ff. fj
onevnai oiiricult to recall tbe events that occurred iom two month* ago; however, the following are the facteaw from my Insignificant position as one of the assistant engineers aboard the ship.
The overall condition of tbe ship on ny arriva- could not be determinedrrived0 on the morning of departure. The mechanical section of the ship was in relative good condition at the tine of departure. The only question that wan not answered to ny satisfaction was the lack of weather reports prior to departure, the reason for ay concern In this natter, was the fact thatn from Port au Prince wa had run Into heavy weather some three hundred ml lea out of Panama. The sea was running eouth-vsat and heavy weather approaching when we left port.
The mechanical failurea that plagued us after several days at sea wore not unnatural but the result of many tired parta giving out. However, in the enao of the bilgeeel that Pan Canal ahould be held responsible for tho failure since they were Buppoaedly to have rebuilt them. The reduced engine power did not effect the maneuverability of the ship In any way the flret aeveral days. However, when we went beyond the flret site into the relatively strong currents there was some chance but lt waa not sufficient to warrant any concern. The Kavy ascertained that our apeed washen they caa* along aide; however, the inability of the navigator to put ua on the point of the aecond site Increased the ureeaure oa the mechanical section of the ahlp. At that time. If we could have put into some ialand sufficient repairs could have been made that would have enabled ua to complete the mission. The increased strain on the remaining motive power left only the question of time until they would break down.
aa not preaent at the conferences held by the Captain, navigator, Chief Sngineer, and Case Officer, where the decision was made by all to requoot assistance, id note the following points of interest and concern.
word to tho crew to prepare to abandon ship prior toHeadquartera for audi action. This was done by the Cuea Officer.
of radio mnnnagea in open text by the Case Officerthe Captain roquooting the Navy to standbv whilethe ship.
known the intentlona to abandon orhip thatpower, when there le no immediate danger to life andto stay afloat (by bucket brlgcde if necessary).
At no time, in opinion, did conditions warrant the abandoning oft thereossibility of being without motive power, driftingeef,eel that only then the decision should hava been
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
The fact that wa vera supposedly drifting toward poiat three the afternoon of the day the navy arrived on the scene is the responsibility of the navigator If he had bean therely familiar with the area he could have avoided the occurence ofituation, even with the set of tha current and the power ofnots.
The conference following the trip led ae to believe that at Robalo there were some efforts nade to read into nessages events that were not of particular concern te us at sea. There was no immediate concern when the first message requesting assistanceug was sent. The declining of old from commercial ships at this time indicates the small concern of the people at aoa In the beginning of tho Incident. o not fool that the backatopplng was at the finger-tips of tho people ln the local headquarters and the resultant messages to the ship tendod to create concern for those in charge ot oea. Sometimes, unfaralliarity with ships, sea and seamanship tends to createhink, this say have occured with the Case Officer in his desire to protect the lives of the personnel aboard the ship.
In deference to the above factB it mi^it be aald, that the crew displayedery remarkable seamanship under the cownand of their Captain fn view of their little experience.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: