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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
estimate on it AMgut int. Tha FBI abstained, the tabieet being outside of tti turtsdtctton.
The toOotetng member organisations of the Intelligence Advisory Committer potlcipaUd Kith the Centre!Agency In the preparation of thU estimate: The Intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Jotnt Staff.
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SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet Bloc capabilities through
ASSUMPTION
No general war within the period of this estimate
CONCLUSIONS
is no evidence that the basic economic and military strength of the Soviet Bloc, or the authority of thc Soviet regime, have been weakened bysince the death of Stalin Weit unlikely that appreciablein these respects will occur during the period of this estimate Despite the recent disorders in East Germany we believe that the USSR will be able to maintain effective control there and in the other Satellites. However,with the succession to Stalin and bureaucratic confusion following the fall of Beria may lead to occasionalin Bloc tactics and hesitance in deciding on policy, both foreign and domestic.
Soviet economic growth will probably continue during the period ofate higher than thatin any major Western state,the very great superiority of the West's total volume of production over that of the Bloc will in fact be slightly increased. There are various indications that the Bloc may in the near future de-
omewhat greater proportion of resources to the production of consumers goods,maller proportion to the production of capital goods, than in the recent past. However, we believe itthat the general trends of Blocdevelopment which have5 will be significantly altered.
he most significant increase in Bloc military capabilities during the period of this estimate will arise from enlargement of the Bloc stockpile of atomic weapons, and from an increase in the number of its jet aircraft and its submarines. Thc Bloc may byaveufficient number of heavy bombers to increase greatly its air offensiveA limited number of all-weather jet interceptors may also be in operation,Bloc air defense capabilities. Wc do not believe that marked changes in Bloc military strength andare likely to occur in other respects-however, there willeneralin training and equipment of Bloc armed forces.
il
8alenkovto the Supreme Soviet that the United States no longeronopoly in the production of the hydrogen bomb. However, no Soviet explosion of adevice has yet been detected. The Malenkov statement may have been pure propaganda, or it may have been inspired by the attainmentpecific stage of development short of an actual test. We believe that the latteris the more probable.
Bloc political warfare capabilities will remain great, especially in Iran andbut will vary in accordance with changes in world conditions and in each
country or region. Soviet Blocfor the more violent forms of political warfare, such as armed rebellion and guerrilla warfare, are greatest in theand colonial areasar less so in South Asia, the Arab states, and Africa. In Westernparticularly France and Italy, and in certain Latin American countries. Communist political warfare capabilities are considerable for sabotage, strikes, and the exploitation of economic difficulties. Nearly all areas arc susceptible to some form of propaganda and diplomaticalthough such pressures would be more effective in Southeast Asia than in Western Europe.
DISCUSSION
AFFECTING BLOColiticol Factors
Trie relationships among top Sovietsince the death, of Stalin are not yet clear. The arrest of Beria established the lact that there was sharp dissension within the highest Soviet leadership, it is not yet clear whether this dissension arose principally from afor personal power or irom differences over basic policy, nor whether Beria's fall has ended the dissension. There is no evidence that the authority of the regime has been weakened by events since Stalin's death, and we believe it unlikely that this authority will break down within the period of this estimate, or even be appreciably weakened. We are estimating Bloc capabilities on this basis.
Nevertheless, internal politicalsince the death ol Stalin, andthe arrest of Beria, have almostproduced anxiety and perhaps some confusion in the Soviet biueaucracy. It is possible that Soviet and Satellite loaders will be preoccupiedonsiderable time with the problems posed by thc transfer of power.
These factors may produce occasionalin tactics and hesitancy in deciding on policy, both foreign and domestic Hov.*ever. we do not believe that these factors will act to impair the baste economic and miliiary strength of the Bloc Nor do we believe that the Soviet rulers will cease lo base their policy on their conviction of an irreconcilablebetween thc Bloc and theworld.
e believe Irmt Soviet ability to maintain effective control In the European Satellites has not been impaired by anything that has happened since the death of Stalin Soviet suppression of the riots tn East Get many demonstrated the thoroughness of thatwhile ai the same time indicating that the Satellite governments themselves may be unable, without Soviet armed force into maintain their populations into the will o! the Kremlin Thethat the Satellite populations will be
'The current critical situation in Indonesia will be examined ln an estimate no* ln preparation.
