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Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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The hypothesis Is frequently advanced that Zhdanov and Malenkov engageditter political conflict for Stalin's favor andontrol over tbe Soviet Communist Party- Thisatter of some importance, since many obsorvera profess to see in this conflict and its outcome an explanation for many of the problems of Soviet policy in the post-war years. The hypothesis set forth below Is aof various versions of the alleged Zhdanov-Malenkov controversy.i
Under thisise in tbe Influence of oneartial eclipse of the other. Zhdanov, who wasIn the Party and generally accorded to be Stalin's favorite prior to tbe war, was sent to Leningrad at tbe time of tbe Nazi ising young man who had become prominent only Inasember of the Supreme Defenseive-man streamlined Politburo for the conduct of the war.ZJ In the Supreme Defense Council Malenkov waa Stalin's immediate subordinate for Party affairs, with additional responsibility for aircraftand for the relocation of Soviet Industry from western USSR to tbe east.
After the tide of the war turned and the Soviet armies began to retake occupied areas, Halenkov waa made Chairmanew Statefor the Rehabilitation of Devastated Territories. Thiswith Beria, Mlkoyan, Voznesensky and Andreev as members, vas responsible for Industrial, agricultural and political reconstruction In the Soviet territories recovered from the Germans. Since tbe German-occupied areas hadarge portion of Soviet Industry, agriculture aad population, the magnitude of the responsibilities of this committee was great.
roponents of this hypothesis, such as Ruth Fischer, Franz
Borkenau and Boris Hicolaevsky, have their own variants, and each has drawn attention to facts overlooked by others. Hicolaevsky, for example, vas the only outside observer to discover that Malenkov appeared In Soviet agricultural affairs
zj The original five members of the Supreme Defense Council were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria. Later additions were Kaganovleh, Voznesensky and Mlkoyan. Voroshilov was later replaced by Bulganin.
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Zhdanov, meanwhile, whatever the reason for his originalto Leningrad Inay have been ln some sort of disfavor ln After the successful defense of Leningrad, he wasof his duties as First Secretary of the Leningrad City and Province Committees. Inhen tbe elty of Leningrad vas presented with tbe Order of Lenin, Zhdanov's name vas mentioned, but only as one of the Politburo members. Zhdanov moved to Helsinki as Chairman of the Allied Control Commission In Finland and remained there untilt which time be returned to Moscow.
Thereafter, Zhdanov again managed to secure Stalin's favor and to eclipse Malenkov. Zhdanov sold Stalin on tbe necessity for an ideological cleansing of the Communist Party andightening up of Soviet society generally. Zhdanov himself spearheaded thepurge. He then began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully unseated hla from several key positions, and then attacked suchof his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, heto bo concerned, from6 on, with agricultural problems andreat loss of prominence.
Zhdanov Is said to haveanatic Communist, and to have believed that lt was possible to make striking advancesthrough foreign Communist Parties, particularly In France and Italy. Specifically, he is said to have been responsible for the organization of the Comlnform inoreign policy move vhlch at the minimum was intended to sabotage the Marshall Plan but which was also Intended to launch the French and Italian Parties Into revolutionary action to seize power.
Tbe French Communist Party undertook violent action In Hovember7 and, until broken by the French army, almost succeeded ln paralysing the government and the economy. Tbe Italian Partysimilar action, but with much less seccesB. Inhe Czechoslovak Communist Party succeeded in seising power; thefor this was attributed to Zhdanov.
At tbe founding conference of the Comlnform inhdanov supported tbe Yugoslav delegates in their criticism of tbe backward policies of other Communist Parties, especially tbe French and Italian, and in general indicated his approval of tbe policies of the Yugoslav Communists. Tito, however, was proving to be less than completely obedient, and8 Stalin decided that it wasto take disciplinary action. After negotiations lasting four months, characterised by efforts of Stalin and Molotov to intimidate and split the Yugoslav Politburo, lt became necessary to apply the extreme sanction against Tito: excommunication from tbe Communist fold.
