the effict,
BEPT-OF STATE
h-ROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA
3 Published3
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The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimatehe FBI abstained, the subject being outside of tts jurisdiction.
The folloutna member organisations of the InteVu/mce Advisory Coamittae participated sell* ihr CentralAgency In the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air force, and the Joint Staff.
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate tbe current situation and probable developments in Indonesia.
CONCLUSIONS
Indonesia, the replacement of the provisional regimeuly electedis an essential step toward the developmenttable and effectiveWe believe that thewill probably meet itsto hold Indonesia's first national electionsarliament and for aassembly sometimelections in themselves, however, will not solve the many problems facing thenor will they necessarilytable government.
Even after elections, much will depend on the actionsew political leaders, whose personal goals and motives are not readily discernible. At present,Sukarno is the principal national leader. His prestige is based on his early leadership in the struggle forhis popularity with the Indonesian people, and his claimed independence of political party. Hence, heocus of loyaltyariety of political and military factions.
The internal security problemajor obstacle to the development of stable government in Indonesia.of dissident elements has been hampered by political considerations and by the limited effectiveness of the army.
However, we believe that no dissident group has the capability of overthrowing the government.table government develops, action against dissident groups will probably become increasingly
The strength of the Communists in Indonesia derives from: <a) their positionajor bloc in Parliament; (b) their control of the dominant labor federation; and (c) the presence of some Communists and Communist sympathizers in the armed services, the police, and theThe Communistshave the capability to causedisruption, though not to overthrow the government by direct military action. The extent of Communist capabilities after the elections will depend, for the most part, on the attitude of thetoward International Communism and, in particular, toward the indigenous Indonesian Communists; thewith which the government acts to improve economic conditions; and the ability of the government to suppress armed groups and to effectively maintain law and order.
The Indonesian economy, whichheavily upon raw material exports.
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is presently depressed because of the fail in world commodity prices. Thesituation will continue toespite theprospectontinued deficit balance of paymentsontinued low level of Internal economic activity, aeconomic crisis does not appear likely
ndonesian foreign policy is chiefly motivatedesire to maintain anposition In the world, and by an attitude of neutrality in the East-West struggle. However, so long asmajor trade relations remain with the West, Indonesia will probably continue to be closer to the West than to the Soviet Bloc.
t best Indonesia will have only begun to solve her basic economic, political, and Internal security problems by the endn time, the government mayits effectiveness, eliminate thedissident groups largely byand improve Its economic situation. However, serious difficulties must bemany of which, if not effectively dealt with, might resultrisis which would seriously weaken, or even result in the collapse of, the central government.
DISCUSSION
S. Indonesia, which achieved independence from Lhe Netherlandss nowto deal as an independent state with the basic economic and social problems common to many underdeveloped areas. Theseinclude low productivity of labor,dependence on raw material exports and. in the case of Java, overpopulation More thanercent of Indonesia'sof aboutillion live In ruralwith over two-thirds of the total population concentrated on the islands of Java and Madura, where there is adensity ofersons per square mile Roughlyercent of the population is illiterate, and educational andfacilities arc rudimentary. On the other hand Indonesia possesses certainadvantages. Itariety of natural resources. Including petroleum, tin. coal, and bauxite, and ls so situated as to be almost entirely free at present from the threat of external attack.
he Indonesian nationalists, who desired to end Dutch colonial rule and establish anIndonesian state, were given their first opportunity under the JapaneseThrough the puppet government which the Japanese permitted them to establish, the Indonesians were able to learn something of administration Furthermore, lhe principal leader of the Indonesian nationalistSukarno, became premier of thegovernment, and thus was in an excellent position to seize the opportunity forwhich was offered by the defeat of Japan. With the support of otherleaders, Sukarno proclaimed anrepublic in
For the ensuing four years, therefused to recognize Indonesianand periods of fighting alternated with periods of negotiation. Independence was finally achieved largely as the result of UN intervention, in which the US played an active part.
In the Round Table Agreementshe Netherlands formallythe independence of the United States of Indonesia. The most importantof these agreements were: (a) approvalrovisional Indonesian constitution; (b) creationnion in which Indonesia and the Netherlands would be equal partners, joined by symbolic allegiance to the Dutch
DGORLT
crown; and (c) protection (or existing Dutch and other foreign economic interests.
