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Secret"
The Republic Challenge to Soviet Defense Policy and Planning
Ah ImelUgence
Secret"
Directorate cf Intelligence
The Republic Challenge to Soviet Defense Policy and Planning
An InleWgcnct Assessment
Coflimcnu andaybedirecltdmtae.CHef-SOVA
As il siirvcyi the pro*peel of republic secession, the Soviet General Staff faces potentially severe degradation to the nation's military capability:
General Staff decision to concentrate sensitive strategic offensive forces la the Russian Republic would be costly and could disrupt strategic planning. Two of the Strategic Rocket Force'sCBM divisions currently arc located in Belorussia. two in the Ukraine, and two in Kazakhstan.
the Baltic republics wore to accede, the loss of territory and jropulatkro would be minimal; however. Ibe kas of strategic defense and early warning assets in these republics weaiM reduce warning tiroe of an attack aad degrade Soviet ability lo defeat it.
The loss of the Ukraine and Moidon or Bcaorussia would cut the defensive depth of tbe European USSR by half. Moscow would be leasm from tbe frontier. The three republics bare someillion people and more thanerceni of ihe defense-industrial base.
The toss of some of tbe republic* to the sooth could expose Ihe Russian underbelly to political or Islamic-based inability and create crprjortunl-ties for Turkish or Iranian influence, while cutting theonscript pool substantially and requiring the relocation of some strategic offensive and defensive forces.
security concerns of ibe remaining republics would depend largely on which ones remained. Tbe Russian Republic presumably could become bear to all or the vagt majority of Soviet nuclear weapons, in addition to most of Ihe editing central forces
How far the deflation of defense authoriiy proceeds depends in large pan oo tbe outlookew all-union treaty nod the shape of tbe resellingentilies:
ederation probably the best case from ihe center's point ofunion government would almost certainly have lo meet, through military reform efforts, many of the demands of the republics, such as drastic reductions in tbe size of the central forces, borne busing for conscripts,reater say for republics Ihrough the union parliamentederation Oniircil type of body in broad national security decision making. However, the center would retain tight control over military planning and force employment.
oom confederallon, we believe member republic* probably would field their ownith joint planning: for mutual defease conducted whhull central force, would coo trol strategic and other nuclear we*pool, intearate the air defease* of all participatingnd, probably,uick-reaction force agnnut threats from outside the cordeeleration.
Bccauae coafedenticai would rxobabjy Involve the ccrutitoeot republic* in neatrty all aspect* of secority dcxisioo mating, the General Staff may actually come to viewystem as the worst option. In the long term, if faced with having to choose between confederation and several republics achieving their independence, the General Staff maymaller
Soviet Union
i
If the union aaxaveu, tensions resulting from historical antagonism* arooog and within the various republics could lead to military clashes that would pose policy challenge* to tbe Unitedespecially, to its European allies. Soviet military planner* must conternplate the potential for anUoors between some republics and outsideMoldova with Romania, or Aierbejjao with Turkey. None of therepublics would want Soviet or Russian troops on tbeir territories, although some might well allow their stationingransitional period. Apart from Russia, only Ibe Ukraine has (be potential to field amodem force. In any event, the General Suil -hcihcr con trolled by Russiamaller Sovietbe uscxeauingly focused oa internal stability and operational planning to counter regional threats and totrategic defense of increasingly fluid Soviet borders
Cotttcnts
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Key Judjmanli
Rer-cblic
GmscrtMion
Amuffl
Military Ooenuooi
Ranisn Factor
From tbe Center
for Soviet Deferae Polk**
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a Union: Federation or Coofcoeration
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ScopeThii paper addresses republic defease and security initiatives and their
potential impact. It tint describes tbe Soviet defense raUhlishmenl that is under attack, andumber of republic actio as that have cAullenged the current system of military conscription, created or threatened to create rcr^bitic-controllcdnterfered wilh itippUcs to the miUtaxy, and asserted tho right to control the center's defense activities within republic boundaries. It then addresses the Impact or potential impact of such actions on military iJanning, maiirxrwcr and economic resources, and cnpcratiocalthe Dcfcruc Ministry's ability to station,train, and use iuwell as anas control negotiations,p)
Issues related to the challenges facing the Soviet General Staff io an era of
historic political change are addressedamber of recent SO v
M!o vlet 'Si Hilary fc-xlcprnenl; Grwal Staff Planing for the^
Ktvrrrr Blent
Republic Agenda
epublic government* and tinoflidal group* have 'orcefolly communicated tbeir frustra-lioaa about (he burden* imposed oo them by theefease and security establishments (teehey have cited the military's priority in resourceto the detrimeat of living;he exploitation aad mistreatment of conscripts sent to the union armed forces, where living and workingarc often harsh and junior tervtcarnca are frecjucotly tabyectcd to tonvaJmca faUl beatings and to catcrtioa by more *cnior enlisted personnel: the tavern enviroomcntal daraagc resulting frommilitary and LJUiury-industrial activities; and the near exclusive control over roiliury operaUons,security, and border matters maintained by the center's military. Ministry of Internal Affairsnd KGB persoetaeL They also have bridled under the
typically arrogant and highhanded manner of the
military aad security force*
Sincehen Estonia issued aprocbiming its own laws sovereign over USSR saws, republics have begun lo mike inrosdi into the unions nsociopoty on power (sechey have named local KGB aad MVD chiefs aad created custom guards and militia not controlled hy the center. VVhero they have not been able to gala control, they have at least been able tospoiler" role, such as coo lira in tog the military wilh reaped to some defense production or tnating on the grounds ofI coocern* la the Last year or two, military district IMD) and local com minders have madeefforts to cooperate with local officials and assuage some popular anxieties, but this has not deflected tbe initiatives of many republic'. Four treads in particular worry Ihe Soviet leadership.