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During this period, the turn of events in Western Europe had led the United States to take the initiative in attempting unilateral solution of the West Goroan economic situation. The British and the French joined in this effort In the winterhJ}. Russianentailed an attempt to capitalize on the most exposed position of the West, the Allied sectors of Berlin, an effort that culminated In the full blockade of Berlin ln June loil8.
According to the hypothesis being set forth, Stalin held Zhdanov responsible for tbe various reverses in Soviet policy, in particular the Yugoslavhdanov's deathxm8 signalled tbe end of the so-called Zhdanov period.2/ After his Death, Malenkov rapidlyigh position In official listings of thewhich was generally taken to indicate that he had returned to grace. Malenkov then allegedlyurge of various persons who owed their positions to Zhdanov's Influence. Meanwhile, tbe Berlin blockade vas liquidated and tbe Greek Civil.War was permitted to come to an end, and the emphasis in Soviet foreign policy visibly began to shift to the Far East, where the Chinese Communists were rapidly gaining complete control of mainland China.
What now can be said with regard to this hypothesis? There arc several very critical questions involved in It. These questions are: Was there ia fact political enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov? Did Malenkov truly lose out in the period from, say,p to some time early? For example, did Malenkov find himself in
t the time, many observers attributed the Togo3lav break to
Zhdanov's purportedly hard line toward theo an attempt on his part to set the same standards of ideological and political conformity for the Satellite countries as had beenin the USSR. Others believed, on the contrary, that Tito was Zhdanov's principal ally in tbe international Communist sphere, and that Tito's defection was not soesult of Zhdanov's effort to bully tbe Yugoslavs as it was the cause of his being Irrevocably discredited.
here were numerous rumors and much speculation that Zhdanov vas murdered. This speculation vas revived and given added Impetus by the so-called Doctors' Plot of
agricultureop-ranking trouble shooter or vas he relegated to this field In disgraceT Was Zhdanov in fact responsible for thecommunist expansionism of this period? Was there inurge conducted by Malenkov after Zhdanov's death and aftervas back in Stalin's good graces? Was there inhift in emphasis In Soviet policy to the Tar East following Zhdanov's death and during the period of Malenkov's rise?
gg POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF MALBHKOV
The question of whether Zhdanov and Malenkov were political enemiesreat deal on the answer to the question whether Malenkov really lost both responsibilities and prestige in the fall of loW*. The evidence for Malenkov's political eclipse is aa
earlyource of the US Militaryin Moscow reported that Halenkov bad suffered someof disgrace, although he was unable to give tbe reasonsalleged trouble. Although onctober it wasMalenkov had been "confirmed" as Deputy Chairman ofof Ministers, thereumor in Moscow thata demotion. This was given added credence on 2Ufromof tbe uunck iiuuiiakiiu nuiwau ou Official biography This biography omitted reference to Malenkov'swork in the Centralhich is believedbeen done in his position on Stalin's personalomitted reference to tbe fact that Halenkov had been aof tbe Party for many yeara; and finally, it omittedto tbe fact that Malenkov bad been an alternate member
of tbe Politburo9ull member since only the
preceding March.biography
had beenof the Chief of the SovietBureau,initialingantoo item haa oeen cleared with
Malenkov vas removed from thetbe Central Committee and lost control over Partyduring this period. Be was givennd he retained them through tbe war; be was lastin tbe Party Secretariat in the spring. be was not listed among the Party Secretaries, nordesignation "Secretary" given after his name on Sovietelection listings, and so forth, until.
7hdanov vas clearly the leadingthe Party; he signed decrees on behalf of tbe Centraland be vas Identifiedthe leading role in tbe Secretariat. The" onlythat Malenkov vasigure of some power andwith Party organizational questions vas hisZhdanov at the founding conference of the Comlnform At this conference, Malenkov gave the reportof the Soviet Communist Party. Itecital ofof the Party since the war, tbe problems It faced,ideological and economic tasks, its problems ofand so forth. It may be noted, however,very definitely was tbe junior partner at tho Zhdanovar-reaching analysis of thesituation and of Soviet policy as veil,served simply as rapporteur for the Soviet Party.
