reiCHXOGICAL STfUTEGT BOARD ttui,
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCHXOGICAL STRATEGI BOARDi
SDSJECTi Ilea fox PsYjiiologlosl fcploltatlon ofeath.
The attached revised draft oonUlcln* tbe latesta olrenlated for TOta-eUp action at yonr earliest eccTenleDoe, In accordance with theafltructions of
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CF PSTCtPLOCrCAL KXTLOrTATIONTALIN'S PART I TWTBODXTION
ft* Tba probleo la tolan of peyohologioal cneraticoapartonTr-beDsive^e* 4cato*/o7 prograa for thatbe tr-rafer of power to new heads In order to Bake
real progress toward our national objectives.
b, Ro once-for-eJl peyobologioal plan is poerlt-le In tbe preaeat situation. Psychological operations, like other actions. Bust be capable of rapid aad flexible adjustaent to changes in tha situation. trong, high-level, continuing Interdepartmental working group sbocld be especiallyto keep peyobolagioal plans and operations under continuous, rerlew and ln harmony with national poll ay.
a. Psychological operations by toaaaelvee oaanot bare ariffieiatrt Impact on tba Soviet eyatea to produce those changes 'which we vould re sard es real progress toward our national objectives. They can onlyto the nooeas of dlplaaatio, political, military, and eca-weda aatlona takan by the Dhltsd 3tates Cucei uasat, orra-see* which aaerge VA within the Soviet ays tea Itself. They ahould be folly geared intorograa for tbe exploitation of
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pel lev. The aeeunptlons adopted for tbe purposes of this paper are set forth laelow. If these assumptions era ln error, the plan far psychological operations will bare to be adjusted accordingly.
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It is asejmsd that tho fundaneotal objectives of the United States witho tbe Soviet system renain as stated la the relevant Nationta Security Council pepera, najwly,,, an!. In essen?a, tleje fuaZaaectal objeotlTL'S are i
(1) agetraatloc of Soviet power and influence
frca the satellite? aad Cocwr?ist China andeduction of Soviet rower and iid*luaace ln world affairs |
(2) to fcrJagundanental ohaags la the nature of the
Sovietwould be reflected above all In the conduct ofrelations by the Soviet reglaaanner consistent with the spirit and, purpose of tbe United Nations Charter.
b. It is assuaed that the United Stetes Gcvernaent intends toto tbe full the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and tbe difficulties' inherent in the transfer of power to aaka progresa toward these ends. .
o. It Isthat tha uMted States Oovarnn-int willrprfcheaaiva^/aad.prog,-aa ofwhatever dlp-loio&t:olitical, Kill tary, end econosdc aeasurea ere appropriate and are within ournit real progreta toward our national objectives aad that tola plan for psychological opera ticca, aa revised free time to tiisa is part of tela ^seolvo-ead^ integrated oaapaign.
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- peace. This will be Intendederious move which will, we hope,to serious negotiations for adjustment of these Issues. It followe, therefore, that tha sore sunt be treated and built uperious effort on the part of the United Statee to make progresseaceful world.
ctiactaituation*
a. Itean estimated that one of the Moot procdaing oppor-tuidties to make real progress twvd our national objectives with respect to the SoTiet syjten wa-ild arise following the death of Stalin. Thenecessity of transferring power to new hands, no natter how careful tbe preparations for it, has created-
for ecae tine end vhlch air, ia gue_cour3e. rer.:ltevere power Struggle Id the Soviet hierarchy. We should not be misled by thesaooth transfer of power, espotism can be ruled fjj thf long run onlyespot and hlatary ia etrevn with unsuccessful efforts toyrantommittee. Thereeal question whether HaJankov (or anyone else) will be able to bring or maintain all of the power factors under his iron control as Stalin did.
b. Among the facta which have already emerged, the following are of particular significance inrogram of psychologicaldesigned to support ourffort to make progress toward our
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(1) The accession to power of the new regime has been executed
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Tha reorganisation of the party aad governmental apparatuaa Hoes alooet identical to tha organisation enployed during World War II. This point* clearly to aa effort to concentrate powergeably eaallf bands aad to present, both internally andan imiressloa of hardness and unity aad continuity at the top.
