SECRET"^
FOB RELEASE DATE: .
NO.
i
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH
3
f '
The following member organization* of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the CentralAgency tn the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. -The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate onay Ml. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of Its jurisdiction.
TELLIGENCE AGENCY
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To estimate French Union and Communist capabilities and probable courses of action with respect to Indochina and the internal situation throughout Indochina through
ASSUMPTION
There is no major expansion of the Korean war.
CONCLUSIONS
therearked improvement in the French Union military position in Indochina, political stability in theStates and popular support of the French Union effort against the Viet Minh will decline. We believe that such marked improvement in the militaryis not likely,oderate improvement is possible. The over-all French Union position in Indochina therefore will probably deteriorate during the period of this estimate.
The lack of French Union militarycontinuing Indochrnese distrust of ultimate French political intentions, and popular apathy will probablytoignificant increase in Indochinese will and ability to resist the Viet Minh.
We cannot estimate the impact of the new French military leadership.we believe that the Viet Minh will retain the military initiative and willto attack territory in the Tonkin delta and to make incursions into areas outside the delta. The Viet Minh will attempt to consolidate Communistin "Free Laos" and will build upin northern Laos to support further penetrations and consolidation in that country. The Viet Minh will almostintensify political warfare,guerrilla activities, in Cambodia.
Viet Minh prestige has been increased by the military successes of the past year, and the organizational and acirninistra-tive effectiveness of the regime willcontinue to grow.
The French Government will remain under strong and increasing domestic pressure to reduce the French military commitment in Indochina, and thecannot be excluded that thiswill be successful. However, we be-
lieve that the French will continue without enthusiasm to maintain their present levels of troop strength throughnd will support the planned development of the national armies of the Associated States.
e believe that the Chinesewill continue and possibly increase their present support of the Viet Minh. However, wc believe that whether or not hostilities are concluded in Korea, the Chinese Communists will not invadeduring thisheCommunists will almost certainly retain the capability to intervene so forcefully in Indochina as to overrun most of the Tonkin delta area beforeassistance could be brought to bear.
We believe that the Communistto secure control of all Indochina will not be altered by an armistice in Korea or by Communist "peace" tactics.the Communists may decide that "peace" maneuvers in Indochina would contribute to the attainment ofglobal objectives, and to the objective of the Viet Minh.
If present trends in the Indochinese situation continue throughhe French Union political and militarymay subsequently deteriorate very rapidly.
DISCUSSION
CURRENT SITUATION
ilitaryhe Viet Minhof the mountainous Thai country of northwestern Tonkin in2 and the follow-up thrust into northern Laos in3 demonstrate that the Viet Minh have retained the military Initiative in Indochina. Although the Viet Minh did not defeat any large French Union forces in these operations, they did force the French to withdraw the bulk of their offensive striking power from the Tonkin delta and disperse It in isolated strong points, dependent on air transport forupport a: Uu same lime, strong Viet Minh guerrilla elements plus two regular
'The Deputy Director for Intelllgencc, The Joint Stall, believes that the Intel llgencc available la Insufficient toonclusion at this time tliat the Chinese Communists will or will not Invade Indochina prior toSee Annex A for Estimated French Union
Strengths and DlsposiUons; Seeor Estimated Vlcl Minh Strengths
and DlsposiUons; Seeor French Far Eastern Air Force
StrengUii and DlsposiUons; and Seeor French Far Eastern Naval Strengths and Dispositions.
Viet Minh divisions sufficed to containegular French Union forcesin the Tonkin delta. The Viet Minh now appear to have withdrawn the bulk of their regular forces from Laos. They probably have left behind political cadres, someforces, and well-supplied guerrilla units in the areas which they overran in order to consolidate Communist political and military control, to prepare bases for futureand to pin down French Union
he Invasion of Laos may have beenas partong-range Communist design to develop unrest in Thailand and ultimately gain control of all Southeast Asia. Viewed solely in terms of the Viet Minhto win all of Indochina, however, the Viet Minh offensive in Laos Ls an extension of2 winter's offensive in northwestern Tonkin, andhift in Viet Minh military tactics. This shift in tactics ls probably largely explained by the Inability to defeat the main French Union forces In the Tonkin delta by direct assault Faced with this position of strength, the Viet Minh began
itlS
o turn the bulk of their regular forces toward the conquest of northwestern Tonkin and northern Laos, areas lightly held by Isolated French Union garrisons.