Ae noted above, there Is no evidence associating Malenkov with the Central Committee apparatus, nor with Party personnel matters, during this period. The supposition tbat Malenkov lost these responsibilities would be strengthened If some otherconld be reliably Identified as responsible for them. evidence suggests that A. A. Kuznetsov may have received these responsibilities. A. A. Kuznetsovormer deputy to Zhdanov in the Leningrad Party organization, andem-ber of tbe Secretariat and Orgburo in
eport of9
I stated tbat tbe Central Committee "hadesion headed by Central Committee Secretary Kuznetsov, which adopted very stern measures in approving prospectiveMilitary Administration (in Germany) officials and workers. "A/
3. Malenkov, following hie apparent eclipse, wasidentified by the Soviet press as "directly" engaged in agricultural wort. |
Thisertain explanation of tbe agriculture problem existing at that time. During the war the Communist Party badumber of its harsher erasures with regard to the peasantry and,esult, the peasants had concentrated their efforts on private holdings at the expense of communal land and bad disposed of the produce from these private holdings on the free market at high prices. Due to tbe destructionfrom the war, tbe disruption of the kolkhoz system,evere droughtoor harvestbe Government and Party found lt necessary to restrict severely bread rations and tbe release of grains. However, because an unduly largeof agricultural produce was grown on private holdings and disposed of by tbe peasantryhe free market, the Government found it difficult' to control the flow of grains and tout in bread rations. Due to the same factors, furthermore, there hadisproportionate flow of money from the city to the countryside, and peasant savings had risen sharply. This served to strengthen the bargaining position ofis the Soviet Government and Party, (it may be noted that lt was this situation which led to the extremeof tbe ruble inhich practically wiped out peasant savings.) Agriculture was thus the most critical problem facing the Soviet Government In the fall and winter. The possibility exists that Malenkov vas moved into agricultureop-flight trouble shooter.
This possibility, however, does not appear to beavailable evidence. Beginning Inheand Party began toeries of joint decreesto correct abuses of tbe kolkhoz charter and to meetcrisis. These decrees were signed by Stalin onof the Government and by Zhdanov on behalf of tbeof the Party. ouncil forPares Affairs of almost forty members wasA.olitburo member, was designated Chairmancouncil. Malenkov wasember. Insession of the Central Committee was held toagricultural crisis and it was Andreev vho presented
. Thus, although agriculture vas Indeed the acj yiwuem in6t does not appear that Halenkov became tbe dominant policy-making figure, but rather be seems to have occupied an anomalous position.
*. There is, finally, the question of Malenkov's prestige throughout tills period. Inhe US Embassy reported that Malenkov "was acknowledged to be Stalin's principal advisernternal political problems." let,alenkov's position bad dropped in the Politburo listing and Zhdanov appeared to have taken his place in Stalin's favor. It is important to note that Halenkov vas tbe only Politburovhose status dropped significantly in tbe period66 and vhose position rose measurably after Zhdanov's death. In7 elections, Malenkov was not widelyand be was not one of the five principalhis relative obscurity prevailed7 and tbe first half
The evidence adduced above almost conclusively establishes that Malenkov's careerery sharp set-backevere reduction in the scope of his duties and responsibilities and, therefore, in his power. What his personal relations with Stalin were cannot be said; lt must be remembered that Malenkov did survive this critical period, and we can be sure that if Stalin bad developed real dislike or distrust of Malenkov, tbe latter would have disappeared completely.
FURTHER LnTORMftTIOH RELATING TO HALEBKOV'S POSITIOH IK TBE HIERARCHY
5 Malenkov waa involved in many activities other than those relating to the Communist Party. These activities undoubtedly brought blm into conflict with other Soviet leaders. Thereji of information relating to these activities, in an effort to throw some light on Malenkov's fortunes during this period.