Militaryhe failure of the draft in the spring0 graphically dem-onslrated republic reeittancc to tbe center's traditional prerogatives. Even officialalmost certainlythat four of Iheepublics failed to draft
even SO peroeat of tbe number of young men needed to satisfy their conscription quotas. Since then.epublics have abetted popular resistance to the draft by passing laws hampering thebility lo conscript youths and station them throughout the USSR. The Baltic Georgian. Bad Mcjdovaa Icairia-luret have suspended conscription and stated that youths thould serve in territorial units in their own republics. Armenia, tbe Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Russia have called for betweenercentercent of their republics' draftees to be su booed at home. The Central Asians have called for theof their conscripts, the majorily of whom have gone Into the Construction Troops, in tbe Turkestan MD. Tajikistan also has called for alternative service for draftee*
These steps had aa impact on the0
Soviei military forces met only abouterceni ol the fall draft callup, comparod with aboutercent in the spring. Progress was particularly slow la the Baltic republics, the Caucasus, the western Ukraine andrepublic comtaiuve ranging fromercent in Georgia to someercent in Moldova. Tbe SlavicDolorussiau aad thethe critical test, because the problem areas identified account formall percentage of draftees. Without giving stxcifics, the MOD recently has indicated that draft result* were poor La sever al obiasts of the Ukraine,likely in the western Ukraine, where anti-Scmclrun high. For example, the chief of the LVov obiasl military cornmirsaritt claimed that onlyercent of bb conscript km quota had been met-Ofliciil datwithmnding,TC_ Jl reports of draft resistance and priorresults in some dues in Russia, coupled with simiUr reports from the Ukraine, luggest that the SUviebo may increasingly fall short of MOD goab
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Arm-In. Nine of tbeeptibllca have aliened tbe right to hav their own armed fceora. Only four have actually begun to create their ownhich vary considerably In site andsignificance:
The Armenians have gone furthest toward buildlria their owa mlHlary (see insetl Theyo facto Minuter of Defense, currently the Chairman of the
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Soviet Ormimj fotXtJ art under iht
cccjrol of central authoritiei. and iht General Siaff undoubtedly warns lo kttp It ihat way. Strategic forces art controlled dtrtctiy by ike General Staff la Moscow, while gtnefl purpose ground and air forces report to Ike General Staff through the commander of one of ihellUary dUtricti (MDj)-see figureeveral MDt are cornposed of part or all of more than one republic, whllt other republics are split between two or more tdtkt. Tht General Staffforcesoniprthtnsive and redundant network of fixed and mobile command posts and lupportlng communications. '
Strategic offensiveequipped with long-range nucleardeployedrutnaer to protect them from attack, Soviet bomber, and ballistic missile units are based Inland, and ballistic missile submarines operate from ports with ready accesseployment areas generally located dose to Sovttt territory. Over ike post several rears, arms controlnd technicalhave led the Soviets to further crntralUe their strategic offensive forces All strategic nuclear missiles catered under ihe INF Treaty have been or ore being removed from ihe Baltic republics. Belonts-sia. and tht Ukraine, whllt Iht older Soviet ICBM forces In the central and eastern pans of the USSR are likely to be eliminated as the Soviets dovmsire their forces as ihey Implement the START treaty.
Strategic defensive forces are concentrated along the periphery of tht USSR In barrier defensesalong Ihe Europeanith areaof strategically Important zones and point defenses of key facilities throughout the USSR. The tytiem Includes air defense radars, fightcr-tnterctp-lor bases, and SAMtrict of large radars at locations on tht periphery of tht USSR
provide warning and iracklng of ballU tic mlsiile attack. In Ihe Interior, there Is aa active ABU intercept system around Moscow
General purpose ground ami air forces have an outward land orientation along potential axes of attack, and general purpose naval forces ore bated. In port, to support potential continental operations.ihat support Soviet forces lend to ba located In the central portions of the USSR, Par txampie. the bulk of the nuclear weapont tioragt factltttts^art located In tht Russian Republic (RSFSR)
The Soviets also have tightly mortared their defense-Industrial ample* from the center.production Is concentrated In theercent) and the Ukraine (ISith theof these defense facilities scattered among the other republics. Nearly ell major assembly plants are tn the RSFSR or the Ukraine- Roughly ihree-euariers of military RDTdEfaciUlltt are located In the RSFSR, and several important test facilities and missile ranges are In Central Asia.
Overall the RSFSR dotntnalts In ttrms af military significance. The Ukraine and Be tor us Ha ore mesa tn importance because of their site, location, andbase. The remaining republics forces andare primarily oriented toward providing strategic defense and conducting general purpose operations Inleast la themost liktlp have been secondary theaters of operations. Forces la the Baltic republics defend against air attack along the northwestern approaches to ihe USSR, as well as provide coastal defense against amphibious landings. Forces tn tht southern republics art oritnttd toward eastern Turkey. Iran, Afghanistan, and western
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Birtkepublic Army
Thefledgitng Armenian military Is basedotch-rrort at unofficial armed groups, mail of which were uMied In Ihe tummcry the mew nationallst-Itd legislature. Thesehich had Initially
formed to fight Aserit and wrest central ef the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory from ihe Ater-batji* Republic, ioil tight cf their cause and began
lighting each ether. Seme were controlled by loeal-and republic-level pcdUicUns more concerned with retaining their positions than with political causes.