f thedeserve special montlor. Fiiet, it coitiauss aa effort, under wry for eons tlao, to strangthfla its control ever *fce alii tary and to bid for Its loyalty. Second^ toe recently criticise! internal eeourity apparatus has been ooo-solldated and pla-ioo" for all to in the bands of tbe most experienced and ruthless polloeaan of tbea Third, there has been an extensive regrouping and consolidation of industrial and transportation and economic ministries, vith eoc-xol being placed in the band*ew lieutenants.
Tbe initial nrcncunceaects by the new regJnetbe leading role played by the Great Russian people. Tha funsr.-al speeches emphasized tbe aultlnatioaal character of the CSS*.. Thus the reglae any fear that tbe non-ftussian Republios as well aa the satellite states are of doubtful reliability and may have to be held la line by increasingly tight measures of repression. Tbe fact that Stalinsurgiin and Mklenkovreat Russian may have ayabolic significance ia thle oco-owction, Hawrver, the peoples of the Soviet Onion are definitely notajor role In the situation.
Beyond this, there la nothing at the present tlae which
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c. On tbe other bead, the very rapidlyhich tbe transfer of peer baa been effected, the nature of thie change, and the stringency of tbe controls that have been imposed, together with the speed with vblah Stalin la to be Interred and tbe vcrnlnge against "disorder and penis"
(en extraordinarily revealing quote froauggest that nervousness
and conoem over tbs stability of the new regiae are prevalent at the highest levelsi, as rereads lalenkov particularly, the eo'to consolidate both the paspff of the re^la* *bd bl* control ever it Is the overriding preoccu/a'don*
d. It Is probably aafe toaesune, therefore, that tbe reglae hopes to avoid aerious external dlffJculties until it has consolidated Its power ortruggle for power develops inay that one aspirant or another eeoa an opportunity to advance hie interests byan aggressive and adventurous course. However, it le also in the nature ofew regis* that lt net display Its hardness or, to state lt negatively, that it suet avoid any sign of weakness. On balance, therefore, lt. is concluded that i
(1) the reglae la unlikely to undertake any rash actions or drasutic new initiatives far eoae tiae.
(2} the new rules are likely to be acre "roymllet than tbs ling* In adhering rigidly for the time being to the policies laid down by Stalin.
(3) the new rulers will react proaptly, sharply, snd perhaps even excessively to any external threats,
^ae-evldcaee-avafclaale-te date-suggaete-teat tat regiesy-ee
part taaiajiy-eeaeeiaeeTbe new re glee ray be preguaed to be eon-
oerned for eome tin* with tha problcmr of i
the loyalty subservience of tbe satellite.
relatione with Ooaounlst China. . .
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(3) ths loyalty erf tbs trsf, U) .internal Mourl^,
ths attitudes erf rinorlty nationalities is the USSR.
part/ control of gorornaent end polloei oIom ties betveen party end people,
r. cf Ite overt attltudee toward the outalda world, the beolo concern of tho new reglae aal of Malenbov In partljnlar la with the oonsolidation of thoosition. JgQu -ffih%e saaaytwni en tee-nevel-ta-heoo>at elroeay ta^aeAlflaa* ay
mJ Serious* tth? regfaP gT gJaOfl ifjWanot prcheblc in the near future. Ie likely to arise oolr In clreapPtanoei where auch lesuea are too novel adettaitelr to be covered by polleiafeaU
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Strategic Concent.
plan for psychological operations must bo drawn uptrategic concept, although Ita formulation ie beyond,of this paper, lt haa been necessary to outline the main features ofconceptaels for the psychological plan. If tola conoeptthe plan for peychological operations will have to be
In accordance with our fundamental objectives and aaprcndelng *aye of making real progrese toward these objeetlvas,alms in the present situation are to use the opportunitiesStalin's death and the difficulties inherent in tbe transfer of powerhands. *
To footer any and all divisive forces within the top hierarchy of the Kremlin with particular reference to the Hal*nkov-8eria-*olotov- ulganln situation.