Soviet Intelligence Activities. 0|
Malenkov was the Politburo member responfliuia ior rounnej. questions, including those of Soviet Intelligence. He was also- said to have been responsible for resolving Jurisdictionalbetween tbe People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs andAffairs, and the Military Intelligence apparatus. Inwith intelligence questions, tbe Chief of the GRU (Military Intelligence Directorate) at that tirao, F. I. Gollkov, was said toirect telephone line to Malenkov's office. imilar
It may be tbat Halenkov's political eclipse In the summer ofln seme way associated with this responsibility.then Minister of State Security Berroiov Badbecausereakdown ln Soviet intelligence operationsAmerica towards the end of the war. Tbe coincidence in timedismissal and Halenkov's fall is striking;wo-month period ln middle of Malenkov maycompromised, both because of his responsibility for tbe loyaltycitizens abroad and also ln connection with foreignwaseries of important incidents in this field. igh level Soviet official who bad come towith the Soviet Purchasing Commission,oviet Havalin Seattle was tried and acquitted of espionage by US courtsj
lastly, In5 Gouzenko defected in Ottawa. (
was not until April and May
that, in toe course or public disclosures and testimony, the fullof the Gouzenko defection became known. This wouldvery closely with tho replacement of Merkulov, which, according to available evidence, probably took place In late June or early July The reverses listed above may have contributed to Halenkov's difficulties.
Soviet Policy on Germany. Malenkov became Involved In foreign policy ln connection with his chairmanship of tbe State Committee for Rehabilitation of Devastated Areas, to which he was appointed This body, called the Special Committee, later became the authority responsible for tbe policy of industrial dlsanntllngiet occupied areas in Eastern Europe and possibly in the Far East, f
The^Speciar
Committee was represented in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany by M. Z. Saburov, who had also been one of the Soviet economic advisors at the Potsdam Conference In There does indeed seem to have been some sort of policy difference ln Moscow on the
tdp-segrei
problem of Germany, and it seems probable that thio was in come way associated with the dismantling program.
The whole dismantling operation was very badly bandiedreat deal of valuable property vas destroyed or lost. The program also created hostility toward the Soviet Government among theof Eastern Europe and Germany. 06 foreign policy speech, Molotov announced that dismantling was to be discontinued and that Soviet policy ln the future would support German The actual dismantling of German industry appears to have dropped off 6 andew form of economic control was developed, which Involved Soviet ownership ofshares In Industrial and commercial firms In Germany and ln other non-Soviet areas. This new program appears first to have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade under Mikoyan. Inbe program was identifiedewlyChief Administration for Soviet Properties Abroadhich is believed to have belonged nominally to the Ministry ofTrade. This administration vas under tbe direction of Merkulov, who bad been repLaced In6 as Minister of State Security.l/
It Is noteworthy tbat Evgenll Varga, the ranking economic analyst for the Communist Party and Director of the Institute of World Politics and World Economics, baderies of articles, beginningegarding the necessity of rebuilding Soviet Industry andwith equipment and plants expropriated from the enemy powers. Varga himself vas not on the Special Committee which handledyet lt seems ,likely that be had been, if not the moving spirit, at least the nan who vas providing theoretical propagandafor this policy. This series of articles is one of thetbat Varga vas ln some way closely associated with Malenkov in this period. Tbe dismantling policy was terminated some timet was in the summer6 that Malenkov lost influence; and lt was In7 that Varga was brought up for criticism because of his theoretical analyses of the impact of tbe war on the capitalistic economic system.
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that many of the Soviet-owned plants in Austria, Germany and Manchuria were turned back to the respective Satellite Governments1hich suggests not the dissolution but at least the reduction in scope of activities and influence of this Chief Administration. Merkulov himself moved from this administration to the Ministry of State Controleplacing the incumbent minister, Mekhlis.
