NO.
SECURITY INFORMAtig
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
PROBABLE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND WESTERN POWER POSITIONS
333
The InteUigence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimateJ. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside ol its jurisdiction. The following member organizations ol the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated With the CentralAgency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, end lhe Jowl Staff.
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PROBABLE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND WESTERN POWER POSITIONS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable relative development of the Soviet Bloc and Western power positions over the next fifteen years,iew to estimating whether or not time is on our side in the East-West conflict.
ASSUMPTIONS
Western Powers.'
No generalof policies of both thc Dloc and the
Continuation of the present general
ESTIMATE
Wc believe It essenlial to state at the outset that there is no unequivocal answer to thc question "is time on our side." Evena "continuation of thc present general trend of policies of both the Bloc and the Western Powers" (itself an assumption of doubtfulhere are so manyor unpredictable factors which will materially affect the world situation as loany firm estimate of the relative Soviel Bloc and Western power positions fifteen years from now. Moreover on thc side of the unti-Communist countries, taking tlie NATO and so called neutralist powers together, ttiere are so many divergent trends that it is difficult to speakonsistent trend of policy. Even within NATO itself, thc chief unifying force lies ln the agreement of the members to resist aggression against any one of them It is possible to appraise in general terms our likely power positionis Uie Bloc If present trends continue and if various major alternative developments do or doome lo pass. Moreover, by examining thc impact of
'The Western Powers are taken to include the US and Its allies.
some of these alternatives, we can it least establish certain significant factors which might alter present trends.
PROBABLE ECONOMICF SOVIET BIOC AND THE WEST
4 The Soviet Bloc. Al present the over-all economic strength of the Soviet Bloc is far less than that of the Western Powers; in Icrms of gross national productf the entire Bloc is estimated to hove been about one-third lhal of the Western slates' However,ontinuation of present policies and programs, the economic strength of the Soviet Bloc will Increase greatly over theears. For some years lhc rate oi growth of Uie Soviet economy will almost certainly remain higher than that ot any major Western state. However. Uie past rapid rate of growth, which wc estimateercent. is already leveling off and thc annual rale toward the end of the
'For the purpose of these economic proiections. lhc Western Powers include the US. theNATO countries, West Germany, Canada. Australia and Japan.
period is unlikely toercent. Even so, total Soviet GNP will probably almostwithin the next fifteen years, while Bloc GNPhole will increase around 75
Bloc economic capabilities to wage war are likely lo increase substantially since the Bloc will probably coniinue to place great emphasis on Uie developmenl of heavy Industry, and in particular on military production. Bloc self-sufficiency, already great, will probablymore nearly complete.
These projections may be invalidated by otherrotooged struggle for power or internal dissension in the Soviet Bloc might dissipate Sovietelaxation in the forced pace of heavy industrial development would probably reduce the rate of Increase in Bloc capabilities toajor war. The difficulty of rapidly increasing the industrial labor force in the USSR and thc probable lag in agricultural production may prove more serious limiting factors on general economic growth than we now estimate. On the other hand. Uie application of known scientificto Bloc agriculture, though this would require large-scale investments, would permit greater increases in Bloc agricultural production and the release of agricultural labor for other uses.
The West. It is more difficult to esUmate the probable economic growth of the Western Powers. The freer and less closely Integrated Western economies, particularly those of the major US allies, arc more vulnerable tofluctuations and trends In International trade than are those of the Bloc Much will depend upon thc ability of the Western Powers toattern of production and oftrade and payment* which will provide such countries as Uie UK, Germany, and Japan with adequate markets, and Inwillteady economic growth. US resources and policies will bo of critical importance In ihis field. However,ontinuation of present trends and nodepressions, we estimate the probable growth In US GNP at about 5fi percent over Uie next fifteen years, and alor Uie Western Powershole.
owever, the Western Powers will continue to face much greater difficulUes than thoBloc in allocating and directing theirtoward cold war objectives andpreparations for hot war. Their ability (and desire) to impose peacetime sacrifices will be less, and Uie problems of agreeing on common objectives and dcvislng*efIecUveamong nations of different and sometimes divergent interests will remain difficult to overcome.