To stimulate divisive forces between tbe Kremlin and the satellite governments Including Gcaxvsilet China.
To maximize the disaffection between the peoples of the Soviet Onion and . . -
To oaxlalee the dlvielan between the peoples of the satellites. Including CoDckMiiet Chine, melenkov.
To maintain and Increase unity between the governmental leaders of the free
(6) To maintain and increase ths ucdtr between >
aatlons.
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o. Aafata.
Tha greatest asset ve have for all of these purposes la the 4yn*tde effective personality and position of President Eisenhower In the United States.
The second greatest asset la the dlplonatlc leadership we have in all International agencies, spearheaded by Secretary of State Dulles end. Representative Lodge.
Tho third greatest asset is our military potential, Including atomic weapons with deterring force and consequent feeling of relative greater security os tha part of those who asoociate with us.
(i) The fourth gnwtoft asset Is our economic strength with our tremendous production and our capacity to assist others.
rreetest llabilitias_arei
natural tendency on the part of other free nationsunited States top dog position.
In maintaining the Impetus of defense build-up
In the face of understanding desires for lower taxes, less military service, social security.
Danger of attitude of complete dependence of other free nations upon United States defense and economic strength.
One*siness of our associate? as to our own long-term economic and political objectives.
heritage of beavy debts and mistakes from previous years,
(1) Mala effort! stretap? of choloq. One of the most significant means of furthering tbe above alas ia to confront the oosaunlet rulers with difficult major choice*ay which does not ffiojjgfaj Jfcaaj to ej.ofo ranks,
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but which tends to isolate then and divide their ccjt-jh:^ r humanity, especially tha free world, vita bb. The Preeidantal above, ahould aerve this purpose.
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(2) Supporting effort*.
With reaoect to the comcunlst wo-ldi
We ahouldconfront the untried refine with other stimuli apt to provokeccasions requiring decision, or failures leading toavoid threats or aabre-rattling.
Ve should plague itbout reliability of key Individuals and groups.
We should foster internal entagonieas by other suitableuch as fostering natljnalistlc faallngs.
hould ocabino "carrot" end "stick" both ln direct support cf the main effort end In executing tha other supporting efforts. An essential feature of tho strstsgy of choicepush-pull" situation, cornclr.1pressures and Inducements which show tbe disadvantagesboice contrary to our Interests and tbe advantages of one which is favorable.
(a) FJ'jcttotions In direction and emphasisetwasn carrot and stick) should be used as an added mesne of confusion except where steadiness of tactics is desirablepecialf) Probing) below).respect to the frog grant*
(a) The most promising ways of furthering our alms with respect to the free world aret
&) to stress the Importance of Increased stength and unity by emphasising the new elements of danger and opportunl^ in the situation.
oillingness and desire to cooperate ln developing unity of effort by the free world. In this connection It will be desirable to approach our alliedpirit ofafive and.take.
<b) Ve ahould exploit thevw5enlng*rf ttes between
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the Kremlin endet partiesisetature, experience and idsologioal pre--see aa the mew leader 'ft _
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e noted that eons time nay elapse before the divisive forceen the present Soviet power *et-up can matureevere power strvgle. Initial and Intermediate actions, therefore, should notse the prospects of successful psychological action In theeveDt that the power struggle brocks In the open.
t. Ibases.
Initial ycirt. During the next few waeke, mnch risk and expenditure are Justified in order to prolong and make the most of the condition of nervousness following the sudden trarefer of power. The Presidential speech ie assumed above, specially for this reason.
Follow-un. It la most Important that tho spurt, particularly the Main Effort, should not be left as one-shot operation. Above all, an adequate "stick" should be ready for the expected Soviet evasion of thef the Presidential speech. Every energy must be employed to sake all seeds of disunity grow, for this purpose, many actions even if unlikely to produce great effect will be desirable for purpose of probing
to find out where the seeds are sprouting. Ifelve vsry favorably, this phase could eventuate in a
in which the communist system breaks Into open Thla third phase In our etrctegy should begin if and whenaeess near. If lt never comae, the strategy should still haveusefully to our basic purpose.