In this manner, the Viet Minh probably hope to retain the military and politicaland, by dispersing French Union forces, to preventlean-up by the French Union in the Tonkin delta or offensive operations by the French Union against Viet Minh troop concentrations and supplyoutside the delta. The Viet Minh may well believe that by gradually extending their base areas In lightly defended regions of Laos, Cambodia, and central Vietnam they can keep French Union forces dispersed and pinned down Indefinitely. In time, they probably expect to sap the morale of the Vietnamese and the French and finally so alter the balance of power as to make possible successful Viet Minh attacks against the key areas of Tonkin and south Vietnam.
The deployment of four divisions into Laos by the Viet Minh and the fact that the French did not attack their long and exposed lines of communication typify the over-all situation in Indochina. French Union forces still outweigh the Vict Minh in numbers,and materiel. French ability to air lift troops and equipment, although strained at the present time, provides the French Union with tactical flexibility In plaruiing defensive and offensive operations. The Viet Minh, however, by their skill in guerrilla war, their ability to move rapidly and to infiltrate and control areas under nominal French occupation, have caused the French tolarge forces throughout Indochina to static defense, thus seriously reducing French ability to take the offensive.
Viet Minh regular forces in northernhave continued their gradualfrom lightly armed guerrilla bandsegularly organized military force. They have made noticeable advances in theof field communications, and unit firepower has increased although they still possess only limited amounts of artillery. Viet Minh combat effectiveness is still limitedack of medical supplies and an Inability to sustain major military operations.
Military aid from the US has enabled the French Union to equip adequately theirground forces. The French air forces, with US logistical support, and with no air opposition, haveair degree of effectiveness in paratroop operations, supply by air drops, and daylight attacks on enemy supply dumps. French naval forces have improved in combat effectiveness and have maintained control of the seacoasts andwaterways. However, the Viet Minh have the continuing capability to threaten control of the inland waterwaysining campaign. Some Vietnamese National Army units have performed creditably In combat, but desertion and "missing in action" figures remain high. For the most part, Vietnamese National Guard and other local security forces lack the firepower, discipline, andto hold positions alone against regular Viet Minh units which infiltrate the Tonkin delta.
Although French Union militaryhave improved slightly, the French Union military effort has been inhibited by considerations of domestic French politics, French security in Europe, and fearar with Communist China. These considerations have caused French commanders in Indochina to foregomilitary operations that would entail heavy casualties and have prevented them from obtaining reinforcementscale that might make possible the defeat of the Viet Minh.
The development of the VietnameseArmy, promised by the Frenchas been retardedhortage of officers and non-commissioned officers, by French lack of faith in the Vietnamese and by French fiscal problems. There has also been anamong many Vietnamese leaders, not including Premier Tam, toajor mobilization effort until the French grant further political concessions and until the Vietnamese character of the new army is fully guaranteed.
SEC
Some political progress has been made In Vietnam during the past year. Premier Tarn's administration has enlisted the cooperation of the strongly nationalist Dai Viet leader Nguyen Huu Tri. andconcern over Tarn's francophilia has to some extent dissipated. Tarn has also added to the political vitality of Vietnam by holding local elections in secure areas of Vietnam. Another Vietnamese program, undertaken with US economic assistance, which involves the relocation of scattered villages in the delta into centralized and defensible sites may be an important step toward the eventual "pacification" of heavily Infiltrated areas. Tlie decisions of3 to increase the size of the Vietnamese National Army while expanding the area of Vietnamese strategic and operational responsibility, could also be of major political significance.
Despite these advances. Vietnam still lacks the degree of political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources. Tarn's "action" program remains morethan substance. Elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support have not left the planning stage, and the Vietnameseis handicapped by incompetentministers and the lack of competent administrators. While Bao Dal refuses to assume active direction of the affairs of state, he remains hostile toward new leadership and democratic activities.