fl While Bloc GNP will probably increaseigher rate than that of the Western Powers and the ratio of Western superiority will therefore decrease. Uie GNP of Uie West Isso much greater than that of Uie Bloc that the absolute gap between the two will widon despite Uie lower rate of Westernhus Uie West will remain for the indefinite future greaUy superior to the Soviet Bloc in total economic strength.
certain factors decrease theof over-all economic growthactor in thc world powerThe ability of the totalitariantoigh percentage o! Itsboth to Uie cold war and topreparations will probablyUian that of the West. Moreover,staled inheeconomic superiority of Uie West,Important, may not be the rulingin determining whether time is on
PROBABLE SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES OF THE WEST AND THE SOVIET BLOC
over-all scientific assets of Uieand quality of trainedand equipment) are now farthose of Uie Soviet Bloc, and almosiwill remain greater over lhe next However, the USSR Is expending great
project these trendsloe GNP Is ctti-nisted to Increase on the orderereent while Western ONP Increases only TO percent, thus altering the raUo ton ravot of the West On the other hand, the actual dls-psntv In favor ol the Wesl will become even greater, from around (ICO billiono somebilUon
OKliHBT
lo reduce ihis disparity, and Ls likely lo nu row the gap between It und lhc West, even though the Western Powers probably willmore basic scientific advances, and will coniinue, in general, to be belter able toprototypes inlo quantity production of high quality. Moreover, the Bloc mayexcessively on the solution of short-leim military and economic problems, thus narrowing thc range of fundamental lescarch and diminishing the probability of basicadvances.
is impossible to estimate whetherrelationships between the Sovietthe West will be changed duringof this estimate by any majorbreakthrough by either side,example, as the Initial production otbomb by Uie US
PROBABLE TRENDS IN THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE WEST AND THE SOVIET BLOC
We believe that throughout the nextyears Uie West will maintain aabsolute advantage ln capabilities for atomic warfare, but that the Bloc willreduce this advantage. Within the period of this estimate both US and USSR willufficient stockpile of atomic and possibly thermonuclear weapons lo cripple the olher side, if delivered onhc US, if it has not already acquired Ihis number of weapons, will do so before Uie USSR does
ontinuation of presenttrends of policies of both Uie Bloc and the Western Powers. It is likely that within the period of this estimate Uie Wesl and USSR will each have Uie means of delivery with which to cripple the other, unless developments inweapons and techniques jwrmit aimprovement over present defensive capabilities. At that point Uie world will haveeriod In which boUi of the great power blocs have lhc capacity lo cripple the other, though only at equally grave risk of
the purpose of this tsUmai* "lo cripple-means to destroyery large proportion of the resources required by in* other side to wage conunulng general war.
crippling blows in return. Unless it attained complete strategic surprise or achieved antechnological breakthrough, wolhal neither side would be able to prevent powerful retaliation in kind. In the absence of general war, however, Uie ruthlcssness of the Soviet rulers and the fear which theyamong many Western peoples maythem to use Uie possession of atomicas an Instrument of pressure In the cold war.
The US is losing, if it has not already lost,
longstanding Invulnerability to crippling attack, and with it the immense strategicof being able to conduct thcdeliberate and extensive posl-DDay mobilization. We cannot estimate the time at which thc USSR will attain the capability to cripple US war-making capacily. bul It ls probably well within Uie period ot thisAt that lime, despite probableizable margin of technological superiority and superior atomic offensivethis continued disparity will become much less significant, at least in regard to bombardment of strategic targets.
On thc olher hand, the continuingof the West over thc Bloc in atomicwill nevertheless represent aadvantage, because of developing tactical uses of atomic weapons. It Is likely that the West will, during the period of this esUmate. remain superior to the Soviet Bloc In capabiliUes for tactical use of atomic weapons, whether in general or in local war.
The development of Bloc and Western power posiUons during the next fifteen years will be slgnlficanUy affected by Iheir relative conventional military capabiliUes, with or without the accompanying use of atomic weapons. Bloc military forces arc beingmodernized and strengthened, and will continue toerious threat to areas around thc Bloc periphery. The West will probably remain superior to the Bloc inof weapons, in the application ofto military uses, and in Its ability to control Uie seas. The West will increaseits relaUve power position If It can develop local military capabiliUes in key areas
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4
the Bloc periphery and ean maintain forces-in-bemg capable ol quick dispatch to such areas in case of emergency.
oreover, attainment of the capability to defend Western Europe and Japan against Soviet attack would significantly Improve thc power position ol the West The resources of these areas, their geographical location, and their 'considerable technological potential, contribute substantially to Western strength. The extent to which Uie Wesl will attain the capability of defending these at eas will depend on Western and other policy decisions. Muchalso depend, In this connection, on the degree of progress which Is made in regard to lhe rearmament and anti-Soviet orientation uf West Germany nnd Japan.
