradea, the Soviet navy, and the Satellite and Chinese Coanuniat sir foraes not otherwise eoandtted0 Aoosrdlng to Soviet dec trine tha PVO interceptor forces would bo augmented by aircraft of these other ferces as may be reowever, th* ability of the control not to absorb additional fighters nightimiting*2 thaighter etrnngth available for air defease af the DSSR,rses in Eastern Europefl Homahuria, and China wasollower
PVO
Air Forces
navy
Area
Satellite Air Forcen
2*t0 Taa IA PTOo Tba operational intarasptsffo at present under ths control of BPfiSELSBe. aro Bsali?lod to the Fighter Aviation of Air Defense (IA WO) one of ths chief eubheodquartere of the PTO. These interoeptcre ara ovgardeed into IA PTO Armies, vhlch era asaigned to key areas only, and vhose headquarters arc believed to be at HMeov, Leningrad, Kharkov, Baku, and possiblyhe state of training and combat readiness of the IA PVO ia* probably at least ao high as that of other Soviet fighter units* Ve cstlaate that thetrength cf these armies is as fellowo-Actual operational etrength asft1 ia estimated to betrength*
eriouo deflcieney of tho Soviet air defenceto exist In ita lirrltod Interception oapabilitica underof poor visibility. The training program currentlycontrolnight, and inatrueont flying. Theof training, particularly in tbeeo respects, ia not eonaidnredUS atandarda, although anphaaie haa bean placed on this type There la no evidence aonflrning or denyingtraining against ansa or eaturatlon attacks. Air dafaneeexercises, stash are lnoreaaing both ln number* and in scope,ieproring the operating effioianey of the ayatea. bat th*fluffielent quantities of AIalmost oertalnly lapoa**handicap on Soviet
16. Taetioal Air Forcesc Th* air forces supporting the Soviet Aray are organised into Ik tactical air arale* and four WUltary Distriet All- roraea. Three ofrmes (the fcth, Shth.art of another (tbere stationed outside the bordere of the ussr, The other eleven are deployed in Soviet border areaa. Scan military distrlat air foroe* also have fighter units, Tbelr presentighter strength is aa felloe*.
TOP-SEGREIs.
MD AIR FORCK
ND AIR FORCE WRITS
KD AIR FORCE
KD AIR FORGS WIST
27 Observation of tha activities of tha fighter alomenta of the tactical air armies shows that theyonsiderable proportion of their tactical training to ground controlled intercept problemso This tends to oonfira other reports that the tactical air arsd.es are reeponeibla for intercepting hostile aircraft in their aaaignsd territorial are as The probable assignment of tactical air armies to the multiple missions of seeking air superiority, interdict ion, ground support, and air defense wouldroblem in case these air armies were withdrawn from their present areas in -vent of warn In this oaae we believe that as the taotioal air army fighters moved forward, IA PVO fighters might move in end assume tho fighter defense responsibility in the areas vacatede This would resulthinning of air defeiuwe unless additional IA PVO units were created, as would
be likely- Another possibility would be for tbe Taotiesl Air Armies concerned to be assigned additional fighter strength to provide both for ground support to the land armies and defence of tbelr present territorial areas as well- In either event, some dsaline in Soviet Interception capabilities night result in the early stagear-The fighter units which deployed forward in support of the ground forces would be assigned tha mission of providing air defense Ln the area between the front lines and the forward limit of IA PVO responsibility, and their operations In these anas would be tied ln with the PVO system in the USSR itself.
23- To dateortion of the IA PVO, tactical air armies, and Fleet Air Foroe have been re-equipped with jet fightersignificant interception deficiency exists in the presencearge nmwber of piston -engined aircraft in operational units -While there is every indication that all fighter units -ill be re -yquipped with jet types, conversion training by unite now rc-equipping and units still equipped with piston=englned aircraft willransitional period of relatively low effectiveness for the units Involved. We estimate that this re-equipment period will be completed lnnd the transitional training period by the closeU, although the IA PVO foroec, buoauee of their high priority, nay be re-equipped sonewhat earlisr.
