OCI No. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CopyOF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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Radio and the Soviet press have announced that L. P. Berla has been ousted from the Communist Party and from bis government positions as first deputy premier and MVD minister, has been Jailed, and win be tried by theupreme Courtraitor. ew days ago" Malenkoveport from the Party Presidiumlenary meeting of the Central Committee which discussed Beria's criminal antlparty and antistate activities.
According to Pravda, Beria has been accused of: _
to undermine the Soviet state lnof foreign capital by treacherous to place the ITVD above the USSRand party;"
machinating to seize power by using the MVD organs against the party and its leadership and against the government "by selecting MVD personnel on the basis of loyalty to himself;"
"impeding decisions, under various Inventedon most important and urgent agricultural problemsiew to undermining the collective farms and creating difficulties In the food supply;"
trying to undermine "with various crafty schemes" the friendship of the USSR peoples, to disseminate hostility among them and "to achieve bourgeois nationalism in union republics;"
impeding and distorting Central Committee and governmental orders regarding the strengthening of Soviet legislation and the liquidation of.and arbitrary action;
bourgeoisn "agent of international Imperialism" and hatching plans to seize power with the aim of destroying the party and changing the party's policycapitulatory policy which would have brought about ultimately the restoration of
APR
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US ambassador Bohlenuly reported rumorsin Moscow tbat Berla vas in difficulty If not in disgrace because of tbe recent disturbances ln East Germany.
While Beria's absence from the opera onune may indicate tbat be was uoder arrest on tbat date, it ls also possible tbat he was in Germany, personally supervising the restoration of order. It would appear to havo been almost impossible to make the necessary arrangements for his arrest while he was still ln Moscow because of tbe intelligence sources and police power at his disposal. There is some lndi cation he may have been lo Berlin onune, the daythe outbreak of the East German demonstrations.
Other recently noted evidence that Berla might have been la trouble was the continued postponement of the Georgian party congress originally scheduled foray. This meeting presumably would have confirmed tbat republic's April purges which had generally been credited tonfluence.
The appointment of S. K. Kruglov to succeed Berla as MVD minister is an illustration of the lack of loyalty among top Soviet bureaucrats. Kruglov was Beria's deputy police chief9 and succeeded him as chief of MVD6 when Berla relinquished bis ministerial duties andull member of tbo Politburo. The following description has been made of Kruglov: aby-faced leviathan of six feet, two Inchesounds, be looksop and ls one. At Potsdam he chain smoked,bummed chewing gum from every Tank he met, and consumed vast quantities of food and vodka, keeping his belly shaking with laughter between mouthfuls. Truman liked Kruglov well enough to give him an autographed pictureegion of Merit."
Although Beria in addition to his police responsibilities was generally considered to have run the Soviet atomic energy program, it is quite unlikely tbat Kruglov will have greater than security responsibilities in this field. There is also no reason to believe at present tbat Beria's removal will change the USSR's emphasis on this program;-*
With respect to the foreign policy implications of Beria's arrest, the Pravda editorial again pointed out that the Soviet government has "stated more than once that
RMATK
unsolved International questions under dispute can be solved by negotiations between tbe Interestednd that "the new peaceful Initiative demonstrated by the Soviet government bas brought about the furtherof the international position of the Soviet Union and the growth of tbe authority of our country." On tbe other hand, there are significant allusions to "the general intensification of the undermining anti-Soviot activities of international reactionaryo the fact that "international imperialism ls becoming Increasinglynd Berla is chargedolicy of capitulation'." All of these may wellew "vigilance campaign"evoked by the flr_sthe "doctors' plot."
Then-gqiv-
4ytteapts to .reduce),final, tension. Theheir Influenco. on Soviet prestige throughout thend the possible weakening of the police^ apparatus of control would also contributen easing of Western pressure or inter--ference within the Orbit. It vould, however, only be under circumstances that war with the West or revolutions within tbe Orbit appeared Imminenteakened regime that the Soviet leaders would consider it necessary to make majorto the West,
The, internal power situation does not appear to have been the determining factortoward foreign, issues"! sit,ipntne) triumvirate probably restedl_LJain fisninr.lty and prestige as one of the old revolutionaries and on his long experience ln foreign affairs, andis controlast bureau-
cratic machine which be could throw"Tnto a
pers-QaT^aggrandizeraent. In this case, Holotov would not have been io any position tolay for supreme power against either Maleokov or Berla, both of whom controlled the more formidable machines of the party and police. It fwould seem tbat the fundamental Issues which affect the USSR's vital interests and power position ln international politics were not drawn into the struggle.
In relation to the new conciliatory policy inside the Soviet Union tho Pravda editorial appeared non-committal, used ambiguous language and ln some cases appeared With regard to tbe post-Stalin emphasis on increasing the production and availability of consumer goods,
r
SFgfiliT
SECURU^NI ORMATION
the early part of the editorial 3eemed to emphasize heavy industry, "the very basis ol* tbe Socialistachine building, technology and science adding that "our light industry and our food industries haveigh
are able at present to satisfy the growing
demands of the urban and rural population on the basis of the policy of price reductions carried out by theowever, the emphasis on consumer goods was somewhat greater toward the end when the editorial stressed that the party's task is "to consider with profound feeling workers' demands, to care dally for an all-around improvement of the living standard of workers and collective farmers, intelligentsia, and all Soviet peoples." It la not clear whether Prayda was modifyinguly announcement that thisaddi-tional reserves have been found for an increased output of consumer goods amounting to over twenty billion rubles ln excess of the envisaged annual plan for consumer gooti^s On the whole, the renewed emphasis on heavy industry, ,oa "the strengthening of the economic and defensive might of 'ournd "the tasks set byh Party-Congress" would indicate that the benefits to the people promised by Pravda in8 Jury editorial would not be at tbe expenseof tbe Five Year Plan.
