COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GUATEMALA

Created: 2/16/1954

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Oorexunist Penetration of Guatemala

enclosures tranaalttod haravlth under tba general aubjeet "Coaaunlat Penetration of Ouateaala" ban bean prepared In response to your request foranoe am ta rials to be need In tbe denlopaamt of information and propaganda far support of. dalagatior. of tbe Tenth InUr-iaarican Cenferenoa in

It is our understanding that these materials are desired for the use of writers and speakers who will den lop the information to suit special needs and opportunities of expression. Ub therefore ban prepared this first onr-all aumaarynUalnaryof the tbeala on which we are working, the thesis is atated in Attachment Ho. 1.

Tbe suppleaentary sat*rials transmitted as Attaotawenteare been prepared In eeml-outliao fere for see as reference by writers and speakers In relation to the subject outline which appears in Attachnant Bo. 2.

U. The present enclosures are to be taken as preliminary andsubmissions of material* which will be aoie ecapletelgr checked and edited, and compiledit for the oee of writers and speakers and wasters of tbe Aaarican delegation at the Conference.

view ef the nry limited tine available for this work,

and the large amount of evidence which must be reviewed and coordinated, we propose to denlop tbe support materials subjaot by subject in oooformity with the outline and so aa to ooaplete the kit in final font for distribution to tbe Aawrloan delegation, by

the meanwhile, if desired, we can make availableof the data developed on individual subjects andaily basis, as completed.

Attachments

As stated abore

Penetration oihaiii.

Outline.

Communlat Minority Control* OuatamaU

oi Guatemala In Soviet Plan for Worldummary.

Communlat Penetration e( Ouatamalan Laborhronology.

Communlat Capture and Manipulation ol Politicalutline.

Communlat Penetration of Guatemalan Institute of Socialutline.

Biographic Information: Roberto Morena

*

Attachment Ho. 1

COWCSLST PSBETHincOCATBWALA

h AJ1HHM,,tpractical control over the direction of (Katmian inatltatloM and policln.

2. leaders of thla minority receive directives frcn the leadara ofwiiiulae,

3- Coaaanlet ldnorltlas todr control and delivered to USSR domination thepaoohoalovaJcla, Hungary, Rumania, Poland

h* Thoof event* pi Ouateaala,

5" lty of tha pattern of events In Guatemala to the pattern oftare-over in other countriesarning to which the ncn-Craeai ilnt majority in Guatemala and the other American iienublics ehbuld take heed.

Bra* .

Attachment No. 2

Conpmnist Penetration of Guatemala

Outlinei

X. Ccananlst Minority Dominateo OUatanala II. Guatemalan Ccenuniet* Linked tonnual em

CownunlatAabor Leaders Tialt Ouateaala

Gcasminiat/Labor Leadars Visit Center*Ccsnunlss

III. OuateemXan Trande Follow Pattern ofit Take-over in Othar Countries.

and Manipulation of Administration Political Parties

of Labor Novsaant

of the Qovertasurt

1. Control of Executive

2* Control of Preae and Propaganda

3. Control of Betional Electoral Board

u> Control of Supreme Court

5. Control of National Social Service Institute

Control of Agrarian Departaont

Te Penetration of Klnistry ef llMejttael

8. Penetration of Ministry of Soonony and Labor

9* Penetration of Minietry of Coamialcetlons

of Araed Faroes

XT. The Bole of Ouateaala in the Soviet Plan of World Domination,

o. 3

I, CfMJSTST KJSOaiTT DOKDUTES WATO&LA

The direction of Guatemalan af aire has been capturedornunlet minority. This minority doom not represent tba poopla of Omataaslsi Numerically, the Hiimilat nnoleus,weioterod party members and only four deputies out ofna so email that Ita ability to dominate, toko over, and than betray tha revolutiont end tha sovereignty of thla nation of three million people* baa seemed Incredible to aany responsible thinJoara both lnaida and outside tha country. However, by gradual penstretian, betrayal and eclipse of tha aodarata foroaa anion triad to acaapt their oocparatlon, tha Coaaunlat adaorlty haa bean ahls to spread ita mat of power until tha Supreme Court, tha Congress and tha Kxeoutivo Itaalf hare been brought undar their domination, and tha amy neutralised. Where tha leaders of this snail group have encountered rosdatanoa, they have been able, through tha uaa of propaganda, tarror-iam, and tho ruthless extreme of eeeaeelnatlon, been able sithar to die* cQuroga, discredit or extirpate tho opposition of those citlwmo who have baooas satannad to tha truend Intent of thla an lament,

m list minority haa achieved naartnanra la Ouataaalaequence of acta which can ba plainly tracedew individuals and their teachers and sponsors! tha agents of international ^mwsiiilsw, with whoa thay are ia constant liaison. In precisely tha sea* path of Overall strategy, eirdlar alnorltias aeeomplished tha takeover and delivery of Poland, Cxocboa lovaklo, Hungary, liunmiaviot castors In Mosoowt and of China underToo Tung.

In all of thaaa countrlas tha local Caaaunlat party was used by Moscow as tha nothod of penetration so aa to paralyse tha State's normal political machinery. Without attempting toajority of lagal support in aeon case thaaa minority partlaa under minority leadereiip bars exploited locally any existing grievances of tha people, forking with laviah prosdaas to aboliah spaclflcalocal ilia thay have typloaUy aada uaa of already axlatinc ond often unwitting, instruments of power to aeiae control and silence cppoeitlon.ore leadership haa remained in close contact with Wwoowj this has worked through front groups espousing particular populart haa infiltrated legitimate reform noveaenta and placed ita own man in kay spots in tha government so as to corrode it froa within, inister process now confronts us ln Ouatoanla,

i* THS fj3st STBP TOa THE COTOOLUATEMALA BT THS OTOTATKaUL ccmchl3ts wasECRJTT potential leadersHALL aCUP Of OUATBftLAS SimsirrarTUTHSM DCS TBE JOB- TRAPTir,ktleidtbsWBXTfa tbs n*

real

Tha Oustseal an Coaaunlst aovaaant had been fermenting lnnd early lyhO's undar tho leadershipoosely knit group of midlle-claea into] tuali vbo bo cans attracted to the rogue of Harxiea. andn Ida red Haradstay out forocial and economic probleno. During this stage, Antonio Obsndp Sanchas and Carlos AlTarado Jerss received their first Coaaunlst Party Indoctrination in Koecow and Vienna. Inaring of tha growing throat of Cxnwtsiiaa, however. President Ubioo shattarad hla young Coanunlat party] killed, laprloanad, and otherwise dispersed its acUvitiee.