ore detailed account ol this subject, sec the Appendices to this estimate.
encouraged to folio* the example of popular resistance In East Germany may require the Soviet leaders to devote more aLnUon and resources to the problem of control in the Satellites and thus somewhat reduce over-all Bloc capabilities
* The Ch.nese Communist rcg.mc has firm conttolover the territory which it adminis-
IVLl,WIein* contro! be.ng threatened or shaken by domestic forces within the period of this estimate. The relations of Communist China to the USSR
lhosey*
The amance is basedommon ideology
ZJ ?Sof Tn
terests which ts not likely to be affected byremlin leadership. We believe however, that Mao Tse Tungmay take tne opportunity increasingly to pursue Commu. nut Chinas own interests, possibly to the detriment of Soviet authority over Commu-nlsm ina. Terminationl make Communist China's economy and military dependence on the
wnfrgCnt>lhiswill continueit Communist China's
capacity for independent action. Economic Factors
he Soviet Bloc Is self-sufRc.ent in food,trong modern heavy industry', and possesses adequate supplies of nearly all the natural resources required further to develop
Sl^iTheofintegrated
with that of the USSR in the interests of pro-
nd tneBloc military production capacity.the period of this estimate, the Sovietwill be capable of supportingwar
he gross national product (GNP) of the Bloc will probably mcrcasc du.mg the period of this estimate at an average annual rVle of
^ wjisR5ard^ S
*I an
rate of betweenercent. This Soviet rate of growth will almost certainly be higher than the rate which the US or anv major Western slate will maintain Never-
ihetess. the total output of the Soviet economy will remain much lower than that of the US and the output of the entire Bloc will remain much lower than that of the NATO stales We estimate that Soviet GNp was about one-quarter to one-third that of the US? and that the GNP of the entire Bloc was -bout one-third that of thc NATO suTe? Theseatio terms may be,lightly during the period ofhough the disparities in absolute termsbably be widened somewhat
he Bloc, and especially the USSR, will probably continue to concentrate uponthe industnal base. Growth of agri-cultural production will probably lag beS
mate that about one-sixth of Soviet GNPow devoted to mil.lary outlays, and that the proportion will probably remain at about this level through the period of tnis estimate
Vafi0UShowever, that the Bloc may ln the near futureomewhat greater proportion of resources to the producUon of consumers' goodsmaller proportion to the production of capital
I Na-
tions are clearest with respect to East Ger-many and Hungary, but they are not lacking orJhj USSR itself. As yefthey areent loasis for an est.mate that significant changes in over-all Bloc economic pohcy have occurred or are likely to occur We believe it unlikely that any ehanges which
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s^gnrncantly alter either the basic emphasis placed upon development of heavy industry and militaryr the generalloc ccononnc development which have been
l8ndWhich our est.mate of probable future Blocevelopments is largely based. cconom|c
Military Factors
M. Wc estimate thai the size of Bloc forces-fn-bc,nS wm not mcreasey miS-
loc mil,-rtZ*n*lhcontinue to emphasize modernization of the armed forces and en-Urgemeni of thc atom* stockpile
top cn gnE T
estimate that byhe USSR willtockpile oftomicilotonn view of our uncertainty concerning theof fissionable materials, particularlyhe number of atomic weapons may be as lowr as high.
alenkov announced to the Supreme Soviet that the United States no longeronopoly in the production of the hydrogen bomb. However, no Soviet explosionhermonuclear device has yet been detected and we cannot be confidentilitarily significant weapon will have been achieved untilest explosion has been conducted. We do know that basicwhich may be related to the theimo-nuclear program is being carried on, and the USSRrowing capacity for quantity production of materials which could be used in the development of thermonuclearField testing of thermonuclearbased on disclosures or Independent research may take place at any time.there is insufficient evidence tothe degree of priority assigned by the USSR to its thermonuclear program. The Malenkov statement may have beenpure propaganda, or it may have been inspired by the attainmentpecific stage ofshort of an actual test. We believe that the latter interpretation is the more probable.
