THE PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES REPORT TO THE

Created: 6/30/1953

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

m

:cret

SECUlU-gr*cVFOai4ATI0M

Chapter Six

COVERT OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FREE WORLD

For five years after the end of World Wax II. governments of non-communist nations, especially in Western Europe, wereto strong pressure from communist minorities. Many of these governments had communist cabinet members and were-Incapable of strong action against communist groups. Nearly all had communists in key administrative positions. Independent covert action by the United States frequently offered the only possible method of strengthening national anti-communist forces. For considerations both of security and policy it was generally impossible for the United States to work with and trust those governments which were under the heaviest communist attack. Because of this special situation and also because thereasic and continuing needovert arm of government capable of conducting certain activities abroad which could not be acknowledged as officially sponsored, an office of covertwas established within the Central Intelligence Agency8 -

As the political and economic recovery in Western Europe permits, some reduction of CIA's covert activities in this area will be possible. In addition, European governments or private groups may be Induced to. assume, either independently or jointly with American agencies, responsibility for some of the political action programs now being carried on by CIA. This would mean that CIA would lose much of its direct control over these activities. Tho Committee believes, however, that such direct control must in many cases be relinquished or relaxed if serious politicallications are to be avoided.

iCTiapUr Stven, p.wludtat covtrt operations undertaken solely to inppoft oeert military forces In wartime.

TOPxnnurnr'&OTORM

T

ZSTO kma nON

The critical countries of South and Southeast Asia and of Africa have presented very great obstacles to the conduct of covert as well as overt activities. Successful covert operations can be developed onlyong period. The Committee believes that these areas shouldigher priority than they now enjoy with respect to assignment of key personnel and development of expanded covert capabilities for future activities.

operations havearge number of foreign political organizations throughout the free world, particularly in Western Europe, in order to make them more effectiveagainst communist subversion.arallel effort,have also been made to establish covert influence directly over key individuals and groups in foreign governments. Such political activities have the great advantage that they permit the United States covertly to influence developments in otherin the interest of the United Statesegree which can not be accomplished overtly. They have the disadvantage lhat theyisk of exposure which may result in damage to United States int

Becauseof the lackof-adequatepreviousfield of peacetime" covert operations, and because*operations were needed to meet serious threats ofadvance8ome of the initialsuffered from hasty improvisation. They did,materially in countering communist subversion duringperiod. The experience gained Is now of value lnmore effective controls over current activities and inthe advantages and disadvantages of continuing themcovert basis.

-3

^80

I

TOP SBCRF/r

S ECTTH ITY^&FORMATI (

esult ol experience gained in the Last four years, and

of major"certain basic mi ties should now increasingly ties

icreign gcvemm

within theworld during this period, locations In present concepts of covert activi-made. Free world governments are becoming Independent American activi-CIA activities tosan today become

basis either for official protests to the United States, or if publicly exposed,ave of popular indignation against"intervention".

Because of the size and complexity of many covert large numbers of people] are familiar

Q te inter" prated as ^n- aUempt by Amertcaii inteUigence- agencies to-take ever and control fjpjm^pjpjpjgfor reasons totallywith professed American ideals. Under thesefew foreigners would accept the view that the onlyis to strengthen free world institutions against cooununist subversion. Unlike the communists, whose political code admits the necessity for subversion, the strength of the American position abroad is dependent upon the voluntary association of foreign nations)

4

Original document.

---

---