I there waa conflict between itburover Soviet economic policy in Germany.
ranri
. tbe dlaaantllng and removal of German in-na-Mu. pxants vas Intended both to prevent future German resurgence and to assist in Sorlet reconstruction. This initial post-war policy vas said to have been predicated on tbe estimate that the Sovietwould not remain in occupationong period of wine.
JMalsnkov had been the leading proponent or xnis
policy, but that he had mot opposition from Mlkoyan and tbe Soviet Military Administration, under Marshal Zhukov untillkoyan allegedly favored the retention of German plant capacity in
^ It is not implied that the purported conflict between MalenkovSMA was at thatactor in Zbukov's career. apparently originated in another quarter. clashed with Vasill Stalin and Col. Ueb. ll A.
serov. It was "wenown" that Zhukov vas
well known that Zhukov wanery difficult character" andather dim view of tbe MVD and MGB." Serov was Zhukov's deputy in tbe SMA, In overall charge of HKVD and BKGB activities. Zhukov reportedly "could not stand Serov." Serov, however,lose friend of Vasill Stalin and Beria, and also was on very good terms with Malenkov and Stalin, Vasill Stalin "behaved very badly" when he was in Germany, and when adverse reports on him were sent back, Serov frequently defended hla. When Vasill Stalin was sent back to Moscow, Serov allegedly again helped byavorable report on him and an unfavorable one on Zhukov.
Zhukov, after bis recall from Germany,Committee and disciplined for adelinquencies andor irjil feasance. He war. reassignedof tho Odessa Military District and later asthe Sverdlovsk Military District.
kov's assignment from March to0 as Ccomandef In Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces.)
Serov subsequently became First Deputy Minister of the MVD under S. H. Kruglov, and presumably remained in that position until Stalin's death. He wasandidate member of tbe Central Com-mittee In Hla assignment subsequent3 is not known.
about5 and received fairly vide circulation, asby Beveral remarks mode during the debate on the bookumber of Communist and progressive public figurestbe USSR and the Satellites bad been "disoriented" by Varga's Sometime in very lateort vas decideda conference of economists to discuss the hook. The debatein May
One of Varga's statements during this debate seems to present almost positive evidence that lt vas Zhdanov vho inspired the debate and the criticism of Varga's position. Varga's statement Is worth quoting In full:' "The difference between the author and the critic among us ln tbe scientific field la different than In the field of art. In the field ofivision of labor la to be observed; the artisticture, tbe sculptortatue, but the criticriticism. He cannot haveituation, ln which one works and another onlydeny such-abetween those writing books and those criticisingIf such aof labor* exists, then,m nooung person, and not veryant to remain, to tbe end of my life, ln the camp of those vho work and not'In'the camps of those who merely This statement* made barely ten months after Zhdanov's furious criticism of Soviet literary figures, and during the Party's newagainst "Art for Art sake" cannot but be considered to haveary courageous statement. It also clearly Indicates the quarters from which the criticism of Varga*'e book wtts emanating. Elsewherethe debate, Varga's statements Imply that the attack originated from doctrinaire members of the Party hierarchy.
Subsequent to this debate, Varga hasareer of ups and downs. Suffice It to say tbat he vas not completely disgraced, and, while his Institute was subsequently broken up, he seemed to remain an Important economist In the USSR. The Party decision on Varga and assessment of his position was revealed ln Pravda lnt la interesting to review the conclusions: Firstly, Varga was adjudged to havetoo much Independent power to tbe bourgeois states ln economic planning, whether in war or in peace, and in particular to havethe nature of the Labor Government In the united Kingdom. (The debates of7 Indicated that this was apparently causing considerable controversy among Soviet economists and politicalecondly, be vas accused of having separated political from economic problems; he bad taken up only economic problems ln his first book, and it was adjudged tbat this was not only erroneous but also harmful, since the two are inseparable. Thirdly, Varga was condemned forto permit tho Party to point out the errors in his thinking, that is, for refusing to recant. It may be noted ln passing that only one of these three criticismsubstantive question which would have
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ondT'r?ofin tbe Western world
and on forecasts of future trends.