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PART II
PLAS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
importance of psychological press urea Ln the presentof sufficient ^ooent to wsjTant not only the concentration of allmedia upon the stated objectives, but also the resoluteexpanded and acre effective capabilities. Even sore essential,the determination to seize and consistently maintain thepsychological opetatiora imaginatively conceivsd and Fefore it can win the hearts or influence the intellects ofDoited States psychological strttegy must capture their
imagine ti one.
oa.'or hope of fulfilling the alms of this plan lies lngoverucent acts of psychologicl significance. Theaerxr.ed in Part I,. is the keystone upon whichprychological strategy le bssed. This assumed speech, endofficial actions which vould stem directly from it, need,be complarentederies of psychologically significant sets.ew of the overtr art psychological prograca propoaed lnparagraphs of tela section are Inte-ded primarily toand Intensify the psychological lmpeot of variousend military actions,
Operations,
For administrative reasons tbe present plan merely suomarltes the broad outlines of the effort called for in the field of oovart operations, but lt as-uues th this effort will be ad equate in its material scale, and sufficiently energetic and Imaginative la its
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o. In covert operation* ve ah mild be ruined in the propaganda field chiefly by teit of plausibility. Within thie limitation there should be broad acope and vide latitude of action in this field} and in theaction field ve shall, ae usual, be guided by national objectives and the necessity of avoiding provocationoint where solidification of the Soviet reglaeespooje by force sight result. Our covert propaganda should cot be concerned with consistency, either aa regards theses or as between areas. so long as care la exercised to svold actions which would be mutually self -cancelling or which would tend to undermine or discredit significant evert actions*
Overt Inforpwtlcs CyrBtlor.e* A. General
the possibilities for rapid Increase In cape bill tlee and
of our overt informatics programs
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of the present effort Is alreadyprograms are
called upon toital role la th* Uplamentatlan of th* plan and tha
J has been written byt of Stat* and therefore changes -
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fcr maximum energy, initiative and resourceful doss in developing theasks listed below is no less great than in tbe easo of covert operatione.
In the situation with which this paper deals, all governments and all peoples of the world may be assumed to be deeply interested, first, ln accurate reporting and interpretation of events ln the Soviet Onion and their consequences end, second, ln tho relationship of the United States to the situation and lta Intentions and its actions with regard to it.rimary responsibility falling upon official overtmedia Is to provide widespread factual coverage and rellabllementery, from original and attributable sources, on developments.ths statement of tbe President crystallising the sttitude of the United lta tea. This is the essential foundation upon which effective propaganda will rest.
Successful use of overt madia ln the operation win require careful coordination of all Esdia. Of special Importance will be theof official statements, inssaueh as such statements are the most effective weapons for overt use. Tbe watch occrdttee envisaged In thia plan must be specifically charged with alerting overt media in advance to forth coning actios and their significance. (For example,ublic statement be intended totrial bellooa,'l the overt media ahould be advised ln order to give lt aaxim-jn dissemination.)
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In pronaesnda directed to cany areas, much should be made of the fact that thiaine for purposeful, determined and united action on the part of tbe Vast.
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in regime, defectionigh priorityi. The principol role of overt media in this work le not the direct Inducement of defection but such indirect assistance as publicising defections when they occur and Indicating that escapees from behind the Iror. Curtain are not ret-imed to captivity.
Congreaslcnal and public leaders should be consulted with regard to exploitation of the new situation and particularly as to the lmpsratlve necesflty for mcintalnlng the continued building of defensive strength in the united Statesthe free world.
This plan should te under constant review in light of tbe developing situation.
B. Tasks
a. oviet Cnlor..