29o Satellite Forces* The Satellite interceptor forces in Europe now consist mostly of plston^engincd fiinters, although all
except Albanian have been equipped with United muubers of Jet airor aft> Poland at present has tho most effective air defenseA new air defense organizations OPL (Oborena Preseciv Latnieao) was established0 along Soviet lines c. Although there ia little information concerning coordination oetueen OPL and PVO, the presence of Soviet military personnel in ooramand and staff positions of OPL* together with the recent assignment of Jet aircraft and modern groundndicates that OPL mayaluable adjunct to the over-all defense of tha USSR,. Present actual Set fighter etrength (ell in the OPL) is estimated et eighty planes0 There is recent evidence that similar air defense organisations are also being established In Czechoslovakia and Hungary^
30, The intercept capability of Satellite fighter units ie considered negligible against high flying boabers and probably only fair against medium and low flying bombers* with tho degree of effective nana directly rolated to the vtstbilityo The main ruUanoo for interception of hostile aircraft rests at present on tho Soviet air force unite stationed within these countries.-, However, Satellite interception capabilities will probably
31 Ths China-Manoburij. Korea areaomrminist Jot Interceptor foroo of considerable size, ocmposed of Chinese Comma--nist, Soviet and Korth Korean uniten The air defense system appears to bo organised along lirus similar to that in the Soviet Union
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itself and probably ia boinp integrated into tho over-all plana for dcfsnse of the Soviet Far East* Available evidence indicates that for purposes of command and control this area is divided Ksographioally into air defense regions. As jet fighter strength has increased, the disposition of jet units has spread generally fron Kanehurln into China proper0 Concentrations of jet fighters, augmented by piston-engincd units, exist in southern Manchuria, thear*a, Shanghai, Hankow, and Cantono These forces could be used against air attacks launched across the foregoing areaa against Siberia.
irfields. Since the end of Worldhe Soviets haveevelopment program of airfield improvement and construction whlah is constantly increasing in tempo. An airfield Improvement programatural corollary to the re-equipment of units with higher-performance airoraftc In the past three years the Soviets have accelerated developmenttring of airfields withrneet or longer in the Western Satellites stretching south from the Baltic Sea toward tho Black Sea, and since the beginning1 there hasarked increase in runwaysfeet or longer. Tho Soviets have also devoted increasing attention to jet airfields In tbe woaturn part of the Soviet Union and have continued to improve airfields in the Moscow area. There hasteady development of airfieldo ln the Cauoaaua and extensive work on air bases in China-. Air facilities along air routes fron Central and
Eastern Soviet Union to and within China have also boen developed* Steady development of air facilities In the Haritisju provinces end on the Chukotski and Kamchatka peninsulas have been indicated. From the etandpoint of defense, this airfield programetwork of baees capable of supporting large-scale jet interceptor operations^
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERT
33. Soviet entlairoreft artillery (AAA) capabilities have smrkedly inoreeeed in tho pent few years, owing largely to tho introduction of new nodal guns and fire control equipment* At present about one-third of the known Soviet AAA strength is disposed in the eastern and western peripheral areas of the USSR end ie available to protect key areas from hostile attackc
3b* Soviet AAA units consist of two distinct categoriee, strategic and tactical* StratoUc antiaircraft artillery, with heavy, medium, and light guns,earchlights, and barrage balloons, ia an integral pert of PVO Strany* It ie organised into PVO brigades, divisions, and corps*
35. Tactical antiaircraft artillery unite consist of independent divisions and the organic antiairoraft artillery within ground foroe units* Tho AAA division,trength of, is the basio antiairoraft unit and is allotted to the various fronts, army groups? and armies as requiredo The exact composition of these divisions varies, eome having two regiments of medium artillory and
two light AAAhile otb-rs hove one regiment of medium end three regiments of light weapons.. Moreover, in the pivaent Soviet Amy ell ground combat units of regimental sis* and larger have erganio AA artillery, with light weapons predominating. The USSR haa0 of the9 AA guna, and we estimate that at09, guns are available.