More interesting is tbe fact that thereide variety of views expressed by tbe various professional economists dorIn* the
propounded. This my be
J ICateconsiderable uncertainty In
Soviet Union at that time regarding these questions. Moreover, since these questions vere so intimately associated with policy, it, corre^ingly, some degreein policy formulation. It is further interesting toeveral of the point, discussed in the Varga debates iere treated In Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism, publishednd some of the formulations In Stalin's Economic Problems would appear to have been taken almost verbatim from several of the speeches made In these early debates.
The Varga debates were interpreted in the Western world asand, so to speak, as indices of the Soviet estimatefuture economic trends In tbe West and the prospects ofpowers. This is probably correct. However, theleads to the supposition that Varga's fate wasof an index of-the degree of predominance which obtaln" h0ulabe noted inompletely submergingthat, as la^ndicated by Varga's career, Zhdanov's Influencenot so great that he could effect tbe complete disgraceman associated^thor
ZHDAHOV ABD IBTERRATIOHAL
Zhdanov's role In the formulation of Soviet policy duringwith regard to tho outsidVworld in general andin particular,ery complex and controversialare on unsure grounds because, sinces, internationalhas been closely Intertwined withNfce foreign intelligencetbaapparatus lsNrf course
aatAT" now-
prnasriiy- test containsublished books and articlesfor example, DediAsr's biography of Tito,]
ermlta someu^yvut^ivaa regaraing tola problem.
Irsported that control of the Czechoslovak bad been exercised by men working out of Malenkov's
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staff In Moscow.
mcOT was chief" of the Foreign Sector of tbe
Wet uomsiunist Party However, tho exact responsibilities of this position, as well as the nature of its relations with the international Coraunlet movement, are unknown.
, .rumors In the top echelon of tbecommunist Party that Zhdanov had been responsible forof Rudolph Slansky as Secretary General of theParty. Zhdanov had been associated with the Cominternnd, with Kuuslnen, was one of the two Sovietthe decision dissolving the Comintern. to Dedljer's biography of Tito, the Yugoslav Ambassador inwith Zhdanov on questions concerning Yugoslav relations withCoonunlst Party. At the founding conference of the it was Zhdanov who laid out the broad lines of policy forCommunist Parties. It has been reported that Rudolphtbe proposed Czech Conaronist coup in8 withMoscow. Tbe Chief of tbe Czech Communist secret police, whoin, reportedecret radio station inwas used only by the highest Party figures, was linked withheadquarters. '
.
t^Z'Vben Andre Marty was defending his position in the French Coazmmlst Party, he reportedly cited tbe authority of Zhdanov ae justification for his actions ln the early post-war period.
According to some sources, the Greek CiTil War was espoused by Zhdanov. This would be of considerable interest. If true. Theclaim that the Yugoslav Comnunlst Party vas the principalof the Greek Communists and. In fact, provided the bulk of the materiel support for the Greek Civil War.
'.ivji. war.
that, before launching the new revoltua uree_ ujnnumsts out the French and tbe Yugoslav Communist Parties forYugoslavs also claim that Stalin himself was skepticalGreek revolution and did not believe tbat it had any prospects Furthermore, according to the Yugoslavs, theas undertaken by agreement between Karkoswithout previous policy coordination in Moscow, j-
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the dissolution of the Comintern,the establishmentev international here van, reportedly, aviews in the Politburo regarding the character of the Zhdanov advocated an organizational conceptallow for specific differences in the methods to bein different foreign countries.
Comment: Dedijer, la the biography of Tito, noted that Tito advanced the proposalew internationalnd that Tito and Stalin discussed the question in
illustrated hla position by tbe Yugoslav He publicly labelled Yugoslavia as the mostDemocracy. Dimitrov, the world-known Cominternsupported Zhdanov's views.