Of more basic Importance in the failure of Vietnamese to rally to the Vietnamesefollowing the French grant ofwithin the French Union9 have been the following:
Vietnamese doubt the abilityUnion forces to defeat the Vietprefer to remain apart from the struggle.
French Government has notpromise complete national Independencefuture date, as demanded by thebecause of the fear that theassembly would then refuse toa warlost" portion of the
Vietnamese, despite manysteps towardre generally inclined tothe French intend to retain effectiveover the affairs of Vietnam.
nationalist appeal andof the Vict Minh remainssignificant numbers of the Vietnamese.
In Cambodia, internal political strife has weakened the government, dissidentelements have continued to sap popular loyalty to the throne, and the King isgreater Independence from the French in order to strengthen his political position at home. Meanwhile,iet Minh combatants in Cambodia, while under fairly constant attack by French andforces, are capable of exploitingwhich may develop.
Laotian stability has been upset by the recent Viet Minh incursion. The Laotians are generally hostile to the Viet Minh but are unable toreat deal to theof theirmall group of pro-Communist Laotians returned to Laos with the Viet Minh during the recentIt Is ledisaffected LaotianPrince Souphanouvong, and calls itself the "Free Government of Pathet Lao" (Laos).
Meanwhile, the Viet Minh leadership, with Chinese Communist material and advisory assistanceas demonstrated the necessary zeal, ruthlessness, and tenacity to exploit to the maximum the limited resources at their command. The Viet Minh havethe area under their complete control and their prestige has probably increased throughout Indochinaesult of military successes in northwest Tonkin and Laos.
In the areas of Viet Minh occupation. Viet Minh control Is believed to be effective, and minimum food requirements are being met. The Viet Minh have taken onthe conventional characteristicsPeoples Republic" and arc now engaged in programs to confiscate and redistribute land and to eliminate "traitors" andAlthough this departure fromfront tactics has increased realization
SECJ*-ET
SEOft-ET
.3
the Viet Minh are under completedomination, the Viet Minh control many villages within areas of nominal French Union occupation through terror, compulsion, and their continued nationalist appeal.
Viet Minh and the Chinesecontinue to maintain closeis estimated that there are less thanChinese Communist adviserswith the Viet Minh inChinese Communists are providingMinh with military supplies al anaverage levelonsand some Viet Minh troops areCommunist China for training.Communist units reportedlythe mountainous northwestTonkin on several occasions to assistMinh against French-supportedbut no Chinese Communistbeen Identified in forward areas.some evidence during the past yearMinh policy statements may benot written, in Peiplng. Close Vietwith Communist China aresuperficially at least, byrelations with the Soviet Union, butunable to determine whether Peiplnghas ultimate responsibility forpolicy.
PROBABLE TRENDS IN FRENCH UNION CAPABILITIES AND COURSES OF ACTION
plans for dealing with the warnow revolve around theof national armies in theparticularly in Vietnam. Inthe Franco-Vietnameseew program callingincrease in Vietnamese strengthcurrent year0 men, organized"commando"0 men has been proposed for
0 are to be recruited and willet Increase in French union strength. Planned transfers of native unite from the French Army to the Vietnamese Army will also strengthen the Vietnamese Army but will not represent any net increase In French Union strength.
nd will probably be undertaken if the initial reinforcement Is successful and if equipment is made available by the US. With these additional Vietnamese forces, the French hope to undertake widespread clear-ing operations and subsequently to organize sufficient mobile groups to begin by5 the destruction of the Viet Minh regular forces in Tonkin.