Af tar tha oonauamtion of tha revolutionh, ths Communis to took advantage of the libaral ideology and need for political support of tha first President elect and soon lnasnuated thanaelvea into hla confidence. There ia strong reason to beliere that ba entered upon office already undar certain obligations of polities snd professed friendship to known Coaanoiats. Thla nucleus group became no re cohesive ln tba early poet-revolutionary period and lnteaalfled ita political activity, adhering sore sad wore closely to Marxist lines. Conscious of Lnajrperleoce, thay relied heavily for direction in labor and political organisation on foreigners and Guatemalan exiles who had been Involved in Ccsaandot activities In other Latin Aaorioan nations and who flocks-to- uatoaoLa afterU Revolution, largely unsuapaotad by the honest liber and unnotioad by tho outaida world.

The principal foreign group consisted of Selvadorsn Conainlat exiles, 1noT wring Hlgual WRJOL Chicas, 'bel and Hax CUSBCA sartinos, brothers| and TirtilioRA tfendoa. Thay wars Joined by two native Coaauriata,BD0 benches, who had been imprisoned by OBI CO, and Alfonao SQLQjtZAHO>cio had fled to HaacLoo, whara ha workad with LGKBAKDO Toledano, 3. ftutlpulatloa of the labor force. In Ouatoaala, labor organisation washere was not* aa In aoat otheringla, unified labor oxnfadaratlon which thacould take over. Instead, thay undertook th job of both creating and of unifying. Their objectives and their baaie strateg; wars identical, however, with Voce already displayed in othsr fomerly froa countries now under Soviet domination, lhe procedure waa tactically nodifled ii

*4V

oroor io mat the pecullorlUeo of the situation in Ouateaala. They worked Binultaneouely to obtain control end unify existing unions, es they stimulated and guided the creation of new unions anong hitherto unorganised workers such as tho canposior.os. As the process of organisation and unification advanced, the Ccenunlat leaders used labor so as to exert pressure on tbs Qovernaait, precisely se was done In the eaae of CseohoslovaJda, IB Ooatenala, one oooeossion after another was aztrented fron the Qorernaont in exchange for delivery of the growing blocks of labor votes. Kaon concession won strangthsned the band of the Cosniarl sVcontrollad labor croups) the Oornajnist leaders are now engaged in working through legislative power to lessen those controls which Government still retains over labor. It will then betill sore potent weapon of influence upon the whole direction of national affaire.

A ocobmd CoKisuaist operational technique is to effect tho greatest degree of ooaplsTKmtary control over labor end political organisations, the noet iaportont slaaonte neosesary to aohisva political controlountry. It is not osceeaery to achievo strength In numbers* no rely in influence.

Tbe first step was to exploit tha tolerant climate and laperfeottbs liberal croups ofik Revolution. Through application ofactic of playing en the rivalries andf the otherCoaaoniste kept the dominant nceW-oanuniate area fully developing enongand filo. Thus, we find Jese Manuel Portuny elected as Deputysar leftlete aaober of the Popular Trout of Liberation. be joined tbe Party of Rovofrrtlonary Actionheand thence occupied various top posts. In JanuaryVictorwas elected Deputy to Congress on the CT3 ticket. In lyl^-Wof the stature ef Abel CtJSHCA Hortinea, Luisnd several others were appointed to high positions in.ktvoroaent and foreign nr

This prograa of Infiltration and penetration cannot be presentedoaplete picture of Cotasunlst activity until it is shown bow institutions and groups concerned with propaganda and education fit into the pattern ofew months after the beginning of the addrdotratlon of Preo.dlitant Cotwronist originally fron Chile, Virginia ERATO lo toller, wee established at the headepartaxmt in the Ministry of education, her officeoeting place for vial ting International Conaunisteeadquarters between her Journeys to Eastern fcurope. Portuny vas appointed after heavy pressure as a

-3-

of tha newly crated Depertaasst of Prose, Propaganda end Tonrlea, an adjunct of the Prosidentic! office, while Pedro Goeffrey Rlvaa eoon became Chief of Propaganda and Director of the government broadcasting station.

In the process of sxtending their infloence, this numericallyof eorarplratore ereeted new labor, political andor fronts with coscplsz later-locking dlreotorates. systematically underlined and destroyed any existingwilling to yield to their oxsolnation. The Syndicatein Educetloa was founded with the help of Fortonyi theRajoJotjonrirT Intellectus^ andhe iaiat-Hyoung artists and writers, the ranlolne jpjssjsj of, ^MtifTllliof DenocT>tl9 Toutfr of OueteneJ*ew ef thesetwo last naaed are affiliates of international ConnunUtsane nuelsus of Isaderehip formed the Ouatemelsn nationalrnny non-XoBwamist literals and progressives were drawnCrrrainlet-lad organisations which were really substitutes forosmmlst Party ss yet not so nsncd and, under guidanceadvisers, scheduled to remain concealed

other names.

The ycern up8 were years of calculated penetration andof Ccrrrunist into thegencies and government of the Guatemalan people, under cover of antes and causae deliberately chosen and erected by Internetional Cccrxmlna for the purpoee of concealment. II. OO'TEHAlAM CCmmiSTS LCTKED TO nrmNaTIOSAl COrWOTIISM

Cuatemelan Conaamista took their first step toward power, by moving in on the liberal revolution and exploiting the tolerant climate and Inperfeet orranlaation ef the genuine revolutionary groups.