16 The USSR la engagedrogram designed to atrentthen existing AAA defenses through the Introduction of the new estimatedm.m- guns and improved fire control equipment.-. These new weapons are probably now available In Boderate quantities around tba most lnportant areea. In the Moscow area, for exaarla, visual observation indicates that in tba past year an obsolete andantlalroraft artillery system has been replaced by tho enpleea* went of atew guna of them. caliber, lt ia estimated that anew guns are available, which with the remaininga. guns amices Moscow the aost heavily gun-defended city in the world- This heavily defended area haa an obter perimeteradius ofoiles centered at the Kremlin, which appears to encircle thenother ring of gunsadius of five to nine riles consists of somenown batteries. While the new medium AA gun (est,as probably now been issued to troops, available evidence doea not permit an estimate as to how many may be operational at this time- Units employing AA rooksta or guided missiles may also be available,
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37- Increasing Satellite antiaircraft Capabilitieo add to ths depth of the eastern and western peripheral defenses of the USSR* Satollito AAA forces are being developed by the USSR toarge share of the strategic defense of ths lines of onmrauiica tion and to provide an outer belt of AAA for additional air defense protect ion n
MILITARY PASSIVE DSPSHSS MEASURES
380 Reports and photo nlsslona reveal activeispersal of equipment, and uae of underground installations ln tba Par hast and in the European Satellites. However, observers from Moscow, Leningrad, and other strategic centers of the European Russian interioroticeable lack of passive defenseesutions in these areas. The types of caraouflago used by tha USSR in World War II and in Korea are indicative of those which will be employed in the future o Skillful uae of natural camouflage can be expected of Soviet military forces.
irfields in Kwantung Province, Sakhalin, and the Par East generally employ earth revetmunts for aircraft, large dispersal areaa, underground storage, and protected repair shopsc The 2bth Tactical Air Army in the Soviet Zone of Germany has prepared dispersed all craft revetments and conducts frequent air alerts to provide real' istie training. In Hungary andt has been reported that underground wartime command posts and filter centers have been
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renovated,. Futnr* ailltary facilities will probably includeterrsncen eonatruction, perhaps including aircraft hangars Q
Passive defence indoctrination In meet of tht Soviet military forees in peaestlne appears to be llnlted to that received through basic instruction and fron field annuals. Defensive as noil as offensive ehenieal warfare instruction ie provided in short oebool eoureee for eott Soviet officers and HCO"e. Tber* ie no current evidence cf instruction in troop unite regarding biological warfare, but lt ia believed that thereiscernible trend toward tba expansion of official allitary inatruttion to enbreec defense against atonic and gorn warfare
SOVIET MVAXEK3E3
al* Ths air defense preparations of ths Scarlet naval forces are consistent with tba prlnarlly defensive role of the bulk of the soviet Navy, Operatingnshore around large portoviet fleet units with thsir early warning radar and antiaircraft batteries, ere isportant eoaponenta of the overall air dsfense eysteoo All fecilso of ths various fleets, such ss aircraft, radar, antiairoraft batteries, and ooeaundcations systems are probably organiasdhief of Staff far Air Defeases. Siaes each of tbs alx Soviet fleets bas its can air feroe, lt can ba sconced that cash fleet lo organised so as to fully utilise ell its facilities for air defense in its respective area0
against aerial attack oa coastal
aroas laaval recpoiajibilityo The areaa aha re tht Navy apparently haa urinary air defense reaponaibility oret* Sea, the Baltlo Sea, pertiorta of the Black Soa, tha Port Arthur area, and the Russian coast between theSR border ando latitude. The areas of greateet concentration of naval air defenses in the Far East are Vladivostok and Fort Arthur0 Naval aircraft would also be available at Sovetakaya Gaven and ln southern Sakhalin> In seen cases when US aircraft have been interceptedP aa ia the Baltic, Black Sea, and Far Raatigh degree of oonbet readiness has been demonstrated.
bjc Thetrength of the naval fighter farose asaircraft, anf which are Jots. The fighters of the various Fleet Air Faroes were estimated to be distributed as follows!
(South) Baltlo Fleet 6th (Horth) Baltic Fleet Northernleet Black Seas Fleet 5th Fleet Tth Fleet If
nknown numbers of piston-enginsd fighters are known to bs still operating in the 7th Fleet.
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Tbe fifhtw intercept wpabillty of these various fleet elr forseo nee increased ocoeidorably1 with the prearan of ocnverslon froa eonvonto Jet flghtora. Thle program baa been acceleratednd aa eatiaata that fighter units of naval Aviation will be entirely Jet equipped by add-iyft.