Progress has been made in carrying out the troop reinforcement program thus far, and the Vietnamese may have close0 reinforcements recruited, trained, andfor combat byowever, the Viet Minh invasion of Laos and the threat of similar operations will probably keep French mobile reserves deployed outside the Tonkin delta in isolated strong points. The addition0 untested and lightly armedwill not offset the absence of these regular French forces, and effective clearing or offensive operations cannot be undertaken until French Union forces are regrouped. Moreover, the French military leadership has been so dominated by concepts of staticas to be unable to conduct the planned operations with the vigor necessary for their success. How the new military leadership may alter this wc cannot estimate. Finally, unless the French Union forces prove strong enough to provide security for the Vietnamese population, it will not be possible to sweep the guerrillas out of the areas as planned. Not only will the populace fall generally tothe Intelligence required to rout the guerrillas but, as in the past, they willgive warning of the presence of the French Union forces, thus permitting the guerrillas to take cover ami later to emerge when the danger Is past.
The French are fearful that they cannotilitary decision in Indochina. Unless the French Union military plans achieve great success during the period of this estimate, the conviction will grow in France that the Indochina problem can only be solved through some over-all East-West settlement In the Far East. The difficulties of the French financial position impel the French to seek relief from the mounting costs
SECJJ-ET
the Indochina war, and Frenchconcerning eventual Germannot only make them reluctant tothe military establishment inbut Impel them to seek the early return of French troops to Europe. The French Government will therefore remain under strong and increasing domestic pressure to reduce Its military commitment inOn the other hand, the Frenchis under strong pressure toits position In Indochina. There is still considerable sentiment against abandoning the heavy Investment which France has poured Into Indochina. More important, there is great reluctance to accept theeffects on the cohesion of the French Union and on French prestigeorld power which would accompany the loss of Frances position in Indochina. In thesewe believe that the French will continue without enthusiasm to maintain their present levels of troop strength throughnd will support the plannedof the National Armies of theStates. At the same time, France will probably continue to seek maximum financial and material assistance for the French Union effort while resisting any measures which would impair French pre-eminence among the Associated States, including the making of any commitments concerning the eventual political status of the Associated States.
olitical strength in Vietnam may grow slightly3 as progress is madetronger national army, as theassume Increasing governmentaland as Premier Tarn's social and political programs serve to decreaseof French Intentions. There willalsorowing understanding, and fear, of the true Communist nature andof the Viet Minh. However, thesewill not bringignificant increase In Vietnamese will and ability to resist the Vict Minh during the period of this estimate because the Vietnam leadership cannot in this brief period overcome popular apathy and mobilize the energy and resources of the people. Moreover, if events should persuade Vietnam leaders that no progress toward national independence is possiblethe French or that French Union forces cannot defeat the Vict Minh, it is probable that the political strength of Vietnam would decline rapidly. Substantial Viet Minhvictories in the Tonkin delta orin Indochina would also produceecline.
In Cambodia, political stability Is likely to decline as the result of tension between the monarchy, the politically divided people, and tlie French colonial administration. Even If French concessions to the King insure his adherence to the French Union, unrest in Cambodiaiet Minh penetration into southern Laos might force the deployment of strong French forces to Cambodia.
In Laos, political attitudes will bealmost entirely by militaryThe Laotians will probably remain loyal to the French Union if they areaggressively. They will not, however, offer effective resistance to Communist efforts to consolidate political control If French Union forces retreat from the country or if the French Union forces defendew strong points.
PROBABLE TRENDS IN VIET MINH AND CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND COURSES OF ACTION
Minh Capabilities andof Action. Barring serious Vietreverses, which could occur ifforces should ovcrcxtend themselvesfrontal attacks on French Unionthe Viet Minh regime will probablyits total strength slightly duringof this estimate. Viet Minhbe increased by their recent gains inorganizational and administrativeof the regime will probablyincrease with experience and Chineseguidance. The program ofand distribution of lands to tenantscarried out probably weakens theappeal among some classes, but will
probably strengthen Viet Minh controls at the village level and thus facilitate the collection of rice.
Militarily, the Viet Minh are unlikely to expand greatly their armed forces because they are already experiencing manpowerTheir combat efficiency probably will increase, however, as the resultodest augmentation of their unit firepowerteady improvement in staff planning andof forces. The Viet Minh probably will continue toteady flow ofassistance from the Chinese Communists, and the amount may Increase at any time. The Viet Minh do not have, and probablydevelop within the period of this estimate, the capability to make such effective use of heavy equipmentartillery, armor,rom the Chinese Communists as to permit successful attacks against strongof regular French forces.onger period,reat Increase in Viet Minh capabilities. Including theof an air force, is possible.