The repeated visits of International Ccrasunlxt agents, representative* and collaborators to Guatemala, are ocasaon knowledge. It is equally well known that then* International Cornmniot agents are net nt tho airport by, or make direct

contact toon otter their arrival with the principal figure* in the Coanunlst minority nucleus of Guntcwalsi the POT (Ouateaalan Comuniet Party) secretary general, the GOTO (Coafederaeion General de Trabojadoras de OustenaU) eecretary of conflicts, the GOTO rice-en ore tary of oowsaanicationo and acta and the COTO general, who isoreurdet deputy.

what have been the cdrouis&tsnoss andf these visits? Ishain of eownend fron Moscow to Ouateaala, which Ouatenalan Connunlst nlnority obeysf Or are these lnaidsnts fortuitous and coincidental, unrelated to the over-all prograa for world domination of Russian Coacmnlsa? The record speaks for itselft

fata national Ckaseaniat labor .leaders Visit Cuateaala

1* Penetration of Ouataaalen institutions by omenta of International CoBMunisa began even before consolidation of the Ootober victory of tberevolution* Trained, paid agente of Moscow, talcing advantage of the liberal Ideology and need for political support of the first president elected after oonsuoaation of the revolution, insinuated themselves into hia confidence at an early tine. There is strong reason to believe that he case to office, unfortunately, already under certain obligations of polities and professed friendship, to such known agente* At any rate,ew souths after his acndniatraUoo began* Virginia BRAVO Loonvinced end sdlitant Coaaunistile, whose build rssenfalsB that of Ana PACKER and whose energy in the Coanunist cause is stupendous, established herself on the payroll of the Ouatenalan Gove recent, at the headepartnent in tha Ministry of Education, During the next year of two, Hale MARTISiEZ, Ecwddorsn Conatmiet, cans to Ouateaala and Joined lahirlwind caapalgn to bring into the Ccnmunlet front the waxen of Buatemele, nevly eaerging into civic responsibility* Before she returned to Souador, Bala MARTIKBZ wrote the basic statutes of the *lianxa leaenina Ouatenaltsce, Virginia BRAVO stayed on, asking her office in the Ministry ofoating ground for visiting international Conmmistaase to occupy between her Journeys to Sastom Europe* Proa each one she returned with what can only be taken ss direotlvea for her continuing work for intornational Coammisa within the education systea of Guateaala and aaong the young professional wonsn Bhe strove unceasingly to draw into tha Coaaunlst organisation.

2* At preoisely Uiie anno period, two other well-*nown Chilean agente

of internationalam, Cesar CODCI Crrutia and Manuel Idoarde mb Richardson, appeared ln Guatemala aad tpaat much tlaa la counsel vlth tha Coaaunlst alnorltj loaders. Thla snail group, than frankly ia ita fomatlTe stages, shoved by aany aotions that lt vsa disposed not only to soospt guidance froa outaids sourota, but Indeed, to wait oautioualy upon suoh goldaaoa before taking major aatloos.

Amongalohardeon'* duties, It saoa appeared, was tha preparationoasptlTS audianoa for tba Chiloan Coasnalst poet-organiser, Pablo HZHtJBA. Ia duo oourse, VESUDA oaae la parson, bearing aaisagss and diraotlTos straight froa Koaoow, In

3* Cnaa of tha outstanding Communistuban bast known by bis alias of Bis* BOQA, paid ato Guatemala. During tha tare* days ha remained la theree tha then leaders of tha net, CTO and rso, as vailworkers who today are known and active among the

JlasCBQCA'* primary and principal object in visiting Guatemala, as statedocal collaborator at tha tlaa- was to bring personally to tha labor unions th* latest instructions for work toward unification of tba three labor organisations of tha country. He offered his collaboration and announcedisit froaB4ID0 Toledano of Mexico, Pre aidant of tha (Wader* oion dj, Trabal adores if ik Amerloa Utina (CT1L) oould be expeoted at aa early tlaa. Tbe unions in turn raported fully to Bias Boca on tha formation aad progress of labor organisation up to

tbat data. Tha Cuban Coaanmist then/revealed hi* pr**aneo ln tha countryrief, misleading announoaaant to tha press before be departed.

4* The loading Bombers of th* Guatemalan Commuulat minority hadlose assoclatloD with UsQUkDO Toledano and with th* CTAL beforeevolution. Inoabardo paidisit which was but the firstequanoe of reappearaaoe*,

5. Loabardo was followed ln0 by Robertonternational Communist of Brazilian originember of tb* Central Coamitte* of CTAL.

was

HOREMA ttOMu trained in Hoseow mong tho front ro

there was

of the Communist minority leadership ofellow student of hi

Moscow courses, Antozdo OTAKDO Sanchez, who iseaber of tho Central

ltical Coaelttee of tho PTO. KUDU'S alssion6 was to coordinate p:

for the esnerel Latin Aaericsn "peace" Congress, to be held under interna

Communist directives in Mexico in -efore going to Guatemala, .fORENA

first to Cubs, where be conferred with Lazaro PTIA and Juan ELLO, Ia

GuatemalaepteabcrS, haoint asetlng of the dlrectii

toaxds of the CTQ,nd other labor and political party crdefi.

'Jnepteaber, at NORSHA'soeting of Guatemalan write

artists and IntoUoctuals was organised* sponsored by theront

(Asoclacion Cuateaalteoa organisations(AnMiaaSeamtninn.:acri tores yflaxa-

he Orupe saker-Ti (literarynd tho Ulensj da

Juyj".tu^ pgpycratleancaj Tba purpose of this Booting vas to orga. national

a Ouateaalan/conaittee for "i'eaco andn the same lines as the ",

Coanittoe" of Hexioo. 'ianuol uiuardo ii.riit. H, the Chilean Coanuniot agont,

or. liand to holp organise and addrosa the aeeting. espected non-^onnunist

cititon was railroaded into the presidency of tbe eoanlttee and was handed a

canned statoaant froa the CTAL to road as his inaugural address. Subsequent

he aought to remove hineolf froa this unwelcome situation uithout rinp ai

feelings, but he paid dearly for hia Independence. WithinA few ninths the

Ccaveanists saw to it that he lost his govemaent jobx aa head of the Social Institute. The position ia now held by tbe Cotmuniot Solorsano.

Lei ore leaving Luatooale, itobsrto :Rjfc3Il placed upon tbe willing

w-ei-iae Coaaunist leaders there the obligation of devuloplng "peace

coamHteos" in support of the 6SSR in neighboring Central American countries.

'* went on with his own work of organisation of tho pro-Soviet "peace" progra

and in9 ho appeared as one of the speakers atU Congress*in

Milan, Italy, 'ihe next fall,aid another visit i

executive

*he eaaejhBse oonuittes of the PSO conferred with hia and he was

guest of honor atnstallation of tho executive committee of the froderaclo

egional SoCcaa?oBinoa. Thus tha first assembly ol tho first

organisation of peasant snd agricultural workers in Ouateaala -as publicly

delivered by its leaders to tho International Coaaunist movement.

The organisation of the "peace" novaaent did not get on very wall in

Ouateaala. Tho few asetinga attempted evoked little reaponee. Meetings were

anrwjunood in the press and then not held at all. Inoorganlzatl

of the "peace" committee followed MCREMA's visit.

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from IH9nternational communist leaders violud Guatemalauatrated below. Xa each caao, thalr coalact wao directly with the Communlat nucleus of political-labor leadership, beginning with reception at th* airport by TOR TUNY, GUTIERREZ, PELXECER. Th* Guatemalan diplo-mat Luisragoo often wees-one of tha reception committee, and throughout the period, both travel aad aaerat communication* linking Guatemala with thawere facilitated through the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Confcrancaa of local Leadera9 with Caaar OODOY Urrutla coincided with launchinguly of effort* towaitedypical instrument of Communist penetration.

Tho0 reflected La Guatemala as elsewhere la the Americas, aadrive by international Communist for gala* ia the Waatara Hemisphere. Godoy Urrutia came from Mexico oa0 accompanied by tha Chilean Luis Enrique DELANO, the Mexican Six to FENANDEZ Doacel, and the Coata Rican Vicente SAENZ, all well-known Communists. Secret conference* with local labor and political chiefs continued for one week, at the and of which they were Joined by Manual MORA Valvarda, former secretary general of tha Costa Rican Communist party, Vaaguardia Popular, aad Carlos Luis "alias, another Coata Rican Communist.

aaaary, immediately followingonferences, thaNational Political Workers Convention waa bald. Th* convention waa tha culmination of tha Communist effort to form political actioala organised labor. Tha loaders made lt known that they planned to form tha National Political Action Committeeolitical party.

Six months later, oaune,rincipal Communist leader* withdraw from th* mala political party supporting th* adminiatration, PAR, andanifesto that Ita taaats and policies war* aot radical enough. Soon aftarward on* of tha Communlat loaders launched the Partldo Revoluclonarlo deew "party of th* workingn July, th* FORTUNY group began publication of Octubre, the newspaper which is now tho official organ of tbe Guatemalan Communist party, PI

Foreign Communist* conferred with th* Guatemalan Under* inebating th* possibilityommunist Party la Guatemala.

La the ii.ni year, Vice ale LOMBARDQ Teladaae aad Louis SAILLANT came directly from Moscow to direct the CTAL-sponsored Congress of Transport Worker* la Guatemala. Tha principal resolution* applied oalr to that country-tha Mr atingle central union of all organised labor in Guatemala, tha aecoed, establishmentolitical party oi tha working class.

Iaho Cuban files ROCA returned with Juan MAP.IKklL.LO, secretary general of tha Cuban Communlat party, and Salvador AGULRHl, for raaawad conferences with local headers.

iealoio ENCLNA, SacraUry General of tha Communist Parly ofparticipated with local laadars La thachock of delegate! before opening the Second Congrcu of Guatemalan Leber.

The principal foreign delegate to that coagros* wa* Guleeppe CAS ADember of th* permanent staff ol tha WFTU SecreUrUt In Vleana. It la elgaifleant that the WFTU aaat thla high-ranking officar to tho national laborf one of tho smallest Latin American countrlea. In th* pa*t, the WFTU ha*te regional labor coagrcee directed by tha CTAL. Thi* ls th* first Instanceermanent etaff memberational meeting, aa indication of th* interest the Coaiwderaclon General del Trabajo daala ha* forCommunist strategy.

Although prepared for3 wa* postponed to Prior to thi* date, Jose Manual FORTUNY aad Victor GUTIERREZ returned from the Vienna meeting of the WFTU and tour* behind the Iron Curtain. They returned separately via Mexico City, where FORTUNYbort atop-over and wa* ia touch with LOMBARDO Toladaao.

ichael K. SAMOILOV, Commercial Attache of th* Soviet Embassy In Mexico, also aesigned to Guatemala, bed coafarrad directly with FORTUNY, SOLORZANO, aad Ernesto CAPUANO, deputy director of thaInstitute of Social Security..

S

Oaanuary,wo-hour meeting with Mikhail CHERKASOV, Couaailor of the SovUt Embassyexico City. Onanuary Pavlicek flaw to Guatemala, whara ho spoke with delegates to the GOTO Ceagraaa. Following this, tha Congreaa formally recommended eatabliahmeat of diplomatic aadrelations between Qua tern ala aad Chechoslovakia. bruary Pavlicek presented hie credentials to Preaidaat ARBENE.

J. IHi SLCCND SltP fGB THl CONIHOL OF GUATEMALA! DIRECT SUPER-VISION BY AGLNTS OF OTTER NATIONAL COMMUNISM

At thia stage La the development of complete Common!it control, it must be remembered that moat of the leading figures who emerged from the first period Communist penetration of Guatemala were only in their late twenties. They had similar backgrounds of mixed Spanish and Indian bloodi their families were relatively poor, yet they bad attained an educational level much higher than the average Guatemalan In these circumstances.

In spite of th* fact that "old professionals" from othar countries had been at their side all during the intlal period, the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin taught at th* Escuela Clarldad, the Communist labor school, wassscond-hand instruction} that la, th* only reliable iaetroctioa as far as tea Kremlin wa* concerned was in th* Kremlin. Thus, th* second stag* of expansion and growth? up to the present was charactsriasdonstantly incrsailag volume of travel by the chosen elite of Guatemala to Eastern Europe and Moscow) their return generally heralded aa acceleration or shift in local Party tactics sad lino. (The detail by thia travel la being preparedappendix to tha present report, )

*

4. THE LAST STEP IN CONTROL BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISTS: COMPLETE ASSUMPTION Or THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

In th* period following tha election of Pr*aldentcommunist activity aad agitation grew stronger and bolder.

In labor, the leadership of tha CGTG, gradually haa com* completely under the control of th* POT political Commltte*. With th* exceptionew independent local unions, it bow represents all organised industrial, tranaportation, sal commercial labor, andonsiderable numberr leu ruraladcra-tlone. Affiliation of th* CGTG with th* CTAL and WFTU) completed lta paaaaga Into th* Soviet -dominated camp.