Upon hit election in latertsidtnt Ter-Fctreayen appointed at dt facto Minister af Defense and asked the armed groups to rweer allegiance to the mew republic Supreme Sonnet. Thaee ihat did art mot being trained by republic officials under iht auspices of tht republic MVD. Same art already deployed lo the republic's border areas, and others may be defending Armenians In Nagorno-Karabakh from Aierit. They art equipped primarily with small arms but have obtained some larger weapons.mortars, flamethrowers, and truck-mounledrocket lassnehert, through thefts from Soviet army depots and some small-scale production. In addition, ihey may have commandeered civilianThey have attempted to make off with Soviet army leaksCs. but we believe ihey have mot yet succeeded in retaining ownership af such weapons. We have no reliable Information allowing us to estimate the Armenian army's site
Military Affair* Committee in the republicSonet, and havela tbeir first defeasero* interview inhe defense minister cutmed (bat Armenian units under the auspice* of the republic MVD were securing .the entire Armenian border. He added that these troop* were being trained at republic srmy garrisons.
In Azerbaijan, the nationalist Aieri People's Front has its own miliury wing that, for at least the last year, has been fighting Armenian paramilitary
he Arerbaiian leaders base incroasiaglyew "special-purpose militia" they formed against Arnscolaa insurgent groups. The republic president *Uo has C old Presidentthai Azerbaijan lateral* lo or [arize iu own military.
One of the ant awe* by the new Mlaoaalwt Georgian Supreme Soviet in the fall0 was to rename the republic's Voluntary Society forwith Ihe Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DO-SAAF) and to change Its charier. The purpose of the Georgianow toeorgian National Army, to which all Georgian ooosoripts arc to be aisigried. In late November, Georgia announced the creationan volunteer Otssoet corps, intended to be the nweteuaepublic artned force, aad passed legisUtroea Georgian National Guard. In late January and earlyhe Georgians went much farther. They passed legislation institatiag their ownb to begin in tbe spring ofclaim toepublic0epublic guard numbering0 men. Some of these republic force* arc now being uaed to suppress Ossetiaa separatists In the Georgian republic.
According tooldova plan* tomaa car*binicri-style police force. That force, under the republic MVD, would augment central defense forcesrisis. In addition. Interior Minister Kostash announced in0 Ihe swearing in of the first regiment of the MoJdovan National Army. Movdovan official* also have announced plans to sponsor cachangca with tbe Romanian military. The Mcddovan* may be pulsing bach from some of there edforts, in the wake of Gorbachev'secember decree ordering (hem to dismantle (heir miliury and paramiUury forma-boos
In addition, several other republics -ooubly themoved to create their own border guarda or militias or to assert republic authority over local MVD forces, which had previously been under
the Joint control of republic authorities and theMVD. in the Ukraine, nascent nationalistfcrrmatiotu have emeried from the remnant* of ia DOSAAF or sporting dobs and OO not yet seem to quahfy for ttatuarepublic
Defensearaber of rcrasbtscs arc also seehiag greater control rver military speocUef aad defease-induiirial management. The RSFSR, torhas endorsed an economic reform proposal that calbpercent real cut in defease spendingoable tbe cut annotirrced by the MOD. la addition, the RSFSR and several other republic* want to control the uaas to which their contribution* to the union defense bod get arc put- Many republic* abo want to strip the center of it* taxing authority aad force il to rely oa voluntary coniributiont. Without the power to tax, the center would be emasculated, aad thishas been fatal lo almost all previousspell the endtrong, ceotrallred military
Scene republics, particularly the RSFSR, abo have moved to wrest defease industries located oo their territory from union control. The RSFSR has offered tax breaks to enterprises thai shift their subordination from union to republic, and some evidence suggests that some defense-industrial managers in tbe RSFSR vrill take orders from YePtsin rather than the center.bo evidence, however, that the efforts to control defense production have confused plantand htevpered defease production.ooces-sioo to republic demands, the draft naioa treaty prepared by Gorbachev calb for joint control of defease industries by the center and Ihe republics. Such dual subordination holds the potcatial for much future conflict
Adding to the disruptions confronting defenseb ihe struggle between the center andover the correct path to economic reform. For eutopic. Col. Gen V. Achx'ov. promotedo Deputy Minister of Defense, receratty citedindering of economic tic* amongas the cause of the Ministry of Defensefailure to supply bb troops adequately.fter months of dithering, Ibe USSR
So pre me Sovietompromise reformlo movesrkct economy within the next two years. The plan calb for very limited privatization of defense plants aadentrally controlled defease conversion effort. At the same time, tbe Rtuniaa Republic hasadical plan that calb forOration ofoeroral of all defense plants Defense conversion woaid bein the newly priv*tired ptaats through taxnd direct subsidies.
Several republics and localities have resistedIbe housing resources to the MOD that they are required by law totrend that has Increased as the General Staff searches for installations and apartracats to house tbe units returning from Eastern Europe. The Latvian government ha* goat thethreatening to deary service* aad lappfie* to the central military's installations. Latvian taVisb tuted that they would not deliver food, escctric power, or water to Soviet army insulUticas. These statements engendered heated responses and counter threats from high-ranking Soviet military officials, and probably ultimately contributed to mfliiarv support for ain the Baltic republic *
Control Otr Militaryeveral republics hate asserted control over all Soviet activities,those of the military, within their territory. Whether tach declarations are enforceable at qacs-ioaable, but they seem Likely to complicatethe lives of USSR armed forcestationed Soviet force* alreadynajor irritant io several republic*
Baltic leaders have declared their intent to make theirodcar-free gone. Then* leaden have called for the center toimetable for the removal of Soviet force* from their teal, la addition, one source of special tension hai been tbe prevrcceallistic missile early warning radar facility at Skrunda, In Latvia. Baltic leaders have indicated thai they understand that they may have loransition period during which some stationedforce* will remain.
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nd the Ukraine have deciated their intent to become nuclear-free looct, though they have la Lea no .aw- lo force removal of aay nuclear facilities. The bead of the leading Ukrainian uiaoo-abat oriaoiatioa has Mated that, daring thai rcpub-uca tianiiUoti to independence, strategic weapceu would remain under central control.