We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists in Indochina will probably attempt to avoid combat except where they can achieve surprise or greatin numbers. They will attempt toCommunist controls in "Free Laos" and will buUd up supplies in northern Laos to support further penetrations andIn that country. If they reach the Thai border, they probably will attempt to organize guerrilla forces among the Vietnamese ln northeastern Thailand, but we do not believe they will have the capability to provide much material assistance to such forces throughhe Viet Minh forces in Loos may hope to receive assistance from thepopulation in Thailand- The Viet Minh will almost certainly intensify political warfare. Including guerrilla activities in Cambodia.
We believe that neither the French Union nor the Viet Minh will be able toinal military decision in Indochina throughhe Viet Minh, with their principal striking forces operating from the Tonkin base area, will probably retain the Initiative during the period of this estimate byattacks against lightly defended French Union territory. The French Union can hold key positions in Laos and mayby attacks against Viet Minh lines of communication, to prevent the Viet Minh from moving southward In force towards southern Laos and Cambodia. We believe, however, that Viet Minh guerrillas inl.aos will develop sufficient strength to control much of tlie countryside and tliat guerrilla activities In Cambodia will beThe French Union probably willbut not eliminate, Viet Minh strength ln south Vietnam. Viet Minh infiltration of the Tonkin delta will probably be maintainedigh level and the Viet Minh may undertake major attacks against the delta if they can weaken French defenses by drawing French strength elsewhere.
Unless therearked Improvement ln the French Union military position inpolitical stability In the Associated States and popular support of the French Union effort against the Viet Minh willWe believe that such markedUi the military situation is not likely,oderate improvement is possible. The over-all French Union position intherefore will probably deterioratethe period of this estimate.
Chinese Communist Capabilities andCourses of Action. The Chinesewill have the capability during the period of this estimate to improve airfields In south China, to train Viet Minh pilots, toimprovement of transportation facilities, and to increase their present level of logistic support for the Viet Minh. The Chinesewill probably retain their present capability to commit and supporthinese Communist troops for anof Indochina. The combat efficiency of this potential Invasion force could probably be increased considerably by the use oftroops who have been rotated from Korea In the past year. The ability of Chinese Communist forces to sustain offensive operations in Indochina would probably beshould logistic requirements in Korea remain at low levelsrolonged period.
A Chinese Communist force, added to Viet Minh forces, would probably be able to overrun the Tonkin delta area before effective assistance could be brought to bear. The Chinese Communists now have, and will probably continue to have during the period of this estimate, sufficient jet and pistonindependent of operations in Korea, for small-scale but damaging attacks against French Union installations in Tonkin. With surprise, they probably could neutralize the French Air Forces in Tonkin. The Chinese Communist air forces do not appear, however, to possess the capability at present ofsustained air operations Inack of improved airfields In south China and stockpiles of supplies. Suchwould take several months.
We believe that whether or not hostilities are concluded in Korea, the Chinesewill not Invade Indochina during the period of thislthough theythe capability, the followingmilitate against Intervention by regular Chinese Communist forces or by largeof Chinese Communist "volunteers":
' The Deputy Director for Intelligence. Tbe Joint Stan, believes that the Intelligence available Is insufficient toonclusion at this time that the Chinese Communist* will or will not invade Indochina prior to mld-lftS*.
Communists probably considerpresent strategy inrolonged struggle andimmediate advantages. IIneeded French and US resourcesat relatively small cost to theIt provides opportunities toCommunist interests whilethe fiction of "autonomous"movements, and it provides anthe Viet Minh, with whichChina and the USSR can indirectlyand psychological pressures onand governments of Laos,Thailand.
leadership Is aware thatand In particular the US, wouldretaliate against Communist ChinaCommunist forces shouldWe believe that fear of suchand of the major war whichare important deterrents to openCommunist intervention In Indochina.
e believe that the Communist objective to secure control of all Indochina will not be altered by an armistice in Korea or by"peace" tactics. However, themay decide that "peace" maneuvers in Indochina would contribute to theof Communist global objectives, and to the objective of the Viet Minh.