over-all capabilities of Blocand air forces will almost certainlyto Increase during the period ofesult of the following factors:in the numbers of modern aircraftvessels including submarines;the number of atomic weapons; progressive
We believe that weaponsilo-Ions are probably within Soviet capability and that the USSR could make smaller weapons (as lown thc event that the USSR should choose to stockpile weapons of smaller Of larger yield, thc estimated number ofin the stockpile would be altered accordingly.
modernization and standardization ofand equipment, particularly thoseelectronic guidance and control;combat efficiency of Communist Chinese and of at least some Satellite forces; and improvement of thc Bloc logisticalincluding facilities and stocks of war material
thc Bloc armed forces willto be hampered by certainin experience, training, andfor strategic air operations and airlack of abilily to conductand naval operalions; andproblems arising from thc size ofand the relatively inadequaterail network and merchant fleet
relative unreliability offorcesactor detrimental tocapabilities. If political tensionresistance in the SatellitesUSSR may find thc military usefulnessforces and Satellite territories
BIOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES
estimate that the Bloc now has theto undertake' concurrentm continental Europe, theand mainland Asia. The Bloc couldwith Chinese Communist andthe Communist forces now inat the same time undertake' anJapan by Soviet forces.
loc naval forces (except lor thesubmarines, and new cruisers andas now constituted are designed to protect Bloc coastal areas and the seaward flankiound campaign. However, thc characteristics of the new construction now appearing, and thc increasing coordination between Naval Aviation and the Fleetrowing emphasis on offensive operations.
' No estimate of the success of these operations can be made without considering the effects ol lhe actions ol opposing forces.
1 -
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respect to mine warfare, thc USSR now has the capability of seriously interfering with Allied sea communications. In the European area, this efiort could include all the ports and approaches of the UK and Western Europe. In thc Far East, most of the vital Allied port areas and sea lanes around the perimeter of thc Bloc could be similarly attacked. Thc Soviet Navy will have no long-rangecapability within the period of thisbut it will remain capable of mounting short-range amphibious lifts In considerable force. Thc Soviet submarine force willits capability to undertake offensive patrols and mining operations along most of the world's strategically vital sea lanes, and possibly. If the specialized craft have been developed, simultaneously to launch guided missile attacks against targets on both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the US*
he USSR now has the capability toconcurrent air operations against the US. the UK, continental Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and the offshore Island chain of Asia. However, operations against the US would be much more difficult than those against the other areas. The USSR has the capability to reach all parts of thc US and to attempt the delivery of Its full stockpile of atomic weapons. However,tripped-downould reach only the extreme northwestern corner on two-way missions without aerial refueling. Even with aerialand other range extensionttack upon the northeastern Industrial area and upon most of thc principal strategic bases almost certainly would involve theof the attacking aircraft and most of the crews, on oneway missions. Until Iteavy bomber available for operational use, the USSR will not have the capability to reach
we believe the USSR capable of adaptinglo this use. hut we have no evidence to indicate that such modifications have been made
* No estimate of the success of these operaUons can be made without eonsWertng the effects of the actions of opposing forces.
' We believe that the USSR has the capability to utilise range extension techniques, but we have no evidence that any of these techniques have been exploited.
most of thc strategically Important areas in the US on two-wayeavy bomber may already be In production and. If it be assumed that series production began inay be available by
We estimate that the Bloc has the capa-bility of providing vigorous opposition against air attacks on critical targets In the interior of the USSR, under conditions of goodUnder clear moonlit night conditions. Bloc defense capabilities are fair againstbombers and negligible against jetUnder conditions of poor visibility, day or night. Bloc interception capabilities arc negligible.
Currently known trends point to anof Bloc air defense capabilities during the period of this estimate. It is estimated that improved airborne Intercept (AI)will come Into operational use during this period. Although the futureand availability of guided missiles is obscure, surface-to-air missiles based ondesigns could be available now or In the immediateimited number of all-weather jet interceptors may be in operation byowever, we cannot estimate the significance of these Improvementsto future air offensive capabilities.
BIOC POLITICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES"
is probable that Bloc capabilitieswarfare against thehave been temporarily reduced byof power to new leadership Inand by the evidences of top-levelwhich have accompanied thewe believe that the weaknesswhich have marked theCommunist political warfare Inwill be overcomehortthe authority of the Sovielbe impairedreater degreehave estimated Is likely.