Tha present admlnletratlon1political strength comes fromational democraticoalition of the PAR, the RN, tha PRO and tha POT. These four parties holdfeats ia Congress aad virtually all government Jobs ara controlled by tham. Tho POT, smallest, but moat cohesive of those parlies, holdsf thocats yet positively controls tha votea of all other members of th* coalition. Thi* ba* been accomplished by Infiltration of Communist leaders IntoeitUns of th* otherbafor* coalition wa* accomplished,

Tha following government office* aad agencies have been penetrated by Communists. Tha Publicity aad Propaganda Department of the Pr*ald*ocy; Private Secretary to tha President; Ministry of LduCBtloOl Ministry of Foreign Affair at Ministry of Communications| Secretary General of th* President! th* National Electoralational Agrarian Council, tha policy agency of tho National Agrarian Department, and tho Guatemalan delegation to tho UN. Member* of th* nucleus group of Communist leadership have beea placed In th* key positions ofoi Congress, Director General of Radio Broadcasting, Director of tha institute of Social Security, Chief of Administration of National Agrarian Department, and Deputy Inspector General of Labor.

Through thla penetration oi the government, th* Communists have been able to obtain funis for th* support of various front activities. Official funds ware used for the second Continental Conference of Democratic Lawyer* and forp pert of Communlat propaganda la all the masjmsdia of tha country, aad tha travel of delegate* to Peace Conferences.

attacbaant Ho, l

IV. THS ROLE OF GUATEMALA IN THE SOVIET PLAN OF WORLD DOMINATION

Analysis ol Communist penetration tactics in Guatemala Indicate, that th* Soviet aim In th* caa* ol Guatemalaot toatellite in Latin America, but to encourage and support complete Communist penetrationaoo lor Increasing Communist activities in that area aad expanding Sommunlet penetration is other Latla American countries.

Summary

Tha aituatloa that erists la Guatemala todayesult ol Communist activity in that country differs substantially from that created by Communlat manauvor* la Eastern Europ* during th* earlyf Soviet takeover there. Tha Eastern European Communists possessed predominant instruments ol physical power and enjoyed direct Russian support. Their Guatemalan colleagues bava neither. Tba Communists la Guatemala presently lack the capability ol molding tha countryoviet satellite,* uaJakely that tho Soviet* would wish thorn to do so.

Most probably tho. events oi thek*ommunist effort to provoke th* Unitednto an unwarranted reaction or to divert our attention aad our efforts from areas of moro immediate Importance.

Power Position of Guatemalan Com muni it Party

The strategy and tactics used by the Soviets In tho subversion and takeover of tbe Eastern European states that are bow their satellites varied from country to country. HIn ovaryf successful Soviet takeover two essoatlolwar* mot. The first wa* that tha Communlat* gained early and affective control over the Instruments of physical power within tha nation, and the second -was that no axternal or foreign influences beyond the Cammuniote' power to control could bo brought against them to Interfere with their program. In Eastern Europe, the Communists' prompt seizure of tho police force* together with tha presence of thoArmy gov* them an overwhelming superiority of force in ovary case. The Communist effort* to take over Grace*69 illustrate* the course of events ln an instance where thaaa conditions wore not Too Greek Army wa* weakened but was still in existence and foreign aid wa* introduced to support it.

In Guatemala today neither of thoa* two conditions for Communist takeover can be met. When gauged by its ability to take over and govern the country, the Guatemalan Communist Party's power position la extremely weak. The Armythe largest and moat powerful armed force ia the country, tt la aot controlled by the Party, and the material available hare givos no Indication that it haa been extensively penetrated. The clear Communist domination of the police force and the major labor union* isounter balance to this instrument. The center of physical power does not lie with the Reds.

The danger of external influencee interfering in any Co mm unlit move la high and it is bound to remain so. The danger cornea not so much from political or military movie of Guatemala's neighbors. It comes rathar from the fact that economically tha country is wholly dependent oa tbe expert of iU two stapleoffee and bananas* The nation's economic well-being, and indeed its very aurvival depend on itsteady market for these itemseaaa ofthem to market.

Guatemala's major customer is the United States and almost all tha shipping needed to move her produce is owned aad managed by Amerlcaa interests. Th* appearanc* of an avowedly Communist regime In Guatemala would result In the withdrawal of American intareatarobably embargo clo*lng the country'* moat important market. Thia Ln turn would result Inolation of Ouatcmala aad her rapid decline Into some thing akin to bankruptcy.

The dielike of American interestsow ao geacral within the country that many Guatemalan citia*n* would welcome the denature of theithout thinking of the consequences, but it Is certain that the leaders of th* Communist Party realise the situation and aa* in thef American trad* abarrier to their overtly taking over th* government and aiauming responsibility for its effective management.

They doubtUae remember tha mlaforutnce of th* Panama Communist Party in tha period after World War II when lt called for the Immediate withdrawal. forcesumber of wartime poets set up In that country. Thia happened to coincide with theof tha US command and the camps were evacuated In

record, time. Initially, public opinion favored the Communist mwve but a* tbo lose of income from tho vacated posts became felt, opinion shifted, and elnce it waa felt that the Party wa* responsible, ita popular position waa considerably waakenad.

Objective* of Guatemalan Communist Party

Since the Guatemala Communist* have neither th* physical nor the economic power toomplete takeover, thayar different and more difficult problem than that which confronted their colleagues ta Eastera Europe5 the Guatemalan Partyany of th* same techniques and tactics as ware used from positions of greater strength in Europe. Th* Guatemalan Party can use these from weakness because its objectives ar* wholly different. It would not bs in the Russian Interest to makeatellite ia the acceptedof the word for th* Guatemalan Communist Party in Its present ambiguous status is almost Ideally organlaed and situated to aerve Soviet and*.

Ita primary purpose ia toa maximum amount of uois* and nuisance, aad ita main efforts have bees in th* flalds of propaganda dissemination and mats Indoctrination. Press outlets, unions, and other mass organisations have bean th* targets. The Communists' unquestioned control of the police provides themaluable lnatrumsnt to direct and control th* activities of these groups but doe* not give them the strength needed to cope with the Army, The Communist-controlled unit* are those best suited to produce spectacular disturbances such as strikes, demonstrations aad parades. They can disrupt the aational life in expensive and perhaps ruinous ways, hutountry in Guatemala's position they hardly aataxe provide the foundationsew state. They create aad main-tafal an atmosphere of continuing Communist threat and pre,sure whichonstant irritant to the United States, and their activities enable the Party to present the rest of Latin Americanicture of devouring U. S. interests clinging doggedly to their profitable hold on the country. That spurioea picture ia thenart of Communist propaganda throughout the world.

While th* government itself remains nominally non-Communist, the nation's essential economic contracts caa bo kept up, and the issuas which la clear-cut form might facilitate tho organisation of opposition remain satisfactoriVy befogged. American trade continue* to provide tho country with its life blood at ths *am* time that American firm* provide both th* government and tha Partyery cca -nlent political whipping boy. Thus tha Guatemalan Communist* achieve theiraad nuiaanca goal without assuming tha daagara and losses that wouldakeover of tho sort aoaa ia Eastern Europe.