PROBABLE TRENDS IN TUG POLITICAl AND SOCIAL STRENGTH AND COHESION Of THE SOVIET BLOC AND THE WEST
Probable Trends tn the Soviet Bloc. Political and social trends will have anand perhaps controlling effect on the relative power positions of Uie Bloc and Uie West and arc most difficult to estimate over soeriod as the next fifteen years During this period it is possible that afor conlrol within the Kremlin mightetraction and decay of Soviet power. Whether such developments will take place or at what extent Ihey would begin toaterial effect on the power posiUon of the Soviet Bloc cannot be estimated at this time. At present, however, we see no indications that thc economic and military bases of Soviet power have been affected by Stalin's death.
In any case wc believe It unsafe to assume lhat over theears the Soviet regime will lose its stability or Uie Bloc its cohesion. While Uie more flexible policies of Uie post-Stalin icgiine and tlie modestof tight Soviel controls may permitovert manifestations of discontentthe Iron Curtain, over Uie long run these very policies may also tend to lengthen the Kremlin's lease on jwwer. The possibility exists Uiat Communist China may attempt to play an increasingly independent role.
Should this potential weakness developreak between Uie two chief Communist stales, it wouldajor loss to Soviet power.
rends in tfte Political and Social Strength and Cohesion of the West. Because of lhe greater diversity of the looser Westernand the variety of forces at play within it, wc find it even more difficult to project probable trends in Western strength andas they affect the global balance of power. However, at no time in Ihefuture will thc Western Powers be likely lo attain or to desire to attain thc centralized control to mobilize their resourcesof the totalitarian Soviet Bloc. Inthey will probably continue to be more subject to internal confbcls. economic fluctu-aUons. and divisive Influences lhan the Bloc. Much will depend on international economic developments, on future Soviet policy, on the future position of major nations likeJapan, and India and, above all, on Uie role played by thc acknowledged leader of the Western coalition, the US itself.
As Uie only single aggregation ofoutside the US itself comparable to the Soviet Bloc, Western Europe plays arole In the world power balance. Itsweaknesses, such as dependence on US aid, lackense of urgency regarding the Communist threat, disputes between Prance and Germany, and French andajor vulnerability of the Western Powers, while Western Europe's acquisition by thc Bloc wouldremendous increment to Soviet power.trong and viable Western Europe, including Germany, would substantiallyWestern vulnerability and alter Uie present power relationship between thc Soviet Bloc and the West to the advantage of Uie latter.
On Uie other hand, we see many obstacles lo the achievemenl of this objective.rimary concern of Uie Kremlin over the coming period will be to frustrate the developmentiable and defensible West-
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s
n this effort the Kremlin will almost certainly concentrate on thc key to thc Europcun situation. Lhe German problem.hift in Soviet policy on Germany, lorled thc Germans tonited, armed, and neutral Germany. It wouldew factor of great significance into the world power balance. Such aif accepted by our NATO Allies, would not necessarily weaken the Westerneaimod and neutral Germany would actuffer state, and if thc Germans were subsequently lo abandon neutrality, wethat Ihey would be more likely to align themselves with the West than with lhe Bloc.
The emergenceearmed. tmti-Coni-immist Japan wouldajor asset Inthc strategic balance Ln the Far East. However, the degree of future Japanesewith the US will depend largely on the extent to which tbe Western alignment not only meets Japan's needs for security and foreign markets, but also satisfies itsfor economic and military aid and for treatment as an equal.