Without engaging in vituperative attacks on Soviet personalities living err dead, official overt meula should seek to accomplish the following tasks:
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To throw doubt on Ua stability of the leaderahlp of tbs new regime. In this connection It will be useful to cite history andexperts on Soviet affairs, such as Tito and former Ccnauniats, to exploit reports by former escapees who have been In the Communist apparatus of differences among the present leeders of the regime, to showespotismespot, to suggest that I'alenkov has not brought all the power factora under his eontrol and to Indicate that the new arrange-ner.te are not likely in the long run to function saootl ly, with tha resulttruggle for power, complete with purges, Is highly probable.
To exploit the fact that the reorganisation of th* Soviet government and th* Coaaunlat Partyather than de^entr*] x.
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and to question why thia ia necessary ln view of the Soviet cltda to Java the overwhelning eupport of th* Soviet peoples.
(3) To imply that although tie Rad'Army appears to have been induced to lend its prestige In rapport of the new reglne, tbe eilitary in fact he* not been given the rol* that lt ha* deserved on the basis of its service toeople of tr* USSR.
(a) To exploit plausible Indications that the leaders of the satellites, including Cen-munlst China, are not completely loyal to the new regime.
(5) To report factually any indications of divergence of policies or interests between sstellitee cr Communist China and tt* Soviet Onion.
it) To exploit apparent personal coolness between Kalenkov and K'*o, especially th* failur* of Mao to go to Moscow for the funeral of Stalin, inay ss to suggest t) at relations with Communist Chinapecial problem for the new regime.
(?) To provide useful advice to Soviet cititans on how to survive ln thle dangerous and unsettled time, thus contributing to th* psychology of Individual caution Impairing th* efficiency of the ays tea.
(P) To recall that the United States and other free nations do tot return to captivity escapees from cccsmmlst tyranny and to exploitscape of significant personnel from the Scvlet world.
(9) To provide renewed evidence of th* peaceful intentions of the free world by exploiting expressions of friendship for tbe Soviet peoplei and by recalling effort* nade by tbe United States and other of the United Nations to relp them during and lismediately after World her II.
To convey the impression that th* attitude of the United States Government la on* of "sharp watchfulness" end of ^cvarenssa tijit .
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new situation possibly contains elements of danger, whicf if they rre-.srlallxe will befirmly, and elements of hope, vblch if they materialise, willareful review of United States policies.
If and wl.en discussions take plsce between the Soviet Government and the united States Goven=ent end Ue fact is made pet lie, to exploit the development intensively in order to partrsy the serious purpose behind this action toessening of International tensions and, ln the event that lt Is net successful, to place the responsibility ecu are ly on the FS3P.
To. thoof Baa-tarn..Europe.
In tbe light of factual reporting and reliable interpretation of tbe evonts in tbe USSR and their consequences elsewhere, official overt Dodls should cany *vt in tba satellites of Eastern Europe the following tasks I
To maintain and ti invigorate the profound national Including religious, sentiments that have been stimulated by the events In the USSR.
To recollect In detail the Indignity and tbe exploitation suffered by the peoples of the satellites as tba result of their subjugation to the lnte -esta of tbe Kremlin, to give eynpatbetlo expres-slin to tbe fear that their lit will be harder rather then easier under the new. Inexperienced and Insecure regime and to suggest to leaders
of tbe satallites that they might take advantage of tbe presentto urge tbe Kremlin to relieve its pressures, particularly ocouacdo,be people.
0) ortrsy the united States aastrong, reliable power,
seriously determined V> advance the oeuse of freedom without general
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U) To nourish la the minds of the' leaders of thell proteges to one degree or. another tbe dead tyrant, doubts aaj
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their relationships with th* new neater* of th* Kremlin, together with encHU-ogeaent of .the consideration that theirnej dope adow regard for popular nationalist sentiments*,
(5) To recollect the sucoessful devletlic of Tito end the successful colltboratlon of Jugoslavia as an Independent state with other independent nations In ths free world*
(b) Tothat the Onlted States does not return escapees free countiles behind the Iron Curtain and to Indicate In detail thean nof escape* program.
