FIELD COMMENTS ON NIE-70, "CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA AFFECTING US

Created: 3/4/1953

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

ISTORICAL KEViEW0 mA

RELEASEAS

SECDHQrY IWGRIttTION

CENTRAL inTELLIGENCE

A3

IB40RAROTW FOR: IV. Allan Evans (OTR)

Colonel Geraldiwd, USAaptain Allen L. Road, DSN (HTfl) Colonel Jock E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2B) Captain John A. Holbrook, OSS (JIG)

Field CocmmmtaConditions and

Trande ln Latin America Affecting BSublished2

Attaohed far your lnforoatlon ore the connects of tho American Ltabeesy, Ckartcnola onhich the Denortrjont of State fcTvnrded to this Offloe onebruary.

PAUL A,sst. Director/Ada. notional Eetlmatea

Distribution nB*

copy

securm/lnfcklatioh

American Qabaasy, Guatemala City, Guatemala,3

Dear Mr. Armstrong:

With respect torequeet in your latter of December2 for ooaaaante on tba National Intelligence Estimate "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting OS Security"esire to draw attention to and oosraent on thla document's conclusion in Paragraphhat "It lathat tba CcDBunlata will gain direct oontrol over the policy of any Latin American state, at least during the next eeroroln appreciation which, in my opinion, may somewhat gloss over the Coram mist potential, at least In Qua taenia, for achieving results Just as injurious to the security of the united States by clever and effective concentration on Influencing events by Indirect aeana aa by concentration on achieving direct control of the GoTernaent'a polloy-aaJtlng apparatus.

1 In Guatemala, our observation baa been that the Comnuniete have thus far dedicated rather minor efforts towards obtaining control of tbe openly established policy-making positions but have rather aimed at installing their poopie ln poaitlona which will give leverage over influential groups ln order to achieve their alas. Thus they have achieved control of the Executive Committee of the Confedernoion General de Trnbaladoree de. Guateaalahe national Laborarge measure of InniMnce orar the frttfoderafllon Haelonal Cermoslna de. teenla,he agricultural federation; leadership of the SIndicateTrabajadoros de Edugaclon de. Guatenalahe teachers' union; key positions intltuto Ot^tcnalteoo deSocialho wealthy Gov:meant social security agenoyi closeolicy-making role ln the offlolal end pro-Government press and radio; and substantial Influence over the actions of the major nationalist "revolutionary" parties on uhioh the Administration boson Its organised politioal support. Additionally, In the current Congress they chose the Special Cccsalttees on Agrarian Reform and Labor Cod* Revision ae tba cocreitteoa to dominate ond, principally through tbe CGTG and CNCG, ore now attempting to establish their ascendancy over the ednlnlBtratlve machinery created to carry out the Agrarian Reform Lav of On tbe other hand, so far ae can be doterainod, tho Coanunists have concentrated little or no

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effort to obtain control of tbe Arced or Pol loo Force e, the Foreign Office or other such key policymaking bodieo which would behorter route to gaining direct control orer the policy of Ouateaala.

Thin pattern of penetration, while it does reflectCcaaainlet realization that their doaestlcforeign support la presently inaufflolent to hope forfistnbllshnentPooplo's Deaiocracy'1 inillunlnatlng of the real Conamlst object ire here. clearly to ao disrupt the country's internal structurerelatione that ita integration into tbo cocoontbe Western world will belninun, particularlyto those efforts designed to safeguard thiseventual dondnation by the Soviet hcetolnnd ofCocrJunists themselves hove sold as much, for instance,the end of their local "Peace" ceaujoign aa"imperialism" will not be able to exploit the country"war preparations'*. To sohieve this aim, theused the leverage of tbe organizations theyride front whieh upeeta the tranquility ofrelationship to tho Western cornsinity. Thus theyup such measures as labor and social securityAgrarian Reform botheans for capturingthe Ul-definrd desire for pro preso of liberal groupsimportantly,eons of fomenting debilitating;and dislocations. They havo also, however,tendency to nationalism and autarchy which mightbreak down the ties and good relations of Guatemalaunited States end its friends. (For Instance, in thecenpoign, Sr. Jose Ikumel Fortuny, Secretarythetldo OuntePaltoco de. Trabajg. wnmlydenand for higher tcriffo of tbe General Associationa rrarnifncturera' and businessmen'sconsidered "reactionary" hy tbo Coeramiste.) Theof theee dynanle and potentially antl-Anericanthe cardinal reason for ths "Patriotic Front" which theannounced ao their tactic ln their Prrty Congress(my do snatch, January. jftyj*

To view the situation here in porapoctive, then, it le ^ 'tod or that the neutralizing' of Ouatemala as

a Western notion is the iaac^Qtc. Ccerainlst objective andci+rthis is done by fjolnlnc direct control over

policy or by indirect but wider exorcise of influence is a k

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question of means to achieve tbat objective, not the objective Itself. Thus If the degree to which Caonuniots hero gained direct oontrol of the Government la used aa tbe scale fortheir success and potential, there is dangeristaken eatlaate for the evidence appears to be that tha Coamunlato thanselvoe uaa the degree to which they can achieve theof the country ae their own scale for Dossurlng suoosso.

The most recent deveJoreasnte in Guatemala, concerning the raooval of the Supreme Court for opposing tbe Arbens adrinistra-tlon In an Agrarian Reform decisloo, provide an excellent example of the degree of suoooeo that the Communists already have ln stimulating and exploiting events indirectly through ita inter-loo kinr machinery (my telegram, Februaryndfore the Ceanunist Prrty, barely eighteen months after it esse Into tha open and fifteen months after It established oontrol of tha GOTO, set itself an Immediate goalthe rapidup of largo forms and liquidation of tho power potential of the landlords by unrelenting application of the Agrarian Roforn Lev which was guided through Congreeo by moans of Sr. Gutlsrres' Special Conraltteo on Agrarian Reform. To carry out tola policy It asoned necessary that tbe Executive Branch Agrarian Rofcra authorities sot without check froa the oourts last the landlords slow up or block the Agrarian Reforn through protracted legal proceedings, but onhe Supreme Court In the cose of Sr. Ernesto Leal Pores In effect ruled that appeals could be nade to the courts vhen the author!tiea exceeded their legal limits. The Coanunists then mobilised th* CGTCGnmralgn to have the Supreme Court Justiceo who made this ruling ousted and, acting in harmony with President Arbens, the Communist and pro-canonist Administration lenders in the "revolutionary" partiesuccessful floor fight in Congrees with the galleries rocked with CGTC workers to have the Justices removed for In ao doing, tho Con^reas swept aside the Independence of the Judiciary snd exposed tho flimalness of Guatemalan daoocracy, an acoorrplishoont which Illuminates ihat the Communists can already do by manipulation and Indirect oontrol andubstantial quo otion whether in the next several years they nay not be able to perfect and extend their machinery to such an extent that they will be able to achieve their ends without rieking en effort to obtain direct control.

Tha foregoing lo, ofrooentatlon to drawto the possibilities which tho Communists have of realizing their objective through Indirect, rather than direct, means and does not outline the antl-Corxsanlat eountorvel'hta which

are present and potentially Important in tho current mixed Guatemalan situation, hat the actual result will bo during the next several years will depend In part on the outccrte of the Interplay ofocciur.ist and antl-Cccrainiat factors in Guatemala and,arge extent, on the ability of the Unite> Status to align ito policy to advantage in the shifting scene that tboss years will doubtless present.

Sincerely yours,

Rudolf E. Schoenfeld

Original document.

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