With regard to the antl-Russification policy, another important factor of the new "liberal" policy, Pravda was also unclear. Beria vis accused of trying "to undermine the friendship of the USSR peoplesthe very basis of the multi-national socialist state and the main conditions for the successes of the fraternal Soviet republicstohostility among the USSR peoples and to achieve bourgeois national elements in union republics." This language is generally similar to the recent criticism in the Georgian and Ukrainian republics which launched the antl-Russif ication drive in propaganda. However, the inclusion of the phrase "bourgeois nationalism^-suggests thate accusedni> 1tn Ah* detriment nfpaTFlTTtTSg"whichtoeturn to Russ^ification. It is possible that Pravda is here cautioning the "peopTe not to^oyerlnterpret crally the propaganda line that the minority republics are "equals among equals" with tbe Great Russians.
4
T
iiCLWUtP^FORMAIlON
any event, the editorial emphatically reaffirmed the_par_ty:sticularly the MVD, in stating: "Every worker, in whatever post, must be under tbe constant control of the party. The party organizations must systematically check the work of all organizations and the administrative activity of all leading workers. It is necessary to check systematically and unremittingly the activity of tho USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is not only the right but the direct duty of the party organizations."
ard to the danger of reversing thewrai trend Ambassador Bohlen recently reported that it
might be radically changedesult of top levelowever, in biseversion to the state of terrorcharacteristic under Stalin would comehock toopulation and would severely strain the system.
captivewill receive-the
of
couraged- The morertirTnTrco!nmunist elements ln Eastern Europe may be stimulated by this sign of weakness to participate in underground resistance work at least for the time being. However, riots or other violent demonstrations can be prevented or controlled unless the
cem ls so disorganized by the coming purge that local operating units of tbe Satellite security systems also are involved.
Joaivid"alsthese police organizations, Vt X 2degrees are coordinated with and controlled by the Soviet security system, are certain to be affected. Consequently, it is expected that there will be someD HhK,Sate;jUe secur"yand headquarters, units Pr0bably wiU not seriously disorganize tbe operating
heue 1SwDO *Jr" evldeQCeany specific Satellite leaders have been dependent on the suppoft of Beria. However,
purge cap be co"PletelYcriminaCir-Tu Us choice ol victims. For this reason
L 1 th6re iS ^ongiderable arge^'le pGrge wlfhin the USSR
will undoubtedly involve some of them, who will be victimized
B,agilledBeria and his alleged
res tor a: tao reform program
Tho purge of Berla has cut across the manifestations of -ore liberal econonic programs which have been appearing in East Germany, Hungary, andesser extent ln Albania and Rumania. The reforms which have been made or promised appear calculated to cope with long-standing problems that the policies of the Stalin regime had failed to solve. These problems, shortages of food and consumer goods, labor apathy, peasant resistance and general discontent, are as serious as ever. It seems logical to assume that the reforms will therefore continue ln force for the time being, ln order to eliminate as much as possible these Internal weaknesses. But the accusation that Berla was aiming at "replacing the policy pursued by the party for many yearsry prtl lfry which would have brought aboutJi^pi LJlism" suggests thliJL-llie economic
ay be re-examined*
this connection, the accusation that Berla "under
ofrms
y
Che
onF>i^exts, has in many ways impeded decisions on most important and urgent problems in the field
a view to undermine the collective
la
and create difficulties in the country's food supply"esumption of the collectivizationatellites _
Malenkov and his colleagues may have seized upon the recent riots in East Germany as an excuse for the final
need to provide
?eZ^?fH1?St BSria bUt Berla's ousting appears to have resulted from deeper considerations than the
a scapegoat for disturbances in the Orbit.
Beria's arrest would seem almost certainly to have been the resulttruggle for power. Judging by the nature of the accusations against him, the other Soviet leaders suspected that he was wielding his power as police chief too arbitrarily with an eye to increasing his role in tbe regime. It ls also possible tbat these accusations are false and that Ualenkov and bis supporters took their first opportunity toolleague's removal.
been
madef the
oi1
in
Certainly this move would seem to an extremely inopportune time from the Kremlin's preserTfiri^a
With the recent developments * fS'wGefoan^ the comparatively high degree of unrest cne Eastern European Satellites andir?tigg -hirh
- Sofnunist leader. Malenkov's arrest of the
struggle for power.
*ECL_yflnvFORMATION
iai<taeasure of the gravity with which the remaining leaders faced this actioa caerges froa the accompanying announcements that local party central committees in Moscow Kiev and 'other places" had been convened and that thev unanimously supported the decision.
Howurge will now be necessary to remove Beria's previous supporters andew power balance is not yet clear. It seems likely tbat at least five republic MVD ministers who appear to be Berla appointees Zll < r.perhaps evonbeen, replaced. Beria's trial may Implicate other figures, perhaps on the Presidiua level However, the remaining leaders must be aware that their
I inyCS' WlU *ppear "eaker aDdconfused 'in direct relation to the size of the purge. Unless the-
oint whereinn^TT^
police and party controls,aQt
linB otfiy into fuchTHruggle daD*erous-resort move in that it would ^
ve^rsa coup
anquish another, directly depends on the ailltarv
with police and. T_
ision to try Beria, apparently publicly, ln the Supreme Court is reminiscent of the great show trial-
heo the victiM wereby t^ 1
nsii mhat "hi*hest Judicial organ" of the USSR. While most of this court's work is concerned with the review of decisions of lower courts, it does act as a
in hig"
Original document.
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