Indonesians then undertookemocratic state. Agovernment was set up in orderon normal governmental functionsestablish Internal security. Initialtaken to rehabilitate thedamaged during World War IIstruggle for independence, and toto the new conditions arising fromof colonial ties. TheGovernment undertook toforeign policy in consonance with thespirit of nationalismrogram was begun tothe Indonesian people, largelythe electiononstituent assemblylegislature.
CURRENT SITUATION IN INDONESIA Political Situation
The provisional government at first was organizedederation of Indonesian states. Inhis federation was replaced by the present unitary state. This change was brought about by the Republic of Indonesia (the largest state in the federation and the leader of the Independencein order to Increase its own power and to reduce that of the other member states, most of which were under Dutcheople's Representative Council, generally referred to as the Parliament, was formed. The members of this body were appointed, not elected. No national elections have yet been held.
President Sukarno hastrong force ln Indonesian development; his prestige Is based on bis leadership tn the struggle for independence, his popularity with the mass of the Indonesian people, and,esser degree, his claimed independence of party. However,0 provisional constitution gives most executive power to the cabinet rather than the president, and Sukarno has not used his prestige to extend the power of the presidency.
t present, the largest representation ln Parliament is held by: the Masjuml (the Moslem Party) withteats, the Indonesian National Party witheats, the Greater Indonesian Association witheats, tbe Indonesian Socialist Party witheats, and the Indonesian Communist Party witheats. The remaining representativesarge number of minor parties and non-political groups.he Masjumi and Nationalist parties have played leading roles In Indonesia's coalitionAll non-Communist political parties espouse nationalism, democracy, and some form of socialistic economy.
The Masjumiederation of Islamic religious and social organizations. Its strength derives largely from the fact that the Indonesian population Is approximatelyercent Moslem. The Indonesian National Party draws its support from the smallclass and significant elements of thebureaucracy. The OreaterAssociation is supported largely by civil servants The Indonesian Socialist Party does not have the popular support enjoyed by the Masjumi and Nationalist parties but itell-organized and politically conscious group, and Socialists hold important positions in the administration out of proportion to the party's parliamentary strength.
The Indonesian Communists havegained considerable political strength, in spite of certain Communist Party actions which at the time aroused considerableresentment For example.8 the Indonesian Communists staged an abortive revolt against the Republic of Indonesia.umerous Communist leaders wereon charges of plotting against the government but were subsequently released.owever, the Communists changed their tactics from opposition to avowedThe united front tactics, along with slogans of "peace andere well suited to dispelling some of the publicof the Communists.
One evidence of Communist political strength ls their positionajor bloc In
Parliament. The Communist Party presently holdseats of lis own. controls directlydditional seats held by three front groups, and can count on some support fromndependent members of Parliament. The Communist Party has also been able toIts Influence indirectly through close cooperation with some of the minor parties and. more recently, with the Nationalist Party. This latter development Is viewed with particular alarm by theecond major source of Communist strength lies in its control of SOBSI, the dominant Indonesian laborwhichembership estimated to beSOBSIinally, the Communist political position is enhanced by the presence of someand Communist sympathizers In the administration and by the fairly effective propaganda activities of the Communists.
Because none of the major parties hasajority in Parliament, the various Indonesian governments sincehave been coalitions. Thesehave not included Communist Party representatives. The absencelearfor any party has made successivegovernments, faced with ancritical Parliament, reluctant to take firm decisions on controversial Issues. Moreover, the government has beenin its general administrative and budgetary operations because of the lack of trained personnel and established procedures. Largely for these reasons, no Indonesianhas yet exercised strongin Improving general economicin increasing production. In carrying out general elections, or in suppressingand bandit activity.