Turkmen Ulan haa declaredhemical- and aaj dear- weapons- free ro.it
Kazakh leadership haa deannded that It be informal before anyat ins on via territory and coectulted regardiruj the stationing of auclear weapon or any other weapon! of man destruction there.
> Armenia and Bescrussia have declared that no military formations or bases from "other countries" (the USSR) may be stationed on their territory witboul the consent of the republic legislatures.
The Georgian Republic has been the mosl violently opposedoviet military presence, Extremist nationalists have resorted to violence lo take over military buildings and intimidate Soviei securityGeorgian cations bus have successfully taken over several military recreation and aeons centers by storming the facilities and literally throwing oat Ihe occupants. In the spring0 they were uruuecess ful In an attempt to storm an MVD base during May Day festivities- Nationaliata, who now dominate the republic i ernraent, have called for all Soviettroop* to be removed from Ihe repulyuc, by force if necessary
The Russian Factor
The Russian Republic'* political importance and iu site, both in land mass and population, make It unique among the Sovietepublic officials arc positioned to influence the millions, structure, and capabilities of the center's forces, aodossible that Russia eventually will be berr to the bulk of the USSR's military assets. At the same time, defense initiatives taken by (he RSFSR have the most serious potential Impact on the center's nbility to plan and conduct military cperatloni
rai Independtacei lav Defease Ministry, Worn Nlghenrare
The potential for Insistemce by ike Ukraine on fielding Ut own army andperkapj. ike leisure of weapons, garrisons, and define production faetlillet In Ihe republic nique ihre.it lo Soviet defense Interests. The Ukraine Is home lo Ike largest concentration cf forces In Ike USSR outside ihe RSFSR. Including someank and motorized rifle divisions, four dlvitlont (two ICS hi ami two IRBhf) of ihe Strategic Rocket Forces, the Black Sea Fleet. Nlkolayevumber of air force and air defense units, and about IS percent of Soviet defense Industry.
More significant, the Ukraine, urtilke the otherrepublics, probably has enough skilled and trained manpower to Staff and command components of all five forces. The Ukrainian Republic provides someercent of the overall Soviet conscript pool, but Ukrainians also make up as much asercent of the officer corps. According lo an article in Kiunaya rveada.ercent of the General Staff Isoviet naval officer recently noted thatercent af Northern Fleet personnel came from the Ukraine.
So far. the Ukraine has made no outright moves to setepublic army or lo assume com red of military facilities on Us territory, all hough ihe Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has asserted the republic's right lo hove Its own military forces. The legislature's initiatives to date have focused on keeping Ukrainian conscript' nn republic territory during their terms of service
Russian Republic President Boh* Yd'tsans views on the future of the USSR armed forces appear generally lo coincide with those of military refcemer Vladimirel'uin adviser. Inopatin-chaired working group sentet of
security proposals to YcVuIn thai called (o> continued ocatial control of nuclear forces aad retoolioa of unifiedorces as opposed to republic arm.es. These propoaab undoubtedly reflectcd bothwith dc facto RossiiA dorzsinaoce of the Soviet militaryome that Russia eventuallycontrol the most Iroportaat all-union force* hi any case '
Ntrmhalias Ycl'tsin aeoms deter mi rxd to otUbiiib political control over RusaU'i territory, thus maUaf it asandatory for tbe USSR MOD to have theioa of the Russian govern/neat (and top military traders have met with the RSFSR parliament to ditcuss issues of mutual coocera) He bat eventhat Raasia have Iha right to name tbe USSR Minister of Defease aa acw central coalition government Moreover, Ycl'tsin periodically has threatened toussian amy if the center continues lo refuse the republics an adequate role In Important security aad economic0 RSFSR kgtsUtive rvaotatioa, adopted by the center, calls for the center to create volunteer units to deal wiih intercthnic conflicts and reserves the right toraftees' service if tach units are not instituted. Ycl'tsin also has said that be will control weapons exports from Russian factories. Moreover, he has cspresacr1 bis concera about tbe environmental impact on tbe RSFSRilitary presence aasrracnted by forces withdrawn fromaad the Wnawachwawahl impact of dumpingLli red servicemen on Russia
la earlyol Oeo Konxtaatineputy chief of the General Sun* to charge of the signal troops, was appointed chairman of the Russian State Committee on Defense aadIhe RSFSR's Minister of Defense. Presumably. Kobcts, who apparently contlaueaervingSun* officer, will functionridge between the republic and the center at new defense relations areecond oflicee, Colonel Generalho has been chief of the Military History Institute, was also appointed an adviser to ihe RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Volkc-gonov. however, has been out of favor with the military leadershipnlikely to play the tame kind of mediating role as Kobcts
Reaction From the Center
The senior military leaden hip has stronglyrepublics' indepetaieol its net on militaryporticuUr, their Interference wilh conscriptiondesire to act ap republic anniea. DefeaseYazov, General Sufi Chief Moiaeyev. aadofficub contend thattroagcan guarantee thesecurity aadlegrity of the stale. They have dessonracedantiioiUUry Legislation aad fail ore towith ah-arson defeasea November,nerves Stretched to the breaking pointactions. Yarov announced newby the centrald ad ragmilitary personnel to use force toi ticksem or on millury facilities bytheir
Until recently, Ihe center has vacillated onof iu defcase-related laws aadn0 the military organized an effort to round up Lithuanian deserters who were being hidden in Ibe republic- la one incident thate dia and popular altrxttjon, Soviet soldiers seized moreozen deserterssychiatric hospital in Vilnius.hen viciously and thenem to units hi the harsh climate of Ihe Soviei Far INevertheless, the campaign was quickly stopped after no moreew dozen of several hundred deserters were captured, presumably because ofutcry in litbuania. Sunilariy. the MOD thus far has moved to prosecutemall percentage ofof draftcene of whom arc performingpublic service authorized by republic laws.