Tc dlscou-agc excessive hopes snd consequent rash actions on the pare of the general population that Bight expos* patriotic citizens to harsh reprisal* at th* bands of uneasy leaderso
To disparage the stature of current leaders In the USSR and the eatollitee on the ground that >iao has now be coneeeing theoretician and revolutionary leader of international IP'TTllllff a
o. To Coccmlst. Chinao
In tbe light of factual reporting and reliableof events within the USSR and their consequences elsewhere,tadia should carry cut th* following teaks s
(11 To promote friotion at all levels between Chinese aad Soviet communist leadership by indicating, among other things, that th* Chinese Comrunlsts are tools nf the Kremlin.
(2) To fcoeat disunity between Kssoov and Peking regarding the yarttnuatlon of th* Korean War, byrowingmineti-ai la the United States to bring the Korean war to an end, by faro* if necessary, by planting doubt whether the Soviet reglsW. Jn
the period while It Is trying to ooniolidat* It*T "
up th* Chlneae Oommoalet* In th* mot th* ttrfted States] take* mora.,,
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action to and the Korean War, and by planting doubt about the stability of tbe new Soviet reglae and particularly about Halenkov'* ability to gather all the power factors under his control and to give Ideological leadership acceptable to Mao.
(3) To' exploit idecl->gieal differences and rivalry between Mao and Moscow,
(0 To sxpliitnceptloo of Kalenkov as anInferior and to build up Mac ar the real hslr of Leila and Stalin*
Tcdoubt whether or not agreements and com*tmente made by Stalin to Wto, especially as regards aid for the Korean War, will be honored by tbe new refine.
To *no*Juraga the belief that the Soviet Union leback dato rial aaiictance In order to keep the People's Republic adllt-rily and economically dependent.
easJtee&saVCte In the light of the experience of Tito with tie Soviet regime, his defection2 and his Implacable hostility not eImply to the dead tyrant but to the whole system embodied In the Kremlin and the Ccclnfora9 official overt media in output to Jugoslavia doei not need to labor the significance cf events In the USSR, but to carry iutlliwiog tasks i
Tc entourage the pride of the Jugoslavs la their escape of the dccination of the Kremlin and the disagreeableof present events In the nationsmlnated by lt and the Cosinfora.
To recall the mutually beneficial reeults ofollaboration with the United States and other free mUams^aaAj* develop oor.fidoooe la the securitybe derived from adactlsr fgfc
ooUabontlOB In th*
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(3) To maintain confidence ln tbe pcver.tbethe 1of tbe United States as the leader of the free
world ln tbe aituotlon now created*
em Eumpe fIncluding Oera^rj),
ia to Western Europe should have primarily the foll-ving tcslat
To emphasize, particularly by tha use of testimony by responsible Western statesmen end expertso7iet affairs, that tha threat to the security cf thi free world has net ln any way boon diminished by reosnt events ln the USSR,
To uertlons concerning the stability of tbe now regime and tbe possible da-igsrs arising from holerltov'a relative Inexperience, (Cautiont Do not Imply that there le Imminent danger of war*)
To emphasise the continuing character cf tha Soviet system regardless of Its Issdershlp, especially its lust for power, its ignorance cf the world, its debasement of culture, its perversion of education. Its scorn of religion and Its utilisation of anti-eetltlam*
To stress the need for prompt ratification of EDO and active support of KATO, as well as other constructive programs wbiab promote the strength uid well-being of rest em Europe and tbe free worlds
To point out'astern unity and strength at this Juncture of history are of decisive iaportano* and may wall eroate
range advantages for the free worlds
encourage the belief that tbe United State*and carefully watching the new situation In tbe OSSR into guard against th* dangers that may Inhere la It, and to tare
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cf whatevercoy appear to advance the cause cf fzsLdoa without general war0
(j) Tc stimulate confidenoe lo the steadiness, strength and reliability cf tbe UnitedIn Its role of leadership In tba free wcrld.
