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STBST IV THE KXCBOIOOICAL STRAtEGY WARD3
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July.
RE FORT TO THE PSTCRCLXICAL STRATECT BOARD
GEnWAL AFTRAISAL
The effectiveness of politleal-paychologlecl (IT) operations la not easily or prociptly susceptible to satisfactory aeseanoent other then laase a,
major aeconpliaheenta of political action and propagandaia western Twope have been In the area of European unification along tho lines of the Atlantic unity concept, and In reducing thend influence of Coscrunian. Covert operations have been ohiefly In ipport of. Governauint ootlona to achieve greater ' oooondc cod political
In coabatting.* nctlono to expose and counter Coenunlst maneuversstability.fc-'i
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'S" of J4
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that oovart W, while aervln, to fosterntl-regine sentiments of tha paopla, to ba fully effective, requires concrete evidence of Coenunirt weakness and resistance activity, as wall aa tangible nigno or growing Western strength In tlw ares. In this fr-me cf reference, Albenla, which boarelatively >ocoislblr4*JBaBBBBBBasv "d'^remains the weakest link In the Soviet cheln of atellites. ijjsssajsjsjass^pssBsa-sssjB
.Elsewhere
esong the Furopean satellites, progress ha* been alow due to tha difficulty of reaching the target audiences through propaganda nedie,
ewweneii of the osager of Cesnsnalen resulting In sere extensive and artleajleU opto si tionsi*
pis own
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to ccessunlea than was the eece six sooths age. effort* to curb orextremist influence and prevent the collaboration of
eleaents with the left have been relatively successful.
own
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The o'jtftAndlngof FV significance occurring during tho period were tho death of Stalin end the transition of power withinR. The inporUnce of both eventa was ore* wide end they provided
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Aside fron neutral. end rsdio eosxaeot,which Is etlll underwey, hss been too obscure' to be gauged conclusively.
1. STATOS OF RTChTJLOCICAL FBCr- AW
A. hathods End Technlr-oas Enplovei] in AccoffftH nhinn these Tasks,i .!
CIA engages in cold wcr cctisitles through the covert use ofe
Af'
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general Western Europeans were highly critical of undertakings which were popularly accepted both ea prlatarlly In the inter eat of theatea. lnapired. Certeln powerful types of propagenda are nost effective when Btagedackground oftrength. Dhfortunetely, views projected fron the platform. debate acawtlsMs reflect lack of reoolutlon and uncertainty poorly undo The effnot ia to undermine confidence in U. f, governmental 'Vandhe confualne role of legislative easvV;aUttees In epeaklnf or acting on international polley aalters,
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CONFIDENTS
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July J-
Poet and present policies of tho United States and Ita Westernalliea toward the Middle East have resulted la deep-seated resentment on' the poi't of tho Araba touardo. role In the creation of thof Israel and the Arab refugoe probloa; in groviag antipathyhe Arab, Asian, and African world directed against the colonial, powers nd against what Is considered an equivocal policy on tha part.of. towards the principle of ao If-dotorsdnd In foar ofrawn into what Is regardedower struggle between two greatlocks. Other problena have erleon froa the basic weaknesses of the eroa itself In terns of ita vulnerability to attack or subversJonB, the '. political instability of nost of Ita governnootg, and the eeoncoio and social deficiencies which cadet throughout the region. Aggravating these weaknesses and contributing to the prevailing unrest are thef national! an and raoltes, and the decline in the British and French power positions in tha area,acuus which the local eulhoritioe are Incapable of filling. Suspicion on tho part of the governments ,and peoples of the area towards any kind of foreigneluctance not only to participate withst In regional defense planning but' -oven to occopt Western nateriel aid or advice, the belief.nterest In tha area arises onlyesire to counter Cceeronlaa coav poundedear that the nrna willhontre of operationstern power stiigcle, en apathy towards problcas transcending tho inraodiato area, govcrnaontolcontrol of satiating inforaationol outlets', and widespread lUitaracy are all obstacles which sake It difficultoach significant segments of the target population.