Onorbachevecree ordering the disbandingugust of illegal military totrna-tlons and the surrender of all illegally held weapons, an order aimed particularly al armed fotmauons in Armenia. The security forces took almost uo practical steps to enforce the decree, and Gorbachev's deadline passed with no rnovement toward control of the armed bands. (Later thai month, however, after Gorbachev
6ewet-
lo allow republic force* Ibe teed la eliminating such groups. Armenian National Armyendered to republic authorities In Yerevan) *
During ibe fall. Gortacbev'i position on these que*-lioeu shifted away from nesMtnracsiatlng tbe demands of tbt repabika and movedougher new policy. Ia an0 tpcechillury aadience, be Implied lhai he might endorseoluntary military aad even suggested that be might consider favorably tbe issue of republicowever, faced wilh rising disaffection at all kvelt of the armed forces and mouth* of pressure from military leaders,ecember haougbly worded presidential decree dernaadiag ibe repeal of republic laws that conflict with all-uniea laws on defease and replaced the MVD leadershipardline politician (Boris Pugo) and ageneral wilh Afghan experience (Borisla earlyorbachev metarge group of indaitrialisis, including many front the defense industry, lo hear their concerns and reassure them about his owa intentions. He was treatedilherini recital of the problems and disruption* caused by governmenlal watering and conflicting orders
la aa effort to regain the policy initiative in dealing with the recalcitrant republics, as well as withof law aad order nationwide, Gorbachev alio prcceeed acw presidential noctures,ew national security council thai probably will have some say oa defense and internal securitybe Lntendi to retain decision making authority. More* over, Gorbachev obtained approval from the Cortgress of People's Deputies for bis conceptnion treaty that recasts the USSRederation of sovereign republics andubstantial role for ibe center. The Congress also approved the proposed Federation Council, which la Intended to give leaders of republics and auionotaousa greater say lala the future
Military authorities haveumber of actions to deal with circumstances caused by mounting ethnic strains within tbend the power of nationalist
influences oa Ihe military has been tracer bated by the growing activism of republicnitially, the military was generally Inclined to compretnise. Ia Decern0 thenon need that rt wouldercent of all EUlllc conacripu to their borne republics. No republic yet baa attempted lo force tbe removal of nuclear weapon* from its territory as part of its aa taanesear policy, but the central government, cooceraed about the security of the weapons,has removed moat of them front tcane areas ofa earlyny contrast, the central government aad the military moved forcefully to sappeca* republic aaacrtivenca* la the BalticThe coaacriptlon issue, with which the center /unified the crackdown,re test for it to reassert its control more generally over republics thatdetermined to achieve Independence, Il is evident thai tbe republic efforts to frustrate the anion conscription effort, along wilh other policiestbebility to do It* business, were trtajdr factors contributing to Ihe centers decision lo ate force
laollowing the violence ia the Bailie republics, tbe center agaia has lathed coonvomise.oint interview wilh newly appointed Chairman Kobcts. Moiseyev isoounccd the creationew General Sun* organ for "cotlabcratioo" with the republic defense committees and ttressed the mereas-ing rights aad rcspotuu'bujiie* of the republics in the defease area.caaibte that that shift reflects ia part tbe leadership's dismay about the outcome of the Jfjraary effort lo use force to intimidate Balticproponents More likely, however,ne sidearefully modulated policy which offers atig leaf ef greater irdluencc on defense policy to republics that cooperate, while threatening much harsher measures against republics that do nc
a
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[oa. tar Sarin Defense Policies Republic cballcuges are made all tbe raore difficult because tbey arc luocrrcpcised oa sweeping changes already under way ia Soviet defense policy aad planning. Allcpaiblic diincniioa;
- Although aiilitarj plaai continue to foccs west, key Soviet aa&tarj leaders are neoraasuity concernedt rhrraii lo the USSR to the aouth, raasnrsg frotn low-intensity bcrrdcr lasubility lo theof nuclear weapons and unstable tsesghbor*.
With tbe withdrawal of forces from abroad, the Soviets' operaticeit! plans bow are premovd upon
deep, atiatcasccrettons to defend their increasingly fluid borders. Planners must grapple with Increased cross-border trasuc and ccopcratlce, partKcUrtj In the wuth, aad probably eoetcr&plate the potential for iDianees botwoea tome republics and outsideexample. Motdova wilh Romania, or Azerbaijan with Turkey.*
To obtainthe Soviet aimed forces have dependedystem of nearly universalto fill the enlisted rinksorce that currently numbersillion men (not counting KCB. MVD, or Railroad Troopsj. General Staff-planocd force reductionsevel ofillion men by the, as well as movesoluntary military, will ease the problem of securing enough manpower to fulfill military tasks. Nevertheless. If tbe USSR wore to remain intact, demographic trends would increase ihe share of less stalled aad less reliable Central Asians and Caucasians in the conscript pool from aboutercent presently to roughlyercent by thehile the Slavic share would fall from the presentercent to arevrjrirnaielyercent, la the meantime, Soviet planners abo are having to cope with separating warring ethnic groups and limiting contact among potentiallynationalities.
Challenges to ihe Soviet mi/liary presence and activities are multiplying, as Soviei forces and thet families return home from abroad in increatinp
numbers and compete with local civilians for scarce food siipplics, housing, and other services andBoth aaunwescar aad cnvtronaaenial rares-turea abo will probably intensify
Rrp-Hle IrUepenitace. Againit this backdrop,of seceaaaoa. or even Increased
(bo republics, react awesome caafleages to General Staff planners already copingtbe loss of the Soviei position in Eastern Europe- As they consider tbe prcapect of outright tost of several of the current republics, arau'iary piaraers mustariety of troubling consider it,-I'll ia mird.