During the last monthshe lack of strong leadership permitted factionalism and differences in the army overto expandajor political crisis. The Defense Minister and leaders In the armed forces headquarters, in an effort tothe effectiveness of the army,plans to reduce Its size, modernize It. and centralize its administration, Otherin the army, principally those who would be eliminated under these plans,the program. They were supported by some members of Parliament who alsoto retain large numbers of already existing guerrilla-type forces. This dispute was magnified by members of Parliament who desired to weaken and discredit the Socialist Party, which allegedly dominated theof Defense and the armed forces
he Parliament, after nearly three months discussion,esolutionfor the reorganization of the Defense Ministry and new leadership of the army and the armed forcesroup of army officers,emonstration onalled upon Presidentto dissolve Parliament and holdelections immediately. Althoughrefused these specific requests, he promised that national elections would be held as soon as possible. In the following weeks, subordinate officers in three of the seven territorial commands deposed their commanders and announced theirof the army high command, buttheir allegiance to President Sukarno. The government later replaced the army chief-of-stafT and accepted the resignation of the Minister of Defense These steps eased tension but wereartial solution of the problem. Two territorial commandsunder control of tho subordinate officers who seized command, and the basicproblem of factionalism in the army continues toerious threat to the authority of the Indonesian Government.
Internal Security
The internal security problem has plagued the Indonesian Government9 when, after three and one-half years of Japanese occupation and four years of fighting the Dutch, thereide variety of guerrilla groups. Indonesia has limited forces with which to deal with this problem.
The Indonesian Army,otal strength ot, organized In battalion units under territorial commands,
is poorly equipped and poorly trained. The National Police Mobile Brigade, whichotal strength otetter equipped and better trained force, having been supplied largely by US grant aid. Its equipment, however, consists mainly of small arms and personnel carriers. TheAir Forceersonnel strength ofilots) andircraft. The Air Force, having only aboutonventional fighters andight bombers,ery limited capability for defense of Indonesia's borders. It hason occasion in support of armyagainst dissident elements, but with limited success. The Indonesian Navyotal personnel strength ofumber of small former Dutch patrolincluding one destroyer. The navy has been primarily concerned withoperations and has performed thiswith fair effectiveness.
he effectiveness of the army has been further limited by factionalism. Correction of defects in army organization has been preventedisagreement both between army territorial commanders and within the army general staff, which has only nominal control over the territorial commands Two of the territorial commands are almostIndependent of the Ministry ofThe danger to the centralposed by these circumstances Isby the apparent continued loyally of the territorial commanders to President Sukarno, either becauseersonaldeveloped during the war ofor because of his official position as President The greatest danger togovernmental authority ls not frombut rather from lowered morale and continuing deterioration of the army'sto cope with the dissident forces.
espite the foregoing limitations on the effectiveness of the armed forces, thehas managed to suppress two armed revolts aid to maintain order ln most areas of Indonesia. However, there remain many bandit gongs and sizable dissident forces, which totalen,one-half of whom are armed.and bandit groups In South Celebes have an estimated strength of. However, the bulk of the dttsident forces is in Java. The principal dissident group is the Darul Islam, concentrated largely In the mountainous country of West and Central Java. It has an estimated active strength00 men, about one-third of whom have guns. Darul Islam advocates aMoslem state and has considerablesympathy, particularly ln the Masjumi Party. Masjuml influence In the government has been exercised to prevent militaryof Darul Islam.
ommunist overthrow of the Indonesian Government by direct military action ls not an Immediate possibility. Reports indicate that possibly as manyuerrillas may be Communist controlled. The Communist Party has officially denied sponsorship of any guerrilla gToup, but Communist attempts to Influence or infiltrate insurgent bands Inmay be assumed. Tbe CommunistsSOBSI, the principal labor federation, and some Cornmunists and Communistare In the armed forces, the police, and some government ministries Thewas able2 toeries of harbor strikesugar estate strike, but the Communists did not exercise their full capability to spread the strikes to otherand to commit acts of sabotage and violence. By such means, the Communists probably could disrupt the Indonesianseriously.
there have been reports thatgroups have received aid fromthese reports have not been
Economic Situation
economic well-being of Indonesiaupon foreign demand for itsand rnineral exports. Theseof rubber, petroleum, copra, tin,and palm oU. Not only does theexports determine the general level ofeconomic activity, butheavily upon its exports to pay for
essential imports of rice, textiles, andThe government also normallyover one-third of Its revenue fromand export duties.
The principal economic activity inls agriculture. Close toercent of the working population is engaged inaboutercent of the national mcocne is derived from agriculture, and agricultural products account for someercent of the value of total exports. IndonesianIs divided between: (a) small-scale native farming, and (b) large-scale estate farming, developed and managed by Europeans on land held on long-term leases from the government, and directed toward production for export.
