now urleans.
it was intendediscussion of details, not policy, and col.had not boon envisaged, norkeen previously in-
formed that col. king was costing.asked col. king
whether he had anything speciala una, which mi&fat haveconing. col. king replied in the negative and said that he hadto sit in, and askedto go ahoad with his regular meeting.
?.proceeding with the scheduled business, briofed
colr&ingrogress mode on the miami office.
3.reviewed with col. king the general concept of approach
to lieroblem,that all the work was predicated
on having tc achieve the objective -wie hard way". it wasumber of factors, such es disaffection of theaii^ht break in our favor and simplify the task. on the otherif arbena stepped down in favor of diaz, or some similarere front and the resulting situation in ouatemalaadverse to us interosta.stated that he saw no
short-cut to the problem, butneed toystematic,
disciplined uro-anerican organization, which could talcs power andcol. king whether he still felt the same way. in
reply, oou. Ring said "yesv he said that the job might havo tabs done faster than planned, because he foresaw the danger that the project might lose its priorltyi col. king indicated that if thereild sort of upheaval ln guatemala, even though not controlled by the us, present us authorities mitfit declare themselves satisfied with that much and withdraw support fron; tho "hard way" plans. however, col. king also felt that the project might take longer than presently planned.
again whether there was any special issue that col.
wisnea to bring up at this time. jsaid that there wasurgent issue. the issue was whetherget the
that had been "promised" to him.
secufffy information
that he was not at all ready to discuss themBney. nuwy was the last item to be discussed. The originalbeen called to review in detail plans which f nhadhad studieoT *uV uVhod not. He
merits oi cash should haTeade without such detailed review of r ^ilans. He asked whether such commitments actually existed, iuu aatd that he had not seen them on oauer.
wasriefing on the piany os welletailed critique ofwas in no position to discuss mcney, let alone make any commitments,merits and demerits of the plan had been carefully analyzed. it might appear appropriate to allocate more or less moneybeensurprise that blanket commit-
ments of cash should haVe oeen maoe without such detailed review of is. He asked whether su not seen them on paper.
hen replied that the ecanitments did not exist on paper,C jhad been given to understand that the current rate ofnoi. De curtailed. Col. King quickly addod that he had made aorally.
7-that the project was currently going through tho
assessmentand that he had toinal assessacnt of assetscould make commitments for which he had both operational and There had to be an assessment of botl Tmd hia Tturned out to be satisfactory, he would naturaiiy get help;get less, he might get more; there would be detailed discussion Tjust what help would be be3t. ointed out that projectwould win Jconfjdence ana convince him of their sincerityreadily by proiessional, hard-headed consultation, than ifatch ofrepeated his conviction that
money should be discussed last or an, arter operational details had been agreed and after thereirm purpose to tho spending.
It was agreed thatnot take money with them. Col. Kim left at this point.
A discussion then ensued about the meetings, next week,
Tasked that^, ot pressC Tfor details ofT^at he not as* lor the names oi nii^lieutenants, etc. it would be better to wait untilf" "Iwas in Miami, and hishad been gained; 3had verv littleinbecause he nad been let down so Tcould be asked for names and detailsand that, inaeed, the best way to win f" onfidencea scientific,professional approach tc tha problems.
number of detailed questions to be putjwerc agreed
11. It was agreed thai2 creative writing ana propaganda personnel, preferably Guatemalans, would bo needed in Miami, roughly divided as follows: five for radio, five forand publications, two artists.
Security Infofmatir^
It was agreed that detailed infonration on KUFUd1 secretary of propaganda would hava to be secured, andP case officer would have to be put in Honduras to work closely with the propaganda secretary. The qualifications of allot P. KAZKAAA for this job were discussed, but no discussion was reached.
Sincinot leaving until late Monday afternoon, it was deciaoa to continue uieir briefing on Monday morning.
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Original document.
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