Ube Soviet naval air defenses include not only tho facilities of naval si swartafloat and ths naval air forees* butetwork of ooaetal radar stations, sup presented byip-baaednd SOTS) posts equipped with sound wave aaplifleroo eoaro blights, and viauel observation equlpaent. Since the Soviet bevy is also reepooaihle for ooast defense, it controlsshore eased AA batteries. Havel AA units equipped withs0 andsio gua* have been Identified. We estinate that about one-third of ths total naanar of Soviet naval personnel are, ia one nay orart of tbe air defease cystenA
t preeont too Baltio area and the Far East area around Port Arthur and Vladivostok are the stoat heavily defended fleet areas. Tbe relatively light defenses of ths long Arctic and Horthern Pacific Coast areas undoubtedlyeflectiononfidence in natural obstacles( plus distance froa ths population and industrial centers of tho USSR, to preeervo these areas froa severe eaevy attack.
Thero -Mill probablyteady Increase In naral PVO strength through ISA* reflecting the aaas type of increase ia the Soviet aavy ssnsraXlTo It is not expected that the eiee of toe fightw payment vlll expand sidastantislly bat the conversion to Jet fighteie will continue. The creationeparate travel alnietryhe naval bunding prograa, ths appalntaont of the vartine sssal Coaadsaav KuZKTSOV as laval sinister In lySl all point to increasing evphaala on naval defenses.
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ECCaKsOC CAPABILITIES OP TEE USSR TO SUPPORT EPS AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
1* Aircraft* Ihe Soviet aircraft ladustry. which, was eppereotlylah priority poet-World War II alaalon of developing ahigh-altitude Interceptor, was producing operationalof jet fightersad by sdd-lQkfl had produced the prototype of Slaee the principal air-to-air defense veapoa for theiii still be tbe interceptor-fighter, we eatlaate that the USSR will continue toubstantial portion of it* alroraft production fecllitlee to producing interceptors for tbe defense of tha Soviet Bloc. Total production of jet fighters2 ia estiaatedircraft, KTG-lVs or variants thereof. Jet fighter proenctioa3 la eat lastedircraft,* proenctioaircraft.
e eatiaete that at least eight final aaaewblynd possibly sure, ere prcccatly prodweias;ightersate ofar year) aad that additional rectories sre engaged ia producing cessrsassaae for this fighter. In contrast only one pleat (poaelbly two) le preeently known to be producing aediwa bosbera, while three pleats arc producing light jet boabere. Ia teres ef cirfraac weight, Jet fighters produced1 amounted to aa eetlaated total0 pounds while bestoers of all types0 pounds. It ic unlikely that aircraft
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plant') capacities will bo Inoreaaod materially between now andpresent capacities would be first expanded to
should this be ecwud.dered necessary by the USSR-) riven allowing for the production of other aircraft, the present Sovietndustry has the plant capacity, utilising present models, to product' an0 fighter aircraft par year, although lt woulc require et least two years to reach this rate. The present aircraft engine industry would probably be unable to neatequires* nt, but there ie eono evidence that an expansion ie under way*
lo Sxoipt for oertain potentially scarce eatarials, the use of which can probably be cinflaod by railflcations in design, the supply of rev. aatariala for aircraft production ia believed adequate| likawise, there are no serious liaitatioos in the quantity or quality Of technical pereonnel*
lu Elootronlco" At present, the capabilitieB of the Soviet Bloc eleotronics industry appear to be sufficient to support, extendj anderiod of tine modernise en early warning syateri, aa well as provide UHF and 6HT fire control and airborne equipi&ont for the Soviet six defense system- In addition to the Soviet electronics Industry Hungary, East Germany, and CsechoSlovakia also produce coosidereble electrode equlpnent9 It ie considered
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that somewhat over half of the Soviet1 production uaa Inspecially wariyearning and improved fire-control and airbornelthough the elootronlc industry has been operating at effectivemall) increase in allitary output could be realisedhort tine lag through the aurtailmunt of oivUlan radio manufacturing*
5o ^sponsion of electronic plants haa taken place1 in the USSR and Satellites, and is expected to continue.; It is estimated that the totalndustry output of the Soviet Bloc can reach ISO* of1 rate0 Firm evidence on many aspecte of Soviet electronics production capabilities ia lacking, but ua believe that these capabilities arc probably groat enough to provides (a) ground radar fornd fire control| (b) AAA proximity fumes) (o) missile guidance| and (d) airborne radar, in sufficient quantities to meet most critical air defense needs*
6c There are no serious economic limitations on Soviet capabilities for the manufacture of electronio air defense materiel in the fields of power or most typos of basic plant machinery0 However, the Soviet Bloc is at present partly dependent upon Western sources of supply for speoializjd critical production materials such as ductile tungsten and molybdcmaaiamond dies, good mice, and thin capacitor paperc The USSR is
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taking atepa to reduce this dependence which will probably decreaseh"
una and AernnltloBo During the peak produetiTS years of World War XI,f Soviet gm production oapaoity vas utilised ln tha produotlon of antiaircrafth0 forhe USSR is estimate to havefCO0 pieoea of ell calibers, of0 wars AA guna. The estimated rate of current production of AA guna of all types iao UpOOO per year,urrent production of atf then. guna annuallyo The present capacity of Soviet weapons and munitions plants, without physical expansion and without Halting other production substantially, is estimated0A guns per year. It is estimated that capacity to produce AA guns of all calibers could be increased to st0 and possibly0 guns per year, although this would ruquire an all" out effort* Any current limitation on the So volt AA gun production and utilisation is probably attributable tog (a) the relatively lower priority assigned to this program; and (b) present Soviet inability to provide adequate numbers of effective antiaircraft fire-control instruments. There ia evidence to indicate that this latter limitation is being overcome*
8. The Soviet Bloc appears to have adequate raw materials and plant capacity for the production and maintenance of amrouiition supplies^ During tho threo yuars ending in Julyfor example,.
tha USSR produced artillery ohella at an estimated rataillion par yaar* Baaed upon current production rates, plant
capacity and stockpiles, Soviet aiamunitioa production capabilltlae
appear adequate for any contingency durin- the period of this eetiaatac
9o although little is known about actual output figures, evidence Indicates Hubatantlal exieUng Soviat production of rockets and rocket propellants and explosives, sobs of which nay be of ii types- The USSR is capable of substantially increasing rocket production rates, including AA types*
here are no credible reports of the production of aa guided Tlsailea Howeverf there ie evidence that the Seriateevelopment program based upon Oerrnan World War II If the Soviets develop eatiefaotory missiles, we believe that they will,ignificant production oapacity for such idsslles between nowh->
IXTechnological Capabilities,. Despite the growing pool of experienced Soviet personnel at tbe product engineering and super" vioory level, technical personnel continue to beremium-- It suet thvs be difficult for the USSR to meet tbe demands for teoh-oloal personnel for new orroduction programs* The resultant effeot upon Soviet technological capabilities has boon reduced; however, by utilising foreign accompliannonts and by
standardising rdauirewonte and designs* Highertl technical schools in tha USSR have also been graduating well-trains3 studentsate comparabloas tbe VSc Inny aanu-facturlnn enterpriaee have established extensive on-the-job training progrssnt for junior engine are,nd produetion super--visor So
12- It has been argued that while Soviet technological oapablli' ties, in terns of trained manpower, may be adequate in the field of advanced basic research, theae capabilities are United in the field Of reducing ideas to practice,, However, thin does not appear to bo the case in those fields of endeavor receiving priority government attention* n those Industriesigh degree of technology, general simplicity in product design ia evident" In view of known quantity manufacture of some very complex producta, this Soviet tendency to avoid complexity is believed toesult of policy decision, rather than lack of ability o In any case, the resultant effect is to conciderably increase Soviet Industrial capabilities for mass production- More recent evaluations; of the products end methods typical of the Soviet engineering industries have provided frequent examples of excellent product design, efficient tooling and the use of good modern plant This trend* notables Inconsistent with limited ability to reduoo to practice* Therefore, we conclude that the USSR does notajor handicap in the shortage of technological skills needed to support air defense development and productionrovided
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Uwttoftm* pregrm oontinuss to basnKiclenUy
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Original document.
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