Probable Trend* in the Strength and Alignment of "Gray"ajorfacing the West is represented by the extreme political and social instability of the underdeveloped areas of the Middle and Far East and Africa, where profound social changes are In progress, entailing ln many areas disorder and consequent vulnerability to Communist Influences. Thc nntl-Western overtones of tills political and socialcreate an additional obstacle to theby thc West of thc resources of these regions. The consequent danger to theposition Is acute in some areas ofAsia and the Middle East. None of these areas Is likely to develop Into an Important center of power during the period of thisbut their loss would neverthelesserious blow to the West. For example, the loss of Indochina, which is possible, would probably resull in eventual loss of most of mainland Southeast Asia. This in turn would lead to worsened prospects for stability tn the Indian subcontinent, and lo greatly Increased difficulties in maintaining the pro-
Western orientation ofommunist takeover in Iran, which is also possible, would jeopardise thc already unslable Westernin Uie Middle East.
n the other hand, the trend toward greater instability and vulnerability toinfluence in the underdeveloped areas is not irreversible. Western control oris still paramount in these areas. Over lheears the US and its allies still have the opportunity to undertakewhich might arrest this trend sndthat Influence.
ectsremlin Shift to Soft Tactics. Wc believerolongedshift to more moderate tactics would alsoeal challenge to further growth Ln the military auength and, the cohesion of Western Powers. To date the US hasm creaUng and partiallyefensive coalition under Uie impetus of an acute Soviet threat. Should this threatto diminish, it will be difficult lothe support of Western peoples forrearmament, close integration ofpolicies, and vigorous anti-Communist efforts. Tlie likelihood of divisions among the Western Powers, especially if encouraged by skillful Kremlin action, would markedlyIt might lead, over the longer run, to some of our allies adopting more neutral positions, or even to thc creationhirdn the otherecrease of cold war tensions might allow many Western countries to concentrate on domestic needs and to devote more resources to meeting their own economic and social problems. It is possible, however,earmament slow-down would Instead lead to unemployment of manpower and resources.
A prolonged relaxation of tensions might also have an adverse effect on the cohesion and vitality of the world Communistand hence on the Soviet power position-Soviet leaders are under some compulsion to pursue an aggressive policy in order toUie Communist ideologyital force. Any pronounced subduing ol thehosUlily motif might serve to soften thc rank-and-file of foreign Communist parties,
and to breed restlessness In countries under Kremlin control. Moreover, without keeping active the concept of permanent conflictCommunists and non-Communists. Moscow might have difficulty in maintaining voluntary adherence of "socialist states"ommunist China and Viet Minh) and their willingness lo undertake direct action In the interest of the USSR.
IS TIME ON OUR SIDE?
We believe thai thc Soviet Bloc under present policies and programs will over thcears decrease thc proportion by which Its economic and technologicalare inferior to those of the West and will acquire sufficient atomic capabilities to cripple *the US. Therefore, although the West will probablyizable absolute margin of superiority, we believe lhat in these respects tune must be said lo be on the Soviet side.
In other respects, time may be on the side of tlie West. Thc West's military capabilities will increase during thc next fifteen years if conventional rearmament programs andapplications of unconventional weapons enhance its present defensive capabilities in overseas areas. Thc extent to which these developments are likely to occur depends on Western and other policy decisions.
Trends can be identified within boih the West and the Bloc which might undermine each side's political stability and cohesion. We cannot predict, however, that these trends will have surh effects and certainly we cannot say lhat they would do so within the period of this estimate.
now seem lo be runningWesl In the underdeveloped areastrends cannot be arrested, thegrowth ol instability andIn these areas may eventuallyeffects on the economic stabilityorientation of WesternJapan.
there Is no reason at this timethe Bloc's decay oi collapse, thcexists of certain changes adverse lostrength and stability,may deprive thc USSR of thatand vitality which con tribute tosystem's survival and growthIhe Kremlin may decide torelax Its previous jwlicics, only tothis relaxation ndverscly affectsSoviet economic growth, satelliteand Sino-Soviet cohesion. It wouldhowever, to assume that thewhich are inherent in the Sovietof themselves have reached criticalwithin the next filtccn years.Ihey do, the totalitarian nature ofsystem and thc Kremlin'sor influence over lis Bloc partnersto provide it with manyUie less cohesive coalition led by the US.
ven under the assumption ofof the present general trend of policies in both the Bloc and lhe Westernhere are so many accidental orfactors which could alter present trends, that wc are unable to conclude lhal time is on thc side of either thc Soviet Bloc or Uie West.ew of the components of power can be projected with fair confidence, the relative over-all development of Uie power positions of Uie West and Soviet Bloc cannot be predicted.
Original document.
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