The najor obstacles encountered in ao anting Soviet Russia operations
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eurrouEdlng the success ofarfare operations In Latin Anterior have been due In tone cases to actions of the. goveraAcnt over which CIA had tohe RFC decision not to sign any contract with theovernnont for the purchase of tin, the question of restriction on the import of venesuelcn ell and the concentration of financlsl and technical assistance In other Quarters of tho globe which was interpreted by eoste Lntln Ancrlerns as neglect of. aore deserving neighbors.
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sTociooiciL ofsiatioksne toe world
The otrefigiboning ofle.haeoUniM with thi .
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sonMua or significaut am* changes aitbctimc
MBl Anaounceaool of th*plot, Its subsequent revsreal aadtha counter-purge against those responsible for ltj Stalin's death} tha new Soviet "peace offensive".
and Eastfcaont Oottualdjof two SLovbV fllerej pardon of UlUlen Oatla; East Bsrllnattack. Intelligence aclivitlea In Poland; Bulgariansevere retaliation against nenbers of escapee feadUoejfor the Vbrld Touth CcngrcBs and Festival to be heldin July and Auguat.
rbpalcr endorssaent of tha sdddle-of-the-road coallUoa Covernatoat and Sovlat rejection of the Western AlHas, invitationsua* treatyatification in West Ceroanj of the ETC treaty aad.,'
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Contractual Agroeaeotaj sigaiBe of loo Balkan Pact by Greece,Turkoy; failure of Da Gas perl Cover nsent to obtain the sdidtato benefit froo Italy's new electoral lav; Barkedties with the West; foraallon and downfall of theeunteinod strength of the Cowrunlst
0,
mim^ streiwrthenlnc of Turkish ties western national the aerlea of tests of strength between Vbssadeq end his opposition and dlsauarloa of Shah to. grant of wheat toPakistan; filling of the post of Minister of the Interior In Afghani atan' by an Individual favorably disposed towardSSR denunclctlon of India's Korean resolution,
K. far Eaatl Chinese NaUooalist troops ooablned operations with Xarcn insurgent forces against' Bursa ae sdlitary and civilian eleseots la the Shan States andesolution looking toward the evacuation of the nationalist's troops; nllltcry invasion of Uos by the Viet Mlnh| demands fron the King of Canboaiafor increased Independence: presaure maintained by the Soviets to establish an Indonesian Enbessy In'Moscow) ftdrino's illness, Magaaytay's nomination by the hhclonallsta Party and Rcamlo's caadlaaoy representing the newly foraad Democratic Party in the fhlllpplnes; fall of tha Japanese Liberal Party administration In tfcreb. end elections for the House of Representatives and the House of
^Councilors In Aprll| release of fteth Korean prisoners of war by President
;.Pheo.
F. Western RwlstJwei Softening of Peron's bitterly antl-JJ.S. attitude| passage by tha Bra till an Cbaaber of Deputiesill excluding foreign
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capital fron ita petroleum indurtryi failure of theejorlty in either the Chilean Senate or Chancer ofof Conaamlet strength In fanaam. Presidentofpril for world.
6. SUBSTAVTHZ ACTIO* COTTINGA UKES
A. Foviot Pesosat bco cffetiBive" cay be
Interpretedignificant aovt In the neater plan designed to negate.are oepeMllliea during the tine of power transl tlon, secure internal support for the new regine, ereato dissension end confusion encng the Western .'Hies by concessions designed to appeal to tha neutralist sentlnent on the European continent, wreak havoc en tha FDC front andeexaed Uostern Germany froa being oosnlttad on the side of the Hast. It appears aimed at Isolating the United States froa Its allies If, indeed,. Is not captivated by the Soviet "new look".
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In the Scandinavian countries, the peace prograa had little effect.
other parts of the world the effect of the peaco easpaign wasobscure, or as in the case of south asia, accepted with skepticism as tho result of the invasion of laos.
B, sfolin'a poa^h. and suecssflon' the death of stalin and transition in the party hierarchy overshadowed all other events during the reporting period imwdlbte world reaction to stalin's illneos end subsequent dealae was one' of intense speculation. considerable disarray became manifest et onoe within the satellites.
