GENERAL- PBSUCCESS - SPECIFIC- VIEWS OF COL. ELFEGO MONZON ON CURRENT POLITICAL

Created: 1/18/1954

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CLASSIFICATION

: Chief, 1

TBSUCCESS

from : Chief of Station, Lincoln

SUBJECT: geheral-

**anc- Views of Col. Elfego MONZOK on Current Political Situation

Attached for the Information of Headquarters and Lincolncopyemorandum prepared by Mr. William L.oncerning

thouBhtlhat it may bl of interest

in connection with this projeot.

emo as noted

4

CIS

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M. Heagey

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

FROM: William L. Krieg

Viewa of Colonel Blfego KONZON on Current Political Situation

The same American eitlsen who recently reportad to Mr. Vardlew that Colonel Elfego Honz6n, Minister without Portfolio, hadroup near Brito, Department of Escuiatla, that tha time was not ripeove against tha Government, oallad at my office today and said that hie friend, who lsloaa friend of Mons6n, hadhree-hour talk with him and obtained thethathought conditions had to become woraa hora before tho Army would act against the Arbentend thatevolt were attempted by opposition elements, tha Government would bring thousands of Indians Into Guatemala City andassacre of white and rtlddle class elements would result.

According to the friend, he approached Colonel Monzfin with an offer of substantia! financial backing if Colonelouldovement agalnat the Monson had replied by reiterating that the time was not ripe but that he believed that in four or five months if things continued their present course, the leaders of the Aray would go to Arbens and tell bin he waa "out." The friend had pressedor his view on what combination of circumstances would cause the Army officers to act^ and Colonel Monaon had roplied,us hope that theretrong economic pressure on Guatemala." Konson had repeatedly emphasised that the Army was anti-Communist and that it woe deeplyover the growth of Communist power.

In the course of the conversation Colonelhad said he understood that Guatemalan exllea and others wereevolt and that he fearod it would resultremendous amount of bloodshed. He hud referred in this connection to tbe fact that during the revolt which followed the asaaaalnation of Colonel Aronaresident Arevalo had started to bava thousands cf Indians from the Patsun-Patslcla area brought Into the City; that Mons6n. who was directing the Government forces, had been able to stop this attempt, but that he bolloved the Government would, if facederioun situation,

resort to the same device with possibly disastrous results which wouldcar on the Guatemalan body politic for years to oome.

My informant'* friend was Impressed by thethat upear ago Colonelodtout defender of the Arbens admlniBtratlon. Kow be received the Impression thatould do nothing to save the Government should lt be threatened.

The Informant went on to say thategun to reconsider his earlier opposition to some sort. embargo on Ountemalan coffee in the light of Colonel Konaon's remark about economic pressure. At he did not think anCongressoluntary agreement among offee importers feasible, he suggested that "red worms*

f

usspot* ro.loa) might be found in Ou; teoalan coffeeanitary inspectors. In reply to questions hetitle to coffee passes to, purchaser when coffee le deliveredailroad station in Guatemala and that the export0 per sack) became due when the coffee passed through the Guatemalan port. Hence the Initial impact of fincVTrusanofl in the coffee would fall on. purchaser rather than on the grower or the Qui>tenalan Government. Sventuslly, of course, suoh measures would discourage importera fron buying On. temalan coffee. If some way could be found to stop buying Guatemalan Government coffee, this would be even more effective, but neither of us could thinkractical way ofhis.

ttLKrlegird

Original document.

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