RELOCATION AND RESUBORDINATION OF SOVIET GROUND EQUIPMENT: MOTIVES AND SIGNIFIC

Created: 2/7/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

The Director of Central Intelligent?-

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL NOTE

From

and Rcsubordinatioo of Soviet Ground Equipment: Motives and Significance

BG David A. Armstrong, USA

National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces

Key Points

anticipation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Trraty coming into effect, the Soviets haw?00 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) east of the Urals; within theone, they have ^subordinated three divisions to the Navy and one to the KGB, thereby exempting their TLE from the CFE ccHtrtting rules. This Note assesses the military significance of those actions. It does not address any issues Of legality. It is based on discussionseeting of tenia Scniet theater-forte onaryrt from CIA, DIA. Amy, and the SIC held under ihe auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces.

The Soviet General Staff probably views the transfers of treaty-Umited equipment (TLE) out of the ATTU zoneay ofapability for robust defense of Soviet borders in tbe.

Tbe moves will increase Soviet offensive capabilities but not enough to give the General Staff confidence in its ability to prosecute deep offensive operations against NATO. An overall assessment of the threat will depend, in part, on NATO's future force structure and force generation potential.

The resubordination of four divisions to the Navy and the KGB does not have great military significance-so long as it is not usedoophole for future additions of TLE.

Although these moves increase Soviet capabilities over those they would possess if the equipment was destroyed, the threat in theill still be substantially lower than it would beFE Treaty.

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Relocation and Resubordlnatlon of Soviet Ground Equipment: Motives and Significance

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motive -buying Insurance

TLE transfers designed toobust defense

Soviel moves were taken by the mililaryime when the military was increasingly assertive andtronger domestic political position than it had in several years.

Wearticularly in the case of the transfers of equipment outside the ATTU rone -that the moves should be viewed as an effort by Soviet military leaders to build up "insurance" against an uncertain future and to come closer to the post-CrT; position they anticipated before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact In addition, the rrtoves reflect mstiiicuvc military opposition to tbe destruction of relatively modem equipment, particularly when the military expects weapons procurement to decline.

Signs of these concerns were evident as carry as the Mandate discussions inhen Soviet sources noted the requirement totrategic reserve to offset the US potential to reinforce Europe. At that time, the Soviet strategic reserve was west of the Urals-subject to the CFE negotiations-and the Soviets clearlyeed to relocate it outside the ATTU zone. In addition, by0 the General Staff had become very concerned about tbe demise of the Warsaw Pact and the impact lhat would have on post-CFE parity. The General Stall then decided to remove as much equipment from the ATTU zone as possible prior toFE Treaty in order to preserve the potential to regenerate substantial forces.

Soviet motives for resubordinating maneuver divisions to the Navy and KGB are less clear. The Soviets have said they require additional naval forces to redress overall US naval superiority. We believe the transfer to the KGB is tied to the USSR's growing need for internal security forces. In any event the Soviets are using the re subordinations to attempt to keep in tbe zone TLE that is not liable to destruction.

We do not believe the transfer of equipment and re subordinations were designed to fundamentally alter tbe post-CFE military balance and result in militarily significant superiority for the Soviets in Europe.

Wc believe these transfers should be measured against the dramatic change in the way that Soviet leaders think about ie DllHta^cainpoMtf of their sccurity_pohcy. In the past

the Soviet Union sought toATO attack and maintain forces capableecisive offensive deep into Western Europe. Soviet CFE proposals (winch assumed continued East European participation in the Warsawn the other hand, reflected an acceptance of parity and

Resubordination of minimal military significance

Threat remains lower than without treaty

security with NATO-equal risk and equal security for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact We believe the events in Eastern Europe led the General Staff to conclude that without transferring equipment east of the Urals, Soviet forces could only barely defend Soviet borders.

It is in right of this starkhe Soviets'iew that they could "hold NATO at riskn!y" as opposedear that they "would be barely able to defend Soviet borders"-that Community analysts believe the significance of the equipment transfers should be assessed. We believe the equipment transfers are intended toobust strategic defense-to guarantee the defense of Soviel borders rather than to give Moscow the capability to mount offensive operations deep into NATO territory.

Nevertheless, the latent force generation potential of the equipment east of the Urals substantially increases Soviet offensive and counteroffensive capabilities over what they would be if the cauiprnent was destroyed. The General Staff, for example, would certainly continue to have confidence in its ability to mount an offensive into Poland. However, ft could not be confident that the Soviet military could continue beyond Poland and prosecute offensive operations against NATOigh likelihood of success.

The resubordination of the four divisions increases Soviet holdings of TLE by aboutercent By itself, that does not significantly enhance Soviet military capabilities. Our pnncipat concern is that the Soviets might use resubordinationoophole to allow the entry or preservauonofunlirmtedquanu'UesofTLE. To alleviate that concern, the Soviets haveolitically binding declaration that any additional rcsubordinations would count against CFE totals.

We believe that, even though the transfer of equipment East of the Urals increases both force generation potential and the capability for offensive operations, the Soviet moves do not

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irtend restoration of the deep offensive threat that NATO ced during. Tbe overall threat will depend. In part, oo NATO's future force structure and force generation potential. Whatever increased military threat the stocks pose, it is significantly less than it would bereaty. Assuming the "resubordination" loophole is closed,esult of the Treaty the overall threat in the ATTU zone is codifiedubstantially lower level, is located much farther away than would otherwise be the case, and is subject to unprecedented levels of onsite inspection.

Original document.

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