The rriocauoo of sit strategic otTeosivc ICBM divisions (two in tscJceuxsia. two la the Ukraine, aad twoazakhstan) would be costly aad would temporarily disrupt the operations of these forces to the degree that the General Staff may not be able lo consider them available for allocation to itsworldwide, strategic unclear strike plans
The suss of strategic defense facilities in tho Baltic republics could reduce warning time of an at met and would degrade Soviet ability lo defeat it.Baltic facilities in the RSFSR would be extremely costly and would not fully offset tbe lest capabilities.'
I
With the loss of ibe Ukraine and Moldova, the defensive depth of the remaining scasneni of the union bordering Europe would be less than half that of the present USSR. Moscow would be lessm from the frontline, and the General Staff woaid Vote control over about half of the Black Sea littoral Finally, the center would loose access to over IS percent of its defense-industrial base and someillion people.
The leas of BcSonusU abo would cart the defensive depth in the European pan of the USSR in half and ihe union's total population by aboutillion. In
J
Sacra*-
number of potential defensive poaitiona
along which Soviet planner* mightefense laBorcrina and Dneprand tbe Pripyat*be ar*avalUbte-
The Ion of several republics ia theaoreover. would not rwluo* the le*ssnh ef the kind toroer* of the remaining union controlled from Meacov Tbe reverse "funnel effect" cf Soviet Earopcanthe width of remaining territories bydVoeaeter* a* the front movedpresent future central planner* with Increased, not decmuod, ground force lines ofunless ihey decided to limit them to selected areas or sectors (see figure 31
Tbe lota of the Caucasian republtc* probably would not debilitate the utnoe'a defense indunry orreduce the conscript pod (sec tigureceethe-less, these republics arc home to important strategic defensive capabilities and provide the centerDitary bufferegion that is wracked by unrest. Their lots would create coportunitlea for Turkish or Iranian influence.
f the Central Asian republic* would cut tbe conscript pool by overercent, force the center to replace several critical military aadfacilities, and, like the Caucasus, potentially bring political or ItUrruc-based truubelity cicacr to Russia's feeders
The inorpen-lenr republics would have their own mi ti larks, but tome probably would sign national security treaties with the residual union or with Russia. Most of the newly independent republtc forces wceld pose little or no threat to neighboring republics, some republics mighthreat from rational rivals anduarantee from the anion, while still others could see the union as the principal threat to their crantiaucd e* istence. None would be likely to want So-Set troops to be permanently lUticeied cat its territory. In the unlikely event that Soviet forces wore to remain In Independent republics under scene sort of basing-rights agreements, they could be Increasingly exposed to violent ckmoostratioos by republic citiiens opposing their pretence on environmental or other grounds
In addition to dealing with the practical implications of the *eoe**ion of particularbe General Staffumber of more general problems stemming from the accevsion process itsetf and the associated uncertainty. Sonet defease planners, for example, probably arc concerned about their ability lo structure force* and plan cpcrarJon* toredible, cobearvc defease in the event of severe political disruption. They must wrestle, at leastwith plans totate whose future border* are not known and with force* that may not be made available lo these. On Use other band, problems associated with cevnnaassd aad control and sue of force* that crow out of th* asaertivenes* of the current repubhea actually would cane if tbe most restive ones
Soviet military force* have traditionally beenprimarily in response to operationalThe General Staff's ability to nation units returning from Europe and Mottgolia already has been cocnnbcaied by the relnctaaoc of variousioarger pretence; the Iota of orte or more of the peripheral republics would further exacerbate rational planrtliig for placement of Ihe unit, remainingestructured and reduced force *
Stationing ofstrategicforces could pose even larger problemsmaller USSR. The coil* associated withelocating these force* from seceding republic* to the RSFSR would be very high and could result in the eventual eUniinatioo of aocne Soviet strategic offensive force* currently based outside the RSFSR. Some strategic defensive assets could be mote readily relocated; nevertheless, the change would require considerable expense and yean to complete aad could resultubstantial decrease in strategic air defease coverage. The center, contequeatiy, has strong incentives to reach aa acccenmodatioe with the Baltic republics aad any other peripheral republic* seeking separation from the union In order to coatuvoe operauoa of strategic ai' defense and early warning unlti in the res ion >
Figured
ed Supportable Military Fact* Sire (Bated on Con script Availability
breakup of the Soviet Union could considerably complicate arms cont'd negotiations and monitoring/ verification activities. If tbe process of secession were orderly and newly independent republics wanted to participate, thebe center, and negotiating partners probably couW find ways to overcomeand modify agreements, if independence were to
come about in more chaoticowever, the arms control process could be severely disruptod, with existing agreements rendered irrelevant orIn either case, the RSFSR's perspective would be
critical In preserving agreement* ind continuingbecame tbe bulk of the forces (both strategic and oartvent'tonal) ate stationed on it! territory. If an independent RSFSR chose to participate ia thearms control treaties and discussions, the existing agrccrncnts would probably be preserved and the momentum of discuss ions maintained or even
nion: Federation at CautfaVerauftML Because of the pronounced resistanceumber of republics to continued domination by the center, central authorities will find it nearly icnpoaaible to turn tbe bands cf the clock backime when the republics uncfttestlootuglyubservient rose Nonetheless, if the republics could be convinced toew form ofa federation or aGeneral Staffabout change in the security realm might be eased. Gorbachev has been pursuing this approach through his proposed all-union treaty, which offers limited autonomy and joint control to tbe republics in someexample, use of economicandmaintaining tight control over national security and most other critical
A new political relationship between the republics and the center could come to rest at numerous pointsontinuum from the status quo to complete
fragmentation of the current Soviet state, but the
arrangements probably would fall Into one of two rough categories that could be termedndhe implications of the two forms of government for national security structure and decisionmaking would, however, be sharplyA federation wouldtrong central government with some latitude for increasedand influence by the constituentall-union treatyodel federation. By contrast, the republics makingonfederation would have substantially more independent authority, with only limited powers held by tbe center. Presumably,onfederation tbe assent of the republics would be required forcu ions in the national security realm. This situation would undermine the central
security apparatus's ability to function in many areas, but the most serious implication* would have to do withability to use forces for internal or external purposes:
fed col loo would represent the belter case from the center's point of view, because the republics* relationship to the center probably wouldtrong resemblance to the status quo. Even here, tbe union government, lo stave off widespread civil unrest and disoccdicoce, probably would have to meet, through military reform effects, many of the detnands of the republics. However, the anion's relationship with the republics would remain char-act erixed chiefly by continuing atrong centralover nearly all security matters. AD republic* probably would not participate willinglyoviet federation. Tbe Baltic republics, Armenia, and Georgia have all announced that tbey will notew union treaty and will instead pursueSome of these republics, however, might be willing loecurity relationship with the center. The remaining ones are unlikely toon calls for draftees to serve In their own republics.