1
Comment: Zhdanov publicly supported the Yugoslavof the other Communist Parties at the Cora*.reform meeting in With regard to Dimitrov, circumstantialsupports the contention that be supported Tito's position during Yugoslavia's conflict with Moscow.
hat Zhdanov disagreed with tbe tone OT toe-reYugoslavia, and insisted that an "escape"the Yugoslavs an opportunity to recant be included. wing" was for an Immediate and complete break with
Comment: In Tito's biography it is claimed that Stalin and Molotov signed the original letter denouncing Yugoslavia. According to the Yugoslav-Soviet lettero, Molotov had levelled at least one accusation against the Yugoslavs.
]Beria was responsible for at leaf
lion of equipment and materials for It is possible that Beria was antagonistic to Yugoslavia because of Yugoslav charges regarding Soviet intelligence
On tbe other hand.
wrote an article In
0peech of Dlmitrov'a favoring Balkan federation. Balkan federationroject especiallyby Tito, and Tito and Dimrtrov had had several discus-
the break'with Yugoslav
sions on the subject.forced
lav-rr-
Co_?nt: None
Zhdanov was considered on "aristocrat of the Party" and one of the best-brains ln the Soviet hierarchy. However, he was sold to he reckless.
CcTOent:that Zhdanov was brilliant,
arrogant and dynamic.
reported rumors In Soviet circles tear. zAdanov had attempted tt
to
pursue "an Independent line."
6. Yugoslavia played tbe chief role in support ofCivil War.General Markos
had been "greatly lnriuenced by the Yugoslav role and support."
Comment: Yugoslav support of the Greek Civil War is well known. Circumstantial evidence strongly supports the contention that Markos was associated with Tito.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Zhdanov wasInternational Cormunlst affairs. This conclusion, taken inwithZhdanov'sand with the reported rumors regarding Zhdanov'sstrongly supports the hypothesis that the militantpolicy7 was Indeed an "Individual" policyZhdanov.
Circumstantial evidence of another nature tends to give further weight to this hypothesis. Stalin, it is known, had little or no
respect for foreign Communists and foreign Comnrunlet Parties. He bad longtruntful and suspicious of foreign Conaamlote. Thus,road, militant Communist policy vas adopted, then tbe presumption must be tbat Stalin's mistrust and skeptic!urn bad been overcome by some advocate ofolicy. Zhdanov evidently was this advocate.
A militant and aggressive policy mas in fact adopted. TheCommnnlst Parties vers given tbe task of sabotaging tbe Marshall Plan: Zhdanov bluntly stated this ln his7 speech. 7 the Finnish Communist Party, for no apparent reason,isruptive strike program. The Creek Communlste, given the challonge of the Truman Doctrine lnevolted ln the summer and fall7 andovernment In December of that year. The Czech Communists seized the Government In It Is easy to believe that Zhdanov's political fortunes depended upon tbe success of the militant policy. It succeeded only ln Czechoslovakia, and thisinor victory vben compared with tbe reverses suffered.
S
The conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:
Tbe broad hypothesis set forth Is not refuted by available Information. Certain sub-hypotheses are stronglyby the weight of evidence. These specific points are:
It appears well established that Kalenkov lostpositions andeduction In status fromo
Available evidence supports tbe contention tbateclipse was directly related to Zhdanov's return to Moscow. Malenkov's most Important position was lostongtimeof Zhdanov. Tbe hypothesis that Zhdanov and Malenkov clashed over control of tbe Soviet Communist Party appears. Available evidence Indicates that Malenkov probably clashed with other Politburo members also, mad that be probably received little If any support from them In his difficulties.
It is highly probable that Zhdanov vas responsible for the policy line of the foreignst Parties ln this period, and that be vas an advocateilitant revolutionary policy. It la probable that Zhdanov's career was compromised by the failure of tbe French and Italian Communlet Parties7nd by the Intransigence aad defection of Yugoslavia.
Original document.
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