Sfe^
feature article to tha effeotao would replace Stalin as chief of the International CP. Radio cceBentary'.-to Satellite nations reviewed Stallo's ruthless life and the suspicious nature of his death.
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To expose Keleakov's work In revising history for hie own glorification, photographs wore sent to the field of plotures printed in "Pravda" onebruary sndaren, Jlluatratiag how the letter had been retouched to show rfalenkovore favored position than actually was the ease whan tha original was taken of the group which witnessed the signing of the Slno-Soviet aereeisent. The death of Cottwald, and the reported illnesses of Piecx, Shebu snd Thorex, were heavily propagandised aa Hslenlcov purges portending liquidations of Soviet puppets in other countries. The inpoot of CIA's propaganda exploiting Stalin's death and the succession to power ia not adequately measured In the isolated events occurringch, but In emulative.effects which will not becoae apparent for sea* tine. The occasion, itself, provided an unusual opportunity to enblazon aoross theropaganda oaapnlrn designed
7. STEPS TAKE* TO tulmwb APPROVED FSB FLA US
A. tP^svcholnpicnl^Ope^atlons Plsn Incident to foraan Cwa.
a supporting plan9 In th* Fall Authorisation for iaplementin? preparations for cease fire and break-off contingencies wee not given to field stations until Wold Inpleoontntlon has aow coseaenced.
3. sychological Operations Plan for Soviet
ational Psychological Program with Respect': to Bacepoos froa the Soviet Crblt)i alls for
the reception, care and resettlement of escapees (Phase A) and stlsuletloa
ftgee, 1
o
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of tholp flow and nBsursncs of their bwIouji exploitationrogram la tho responsibility of the DepartMnt ofrequires no Unaleoentatloo by CIA. Therogram callsattentionscapees, but does not require new Agencyoperations. The major project advocatedFhaee B) callsactivationfreedom corps". This project hasnd Is new awaiting ispTmentation by the Department^/gggg^KK^^ttK^^J'
build-up, awaits action by State end Defense. Appropriate CIA personnel' have been alerted to the support action required both in Washington and in the field. The Inducement effort, the Increased utilisation ef Irea Curtain oeoepees find the propaganda value or Inherent escapees era receiving close attention. TJ. 1atlonal Psycholorfeal StrgVyr vith9l waa forvardod to the field shortly after ita approval bySB to serveolicy guide for all CIA covert psychologicalperations in the German area. The FTerman country plan was written to conforml, which also is being usedasis for FTnd
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D. 2 (PsvcholarlcaJ, Strong? Proarpm for the Middle East it- CIAa draft of the FTrogram for the Middle Bast which takesconsideration the objectives and tasks outlined In Theprogram was drawn upomplete review of FSB proposal*the field ty'
sent to the field shortly after Its approval with instrucUons to draft an operational anrex.- This annex has not as yet been received byheadquarters.
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PEhTJlTJRES.
The table below lee euanary of the total casta of our aeUonal psychological programs. The figures are taken froa expenditure figures contained in the appended progress reports of the Depart-nenta of Stat* snd Defense, the Central Intelligence agency, and tho Itutufll Security Agency.
s,June
(th.c
3
shown are in
In-
I.
(Stale) 2 1 3 -h
In-fomalion
35
Miliary -Unconventionaleyver
(Defense) 1 6
as* -
(CIA) '
Escapee Program (Stale)
Strategic Plana and(PSB)
Ilel
O.I|
9.2
.5
2:
6.
.
For radio acquisition and construction
Total requested IIA Congressional Appropriation
In view of impending changes, including setting up of new information agency, no valid basis wist* for projections beyond
This figures scheduled for transfer to the new DSIA under raerganisa-tion Flan so. 8. Itillion already transferred to IIA by Burs* of Budget
Thesffiguris*-re being mipplied directly to the President by th* Director of
yr^^tp^ehSm'together by reeson of short period of operation in fiscal included intotal Ho basis for estimate
INFORM*TIOB
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Original document.
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