a looseoption that Is favored by those republics that are more willing tocontinued association with theassociated republics would depend upon the union .for scene of their security requirements. In this case,
we might sec retentionmall central force that controlled strategic and other nuclear weapons (the RSFSR's leadership, for example, has erpliciUy recomtneoded continued central controlntegrated tbe air defeases of all participating republics; and, possibly,uick-reaction force against threats from outside the confederation.entral force might also be nscd for international peacekeeping missions. Each republic might field an army or national guard, with joint planning for mutual defenseby the center aad the republics. Finally, republics would probably Insist that the center allow them,inimum, to participate in all-union
ikt CocrreMionol Armed Forces In Europe (CFE) Trtaly Wves Until, on NATO and Warsaw Focieaving each tide lo allocate force level, among iu rnemben, the accession of newlyrepuoHcs might be possible only If ihey reached an accord wiih the central avthorltlei In Moscow onari of ike USSR', original allocation to cover whatever force, the rtpubJkt wished to deploy. Secession agrertneeas with the Bailie republic which already hove txprxsstd intertrt in joining CFE talks, probably would cow Ihe statu, ol remaining Sonnet forces there ami Inspection rights under CFE. Other republics, such as Arvnenit and Aserbajjaut. might hove no inlertst In CFE emd could dirruml Usby refusing to bout Inspections of any remaining Soviet facilities or by developing their own forces. The willingness of independent republics to participate in follow-on negotiations could effect the geographic scope of future agreend expand participation In complex negotiation.
Strategic arms control effort, would be most affected If republics wilh ICBfd and heavy bomberBelorussla, Ike Ukraine, Kasakhsian. and. of course, IheIhe union. Soviei military officials probably would plan to lake any ntgoliated START reductions In older strategic forces based outside of the RSFSR first, and (costs perirdtltngj would preferransfer any remaining modern strategic nuclear forces to the RSFSR, in the event lhai republiceft as the successor to ihe center. From the US point of view, any such agreement should provide foe continuing US access to conduct Inspections In the lest likely event that the Soviets sought to station strategic forces In Independentf thedid not allow for ttsch access, ihe republic could refuse,onsignatory. US requests to laipect declared Soviet strategic fcrdliiies. In the near term. Ihe RSFSR or the Ukraine could demandon the Soviet START delegation, along with ihe separateatify agreesncstts that affected strategic forces stationed on Its territory, leading to some additional delays In the process of negotiating and Implementing strategic arms control treaties.
The prospect of republic Independence already has affected the Soviets' position, and proposals In START and could affect ihtir concepts for follow-on strategic arms control negotiations. In START II talks, for exampln, tht Soviets could stress proposals that would allow flexibility In forceas the construction of new strategic facilities In the RSFSR to house relocatedwould heto them adjust to problems with the republics
on larger defease Issues, such asof potential threats, tbe site of defense budgets, and national arms control strategic.
Under either system, tbe unwillingness of someto accede to the center's defense directives and demands for resources probably would exacerbate the difficulties the General Staff has already experienced In using forces to deal with domestic unrest and disobedience. Evenederation, the continued insistence by some republics that their cotiscripts
serve in their own republics, their ragged responses to all-union conscription quotas, their calls for voluntary military service, and their active resistance to the center's stationing of large all-union forces on their soil probably would result in these republics being classified as potentblly unreliable by the General Staff, and could even compel it to plan to avoid using some republicor International crises
Scon
military leader* would ice retention of tola authority to tue military fore* aa crucialederation, they presaenably would hare aacacarer central feraecafecier* tico, ihey mil hi boL la um Utter case, central authorities almost certainly weald require the pmaasioa of the republics to use ceenral fceeea sutsoaed oa their territories io deal wrJi tnirrnal prockleen. and might csKoueter outriabt republic baas oa the center's use of any local mQiiia.tloaal dcohuion to commit forces abroad probably woo Id require oa*sc*uvc**cc of republic authorities- uvea In the face of an external threat to the tarries! of theraise critical rjoeations retarding Ibe participation of specific ethnic groups, command and control, andiff on* already under way by military reforiDers toose for the Defense sod State Security Committee of Ihe USSR Supreme Soviet la controlling the use of Soviet forces outride the USSR, similar to that under the US War Powers Act. could be mirrored at the republic level. If Ihe Federation Conned were used as Gorbachev seems to intend, it, too, couldole in bringing to bear the ceaaions of tbe republic* oa suchdevelopment lha USSR MOD would disbar Moreover, each republic forming its own army eventually would be forced to develop Its ownand controlwoold have to mesh with aa integrated, all-union defease system.