For more detailed information, seeapabilities for Attack on the US through
For detailed discussion of Bloc political warfare strengths and weaknesses, seef this estimate.
loc political warfare capabilitiesarge degree noi only upon the situation within the Bloc but also upon the success with which the non-Communist world meets thc challenges to its stability which would exist even If there were no Communist threat Thus Bloc political warfarewould increase if the economicin thc non-Communist world should deteriorate: if nationalist antagonism inEurope should be intensified; if conflicts between the US and its allies shouldthe program for improved Westernand if nationalist movements Inareas should stimulate rebellions against the Western Powers. Bloc political warfare capabilities would decrease if theworld during the petiod of this estimate should avoid thc dangers arising fromsuch as these.
The relative military strength of the Bloc and the West isactor influencingwarfare capabilities. Increase orof over-all Bloc military strengthto that of thc West would almost certainly produce some corresponding increase orin Bloc political warfare capabilities. Fear of war and consequent vulnerability to Bloc political warfare would probably grow rapidly in some parts of the non-Communist world if it became widely believed that the Bloc's capabilities in atomic warfare had significantly increased relative to those of the West. This vulnerability to political warfare would be accentuated if It were widelythat the Bloc had markedly improved its air defenses relative to Western offensive capabilities.
Finally. Bloc political warfare capabiliUes will be determinedreat extent by the impression which the non Communist world forms of the general character of Bloc policy. The new leadership in the Kremlm might, for example, resume the Stalinist policy of obvious and aggressive hostility to the West, probably hoping thereby to insure the unity of thc world Communist movement and to promote fear and despair among non CommunistOn the other hand, the Kremlin may attempt by acts as well as by propaganda to
l>crsuade the non-Communist world that its basic policies are conciliatoryundamental change has In fact occurred with the passing of Stalin. The Kremlin might thus expect to attain some of Its objectives by promoting complacency lather than fear among Western peoples. It might hope thatourse of action would, among other things, lend to weaken theof thc NATO alliance and reduce the level of defense expenditures which Western peoples will be willing to support.
loc political warfare capabilities vary gieatly throughout the world. We believe that during the period of this estimatecapabilities to establish Communist governments by political warfare techniques will be greatest in Indochina and Iran. In olher areas of the world, Communistto influence the attitudes of peoples and the policies of non-Communistwill constitute the principal danger posed by Bloc political warfare.
Western Europe
Various issues arising out of the German problem can be exploited by the USSR tothe Western Powers and to undermine Western defense programs. So long asremains divided, agitation of theunity question will remain an effective weapon of Bloc political warfare, both inand in Western Europe, if Westernis brought into the Western coalition, or If Germany is reunited and is not brought into the Western coalition, the Germanwould continue lo offer the USSRfoi' creating dissension and friction.
The Communist parties of France and Italy are Ihe only Communist parties in West cm Euiope lhat have significant capabilities for political warfare. During the period o: this estimate these parties will probably noi be able to gain participation in the governments or otherwise to acquire direct influence over national policy. On the other hand, given the strong social discontent within thesethc voting strength and mass followings of the Communists will probably beat approximately the present levels
They will thereforeapability to harass governments, to confuse opinion, and lo discredit parliamentary institutionsthis capability would be magnified if the centrist parties lose strength to the right and non-Communist left, thus increasinginstability.
n Western Europe generally, butin Fiance and Italy. Bloc capabilities for economic warfare" and for political action would Increase sharply If there should be any serious decline In thc level of economic Communist-controlled labor unions which al present are unable to lead the mass of workers into political strikes would recover this capability. In these circumstances. Bloc economic pressure, which is not now anaspect of Bloc political warfare, could become increasingly effective. However,the Bloc changes its basic economic policy. It will not be able within the period of this estimate to provide markets for largeof non-strategic goods. In any case, thc Bloc will be unable toignificantof the goods for which Westernis now dependent on overseas sources.ractical matter, therefore, the Bloc lacks the capability to bringajor shift In present trade patterns. elatively small increase In the volume of trade which certain countries now carry on with the USSR could have an appreciable* economic effect in those countries andore significant psychological eflect.