Conclusions on Recent Event*

In evaluating th*that have occuraad ln Guatemala during racent weeks, it becomes obvious that many of tham areort having particularly high new* value ln th* United State*. Tha Communist* seem to bo doing ail thatn their power to draw attention to their maneuvers and are doing Lt in tha one country that ha* th* power to react aharplyhem. Thlaighly Irrational behavior for experienced political conspirators who arc seriously seeking political power.

A priaat with American connections wa* expelled from the country aehort time ago. Hi* expulsion received wide attention Ln th* American preaa, but thereo information available bar* that priest* of otherave a*aor tbat anti-religious activitiea within Guatemala have otherwiee beenup. Two United State* nawamen bava bean expelled, but Lt doae not appear that any other* have been bothered. In an Interview oa Februaryoreign Minister loricilo referred to those two American* as specialndded ne ofppears to have been admitted to tha country la order that ho might be thrown out twenty-four hours later. The ax pulsion, ofar bettor story and far mora widely reported one thata wouldare refusal of aa entry permit. Tha alledged plot involving Nicaragua and other Latin American states as wall aa ourselves wa*trong news story aad received wido attention. It should b* aetsd that tho Guatemalan government hastened to exonerate Nicaragua while tho atory wa* still oa fronthare..

Iteastcoincidence that the leaders of th* non-Cocornunlet labor union In Guatemala, were arrested while tha AF of I* Executive Council was ln convention in Miami.

Italmost certain that tha primary pur pose of thi* activity ba* been to anger and alarm the government and people of tho United State*. Tha Guatemalan Communlets apparently hope to provoke some reaction from us or fclec to divert our attention to tham from Com muni it activitywhero.

A* the Deportment of Stat* ha* auggaatod, tho Guatemalan effort may bedirectly to the meeting! La Caraca* scheculed for March fLrat. AayAmerican reaction to Guatemala'srill seriously weaken oar position with th* other Latin American state*. Many ofountriesp andmemories of United Statee interference In past years. tatemoat. official that might ba construedhroat of intervention,ositive acdon auchovement of forcoe to Panama would bo grist for th* Communist mill.

Tbe danger that tha recent Oar* up la dlvarelonary is mora oarlous. Tbe power realities la Guatemala aad throughout tha Carrlbeaa area are suah that these events constitute atertiary daagar to our eecurlty. In other parts of the world auch aa Ludo-China tho power balanceighly precarious and the potential benefit* tbat tha Soviets would deriveictory era far higher. However, United States cone am with Latin American Integrity atoms hackime when we hardly knew of lado-China's existence and an apparent throat to the area aoutb of ua mill distract* u*egra* out of all proportion cd* to tho danger involved.

If,ritical time, American attention and concern caa ba drawn to aa area of relatively minor danger, tha advantage* to World Communism are all to obvious. These advantages will be increased If we can bo induced to commit any part of our conventional military forcesegion where they aro not urgently required aad where their very praaanca will aggravate our dlfficultle*.

AtUehsent Ho. 5

Penetration of tbe Labor Movement

Prior to4 Revolution, there were no labor union* in Guatemala, other than controlled worklagmon'c national aid aocictiea. Almost Immediately after tha revolution,chooltaachcra' union waa founded, which evolved tn5 Into tbe Sindicato de Trabajadorts Educaclonalea de Guatemala (STEG).hort time later, the railwayman's mutual benefit society was reorganised as Sindicato de Action y_ Mcjortmlentq Ferrocarrlllcrond the labor movement was launchedational scale with the organisation of the Conicderaclon de Trabajadores da Guatemala (CTG) In

This waa ateftist-nationalist movement without Communist Theommunist party had been shattered by President DBICO, its activists killed, imprisoned or dispersed to other countries. There was thus no native organisation, and lt was necessary to reconstruct tha party from the baae. The seeds of the future Guatemalan Communist Party were planted within the CTG. Sines there were no Guatemalan Communist labor leaders available to advise the budding organization and steer lt in suitable directions, Communists from other Central American countries were Imported, Theforeign group consisted of Salvadoran exiles, including Miguel UARalvadoran Communist whotill associated with the local labor movement) Abel andENCA Mar tinea, brothers sucUcdifrom El Salvador2 for Communist activities, the latter of whom isember of the Political Committee of PRO, and Office Manager of the IGSS; and Virgilio GUERRA Mendcs,ember of tbe POT Political Committee. Tbay were joined by two native Communists, Antonio OVANDO Sanchez, who had been mprisoned by UBICO, and Alfonso SOLORZANO Fernandez, who had fled to Mexico, where he worked with LO MB Aft DO Tolsdano.

These Communists, who had had labor union organising experience in other countriea, were the advisers of the young CTG. They quickly gained control of it, and established the Eacuela CI art dad as an indoctrination school, with Abel CUENCA as director, Ita Communist orientation at length caused enough alarm

CRET

actional fight split tha CTQ. SAMF and otherwithdraw Ln6 and organised th* Federaclon Slndlcal do Guatemalander the loaderehip of SAMF chief Arturo MORALES Cubaa. In ita (lr et year, FSG outatrlppad the CTO Ln mcmbarahLp, Tha AREVALO government dealt tha CTG another blow by formally closing the Eecuala Clarldadecree citing it ae contravening Articlef th* Guatemalan Constitution which forbid* "political organisationsoreign or international characters.

Tho Communlat doctrine* taught by tho Eecuela Clarldad and by tbe Com -munist-oriented figures loading th* labor movementonsiderable attraction upon tho young student* and othar* who ware lookingnified and firm ideology In the disoriented first period af tba post-World War IX "revolutionary" era, Tho present leader* of tha Communlat Party were at this time in their mid-twenties. They bad similarhey ware of mixed Spanish and Indian blood} their famlla* ware relatively poor, soul they hadan educational level higher than th* average Guatemalan in thao circumstances.

A group led by Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and consisting of pcr*on*with tha Escuela Clarldad gradually came to dominate the labor movement. The withdrawalMI" had loft th* teachers' onion ST EG as tha most militant union in tha CTG, OUT1ERREZ rose rapidly from tha STEG Executive Committee to tha STEG Secretary Generalship, and the nee to th* position of Socretary Oeneral of the CTG.