Before the war, the lands leased or rented by the estates represented aboutercent of the total land under cultivation, andfor roughly two-thirds of Indonesia's varied agricultural exports. Foreignm estates was estimated at0 million, three-fourths of which was Dutch. However, estate production of allexcept rubber is now far below prewar. The estates suffered considerable damagethe war and In the period of civil strife which followed, and now account for only one-third of Indonesia's curtailed agricultural exports. Foreign operators have beento employ funds for rehabilitation of the estates, largely because of domesticand the uncertainty concerning the future status of the estates.
The government has not deterrnlnedong-term policy with respect to foreign-operated estates. The government,that continued foreign management of the estates is for the time being essential to tbe economy, has so far refused to yield to demands for nationalization or redistribution of the estate lands. It presently plans, however, to Increase Its control over theof the estates by renegotiating theleasing arrangements as present estate contracts expire. Also, theduring the past two years hasto native farmers much of theland held in reserve by the estates
Native farm output hasowever, serious agrarian problems remainonsequence of the low level ofative agriculture and the increasing pressure of population In Java. One result of this situation has been the steady Increase In number of landlessan important cause of unrest.
The Indonesian Government haser.es of small-scale programs designed to relieve agricultural unemployment,ore adequate system of agricultural credit, and increase the productivity of labor. The government ls continuing, thoughery limited scale, the prewar Dutch program of Javanese resettlement in the outer Islands Efforts are being made to develop Ugh*.to provide increased non agricultural employment opportunities- Finally, theGovernment, with the assistance of US and UN technicians, is attempting tothe output of food in Indonesia,rice.
The present economic situation inis not favorable. During the0 andhen world prices for Indonesian exports were high, Indonesiaavorable balance of payments. In the last quarter1 these prices fell, and2 Indonesia suffered from depressedeconomic activity and from balance of payments difficulties- Exportstimated3 million,illion less thanhe main cause for the fall In export earnings was the decline of aboutercent in average export prices for rubber. Concurrently with the decline of exports, Imparts Increased5 million15 millionhis Increase was causedonsiderable extentharp nse in rice imports,
esult of these changes, Indonesiaeficit on current account2 of0 million, most of which was financed by drawing upon theforeign exchange and gold holdings. At the endndonesia's net foreign exchange reserves, mostly in gold andhad declined to7 millionigh of6 million in
tbe middle of the year. In an effort to deal with this situation, the government tightened exchange controls and further restricted the importation of selected luxury and semi-luxury commodities.
government normally derivesof Its revenue from importduties. Largelyesult ofin tradehe governmentestimated budgetary deficitA considerable part of this deficitfinanced through an Increase inwhich has contributed to
Foreign Policy
development of Indonesiansince independence has beenlargelyesire to be free ofeconomic domination by otherforeign relations centercompleting the process of severingthe Netherlands, and (b> keepingapart from the East-West struggle.
S etfierlands-Indonesian Relations
The Indonesians desire to eliminate what remains of the preferred Dutch position, and there have been increasing demands that the Round Table Agreements be abrogated. The first step toward revising the formalbetween the two countries was taken in3 and resulted ln an agreement to terminate, byost of the services of the Netherlands Military Mission, which was provided for In the Round Table Agreements.
Indonesian hesitancy unilaterally tothe Round Table Agreements may be due to the fact that the Indonesians have made little progress toward their objective of reducing their dependence on Dutch capital and on Dutch technical and managerialThe Indonesians lack both theand personnel to replace the large established Dutch industrial and commercial firms. Likewise, Indonesia has lacked the trained administrators to enable it to dispense withutch officials who remained to serve the Indonesian
major issue left unsettled byTable Agreements was theWestern New Guinea (West Irian).popular excitement has beenover this Issue. In theWestern New Guinea was included inNetherlands East Indies colonywas Included in the transfer ofto Indonesia. To the Indonesians,issue to be decided Is the politicalWestern New Guinea within theDutch, on the other hand, hold tothat they retain sovereignty overTwo conferences held atave failed lo settle the Issue,area remains under Dutch control.
Relations with the US
he US has replaced theas the country with which Indonesia carries on the greatest volume of trade. The US purchases the major share of Indonesia's rubber and tin exports. Moreover, the US has provided Indonesia with economic andassistance, equipment for Its mobilepolice force, and an Export-Import Bank line of credit.