Southeastern Europe
loc political warfare capabilities willnegligible in Southeastern Europe. Thc inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO and the recently concluded Ankara Pact between Turkey. Greece, and Yugoslavia have reduced greatly Lhe political effectiveness of Blocstrength in this area. Moreover, wethat thc Bloc will be unable, through conciliatory tacticsormalization of relations, to reverse the Western orientation of these states.
"Studies are currently in progress In preparation forSoviet Flloc Capabilitiescheduled for publication in
Middle East ond Africa
uring the period of this estimate Bloc political warfare in the Middle East and North Africa will be favored by the continuation of strong nationalism, political and socialand economic dislocation. Thewill be most favorable lo Communism in Iran. In Egypt and Syria, the militaryin power will probably limitcapabilities. In the Middle Eastthe Bloc will find it difficult to develop effective Instruments of political warfare out of the local Communist parlies. The Bloc could intensify Middle East tensions by anti-Western propaganda, by providing someto either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict with Israel, or by releasing large numbers of Jews for emigration to Israel. It mightneutralist sentiment and create some good will by offers of trade and militaryCommunist capabilities ln North Africa are relatively significant already because of ihe influences which can be exerted In that area by the French Communist Party, and may increase if nationalist antagonism to France grows. Other parts of Africa appear to offer some of the same opportunities to Communism as the Middle East and North Africa, though they are comparatively untried territory.
Communists will continue locapabilities for politicalIran during thc period of thisconditions of continuing politicalthe Tudeh Party may developto gain control of thethrough violent or non-violentmoves loward an Improvementand economic relationstraditional Iranian distrust offacilitate Communist infiltration
South Asia
political warfare is unlikely loWestern orientation or lheposition of other countries of thelhe East-West conflict. The IndianI Party may increase itsnot sufficiently to endanger theParty's control of the central govern-
ment. In Lhc other states of South Asia, the Communist parlies will probably noterious factor. Afghanistan will remainto Bloc military and economic pressure, and Ceylon may become subject to economic pressure If it continues to readjust its trade pattern to attractive offers made byChina.
Southeast and the Far East
he Communists will continue to have substantial capabilities for political warfare in the counlries of Southeast Asia, with thc probable exception of the Philippines. The political fate of most of Ihis region may be decided in Indochina. Communistfor supporting the armed rebellion inwill probably continue to increase. In Burma. Communist capabilities forguerrilla raids and for assisting other dissident groups are small at present. if the Chinese Communists furnishmilitary support, these capabilities would increase,erious threat to thc government's position. Thailand isnot vulnerable to Communist subversion in the absence of strong external Communist pressure. If. however, the Communists shouldosition of strength inalong Thailand's borders,capabilities for subversion wouldincrease, particularly among thein northeastern Thailand. Inthe Communist Party is represented In Parliament, controls the dominant laborand has infiltrated the armedthe police, and the bureaucracy. It will be capable of harassing the government through political action, sabotage, and strike activity." Communist capabilities forwarfare may increase in Southeast Asiaesult of the Korean truce.
"The current critical situation in Indonesia will be examined in an estimate now In preparation.
loc trade offers to Japan will almostbecome more powerful weapons of political warfare following the truce in Korea, particularly if markets in the non-Communist world should become less accessible toexports. Bloc diplomatic moves toward resolving outstanding Issues, such asof Japanese POW's and Sovietof former Japanese islands, and toward restoring normal diplomatic relations could be employed in attempts to undermine Japan's present pro-Western orientation. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) will continue to be able to exploit antl-US feeling and Japanese nationalism, but not to the extent of undermining the US-Japanese The JCP will retain some capability lor espionage, sabotage, and subversion, but will not be capable of threatening internal security.
ommunists will retain capabilities for espionage, subversion, and sabotage in Soulh Korea and for stimulating anti-US sentiment These capabilities will probably beto lhe degree of Communist military strength remaining in North Korea and
Loltn America
he Communists In all major Latin American countries willapability for sabotage, for strikes, for spreading Bloc propaganda, and for stimulatingsentiment in nationalist, intellectual, and organized labor groups. These capabilities would increase if there should be economic stagnationecline in thc level ofactivity in Latin America. Inthe only country in Latin America where thc Communists have power within the government, they are almost certain toand may Increase their influence. AU thc major countriestin America willsusceptible to Bloc trade offers.
Original document.
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