Meanwhile, tha Communist-oriented group aleo infiltrated, which had originally been formed In protest to the dominance of Communist doctrine* Ln the CTQ, Tha la*trum*nt of th* FSQ leftist turn was Manuelga, ommunist-line opportunist who rose from tbe SAMF to the FSG Secretary Oeneral. Byomlto National do Unldad Slndlcal (CNUS) wa* founded to coordinate tha action* of tho CTG aad FSG, and laid the foundationsow united organisation. GUTIERREZ' extreme leftist labor group worked bend in glove with Jose Manuelxtreme leftist political group, and many of th* younger Icadera, such aaule RAMOS, ware active in both. Their activities war* ln th* naturs of two aspectsingle current rather than

the activities of separate entitle

Effots toward creating aunified confederation of ail Guatemalan worker* werepark-plugged by- International Communlet labor leader* outaldc Guatemala. Joao MORERA, Cuban Secretary of therequent secret visitor to Guatemala, laongress of Latin American Transport Workers was held in Guatemalaacade for preparation for 'unification of the Guatemalan labor movement. Resolutions of th* Congress concernedlves primarily with Guatemalan laborad the meeting alao afforded an occasion for th* presence in Guatemala of Vicente LO MB Ah DO Toledano, Secretary General of the CTAL, aad Louis SA1LLANT, Secretary General ofU,

Inhe CTO and FSQ brought to fruition the Coofcderaclon General de Trabajadoresith LOU BAR DO and SA1LLANT a* mid wives at the event, GUTIERREZ admitted that th* organisation of GOTOirect result of thef these two International Communists. At It* founding Congress, the COTG alsoesolution of thank* to UORERA for all his efforts in its behalf.

Leadership of the GOTO is completely under the control of th* POT Political Committer. With th* caxoptionndependent local unions, it represent* all organized Industrial, transportation, and commercial labor, andonsiderable number of agriculturalncluding tne union of the worker* of th* United Fruit Company plantations. Affiliation of th* CGTG with tho WFTU and the CTAL3 completed it* passage into the Soviet-dominated camp.

Key paoltion* in the CGTG are all held by GUTIERREZ, t* Secretary General,ember of the POT Political Committee, and head of the PGT Cental Committee'* Labor Union Commission. Jose Alberto CARDOZA, also of (be PGT Political Committee,irst Vice Secretary Geaaral of COTG. Carlos Manuel PELLECER, another PGT Political Committee member, is CGTG Secretary for Labor Disputes. In fact, th* roster of CGTG officers i* studied with the names of PGT

Besides controlling COTG, ths POTtrong ideological influence over the Confedcrscion Neclonai Campcslna deational federation of hired farm workers, small tenant farmers, snd small farmers. None of its presort officers are publicly known to be members of the POT. ItsIdeological orientation stems from its Sserstary Oeneral, Leonardo CASTILLO Floras. Although he isTO member as far as is known, he has been activ* in the Communist "peace" movement, and hasar leftist Une In his speeches. At present, ths CNCG is closely affiliated With tho left wing of the PAK, and the leaderships of the two organisationsASTILLO florasember of tha PAR Political Committee, andANDO Arriola, the president of Congress, is concurrently CNCG Socretary for Agrarian Affairs and PAR Secretary for Organisation.

The CGTO and the CNCG haveey factor ln politics: their representative are in tha majority on tha Local and Departmental Agrarianunder the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law, and three officers and several members of CGTO and CNCO are Deputies in Congress.

The Second Congress of the CGTO was hold in4 after several postponements. Prior to this data, Jose Manuel FORTUNY and Victor GUTIERREZ returned from tha Vienna meeting of ths eVFTU and tours behind the Iron Curtain. They returned separately via Mexico City, where FORTUNYhortatxapaand was In touch with LOMBARDO Toledano. Also prior to the Congress, the Guatemalan Ambassador in Mexico returned to his post from Guatemala with information from President ARBENZ for Vladimir PAVLICEK, Casch Minister In Mexicoroposed trip by Pavlicek to Guatemala.

Onanuary, Pavlicekwo-hour meeting with Mikhail CHERKASOV, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Onanuary Pavlicek flew to Guatemala, where he spokexdxec with delegates to the CGTG Congress. this, the Congress formally recommended establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between Guatemala and Czechoslovakia, ebruary Pavlicek prassnted his crddentials to President ARBENZ,

/

During tbe Congress, the Communist red flag flew beelde theemblem over th* building which housed ths sessions. Delegates die* tribuUd banners denouncing "foreign Intervention" by imperialist forces. Thus waspectacleompletely Communist-dominated Congress.

Outline

ha

1. Thepolitical strength darlraa from thaDeaocratlc Front1 (Freate Deaooretloooalition ooapoaad of tha fart; dp Aqcjyp paTojuo^pnartflha Fartldo fa 2AGun taps Itqpq

nd the Ccmauniat Pertlgo

TrabaJq (POT). Thai* fear partlaa holdfeats ln Congreee, and Tirtuall all gorernaaat Jobs ara hold by one or another of thaaa parties. Tha aaalleat but aoat oohaolTa of thaaa partiaa, the POT, haa only four ofongressional seats yet lt oontrols the other Beater of tha oaolitlon.

2. Domination has bean acacarpliahed by tha following means i

of Cceaamiet leaders la may positions the otherbefore tho PBG was officially launched.

ruidsnee la tha earlyperiodwho had baas indoctrinated in Moaoov (vortuny, Roberto AlaTaradoSolorsano.".

o. Ooatinuously maintaining oontaot vlth tha executive and political oceaaitteeo of tbe other revolutianary partlaa through Ccasmaileto raters.

Tbs PAR ls currently beaded by (Julio Estrada de laan vbo was bendVpiched, trained, and given increasingly responsible positions by the Communist*.

The PRO la heededhrevd Doa^Cosaezaist politician (Charnaud MacDonald) who has collaborated closely vltb Communists vhen such action advanced hla Interests. K* has cn his Political Cceadttee three people who are oleeely identified with promoting Ccanainlst objectives.

fj) The Rfl ia beaded by one of tho betrayers of President AREEKZ 7 although he insists, without definition of what ha means, that ha isJaime Dies Rosaotto)

d. Applying the "divide and rule* tactic of playing oa tha rivalries and Jealousies of the other parties toominant non-CcBmajniat group froa developing among tha noa-Ccenamiat rank aad file of these three part lee.