JTZ T
ANNEX A
K8T1 MATED GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS AS
INDOCHINA
A. FRENCH UNION FORCES
COMrOXKXT
*
PLATXAUX
CHINA
ExpeditionaryEF*
SUtes Annies
States National Guards
Hilary
Auxiliaries
Auxiliaries
Semi-MlllUry
200
strength* and dispositions were effective before th* Viet Minh Invasion of Laos. Since lhat lime French Expeditionary Corps iCEF) strength In Laos has been Increased0 and CEF stienRlh In Tonkin reduced
French Union regular forces are organizedotal of lis CEF battalions andssociated States battalions. The CEF hasrmored, andrtillery battalionsAA battalion. The Associated States haventanlryrtillery battalionsnrachute battalions.
notrench personnel detached for duty with the Associated States forces aa cadres and advisers. Composition ofs as follows:oreignative
T
ANNEX B
ESTIMATED VIET MINH OROUND FORCE STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS AS3
B. VIET MINH FORCES
COMPONSNT
AH &
-CHINA
Forces (Full-time)
Militia (Armed)
TOTALS
strengths and dispositions changed during the Viet Minh Incursion into Laos in April.iet Minh regulars moved from Tonkin into Laos and on0 moved from Annam. By mid-May, however. It Is believed that ail0 of the Viet Minh regulars had returned to their base areas In Tonkin and Annam.
Viet Minh are organizednfantryrtillery division.ndependent regiments, andndependent battalions. Regional forces are organized inattalions.
issident Khmer Issaraks are also active in Cambodia.
SEJ>*rET
ANNEX C
AIR ORDER OF BATTLEFRENCH AIR FORCE AND NAVAL AIR ARM, FAR EAST
UNIT DESIGNATION
AND TYPI
ASSIGNED
Bach Mai. Hanoi Cat Bi. Haiphong Cat Bl. Haiphong Cat Bl, Haiphong Cat Bi, Haiphong Bach Mai, Hanoi Bach Mai, Hanoi Gla Lam, Hanoi Gla Lam. Hanoi Do Son, Haiphong
North Tactical Command
lst/fl Fighter Squadronighter Squadron Detachment,ighter Squadront. Bomber Squadron Detachment,l. Bomberh Photo Recon. Squadron Detachment,rans. Squadron Detachment,rans. Squadron Detachment,rans. Squadronrans. Squadron
Center Tactical Command
ighter Squadron Detachmentighter Squadront. Bomber Squadron Detachment,rans. Squadronrans. Squadron
Tan Son Nhut, Saigon Tan Son Nhut, Saigon Tan Son Nhut. Saigon
South Tactical Command
ighter Squadronrans. Squadron Detachment,rans. Squadron
Miscellaneous light aircraft and helicopters tosed throughout tbe three tactical commands for liaison, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and flight training)
TOTAL
Naval Air Arm
6
B-26
F8F
C-47
U-52
C-47
C-47
U-52
U-52
10
152
U-52
>
based
other types
(all types) temporarily unoperational because or shortages in personnel and
I7S
TOTAL
S
SELP*TET
ANNEX D
FRENCH NAVAL FORCES IN INDOCHINA
Small Aircraft Carrier <CVL|
Gunboat
Escort
Submarine Chaser
Submarine Chaser
Motor Minesweeper
Amphibious Vessels:
Miscellaneous small landing
Auxiliary Vessels;
Service
French Navy
Vtetnam Navy
Mission Aircraft:
"The French have attempted to keep one of their two carriers in Indochina waters, subject lo overhaul and repair schedules. The ARROMANCBES (CVL) and the LAFAYETTE <CVLI departed tor France In February andespectively, for overhaul and repairs.
' Carrier-based aircraft.
JTE T
7.
Original document.
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