Indonesia has found It difficult toIts Independent foreign policy with its economic ties with the US. Inhe Sukiman government fell because ot Parliamentary sentiment againstrovision of the US Mutual Security Act which was alleged to Involve an abandonment of neutrality. Again, many Indonesian political leaders objected to signing the Japanese peace treaty, and the treaty has not yet beento Parliament for ratification.to the treaty were based on the belief tbat It would violate Indonesia's independent foreign policy by associating Indonesia with the US bloc. In addition, the Indonesians wanted assurance that their reparationwould be met and that they would receive satisfactory guarantees against the encroachment of Japanese fishing vessels ln Indonesian waters. The government signed the treaty on the understanding that the US
0DOI>nT
would use Its influence In the reparationto assist the Indonesians ln gaining adequate compensation. Indonesian leaders, who might prefer to remain uninfluenced by the OS, have nevertheless been forced tooth the impact of US power In the Pacific and the Importance to Indonesia of US trade.
Relation] with other Western Countries
of Indonesia's external culturaland her most important externalrelations have been with the Westother hand, the West is associatedin Indonesian eyes, so thatovertures to Indonesia have beenconsiderable suspicion. However,and the desire to remain neutralEast-West struggle have notfrom accepting US aid,in the Colombo Plan, or observing theon the shipment of strategic materials
Relations with the Soviet Bloc
Indonesia's few overtures to the Soviet Btoc seem to have been aimed atounterbalance to the ties Indonesia already has with the West. Despite immediate Soviet recognition of Indonesian independence,exchanges diplomatic representatives only with Communist China among theof the Soviet Bloc. However, Parliament has recentlyesolution favoring the establishmentiplomatic mission Inbefore the endhe facts that the first Chinese Communist ambassador to Djakarta had once written articles attacking President Sukarno, and that the largestaff Is suspected of subversive activities, have limited the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist mission. Indonesian citizens have been permitted to participate inmeetings abroad and to attend the Moscow Economic Conference Inost Indonesians are sympathetic to the cause of the Viet Mlnh ln Indochina,it as primarily an independence movement.
Indonesian trade with the Soviet Bloc has been small. mports from the
Soviet Bloc (primarily from Communist China and Czechoslovakia) accounted for onlyercent of total Indonesian imports, andto the Soviet Bloc (primarily toomprisedercent of total Indonesian exports. Tbe exact amount of Indirect trade is unknown, but is believed to be small.the past yearalf, Soviet spokesmen have made several well-publicized offers of capital goods and technical aid to Southeast Asia, and Communist China hasilateral trade agreement withsimilar to Its arrangement with Ceylon. No specific agreements have resulted. Inuantity of rubberrivate company for shipment to Communist China, but the governmentthe export license, purchased theand therebyiolation of the UN restrictions on shipments to Communist China.
Relations with Son-Communist Asian and Pacific Area Countries
Relations with neighboring countries,Burma and India, are friendlyin keeping with Its independent foreign policy, Indonesia has shown little interest in proposals for bilateral or regional alliances, such as the Fmpmc-proposed Pacific pact. Indonesia has cooperated closely with the Arab-Asian Bloc In the UN.
Relations with Australia have variedto the party in power in Australia. The Australian Labor Government, which strongly supported the Indonesian causethe Indonesian-Dutch struggle, wasto bo more sympathetic to Indonesia than is the Liberal-Country Party coalition now In power, whichro-Dutch stand during that period. However, both Australian governments have supported Dutch retention of Western New Guinea, and this hasrelations between Indonesia and Australia.
Although Indonesia has not established diplomatic relations with Japan, consularhave been exchanged and economicare close.apan becamethud most important trading partner.
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and. Inndonesia concluded what was generally regarded as an advantageous trade agreement with Japan. In thisJapan agreed to the deferred payment of dollar balances that had accruedormer agreement; this conciliatory position was probably occasioned by recognition of the importance of the Indonesian market.diplomatic relations with Japan willdependatisfactory settlement of reparations claims.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA
Little will be accomplishedesolving Indonesia's basic political,security, and economic problems.