(1) 2 tha issue of fVammtnlari itself was an important

factor ln keeping tha parties divided, as each bad a

(I) The struggle of these two win go dominated the internal affairs of the PAR sad tha HI with tha aoat pro-Ccsaaunlst faction gradually winning io both.

(3) actional fights laesultedchlsa and the splinter group founded the Sooialiat Farty,

u) n announcement tbat non-Counlet minority groups within ths three parties wouldsingle1 revolutionary party undar tbe PRO was fruetrated by PCG propaganda attacks against tha leader* of the plan, calling aeeuaing tbaa of being "rightist devietlo

Attachoent No. 7

Communist Penetration ot the Guatemalan Institute oi Social Security

AUoaao SOLORZANO Fernandas, Director General

SONO U, by hla profession aa well aa hlaonvinced Communist, although he haa never openly joined the POT. He Is aaMarxist intellectual,abor organizer aad agitator ol long experience.oung law student, he waa sent to Mexico City by President UBICO, who gaveosition ia the embassy to provide financial aid lor bis studies. However, bis friendships with Communists and leftists became so pronounced that UBICO cancelled tba aid.

In Mexico City, SOLORZANO came under tha direct invluanc* ol Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano. sad at eaa time served as LOMBARDO'a secretary. He also taught labor law, theory, and practice In the Workers' University in Mexico City, aadroup ol Communists which actively distributed propaganda directed against UBICO* After4 revolution SOLORZANO returned to Guatemala, Prior to his departure from Mexico, ho waa in frequent contact with the Russian Embassy in the capital. Ha was also instrumental in obtaining financial aid from LOMBARDO Toledano to assist the return of Juan Joso AREVALO from exile to tha presidency.

Heember ol the Communlat Party ol Mexico, but was expelled, on the ground, he says, that ha disagreed with the theories ol Earl Browdcr, US Communist leader during World Wary hla own admission, he continues toonfirmed Marxiet-Leninist-Staliniat.

His wileoistreee ol former President AREVALO, and duringadministration ha served as Secretary to the

A chronology ol his activitiesas Communist organser in Central America,

one ol the principal leaders oi the Vanguardia

Naclonal, an extreme leftist political party.

Was an organiser ol CTG*

went to El Salvador end Mexico, where he re-

ceived financial support from Soviet aad Marxist sources, following his return to Guatemala, upon AKEVAL'e election, ba wrote the chapter on social guarantees in9 Coastitatioa.

to World Peace Congress in Paris.

Contacted Manuel HUBNER Richardson while the latter was in Guatemala.

Secretary General of the Guatemalan Committee of

the Partisans of Peace (Comlts Ouatcmaltoco por laa Democracla),

Apriloa recefption committee to welcome Pablo NERUDA,

Chilean Communist poet, to Guatemala.

Septembera petition demanding rejection of the Rio Treaty

by the Guatemalan Congress.

AprilAdministrator of the Guatemalan Institute of Social

Security (Inatltuto Quatemalteco de Scgurlded Social, XGSS) following ouster of tha incumbent, engineered by outresident AREVALO and president-elect ARBENZ. Inhen ARBENZ was asked by the Board of Directors of the Institute as to his wishes In connection with the continuance in office of Oscar BARAHONA Strebor, be stated that he wished BARAHONA to serve out his term. Subsequently, however, AREVALO, while still President, requested ARBENZ to withdraw his support from BARAHONA. end to give it to SOLORZANO. ARBENZ complied,avor to AREVALO and in partial payment of his political debt to the PAR.,

oncerted campaign of character assassination waa laocnhed againet BARAHONA. with

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andnewspapers circulatingabout hla financial recordbai* alleged service to reactionaries during tbs time ha bad been in Ouatemala. aad mentioning tha name of US Ambassador Patterson.

Pressure io various forms was brought to bear on the Board members to vote solorzlection, aad thus to lead the unsavory affair aa aura of respectability. The Employers1 Representative was promised that ha would bs made President of the Board ia exchange for his vote. The Reprsseaativa of tha University acquiesced to avoid displeasing the government. Two of ths Board members resigned following this series of events. Headed "Peace" Rally.

Appeared oa platform at tha Communlat Party's first public meeting.

Appointed Abel CUENCA Martinaall-knownCommunlat, as Office Manager of tha lOSS. Tbls appolatmeat was tha prelude ia later wholesale appointment of Communists to the agency. Member of PRO "Political Bureau1.

Although ha wasember of the Specialon Agrarian Reform, he and Joaedominated consideration of the Agrarianby that

SO LORE ANO waa attacked by DIAZ Roes otto andhen thay withdrew PAR from PRO, on tho ground that he (SOLORZANO) had "failed loyally to defend PAR from rightist deviation!et currents."

Spoke at First National Conference on Social Security, held under thinly-veiled Communlat auspicee, andlatform that was made up entirely of Communists.

JuneEditor of Dlarlo del Pueblo, official organ of

tna PBC, Helped make up financial lossesanceby tha pro-Conam unlet Peace Committee.

that, although ha waa expelled from the Commualat

Party el Mexico, he baa been endo be aMaradat-Lexdniat-Staliniit. Deplored "secrctarianisi of the Guatemalan Communisea,

BOLORZANO's editing of Plario del Pueblo critixixedMacDonald on the ground that itawee Marxist-Commuxdet, CHAKNAUD triad atoffset BOLORZANO's influence by appointingand clerks who supported CHAKNAUD,removed them for lack of ability. movement against SOLORZANOIbecame strong, a

meeting was called to depose him es editor, butand Communist sympathisers in thethe petition to removesupport of PROommunist Party project for

establishmentank lor foreign trade.

Attitudes Toward SOLORZANOt

Leading Guatemalan Communists are apparently not entirely sympathetic to SOEORZANO* Some reseat Mm aa aa 'UiSsHu leifc "inielectuale" andthers scorn him dor his expulsion from the Communist Party of Mexico, sono has been attacked by GUTIERREZ and PELLECER, who have harried his activities in tha 1GSS, andTUNY, who calledrightistHe once had the support of CHARNAUD MacDonald, but that PRG leader has lately objected to SOLORZANO's Marxist orieatattoa.

SONO andSS

SONO haa no qualifications for Ms present position aa administrator of the IGSS, and neither have the many Communists he haa appointed to positions ii thehe IGSS has been recklessly exploited lor politicalnd under its present management thia on* valuable result of4 Revolution may endailure.

Original document.

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