(f. To exploit tbe doubts and Insecurity, both personal and doctrinal, assailing Bashers of Gcnonciiat parties and frontinEurope, whidif already beset by Internal dissensions and loss cf strength Ir. nazy areas, nowtbe further pTotlen of adjusting to an uncertain sitlor. In .'x-ecow,
suggest that Halaekovroduct of tbebureaucracy, and having little or nc knowledge of theis likely to prove indifferent to tba local needs andcoonunlst parties and their members outside tbe USSR*
Indicate that MalenkcvTs reported lack oftheoretical Betters creates ideological uncertainties whichto causa confusion and difficulty particularly In
parties and among fellov4ravelers outside tbe USSR.
ask who is new tha pre^eda^ct theoreticianspokesmen for worldMao or KaierJotv.
fe To the Sser erd KJddl- East.
It. rifcw cf the lack of approuiatlon generally prevailing in tb* Arab States concerning tbe nature of the menace of Soviet Coouciem and in view of need to pronots tbe stability and the seourity of tot art* through cooperative econoedo and adary measures, official overi aedlaba following taskst
To eatphaelse that tbe daath cf Stalin leaves Soviet tyranny and its unlimited external Imperialist ambitions unchanged.
To emphasise the continuing enaraster of tbe Soviet, system, regardless of Its leadership, especially its lust for power,
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causing others to aonslder tbe oocsrunist menaee less serious than It has been,
Tbe fellovlrg na'er tasks therefore fall on offlalal overt media ln output to the area*
(1) mphasize that tha change of eocaaad iaR Involves do change In tbe Imperialistic* aisbltions of tbe
(2/ To erphasics tberjilng oharacter cf tbe Soviet system, regard!jes of Its leadership, especially Its lust fcrts igncranos cf the wtr_dp its dobasmrfnt of culture. Itsofnd its st-orn of religion.
(3) To emphasize that, although there nay appear to be points ofec Kao ted Maletkov, proofavorable charge of attitude or Htto's part will be shown not by words but only by concrete actions ln Korea, Indochina and elsewhere, including Concealst China itself.
U) To emphasise that the national aspirations cf- the people of the area will net be achieved as the result of fortuitous events elsewhere, but only by hard, strenuous effcrt by each nation la tbe area and by Individuals within it,
(5) To ssltt every opportunity to enhance in the area tba prestige and the standing of th> United Spates and, as appropriate. Its major alliee, and to danoustraV- tbe strength, steadiness and reliability of th; United States as the lead a- of tba free world.
(0) To exploit tbe confusion and tba uncertainty that is likely to beset Oennunlst organisations and affiliated bodies in tho area, particularly to encourage Jealousies and to promote friction between Chinese snd Soviet Comm-mdst Party apparatus as la Southeast) and Southern Asia* 4* Supporting actions.
appropriate politleal, military andactions consistent with
this plan and related to lt ahould also be undertaken.
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eg others to consider tbt eeeaeucist menase less eorious than lt has teen,
Tbe following major tasks therefore fall on official overt media In output to the area)
Tc emphasise that the change of oonmand In tha USSR Involves no change In the imperialistic* ambitions of the regime*
To emphasis* the continuing character cfviot system,a of Its Isaderahlp, especially its lust fcrts Ignorance of th* wsrlde itscf culture, lisof aduoaticc, and Its Sborc of religion*
Tc eaphasix* that, although there may appear to be points ofttwsec Kao acd MalecJcov, proofavorable charge of attitude or Hco'a pert will be ehovn not by words but only byn Korea, Indochina and elsewhere. Includingra
To emphasise that the national aspirations cf the peiple of the area will net be achieved as the result of fortuitous events elsewhere, but only by hard, strenuous effort by each nation ia the area and by individuals within it*
($) To seise every opoortuclty to cohanc* In tho area the prestige and tbe standing of theotea and, as appropriate. Its major allies, and tobe strength, steadineas and reliability of th: United States as the lead a* of the free world.
(6) To exploit the confusion and th* uncertainty thatikely to beset Onmmunlst organisations and affiliated bodies la tho area, particularly to eovwrage Jealousies aad to promote friction between Chinese and Soviet Coxeranist Party apparatuae* la Southeast and Southern Asia*
4* Supporting
Appropriateilitary and ocenoal* action* osmslstent with thle plan and related to It should alao be uc^rtakxsu
fage,
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