Electiononstituent assemblyarliament ls plannednd is anstep toward the development of an effective representative government.may provide the psychological sense of contact and rapport between the people and the government which will increase political stability. Members of an elected Parliament, and the government formed by them, might act with greater confidence than have the provisional legislature and cabinet. However, we are unable to predict the outcome of the elections or the policies that will thereafter be followed by any of the major parties. In any case, the elections will not solve the many difficult problems facing the country and political stability will by no means be assured.
e believe that the national elections,complicated and delayed by numerous technical problems, probably will be held scene timehe government's ability to maintain at least the present degree of internal securityritical factor inout the election plans. Also, even though the election law has been passed, regulations to implement the basic law must beand acted on, and the generally Illiterate population must be educated and otherwise prepared to carry out its franchise. Various groups which sought to delay adoption of the basic elections law probably will raise other difficulties to prevent, or at least delay, the promised elections In this situation, much will depend on the actionsew political leaders, whose personal goals and motives are not readily discernible.
elections arc not held asor if an effective government isfollowing elections, the steadyof confidence in theonsequent weakeningauthority. In theseor all of the following might occur:
of the major armymight defect and refuse tothe authority of the central government;
areas might seek to re-establishfederation in which theyautonomy; (c) Parliament might beand full governmentalmall group of nationalheaded by President Sukarno.
In the period before elections, theIn Indonesia wil probably retain, and may enhance, their capability to influence government policy through their activities In Parliament, to create economic disorder through their control of the labor movement, and to Increase their numbers in the armed services, the police, and the bureaucracy. The extent of Communist capabilities after the elections will depend, for the most part, on the attitude of the government towardCommunism and, in particular, the indigenous Indonesian Communists; thewith which the government acts to improve economic conditions; and the ability cf the government to suppress armed groups (bandits, dissidents or potential dissidents) and to effectively maintain law and order.
We believe that none of the existinggroups. Including the Communists, has the capability of overthrowing theby force. Moreover,tabledevelops following parliamentaryaction against dissident groups will probably become increasingly effective.we believe that MasjumI Influence will continue to stand In the way of suppressive rnilitary action against Darul Islam, and that efforts to eliminate Its threat will be by way of negotiation.
he economic situation will continue to be precarious An economic crisis could occur il the government proved unable to curtail expenditures, and if world prices for Indonesia's exports continued to decline, thus further worsening the terms of trade for Indonesia Under these conditions, Indonesia's foreign exchange holdings would be rapidly exhausted, domestic prices would continue to rise, dissatisfaction amongand estate workers would becomeand the Communists, through the unions they dominate, would be able to foment strikes and unrest. However, the government is continuing measures designed to increase the production of food,rice, and of those raw materials which are in continued demand on world markets, and to curtail imports. Accordingly, despite the immediate prospectontinued deficit balance of paymentsontinued low level of internal economic activity, aeconomic crisis does not appear likely
will almost certainly notpolicy of attempting to stand apartEast-West struggle. Currentthe Netherlands will probablyfor some time and willkeeping alive anti-colonialism andconcomitant distrust of theWest. The Indonesianeventually accede to the formallydesire of ParUament torepresentatives with the
Indonesia's orientationWest will probably continue, so longwith the West continues to bethe maintenance and growth ofThere Is considerable publicIn Indonesia to expand trade with the Soviet Bloc in the belief that Indonesia will therebyetter bargaining position. If the demand of the West and that of the US In particular for Indonesian exports should sharply decline, the Indonesians would be even more favorably disposed to trade offers Irom the Soviet Bloc.
chievementruce in Korea would probably enhance the UN's prestige in Indonesia would lookeneral peaceful settlement in the Far Eastogical consequence of the truce. In theview, peace In Korea would remove the necessity for East-West trade controls. Should Indochina fall to the Communists without overt Chinese CommunistIt is likely that Indonesia would view the event asriumph of But if open Chinese Communistwere involved tn the fall of any of the Associated States or In aggressionIndonesia might be inclined to view the threat of Communist China much more seriously. In any case, If major traderemain with the West, Indonesia will probably continue to be closer to the West than to the Soviet Bloc.
t best Indonesia will have only begun to solve her basic economic, political, andsecurity problems by the endn time, the government may Increase its effectiveness, eliminate the remaininggroups largely by attrition, and improve its economic situation However, serious difficulties must be overcome, many of which, if not effectively dealt with, might resultrisis which would seriously weaken, or even result in the collapse of. the central
Original document.
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