Presumably, decisionmaking power over the use of nuclear weapons would be retained, under confedera-taoa. by the central authoritiesthe event ef the complete collapse of ibetheeadership If.nion larger than the RSFSR, strategic weapons were deployed In either republic* and those republtc* Insisted on joint control of tbe weapons, the decisionmploy them would be complicated and almost certainly delayed, possibly to tbe point where ihe success of the strategic nuclear plan would be jeopardized. Because of strong anilnu-clear sentiment in most of the currentowever, th* worst fear* of tbe mililary leadershipsharing control of nuclear weapon* ia amay not be realired (ittboagh some af the republics mighi review their thinking about theof acquiring nuclear power statu* athe RSFSR aprtirently
accepts it* status as the repository for substantial nuclearnd ft is likely to accept nuclear forces that might be relocated from other republic*,the exorbitant expense Involved in moving strategic weapons makes this an unattractive option.
The impactonfederated form of govtrnmeni on the center's ability to perform other national security funcriona would be similarly disruptive.eneration might involve only minor changes from the statu* quo, the Increased authority that republics would exerciseonfederation would snarkedly increase the military leadership'sorgreatly expanded powers of the republic* ewer taxation and iprndlng for defeat* purposes would giveeto over defease programs, making the armed force* access to resource* subject to theaf the republic*
The impact of political change OD the armed forces' ability to nation Its force*est advantage would depend woolly on bow much control was ceded from the center to the republic* In the negotiations setting up the new union. Evenederation, Ihe increased asscTtivencss now evident on environmental and other questions would almost certainly complicate theStaffs decisionmaking process; tinder atraditional criteria for placement of many military units wouldackseat to political consideration*
Another area that could be seriously affected invcaves the scope aad type cf trailing to be condacted oa republic territory. Both training aad readiness of the aD-unioe armed force* would suffer if rcpcSjc armies were more widely est*Wished, as they almost certainly would beonfederation. Indeed, republic forces organized,nd trained primarily forpedlVc task* could vary from all-union norms so drastically that coordlaated or integrated training operation* would not be feasible. Finally, because of the Soviet leadcrthlp's Insistence on firm control of strategic offensive force* and coocem for the security of these weapons, field activity by mobile
1CBM units would probably decrease signilieanily, and other land-bateei nuclear force training would probably be conducted only at centrally controlled teat and training facilities.
Outlook
Theough new policy may dampen tome of thessertiveneu on defense issues, bat It is unlikely, short of massive regression, that it will stlBc republic protests or derail policies that have strong popular support. In Katakhsuo. for example, public feelings about nuclear and Other environmentalarc so strongelatively conventional Communist government hat placed tremendouson tbe central government and succeeded Inromise that the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site would be closedimilarly, fears of and disrespect for military service are so wido-spread in the country that the MOD is unlikely to contain draft resistance to the point where it is noroblem, although it may succeed for the present in ending overt tnstilutiooal efforts by the republics and localities to interfere with conscription.
Over at least tbe next few months, the General Staff will continue to exertlimitedtoward instituting tome reform measures in Ihethe status quo. Failing that. It will strongly resist movementystem thai would signiheandy undercut its traditional authority and responsibilities as well as the effectiveness of all-union forces. Internally, the center will use Iheperational troops and special police,by the0 airborne troops to control unrest and combat disobedience of union laws. Military planners will work to ensure tbe reliability of mililary units, replicing "unreliable" individuals and selectively employing units to minimize anyloyal ties. Externally, although senior officers will have lo consider the implications of republicthey will continue to plan on ihe basis of existing forces, dispositions, and missions. In9 Ihe General Staff issued directive* premisedefease of Eastern Europeontinuing role for non-Soviet Warsaw pact (NSVVP) armies. Although, in retrospect, such assumptions seemat that time Soviet forces were (and still arc)
based In (eastern) Germany, Poland, Chechoslovakia, snd Hungary, and NSVVP armies apparently tlill coordinated tbeir plans, readiness, and operation* with the Soviet Union, f
the MOD continue, to piauauiea* io icy regions such as the Baltic republics. *
Over the long term, the center aod the republics willew accommodation on security policy a* one element of their evolving relationship. Soviet military planner* will continue to argue that republic security concerns should be subordinated to central interests and may be expected toederative type of association to stscceed today's union. If, as we think likely, deep-rooted and widespread republic opposition to union dominance continues andhe center ultimately may have to chooseooseof republics or aUcnving nearly all of them to become independent.
On theonfederation might appear more attractive to the General Staff, because Ihe union probably would be essentially unaffected in size or resources and its forces probably could continue to be deployed in some number in tbe republics. However, the degree of intrusion the republics would demand into virtually every aspect of military decision making and the inherent disruption to military planning and operations are likely, in our view, to dbincline the military leadership to use Its influence to press for the confederation option. Ia the long term, rather than accept tbe ambiguity, uncertainty. *od delay likely to be associatedonfederation, Soviet mililary leaders may welluch smaller union, allow, ing several of the republics to establish theiras long a* the rernainlng one* accerledight, centrally controlled federation
The manner in which the USSR movesew relationship between tbe center and the republic* could influence the way the miliury play* iu role as well as the ultimate outcome. If Ibe Baltic republics, for example, continued to push aggressively forthe armed fcrces would be likely to argue
-feecrtT"
for activeresulting Inviolence. On Ibe other hand, if the republics moved slowly, in conformity with Gorbachev's policy and with the terms of the USSR Ccenurtuiioo, It la possible that the armed forces may be forced over theerm to accept the transitionew order without active or bloody confrontation, ftocreeheleaa, because some republics have more military value to the center than others, the General Staff would probably fight losingat theunder any cceteUtion.'
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Original document.
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